



Vladimir Nevezhin

If the hike is tomorrow...

FROM THE AUTHOR

ELENA DOROFEEVOY (KVASOLE)

The problem formulated in the title of this book was covered with varying degrees of completeness in a number of previous works of its author [1], which aroused interest among specialists. Some opponents reacted with approval to his concept, while others, on the contrary, came out with sharp criticism. [2] All this made it possible to rethink the problem in a new way, as a result of which the monograph was born, which is presented to the readers. The

proposed book is the first part of a dilogy about the activities of Soviet propaganda agencies on the eve of an armed clash with Germany. The second part is called "Offensive War Syndrome-2".

I would like to express my special gratitude to all those who responded to the author's publications. Constructive suggestions and critical remarks were stimuli in the work. Sincere gratitude to the researchers of the Institute of Russian History of the Russian Academy of Sciences and other research centers, who took an active part at various stages in the discussion of the manuscript of the proposed monograph.

INTRODUCTION

The study of the nature and content of Soviet propaganda in the second half of the 1930s - early 1940s. seems relevant for a number of reasons. First of all, a comprehensive study of this problem provides the key to understanding the role of the propaganda sphere as an integral part of the Soviet political system, which formed public ideas about the coming war as something inevitable. Her study leads to the question of the ideological justification of the Soviet military doctrine of this period. As a result of the development of this topic, it is possible to clarify the direction of the Soviet leadership's propaganda aims to ensure the interests of the USSR in the conditions of an aggravated international situation, as well as to specify the process of forming foreign policy stereotypes in the public mind, primarily ideas about potential military adversaries. Finally, an analysis of the functioning of the propaganda machine of the Bolshevik state on the eve and in the initial period of the Second World War, to some extent, allows us to reconstruct the system of views on it of the Soviet leadership.

At present, one of the most pressing issues that historians face in their research is the question of methodology. Under the conditions of the existence of the Soviet political system, Marxism-Leninism was the official state ideology that determined the content and direction of humanitarian, in particular historical, knowledge. In the post-Soviet period, Marxism-Leninism, for objective reasons (the prohibition of the activities of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union after the fall of the USSR and the cessation of its ideological influence on society and the humanities), ceased to play the role of a comprehensive methodological tool. This not only led to heated discussions about the need to "change the

methodology" of history, but also intensified the process of searching for new universal methodological principles of cognition of the past. On the one hand, there is an unwritten rule: the historian must base his research on a certain methodology. Methodology is understood as a set of fundamental approaches and principles on the basis of which specific research methods, rules and procedures for its implementation are developed and selected, i.e. methods and corresponding material and spiritual tools and tools. [3] On the other hand, there is pluralism regarding

research methodology in historical science, because it (methodology) "remains only at the level of hypotheses, not laws." [4]

It seems fruitful to use as a methodological tool any author's concepts that do not contradict the logic of science: the synthesis of macro- and micro-approaches to the historical process; analysis of the phenomenon of totalitarianism; constructions of social history, etc., etc. The main condition is that the principle of pluralism in the study of events and phenomena of the past should be preserved (naturally, within reasonable limits), and that any scientist could independently decide on the choice of methodology. There is hope that the era when methodological principles (or rather, the only methodological setting - Marxist-Leninist) were unceremoniously imposed "from above" has irretrievably sunk into oblivion. The question of research methodology is not the

only one that arises when studying the problem. Its development is complicated for a number of reasons of an objective and subjective nature. Achieving mutual understanding between opponents, sometimes relying on the same factual material, is hampered not only by differences in political views, belonging to one or another scientific school, but also by an ambiguous perception of the definitions that they use in their research.

First of all, this refers to the concept of "ideology". Ideology is interpreted as a form of social consciousness, which is a relatively systematized set of ideas and views, as well as the goals and means of influencing reality arising from them. Usually it reflects the specific interests of certain classes or social groups. [5]

Purposeful dissemination and approval in the public mind of certain ideas, views, judgments and assessments is the main task of **propaganda**. The Latin word **propaganda** in translation into Russian means "to be distributed". The main goal of propaganda is the formation, on the basis of relevant information, of a system of ideas that express a person's attitude to the world and his readiness to act based on the formed ideals and principles.

Propaganda is characterized by the fact that it is widely used primarily in the development of a certain course of government within the country and in the international arena. That is why propaganda operates primarily with information of a political nature, which can influence the way people think and act in accordance with the political interests of society as a whole or its individual groups (for example, the ruling elite) in particular. [6]

The terms "lie", "distortion", "manipulation", "brainwashing" are sometimes used as synonyms for the concept of "propaganda". [7] However, since the ultimate goal of propaganda activity in the conditions of any socio-political system is the introduction of certain ideological attitudes into the public consciousness in order to achieve a predetermined goal, [8] the discussion about the "correctness" of the methods that are used in this case seems to be unproductive.

With the complication and deepening of human relations in the political field, there is an ever closer convergence of politics and propaganda. Propaganda not only became appears as a tool for carrying out the course of one regime or another in order to achieve certain goals, but also tends to adapt to practical politics. [9]

By the beginning of the 1940s. in most of the developed countries of the world, a system of technical media was created, which included the press, radio broadcasting, cinematography, and book publishing. In the USSR, where the Bolshevik Party acted as the ruling party, the defining principle of political informing was a strict ideological orientation. The entire information flow was strictly subordinated to political and propaganda guidelines. Only that information was selected and reported with proper detail, which was consistent with the corresponding worldview position or with the immediate and future propaganda tasks. Other information

kind of official political propaganda structures were hushed up or intentionally leniently subjected to negative evaluations.

The leadership of propaganda activities turned out to be elevated to the rank of state policy of the Soviet regime. This regime was distinguished by: a carefully developed ideology, which was an official doctrine that covered all the vital aspects of human existence and was supported by at least the majority of members of society; the only mass party headed by one leader, the leader (at the time described, Stalin), comprising a relatively small percentage of the entire population; a system of terror, physical and psychological, carried out through party and police control; technologically determined, practically monopoly dictate of the party and the state over all means of mass communication.

The Soviet regime was characterized by a special system *of total propaganda*, to which was characterized by the following main features: the suppression of any alternative sources of propaganda influence (internal and external), primarily a ban on the free import of foreign, and not only propaganda, literature and other information carriers;

centralization of propaganda activities, which was expressed in the party-state leadership and control over all issues of propaganda strategy and tactics; the ultimate ideologization of propaganda, which consisted in the massive dissemination of worldview postulates by means of information, the transformation of these means into a tool for ensuring ideological attitudes. [10] Closely related to the definition of "propaganda" is the concept of "political and ideological campaign". It

seems that a political-ideological campaign can be understood as a regime-initiated focus on one or another group of issues within a political (foreign policy) nature in order to achieve predetermined goals. This process, in the specific conditions of the late 1930s and early 1940s, when a system of total propaganda already existed in the USSR, was carried out by actively influencing public consciousness with the help of all available political propaganda tools, ranging from oral agitation to means mass information and press.

The deployment of a political and ideological campaign, as a rule, is preceded by an initial impulse, when the position of the top party political leadership on its nature and content is publicly proclaimed. Having received such an impulse (or a "send from above"), the organs of political propaganda and agitation begin to carry out organizational measures to restructure their work in accordance with the "guidelines" received. Then the higher, middle, and lower levels of the propaganda structure come into action successively. It is in this way that it is carried out

initial stage of the process.

The second stage of the political and ideological campaign consists in the direct introduction into the public consciousness of certain specific foreign policy directives formulated by the country's top political leadership and picked up by agitation and propaganda. At this stage, as they say, "the idea seizes the masses" (or "the mass seizes the idea"). Such is the general model for carrying out a political and ideological campaign that has taken shape in the USSR. [eleven]

The monograph also uses the concept of **offensive war**. According to the Russian military historian M.A. Gareev, along with the definition of "defensive war" it has a journalistic connotation. "In the past," Gareev believed, the term "offensive war" served to reveal "which side starts the war." In the course of the armed clash itself, the opposing sides "were forced to combine both offensive and defensive actions." [12] S.M.A. Gareev donated salt to G.V. Kostyrchenko. He wrote that "offensive wars are far from always

aggressive, quite often they pursue defensive goals aimed at preventing an already prepared aggression. [13]

In this regard, it should be recalled that the ideologists of Bolshevism, primarily V.I. Lenin, invested their own special meaning in defining the essence of an offensive war. Lenin believed that the understanding of wars should not be approached "with a general template." "Wars are a very motley, diverse, complex thing" - this Leninist definition refers to January 1917, when the Bolsheviks had not yet seized power in Russia. One of the main types of war, as Lenin saw it, arose from the relationship between the "oppressed" and the "oppressing" nations. For him, the statement of the German military theorist K. Clausewitz was an axiom that "every war is a continuation of politics." "Politics is a relationship between nations, classes, etc.," Lenin explained, deriving from this a "general rule": war is **legal** on the part of an oppressed nation, whether it be defensive or offensive in the military sense. [14] After the appearance of the

Soviet state on the world map in 1917 and the creation of the Communist International (1919), which turned into the "headquarters of the world revolution", the Bolshevik leadership found itself seized with a kind of euphoria. It blindly believed in the possibility of accelerating the "Sovietization" of neighboring countries with the help of military actions. One of the failed

attempts to implement this plan in practice was the Soviet-Polish war of 1920. Although the Red Army was defeated in it, it became an axiom for Lenin and his closest associates, as well as for the leadership of the Comintern, that the Soviet state would inevitably accumulate sufficient forces for the transition from passive defense to an offensive against the capitalist world with the aim of destroying it. There was no doubt that such a moment would come. In the Political Report of the Central Committee of the RCP(b) at the IX All-Russian Party Conference on September 22, 1920, Lenin assured: "Our basic policy has remained the same. We take advantage of every opportunity to move from defense to offensive. In the future, Lenin explained to his supporters, it would be necessary to repeatedly change the defensive policy to an offensive one, until all the capitalists were defeated "to the end". Formulating the long-term task of the Soviet state in

his closing remarks during the debate on the Political Report of the Central Committee, he emphasized: "... we (the Bolsheviks - **V.N.**) are really moving on an international scale from a semi-revolution, from an unsuccessful sortie to ensuring that there is no miscalculation, and we will learn from this offensive war. Such a transition, the beginning of a new period of the "world politics" of the Soviet state, according to Lenin's prediction, was destined to be noted by future historians. [15] At the VIII All-Russian Congress of Soviets (December 23, 1920),

Lenin found it necessary to recall "the ever-threatening ... danger that will not cease as long as world imperialism exists." To say that the Bolsheviks "should wage only a defensive war" meant, in his opinion, "to repeat the old phrases of petty-bourgeois pacifism that have long lost their meaning." Referring to the Bolshevik leadership, he bluntly declared: "If we had to give a vow before ... constantly hostile forces ... that we would never embark on certain actions that could turn out to be offensive in military strategic terms, then we would be not only fools but also criminals. [16]

Lenin's idea of the need to move "from defense to offensive" was interpreted in the appropriate way by the ideologists of the Bolshevik Party, leaders of the Communist International, and prominent military leaders. So, N.I. Bukharin, in his article "On Offensive Tactics" (1920), emphasized: "We live at a turning point, on the verge between proletarian defense and proletarian attack (*italics mine*. - **V.N.**) on capitalist strongholds." [17] With the active participation of the Bolshevik-Leninist M.V.

Frunze formulated the doctrine of a revolutionary offensive war, designed to ensure the victory of the world revolution. [18] And although in

1921-1923, in the conditions of relative stabilization in Europe, the Bolshevik leadership tried to formulate a new political concept, the essence of which was to reject the military option of spreading the world revolution, preference was not given to the peaceful path and a complete rejection of there were no revolutionary slogans. The period to be lived through was defined as temporary, during which it was necessary to prepare for a new armed clash. [19]

Thus, Lenin and the Bolshevik leadership interpreted the offensive war from class positions, focusing on the fact that in the future an armed clash with the "capitalist encirclement" was inevitable, which could begin not only with an attack by the enemy, but, under favorable conditions, and on the initiative of THE USSR.

Chapter One HISTORIOGRAPHY OF THE PROBLEM

1.1. Soviet period

The problem of propagandistic support for the process of ideological preparation of the USSR for the war was not ignored in **Soviet historiography**. However, until the early 1990s. the determining factor that had a decisive influence on the content of the documentary materials published on this problem and on the nature of specific historical studies on it was the unlimited political and ideological dominance of the ruling Communist Party. There was also its own specificity associated with the evolution of the ruling political regime in the second half of the 1930s - 1980s, which was largely determined by the activities of its leaders - Stalin, N.S. Khrushchev, L.I. Brezhneva, M.S. Gorbachev.

Study of the events on the eve and course of the war of the USSR against Germany in 1941-1945. in Soviet historiography it has its own periodization: the first stage - from the late 1940s to the mid-1950s; the second - from 1956 to the mid-1960s; the third - from 1965 to 1985; the fourth - from the second half of the 1980s to 1991. This periodization is substantiated in detail in generalizing historiographic studies. [20] Since the problem of the ideological preparation of the Soviet Union for war and the role of Bolshevik propaganda in this process is one of the components of the problems of the events of the prewar years, it is advisable to use the proposed periodization.

The first stage in elucidating the problem we have chosen is closely connected with the name of Stalin. The emergence of objective concrete historical studies devoted to the analysis of the whole range of issues related to the functioning of the propaganda mechanism of the USSR, and even more so - their critical consideration, at this stage were extremely difficult. This was due not only to the existence of the ideological monopoly of the ruling Communist Party, but also to the presence of the Stalinist concept of the events of the pre-war period, which was distinguished by an apology for the Soviet political regime.

This fundamental circumstance was fundamentally reflected in the situation with access to historical sources. For decades, not only the necessary archival documents, but also collections of materials and brochures on the problems of the ideological preparation of the Soviet Union for war remained in closed storage. Meanwhile, publications of this kind appeared already at the turn of the 1930s-1940s. They reflected, first of all, the experience of propagandistic support for military operations conducted by units of the Red Army against Japanese troops in the Far East. [21] The practice of party political work during the period of the anti-Polish campaign of 1939 in Western Ukraine and Western Belarus, which was characterized in Soviet historiography as liberation, was analyzed in a similar way. [22] During the period of hostilities against Finland (the so-called "Winter War" of 1939-1940) and after it

graduation, brochures and books were also published, intended, in particular, for the political staff of the Red Army. They summarized the experience of solving some problems of ideological training of troops. [23] At the same time, based on the current tasks of an ideological nature, other materials were also published: texts of speeches by the head of the Main Directorate of Political Propaganda of the Red Army, [24] directive documents signed by him, [25] brochures to help the Marxist-Leninist studies of the commander composition of the Red Army on the foreign policy of the USSR. [26] However, for the above reasons, the experience of propagandistic support for the ideological preparation of the USSR for war until the second half of the 1950s. has not been analyzed in the open research literature.

The next stage in the Soviet historiography of the problem was the second half of the 1950s - the first half of the 1960s. During this period, a campaign was launched in the Soviet Union to criticize the "cult of personality of Stalin." It was initiated by N.S. Khrushchev, who took the post of First Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU. The impetus for its start was provided by the decisions of the 20th Party Congress (1956), at which Khrushchev delivered a closed report, where an attempt was made to shift mainly on Stalin all the miscalculations and mistakes made in the leadership of the country, including in the preparation of to armed confrontation with Germany. Following this, the task was set to create a generalizing work on the

history of the Great Patriotic War. At the same time, in the second half of the 1950s. the source base of research began to replenish. In particular, the publishing house of the USSR Academy of Sciences "Nauka" created the scientific edition "The Second World War in Research, Memoirs and Documents", within which numerous memoirs of active participants in the events of the second half of the 1930s - early 1940s were published. years, in particular army political workers, journalists and diplomats. [27] Although this kind of literature turned out to be emotionally colored and distinguished by a subjective-personal approach in assessing the events of the past, it contained facts previously unknown to a wide range of researchers about the organization of Soviet propaganda in the prewar years. In preparing generalizing works, primarily a six-volume history of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union of 1941-1945, special attention was paid to the question of the ideological preparation of the USSR for war. In the first volume of this work, previously unavailable archival documents were used, which made it possible to significantly

replenish the source base. The result of Khrushchev's campaign to expose the "cult of personality" was, first of all, that the first element was "knocked out" from the seemingly monolithic tandem "Stalin - Bolshevik Party". The name of the leader, who previously personified all the achievements and victories of the party, began to be mentioned mainly in a negative way. And vice versa, its organizing, leading and guiding work was elevated "to the rank of a decisive factor in achieving victory." [28] The issue of ideological preparation for the war in the six-volume book and other summarizing works was considered through the prism of the activities of the Bolshevik Party "to educate the people in the spirit of socialist patriotism." In general, this plot was revealed in optimistic tones, where elements of

declarativeness prevailed. [29] This line of activity of the Bolshevik Party in the prewar years seemed to be "an important means of strengthening the defense capability of the Soviet state." The process of "educating the people in the spirit of socialist patriotism" carried out under her leadership was described as completely conflict-free and therefore successful. The depersonalized "party and government" (it was not customary to mention the names of Stalin and Molotov in Khrushchev's times except in a negative way), according to the text of the corresponding section of the 1st volume of the "History of the Great Patriotic War ...", formulated the immediate tasks of improving ideological work in country: mastering the theory and history of the CPSU (b); education of patriotic feelings; increasing mobilization readiness and vigilance, etc., etc. They were solved by party and Komsomol organizations, and as additional effective means of ideological

Fiction, theatrical dramaturgy, cinematography were involved in the artistic education. The equally impersonal "Soviet people" ("people"), proceeding from the constructions of the authors of the mentioned work, were deeply imbued with the spirit of "Bolshevik party spirit"; under the influence of fiction, theater, cinema, they became true patriots, acquired "the ability to live by the public interests of the country, actively participate in the events of our time, understand the world significance of building socialism." [30] At the same time, in the 1st volume

of the history of the Great Patriotic War, perhaps for the first time in Soviet historiography, an attempt was made to critically rethink some of the negative trends that took place in the process of the USSR's ideological preparation for war. In particular, it was noted that in the conditions when "the Soviet people persistently fought for peace", propaganda work was observed "sliding into pacifist positions", the distinction between just and unjust wars was "smeared". [31] Further, the mood of "an easy victory over the enemy", which spread on the eve of June 22, 1941, was criticized, and it was pointed out that such views were propagated in some works of literature and art of the prewar period (in particular, N. Shpanov's book was called "First strike", the film "If there is war tomorrow", etc.). [32] Finally, it has been argued that in Soviet propaganda the supposedly "mistakenly" character

the rear of a possible enemy was shaped, it was believed that it was fragile, and due importance was not attached to explaining the motivation for the actions of soldiers and officers "in fascist countries", the great efforts made there with the aim of "stupefying the masses". [33] In general,

the authors of the section on the ideological work of the CPSU(b) painted in the monograph "The Great Patriotic War ..." an idyllic picture of what it **should have been** according to the ideas of the Bolshevik leadership. And allegedly only unnamed lecturers and propagandists "violated" this idyll. The Communist Party itself in the works of historians of the 1960s. seemed infallible and indisputable. In the end, following the logic of the authors of the 1st volume of the History of the Great Patriotic War..., there were no reasons for pessimism: "Despite some shortcomings in the ideological work (in another case they were called "serious shortcomings".) [34] - **V.N.**), the Communist Party achieved great success in the pre-war years in the ideological and political education of the Soviet people. [35] In the late 1950s - early 1960s. the first generalizing works

began to appear, specially devoted to the system of education of personnel of the Red Army. But they were notable for low information content, subjective approach to the presentation of the topic, excessive declarativeness of judgments. These works became, in fact, a kind of illustration of the ideological guidelines of the CPSU that in the prewar years, not only Red Army soldiers and commanders, but all Soviet people were brought up in the spirit of devotion to communist ideas. [36] This kind of schematism, when presenting facts and events

related to the process of the ideological preparation of the USSR for war and determining the role of Bolshevik propaganda in it, remained in Soviet historiography for decades, although during the period of the so-called Khrushchev "thaw", when the task of exposing the "cult of Stalin's personality" was put forward, and attempts were made to critically reassess them. This trend manifested itself, in particular, in the analysis of negative phenomena in the political preparation of the Red Army, which were revealed after the Finnish campaign of 1939-1940. [37]

The next stage of the Soviet historiography of the chosen topic is 1965-1985. The unbridled criticism of the "cult of personality of Stalin" was replaced at this stage by a massive ideological campaign directed against the "slandering" and "de-heroization" of military history, including the events on the eve of June 22, 1941. However, the inertia of Khrushchev's "revealing" attitudes still gave to know about himself in historiography. So, Yu.P. Petrov

correctly pointed out the importance of Stalin's speeches in the second half of the 1930s - early 1940s. as fundamental in political and educational work with the personnel of the Red Army. However, largely based on the political situation that developed in the conditions of the debunking of the "cult of Stalin's personality", the historian negatively assessed this circumstance. Petrov categorically stated that in 1940-1941, on the eve of the war with Germany, the Soviet leader gave incorrect assessments of the military-political situation. Since Stalin's instructions were immediately "transferred to the press and to political and educational work among the troops," he stated, in Soviet propaganda on the eve of the German aggression "a peaceful tone prevailed, the cunning policy of the imperialist states was not explained ...". The troops "almost nothing was said about the most likely enemy - the armed forces of fascist Germany, which at that time were energetically preparing for an attack on the USSR ...". According to Yu.P. Petrov, these shortcomings in propaganda activities sought, on their own initiative, to criticize the Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks A.A. Zhdanov and the leadership of the Main Directorate for Political Propaganda of the Red Army (GUPPKA). Petrov even presented the matter in such a way that only the GUPPKA was the instigator and initiator of propaganda campaigns among the troops on the eve of the German attack on the USSR. His monograph stated the following: A.A. Zhdanov "and other workers of the Central Committee" were forced to agree with the main provisions put forward at the initiative of the GUPPKA at the beginning of 1941, but "these fair assessments of the shortcomings of propaganda and all educational work" were allegedly rejected by ... Stalin. [38]

G.D. Komkov wrote that, on the one hand, in the prewar years, the leadership of the Bolshevik Party was the determining factor in educating "all working people to be conscious, active participants in the historical process"; it allegedly was characterized by "truthfulness in highlighting the dangers threatening the country." On the other hand, Komkov pointed to some "perversions of Marxist views on the nature of wars" in ideological and political work, namely: the preaching of "pacifism", the spread of "wrong views", which consisted in underestimating the potential of states hostile to the USSR, exaggerating the weakness of the rear his likely adversary. All this, in Komkov's opinion, could by no means contribute to "preparation for the difficulties of war" and hindered "vigilantly following the intrigues of external enemies."

Responsibility for the appearance of such negative tendencies was placed entirely by the historian on lecturers, writers, playwrights, and cinematographers. The Communist Party, a priori infallible, as follows from his argumentation, "resolutely opposed confusion" in matters of propaganda, and, in particular, "restored (sic. - V.N.) **Lenin**'s doctrine of just and unjust wars." However, in the end, due to the prevalence of "wrong views" inspired by the propaganda apparatus, "unjustified moods" became dominant in the public mind. As a result, as follows from the work of G.D. Komkov, for many Soviet people "the treacherous attack of Hitler Germany on the USSR" was a complete surprise. [39]

The above statements, firstly, seem incorrect, which is mainly due to the poor knowledge of the problem at that time. Secondly, they show an exclusively negative attitude towards Stalin and at the same time do not take into account the political situation that had a serious impact on Soviet historical science at the end of the Khrushchev "thaw".

Meanwhile, in the second half of the 1960s. through the relevant structures of the Central Committee of the CPSU, new tasks were brought to scientists and teachers of universities in the humanities, on the basis of which it was necessary to completely abandon the focus on negative facts that revealed with varying degrees of completeness the reasons that led the USSR and the Red Army to the defeats of the summer of 1941 Now it was necessary to "rebuild

and concentrate mainly on proving that the Soviet Union "had an enormous superiority over any capitalist country" and that only unfavorable objective circumstances led to the unsuccessful start of the war against Germany. [40]

New ideological attitudes had a significant impact on the process of replenishment of the source base of research on the above topics. On the one hand, carefully edited memoirs of the participants in the events [41] and documentary collections about party political work in the Red Army in the prewar years continued to be published. [42] On the other hand, archival materials began to be more actively used in generalizing printed works, containing new factual data on the system of party propaganda organs, on the organization of ideological work in the troops on the eve of the war against Germany. [43] However, these facts were selected in such a way as not to give rise to critical assessments and conclusions.

Research topics on the problem of the ideological preparation of the USSR for war were distinguished by their narrowness and one-sidedness. The main task was to study the experience of "practical activities of the Communist Party in creating and developing a system of communist education of Soviet soldiers", the work of "commanders, political bodies, party and Komsomol organizations in instilling in the Red Army personnel the qualities necessary for the defenders and builders of socialism." [44] Ultimately, the whole pathos of such publications, as in the Khrushchev era, was reduced to proving the thesis that by June 22, 1941, the restructuring of party political work had achieved its goal - a comprehensive moral and political preparation training of personnel of the Red Army "to repel possible imperialist aggression." [45] At the same time, censorship was intensified in the selection of memoirs for publication, including

those relating to the description of the events of the prewar years. On July 4, 1977, the Secretariat of the Central Committee approved the resolution "On measures to strengthen control over the preparation and publication of memoirs", according to which such literature could be published only after approval in the relevant departments of the CPSU Central Committee, in the IML under the CPSU Central Committee, in the Main political administration of the Soviet Army and Navy. [46] GlavPUR even made an attempt to organize the purchase of books of previously published memoirs that did not agree with the one formed in the second half of the 1960s and early 1970s. concept of the Great Patriotic War. [47]

The last stage of the Soviet historiography of the problem (second half of the 1980s - early 1990s) coincided chronologically with Gorbachev's "perestroika". Historiography, called upon in the Soviet state to fulfill the protective ideological and political function of the Soviet state, by this time increasingly began to encounter what was called "blank spots" in the "perestroika" period. Historians went into the petty world, resorted to the Aesopian language, sought to free themselves from the "corset of Marxism-Leninism" in its Brezhnev version, sometimes losing their professional curiosity.

Created by the end of the 1980s. political conditions, when a justification for a "renewed legitimization of perestroika" was required, the events of Soviet history, mainly its Stalinist period, were subjected to special attacks. Publicists, writers and journalists were most actively engaged in the search for "white spots" in it. [48] At the same time, attempts were made to interpret propaganda materials that became known thanks to archival research, the authorship of which was associated with the names of the head of the Political Directorate of the Red Army (PURRKA) L.Z. Mekhlis, member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks M.I. Kalinin, Secretary of the Central Committee A.S. Shcherbakov [49] and others. But, unfortunately, such important documents were not given due attention then. On the other hand, accusations against Kalinin and Shcherbakov sounded quite in the spirit of the

rye, judging by some publications, on the eve of the war with Germany, "wishful thinking", made "erroneous statements". [50]

Acting in accordance with the political situation, some historians sometimes showed extreme subjectivism. So, if before that Soviet historiography was dominated by a tendency to apologise for the propaganda activities of the party and the state, carried out on the eve of the war against Germany, then at the turn of the 1980s-1990s, on the contrary, when covering this issue, many negative assessments were given. And sometimes the authors who became famous precisely because of their works, in which Soviet political propaganda was extolled, at the end of the "perestroika period" already acted as its own critics. In place of enthusiastic statements in publications of this kind, statements began to appear that the main goal of this propaganda was allegedly ... "to justify the autocratic regime of power and preach the ideas of deformed socialism (sic! - V.N.) ". [51] But according to the established tradition, works continued to appear in which the activities of the party of the prewar period in the

ideological sphere were considered exclusively from positive positions. [52] Again, as in the stage of combating the consequences of the "cult of personality", anti-Stalinist motives in publicism and scientific research turned out to be a distinctive feature. Along with this, "revealing" attacks against the formerly "infallible" Communist Party began to sound more and more insistent. Thus, the ideological tandem "Stalin - the Bolshevik Party", attempts to destroy which were made under Khrushchev, and conservation - in the Brezhnev era, was finally eroded under the influence of the "perestroika" historiography of the hump.

Czech times.

1.2. In the mirror of discussions at the turn of the 20th-21st centuries

1990s became milestone for national historiography. The departure from the political arena of the CPSU led to overcoming the ideological control of the ruling party over the humanities, including historical science. With the collapse of the USSR, the formation of **post-Soviet Russian historiography** intensified. It differed primarily in the presence of pluralism in methodology, in approaches to the presentation of the events of the prewar years. Unconventional views were formed, new systems of argumentation were formed, which was reflected in the "variegated mixture of old and new approaches, assessments, facts" that penetrated into scientific publications. These processes developed against the backdrop of extreme polarization of views, political aggravation of discussions on various topics related to the history of the Stalinist regime in the second half of the 1930s - early 1940s, including questions of the ideological preparation of the USSR for war and its role in it. Bolshevik propaganda.

Within the framework of Russian post-Soviet historiography, two stages in the study of this problem can be conventionally distinguished: the first half of the 1990s; second half of the 1990s - at the

beginning of the XXI century. And in the post-Soviet period, according to the already established tradition, attempts were made to turn again to the theme of the political education of the personnel of the Red Army in the prewar years, and special attention was focused on the negative consequences of repressions. [53] The texts of official statements by representatives of the Bolshevik leadership (Stalin, V.M. Molotov, M.I. Kalinin, A.A. Zhdanov), as well as propaganda intended for the personnel of the Red Army, began to be introduced into scientific circulation and underwent a critical rethinking. materials that date back to 1939-1941. Among them, reports, draft directive documents of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, the Main Directorate of Political Propaganda of the Red Army, which directed the personnel of the Red Army to active, offensive actions, and even contained the idea of taking the initiative of such actions by the Soviet Union, were of particular importance. [54]

But the situation became more complicated after the publication of V. Suvorov's works in Russia. V. Suvorov (V. B. Rezun), a former Soviet intelligence officer who defected to Great Britain, became known to the Russian reader primarily due to his books on military topics. The main theses set out in them, which V. Suvorov himself called "wild applications", [55] boiled down to the following. Stalin was not only involved in the outbreak of World War II, but he himself was preparing to be the first to attack Germany. V.B. Rezun even named the date of the alleged attack - July 6, 1941. And allegedly only due to a tragic coincidence for the Soviet Union, Hitler prevented this attack. V. Suvorov asserted that in May 1941 a "sharp turn in all Soviet propaganda" began, connected, in his opinion, with Stalin's aggressive intentions. [56] In turn, the Russian military historian V.D. Danilov stated: "Historiography is not yet aware of documents that testify to the fact that in the interests of preparing an attack on Germany, a powerful propaganda machine of the Bolshevik Party launched its work." [57] In this regard, it should be emphasized that documents, including propaganda ones, that would indisputably prove the intention of

the USSR **to attack first**, have not yet been found either in Russian or in foreign archives. However, since the mid-1990s various issues related to the analysis of the specifics of the Soviet propaganda of the prewar period began to occupy the attention of an increasing number of historians. This interest increased in direct proportion to the number of materials introduced into scientific circulation about the activities of Soviet ideological structures in the second half of the 1930s - early 1940s. [58] The identified sources, along with previously known documents, became the main object of analysis in the course called "unplanned discussion" about the events on the eve of the German-Soviet war. This discussion proved to be a turning point in the study of the role of Soviet propaganda in the ideological preparation for war. [59] The controversy began at the initiative of the Association of Researchers of Russian Society (AIRO-XX), as well as the editorial board of the journal *Otechestvennaya istoriya*, the publication of the Institute of Russian History of the Russian Academy of Sciences.

AIRO-XX published a collection of articles under the heading "Unplanned discussion", where due attention was also paid to the issue of propaganda preparation of the USSR for war. [60] This collection attracted the attention of numerous Russian [61] and foreign scientists. The reviewers noted that the compiler approached his task objectively, trying to reflect different views on the problem of preparing for war. [62] I.V. Pavlova cited this edition as "an example of the clash of directly opposite points of view." [63] The compiler of the collection, as emphasized by the German historian S. Voss, refrained from a conclusion that might seem biased. And thus he dared to do something that could not occur to several generations of Soviet historians. The compiler, Foss developed his idea, leaves chi

face-to-face with conflicting arguments and different views of researchers, denying him the help typical of Soviet times in determining a position based on historical facts. In the current situation, the inquisitive reader is faced with the need to do an analysis on his own (using the example of Stalin's military preparations in the spring and summer of 1941) and rethink the available assessments of the Stalin era, not trusting the reckless

quick and quick answers to difficult questions.

Critical remarks and constructive recommendations were also made on the content of the mentioned collection. In the review by A.V. Golubev paid special attention to those of the articles included in it, which dealt with the topic of ideological preparation for war. Golubev, on the one hand, drew the following conclusion: under the influence of the changed international situation, the Soviet leadership in the spring and summer of 1941 returned to the idea of "expanding the front of socialism" by armed means, which earlier, it would seem, had been shelved. On the other hand, the reviewer pointed out the need

the need to study a specific topic: how exactly it was supposed (and whether it was supposed at all) to implement this idea not only in propaganda, but, first of all, in military-political and strategic terms. [64]

A detailed analysis of the collection of articles prepared by AIRO-XX was carried out by the German historian W. Strauss. The disadvantage of this, according to Strauss, noteworthy, innovative work is that it does not contain a single article on the internal political situation of the Soviet Union on the eve of the war against Germany. It lacked an analysis of Soviet society, a "collective psychogram" of the Stalinist system, a study of the "bleeding" to which Bolshevism subjected after 1917 the Russian people and representatives of other nationalities inhabiting the USSR. The authors of the published articles, W. Strauss summed up his review of the aforementioned collection, did not say a word about the political and psychological state of the population of the USSR and did not even outline an approach to assessing this problem, not to mention the analysis of the internal political situation.

It is hard not to agree on the whole with the remarks made by the esteemed colleague. However, in order to obtain adequate answers to the complex questions formulated by the German scientist, it would be necessary to conduct a special comprehensive scientific study based on extensive archival material, with the involvement of not only Russian but also foreign authors. [65] Meanwhile, the task that the compiler of the collection prepared by AIRO-XX set himself was more modest - relying mainly on already published articles written by historians and publicists, to reflect, if possible, the diversity of views on the problem of preparing the Soviet Union to armed confrontation with Nazi Germany at the initial stage of World War II.

The discussion that unfolded was also reflected in the pages of the journal *Fatherland History*. Two articles were published in it, united by a common theme: "The USSR on the eve of the war with Germany: politics through the prism of propaganda." [66] They were based on new archival materials identified by their authors. The editorial foreword emphasized: "In studies devoted to the policy of the Soviet leadership on the eve of the German attack on the USSR, the question of the ideological and psychological motivation for specific plans and actions was not considered in essence. However, without understanding the peculiarities of the political thinking of the party and state elite, it is impossible to resolve the issue of the real military-political plans of the Soviet leadership. Subsequently, the aforementioned articles published in the journal *Otechestvennaya istoriya* were reprinted in whole or in part both in Russia² and abroad³. They presented an alternative view of the role of Soviet propaganda in the ideological preparation of the Soviet Union for an armed clash with the "capitalist encirclement". Later, the magazine "National History" noted that unfolding on its pages

The dispute about the representativeness of Soviet ideological and propaganda documents on the eve of the Great Patriotic War in terms of the degree of objectivity in which they reflect the real military-strategic intentions of the Soviet Union is only an integral part of a broader discussion about the role of the ideological component in the mentality and policy of the Stalinist regime⁴.

At the turn of the XX-XXI centuries. the controversy that unfolded on this issue was reflected in a number of articles, monographs, dissertations⁵. In addition to the desire to show the mechanism of action of the propaganda machine of the Soviet state and the Bolshevik Party, fruitful attempts were made to develop such plots as the formation of foreign policy stereotypes with its help, including the image of the enemy¹. Attention was drawn to the reflection in the official propaganda of the second half of the 1930s - early 1940s. military doctrine of the Red Army. Biographical sketches were published on the activities of the most famous functionaries who represented the leadership of the political and ideological bodies of the Stalin era³. Attempts were made

explanations of the motivation for a rapid change in personnel and permanent transformations in their structure in the prewar years. [67] An analysis was made of the specifics of the perception of the picture of a future war by representatives of Soviet

society. [68] Fruitful was the critical rethinking of the content of Soviet propaganda in the context of the general problem of ideological preparation for war. [69] In the monograph by S.G. Osmachko studied the experience of political and educational work with the personnel of the Red Army, carried out during local wars and armed conflicts, in particular - near Lake Khasan (1938), on the Khalkhin-Gol River (1939), during the period of "liberation campaign" Yes" to Western Ukraine and Western Belarus (1939), as well as during the armed clash with Finland (1939-1940). Osmachko, first of all, noted positive tendencies in the organization of this work: its multifaceted nature, the use of significant human and material resources, the possibility of solving a number of practical tasks facing the personnel of the active army. He stated the presence in it of a powerful system of ideological, educational influence, which was distinguished by sufficient harmony, breadth of coverage and variety of forms used. The content side of its functioning was the military ideology - an integral part of the Marxist-Leninist ideology common to the whole country.

At the same time, S.G. Osmachko did not ignore the little studied aspects of the problem, which, for objective reasons, did not find coverage in Soviet historiography. He concluded that the military-ideological content of the educational process in the Red Army was characterized by slogans, declarativeness, and quotations. The main emphasis was placed on instilling loyalty to the Soviet political regime and its leader, Stalin. All measures of ideological influence were aimed at instilling in the soldiers the conviction that the Marxist-Leninist theory was correct.

orii.

Some military-ideological ideas, according to S.G. Osmachko, fundamentally incorrectly reflected the reality of the 1930s, which, in turn, led to a deformation of the moral and political state of the troops. There was an overestimation of one's own military potential, a complete disregard for a potential military adversary, and a belief in the weakness and unreliability of its rear. All this led to the formation of ideological stereotypes, conditional, speculative constructions that differed from reality and were perceived dogmatically. As the strength of the Red Army grew, stereotypes of this kind acquired an unconditional, indisputable, protective character for those in power. Military operations (especially against the Japanese in the Far East and against the Finns) showed that the enemy had a strong, combat-ready army and a strong rear. The Red Army men and commanders, who did not have an adequate idea of the enemy, had confusion, doubts, and indecision, which had a negative effect on the combat capability of the Red Army.

Under these conditions, the Soviet military ideology was aimed at adapting the old dogmas to the new conditions, acquiring, according to S.G. Osmachko, mostly "acquittal". In educational work, the internationalist approach prevailed, which manifested itself with particular force during the "liberation campaign" of 1939 and at the initial stage of the "Winter War", political workers, based on the instructions of PURKKA, gradually switched to a patriotic one, introducing into the consciousness of personnel the idea of protection from external danger. [70]

Meanwhile, the emergence of an alternative view of the Soviet propaganda of the pre-war period caused criticism of the supporters of the "traditional" point of view on this issue, which was predominant in the Soviet period. The negative reaction was not long in coming. The writer of these lines, as well as M.I. Meltyukhov, who touched upon the problem of the ideological preparation of the USSR for war in a number of publications, was criticized for his "non-traditional views" both from the "left", [71] and from the "right". [72]

During the "unplanned discussion" that unfolded among Russian historians in the second half of the 1990s, one peculiarity emerged. A number of authors entered into a sharp debate with V. Suvorov, trying to show the complete inconsistency of his speculative constructions. [73] At the same time, the name of the creator of the Icebreaker began to be used as a kind of bogeyman in polemics with "undesirable" opponents. It was associated with the image of a traitor and a falsifier who grossly distorted facts and historical events in order to confirm his extremely ideological and dubious concept. Therefore, an objective researcher who tried to take a fresh look at the Soviet pro-propaganda documents of May-June 1941, offensive in their direction and anti-German in their content, was classified by apologists for the "traditional" point of view as supporters of the "defector", "pseudo-historian" V Suvorov, and his scientific reputation was seriously tested.

In this regard, the following should be emphasized. At one time, V.B. Rezun directly admitted: "impudence and shamelessness" are two qualities that he "always noticed in himself and never denied" that they are inherent in him. [74] V. Suvorov considered it an important matter to "join" the constellation of historians. "Historiography is one of the varieties of intelligence activities," he said thoughtfully in his interview. V.B. Rezun, without further ado, categorized himself as a historian and called himself a "scout of the past." [75]

Meanwhile, the "creative laboratory" of the newly-minted "scout of the past" is simple and uncomplicated. In response to reasonable reproaches of being unscientific and free with sources, he told his opponents: "I believe that forcing oneself to listen is the main thing in modern literature." [76]

Thus, the question of the role of Soviet propaganda in the ideological preparation of the USSR for the war was developed with varying degrees of completeness in Soviet and post-Soviet Russian historiography. Scientific interest in this issue began to appear already at the end of the 1950s, but it really began to be studied only from the second half of the 1990s, when, thanks to the introduction of new and deeper analysis of already known sources, and also in an atmosphere of pluralism of views, the process of revising previously established views on it began.

1.3. Research objectives

To conduct propaganda, special structures are created, including various institutions and organizations where the cadres of propagandists are concentrated. In Soviet historiography, a general description of the structure of the propaganda organs of the USSR in the prewar period was never presented. This gap was formed due to the inaccessibility for most researchers of documents on the specifics of the functioning of party and state political propaganda bodies of higher, middle and lower

call link.

Only in the second half of the 1990s, with wide access to archival materials stored in the Russian State Archive of Socio-Political History (RGASPI), the State Archive of the Russian Federation (GARF), the Russian State Military Archive (RGVA), the Russian The State Archives of Literature and Art (RGALI) and other archives provided an opportunity to get a more objective idea of the scope of the activities of the Soviet propaganda machine of the prewar period. This was reflected in the domestic post-Soviet historiography. [77]

The functioning of this cumbersome but effective ideological mechanism within the indicated chronological framework was considered in the research literature not only from the point of view of the perfection of its constituent structures, but, first of all, taking into account the personal qualities of the figures who headed them and the ordinary performers involved.

lei. In particular, one can come across statements that on June 22, 1941, the USSR entered into an armed confrontation with Germany "with flagrant unpreparedness" not only in the military mobilization, operational areas, but also in a "military-ideological" relation. [78] It seems that such statements testified to the poor knowledge of the issue.

In this regard, the monographic study attempts to expand and concretize the understanding of the organizational foundations of Soviet propaganda in the second half of the 1930s - early 1940s, to show the real significance of the leading cadres involved in it and ordinary performers who controlled, directed and carried out propaganda actions to prepare the country's population for war.

In the 1990s in historiography, topics continued to be developed that attracted attention during the period of Gorbachev's "perestroika". Some of the subjects considered were directly linked to the question of the specifics of the operation of Bolshevik propaganda in the prewar years. Among them is the question of its nature and specifics during the period of the Soviet-German non-aggression pact (August 24, 1939 - June 21, 1941). One can agree with the opinion about the "weak effectiveness of the penetration of the idea of friendship with Germany into the minds of the Soviet people" in this period. [79] However, some historians, justifiably proving the existence of certain political and ideological costs from agreements with Hitler in 1939-1941, tried to present the matter in such a way that Bolshevik propaganda was allegedly completely paralyzed as a result of these agreements and, in contrast to Nazi, played a minor role in the preparations for war. [80] The monograph examines the question of the forced change in its content (temporary abandonment of the anti-fascist orientation, exposure of the predatory nature of the foreign policy of the Nazi leadership), as well as the unenviable position in which, in connection with this, the Soviet functionaries involved in propaganda work found themselves. . An attempt is made to show that two

tendencies were present in Soviet propaganda during the existence of the non-aggression pact and the friendship and border treaty with Germany: on the one hand, since August 1939, its anti-German and anti-fascist orientation was muted until it was completely curtailed; on the other hand, as tensions grew in Soviet-German relations, connected primarily with the military successes of the Third Reich in Europe, especially since the autumn of 1940, anti-German and anti-Nazi motives were resurrecting in it, albeit in a veiled form. This created the prerequisites for a new propaganda turn that began in May 1941. In the monograph, both of these trends are shown inextricably linked, which made it possible to focus on highlighting the role of Soviet propaganda in the ideological confrontation with Nazi propaganda in the context of the approaching open armed conflict between Germany and THE USSR.

The book presents materials on what were the views of Stalin and those functionaries from his inner circle (V.M. Molotov, A.A. Zhdanov, A.S. Shcherbakov, M.I. Kalinin, L.Z. Mekhlis) who were involved in the development of fundamental political and propaganda documents intended for ideological support

preparations for the upcoming armed confrontation with the "capitalist environment."

In modern Russian and foreign historiography, a large place is given to the problem of social mobilization in the USSR at the initial stage of World War II. In this regard, attention is paid to the political and ideological campaigns carried out in the Soviet Union, which can be considered as one of the most effective ways of its implementation. This, in turn, makes it possible to assess the real possibilities of influencing public opinion with the help of such campaigns of the ruling regime, to get an idea of the features of mobilization processes.

owls.

In the specific conditions of the late 1930s and early 1940s, when a system of total propaganda already existed in the USSR, political and ideological campaigns were carried out using all available tools, from oral agitation to the media and the press. The outbreak of the Second World War on September 1, 1939 necessitated the social mobilization of Soviet society, which was based on psychological preparation for the inevitable armed clash with the "capitalist encirclement". In the language of modern political science, this was **a conflict type** of mobilization, where the factor of threat from the outside was prevailing. Accordingly, the proposed study examines political and ideological campaigns aimed at forming, mainly among the personnel of the Red Army, stereotypes and associated with the preparation and conduct of military operations during the periods: 1) the "liberation campaign" of 1939 in Western Ukraine and to Western Belarus; 2) "Winter War" 1939-1940. v. Finland; 3) preparations for an armed clash with Germany (May-June 1941), which was conducted under the slogan of "offensive war". The undoubted progress achieved so far in the study of the circumstances and course of the Soviet-Finnish ("Winter") War of 1939-1940 [81] has made it possible to take a fresh look at

the content of Soviet propaganda. However, there are claims that, being primitive, fuzzy, built on unrealistic assumptions and misinformation, it did not fulfill the tasks that it faced at that time. [82] Such assessments, although to some extent correspond to the realities of the Winter War, are, however, overly categorical and cannot contribute to an objective study of the named topic. In this regard, the monograph focuses on the evolution of Soviet propaganda on the eve, during and after this war. The author relied not only on the publications of his predecessors, in which this topic was reflected to some extent [83], but also on his own developments. [84] It is generally recognized that a specific feature of the Stalinist regime is that Stalin almost single-handedly (or within a "narrow circle" of his comrades-in-arms) made the most important decisions on the main problems of domestic and foreign policy. Only after that the adopted decisions (orally or in

writing) were transmitted through the "instances". In this regard, the content of Stalin's speeches to the graduates of the military academies of the Red Army on May 5, 1941, seven weeks before the start of the war between Germany and the USSR, is of paramount interest. Earlier, the author of the monograph repeatedly turned to the analysis of the content of these speeches, realizing their great propaganda significance. [85] At the turn of the XX-XXI centuries. works of domestic and foreign researchers appeared, which also contain various interpretations of what the Soviet leader said at the traditional graduation of military "academies" in 1941. Here we can name Russian authors Yu.V. Basistov, [86] L.A. Bezymensky, [87] O.V. Vishlev, [88] M.A. Gareeva, [89] Yu.V. Emelyanova, [90] A.V. Shubin, [91] historians from Germany (B. Bonwetsch [92] and J. Hoffman at [93]), Israel (G. Gorodetsky [94]).

The proposed monograph focuses on proving that Stalin's speeches to graduates of military academies were a kind of "message", the main starting point of the political and ideological campaign that unfolded in May-June 1941, which was waged under the slogan of an offensive war.

The TASS Refutation of May 9, 1941, is interpreted in the same context. The book shows what role was assigned to this refutation, in the writing of the text of which Stalin personally took part, and what place was assigned to him by the leader in the mentioned propaganda campaign.

Another "message from above" in the unfolding political and ideological campaign was the publication, literally on the eve of the German-Soviet war, of Stalin's letter "On Engels's article" "The Foreign Policy of Russian Tsarism", addressed to members of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks. [95] Previously, we have already made a brief review of the judgments of the authors of the 1960s - the first

half of the 1990s on this account. [96] Later, new papers appeared that dealt with this issue. [97] In the proposed study, the very fact of the publication of Stalin's letter is interpreted, along with his speeches to graduates of the military academies of the Red Army on May 5, 1941 and the "TASS Refutation" of May 9, 1941, as a "message" in the unfolding political and ideological campaigns.

As already noted, during the "unplanned discussion" of Russian historians, the question was raised about the scope of the work of the propaganda apparatus of the Bolshevik Party on the eve of the German-Soviet war of 1941-1945. The researchers were able to identify archival materials on this topic, which were partially published and analyzed. These materials were prepared in the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, the Propaganda and Agitation Department (UPA) of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, the Main Directorate of Political Propaganda of the Red Army in the second half of May - the first half of June 1941. "toward the military policy of offensive operations", which was delivered in a speech to graduates of the military academies of the Red Army on May 5, 1941. From the analysis of their content, it follows that on the eve of June 22, 1941, a radical turn was outlined in Soviet propaganda: it began to reorganize under the slogan "we are a blunt war". [98] This point of view is shared by a number of Russian [99] and foreign researchers. [100] At the same time, there is a tendency to reduce the significance of the political and ideological

campaign of Bolshevik propaganda, which began after May 5, 1941, but was never completed for an objective reason - in connection with the German attack on the USSR. [101]

Taking into account the importance of the theme of propaganda preparation of the USSR for an offensive war and its ambiguous interpretation in domestic and foreign historiography, the author of the proposed monograph considered it necessary to turn to it again. He set himself the task of giving an idea of the directive and instructive materials prepared in May-June 1941 at the GUPPKA, with the main goal of showing that already at the stage of preparation, the drafts of these propaganda documents were considered as a guide to action, since in they almost completely reflected and supplemented the Stalinist ideas expressed in speeches on May 5, 1941.

To solve the problems posed in this study, various archival materials and published documents, diaries, and memoirs were used. When writing the monograph, we managed to draw on some previously inaccessible

sources. The main set of archival materials used by the author are the RGASPI documents. First of all, attention was drawn to cases related to the activities of the Politburo, the Orgburo and the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks. Documents of Stalin's personal funds, [102] V.M. Molotov, [103] and also A.A. Zhdanov [104] and A.S. Shcherbakov, [105] who oversaw the work of the Propaganda and Agitation Department.

To understand the operation of the propaganda mechanism of the Soviet regime, much is given by the documents deposited in the fund of the UPA of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks of the RGASPI. Together with materials from the personal funds of Stalin and his associates, as well as the Politburo, the Organizing Bureau and the Secretariat of the Central Committee, they contribute to the creation of a visual representation of the mechanism for the development of basic directive and instructive materials, the deployment of political campaigns associated with the process of ideological preparation of the USSR for war in second half of the 1930s - early 1940s.

At the turn of the XX-XXI centuries. Sources about the rethinking by the Stalinist leadership of the experience of military operations of the Red Army in 1938-1940 were introduced into scientific circulation, in particular, the results of the "Winter War" against Finland. Among them are texts: Stalin's speeches at a meeting of the commanding staff at the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks (April 17, 1940), [106] his instructions at a meeting of the commission of the Main Military Council (April 21, 1940). [107]

The American historian D. Brandenberger published a report by L.Z. Mehlis on military ideology. [108] At the same time, Brandenberger, unfortunately, made some

accuracy. Firstly, he incorrectly named the position of L.Z. Mekhlis (head of the Main Political Directorate of the Red Army), and secondly, the historian incorrectly indicated the date when this report was made (May 13, 1940). [109] Thirdly, D. Brandenberger unreasonably asserted that the report on military ideology was made at a meeting called by the people's commissar of defense. [110] As for the position of Mekhlis, until September 1940 he was the head of the Political Directorate (and not the Main Political Directorate) of the Red Army. Other inaccuracies made by the American researcher can be easily corrected if we turn to the publication of the materials of the commissions of the Main Military Council (GVS) of the Red Army following the results of the "Winter War" (April-May 1940), which was carried out by the scientific staff of the RGVA mines. [111] From it, in particular, it follows that L.Z. Mekhlis made his report on military ideology not on May 13, as D. Brandenberger claimed, but on May 10, 1940, and not at a meeting convened by the People's Commissar of Defense, but at a plenary meeting of the GVS commission. [112] The mentioned publication not only republished the text of Mekhlis's report, but for the first time introduced into scientific circulation the transcript of the meeting of this commission on May 13-14, 1940, with a discussion of the speech of the chief of PURKKA. [113]

The scope of the political and ideological campaign, which was initiated by Stalin's speeches to graduates of the military academies of the Red Army on May 5, 1941, can be judged by various kinds of published and archival materials. Among them - the first version of the draft directive GUPPKA "On the tasks of political propaganda in the Red Army in the near future." It was introduced by A.A. Zhdanov and A.S. Shcherbakov at the end of May 1941. Then it was discussed twice at the Main Military Council and, as it is believed, on June 20, 1941 it was handed over to Stalin, but he did not have time to approve it before the start of the war with

Germany. Adjacent to it is the report "The Current International Situation and the Foreign Policy of the USSR" [114], drawn up at the GUPPKA and already attracting the attention of researchers, [114] the main provisions of which echo the thoughts set forth in them.

Of great importance are previously unpublished and only at the end of the 20th century. the texts of the speeches of Lenin [115] and Stalin introduced into scientific circulation. [116] The monograph also used collections of documents on party political work in the Red Army. [117] At the turn of the XX-XXI centuries. documentary editions were published, which reflected the fundamental problem of "Power and the artistic intelligentsia", in particular, such aspects of it as the implementation by the Bolshevik party and the Soviet state of the daily management of literature and art, subordinating them to the current political and propaganda tasks. [118] We have already noted the relevance of analyzing the

state of Soviet society in the prewar years, compiling its "collective psychogram". It seems that the solution of this problem is impossible without the involvement of previously top secret documents of the NKVD, in particular, analytical materials on the moods of various social groups. The monograph uses documentary publications and studies in which

Some materials of this kind are presented, which give some idea not only of the attitude towards the foreign policy actions of the Soviet leadership of the purely civilian population, [119] but also of the personnel of the Red Army. [120] The periodical press of the pre-

war period is represented by a number of central newspapers (Pravda, Izvestia, Komsomolskaya Pravda, Krasnaya Zvezda) and magazines (Bolshevik, Historian-Marxist, Political Education of a Red Army Soldier, Propagandist and an agitator of the Red Army", etc.).

Memoir literature is involved, first of all - memoirs of writers K.M. Simonova, [121] I.G. Ehrenburg, [122] journalists and diplomats E.A. Gnedina, [123] N.G. Palgunova, [124] D.F. Kraminova, [125] Z.S. Sheinis. [126] Of great interest were the

diaries of representatives of the Soviet intelligentsia. For them, this genre sometimes served as a kind of creative laboratory, where impressions were accumulated and the writer's pen was honed. [127] In the monograph

diaries and notebooks of writers M.M. Prishvin, [128] V.V. Vishnevsky, [129] Academician V.I. Vernadsky. [130] Diaries are usually unusual for

communist politicians. [131] In this regard, the unique diary entries of one of Stalin's closest associates, the General Secretary of the Executive Committee of the Communist International, G.M. Dimitrov, [132], which have already been repeatedly analyzed in the research literature.

[133] The testimonies of representatives of the young pre-war generation of Soviet people also contribute to the disclosure of the topic. [134]

Chapter Two GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF PROPAGANDA IN THE SECOND HALF OF THE 1930s

2.1. Basic structures

The system of total propaganda in the USSR in the prewar period was characterized by an extreme degree of centralization. The Soviet leadership took radical measures to unify the political propaganda machine, turning it into a reliable tool for pursuing a policy of strengthening the ruling regime. Repressions within the country, the process of "general militarization" of the USSR, associated with the complication of the international situation, the approach of the inevitable armed clash with the "capitalist encirclement" - all these trends radically influenced the process of further structuring of this system.

Back in the early 1930s. Stalin took seriously the task of preparing his own "ideological personnel reserve". By this time, the Institute of Red Professors (IKP) already existed, founded in 1921. It trained teachers of social sciences for higher education. At the same time, through the ICP, personnel were trained for party and state bodies. In addition, since 1918 the Communist Academy functioned, which was a kind of counterbalance to the former Russian Academy of Sciences, which was reorganized in 1925 into the Academy of Sciences of the USSR. In 1931, the research structures of the ICP and the Komakademiya were merged and on their basis several independent ICPs were created, called research institutes: agrarian; world economy and world politics; natural sciences; Soviet construction and law; philosophy, literature, history. [135] On May 13, 1935, at the initiative of Stalin, it was decided to divide Agitprop, which had previously existed as an independent structural unit of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, into five departments: printing and publishing houses; party propaganda and agitation; schools; Sciences; cultural and educational work. [136] On November 14, 1938, the Politburo approved the decision "On the organization of party

propaganda in connection with the release of the Short Course on the History of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks". This book, which was written with the direct participation of Stalin, was indispensable for study in the USSR for decades. In the aforementioned resolution of the Politburo, in addition to formulating the task of studying the "Short Course in the History of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks," the need was stated for changing the structure of the party apparatus at all levels. The Propaganda and Agitation, Press and Publishing Departments that previously operated in isolation from each other were merged into one Propaganda and Agitation Department (OPiA). As a result, the task of controlling the ideological work of Party bodies has been greatly simplified. OPiA controlled the entire press in the country, followed literature and art. In his subordination was the theoretical center of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks - the Institute of Marx-Engels-Lenin (IMEL), as well as IMEL

in the Union republics. [137] Speaking at the 18th Congress of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks (1939), Stalin put forward a proposal to concentrate the work of party propaganda and agit

corresponding structural subdivisions of the Central Committee. [138] For this purpose, on his initiative, on August 3, 1939, the Directorate of Propaganda and Agitation of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks (UPA) was created. [139] Together with the Directorate of Personnel, the Directorate of Propaganda and Agitation of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks became one of the two bases on which the party apparatus was to rest from now on. The UPA was entrusted with the following functions: directing propaganda and agitation in the country with the help of mass media, publishing houses, etc., controlled by it; theoretical training of the entire mass of party and state employees, i.e., the implementation of "communist education". [140] Initially, the Department of Propaganda and Agitation of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks had five departments: party propaganda, Marxist-Leninist training, press, agitation, and cultural and educational institutions. The UPA staff consisted of 115 people. In the future, its structure became more complicated, and the number of employees increased significantly.

The growth of the military-political function of the Stalinist system led to the creation in 1939 by decision of the XVIII Congress of the CPSU (b) in the district committees, city committees, district committees, regional committees, regional committees and the Central Committee of the Communist Parties of the union republics of military departments. They were called upon to assist the relevant authorities in the registration of persons liable for military service, conscription into the army and mobilization in case of war, organize air defense, manage the activities of Osoaviakhim, the military and physical culture work of sports societies, Komsomol organizations. [141] The Bolshevik leadership highly appreciated the political

and propaganda potential of the periodical press. Stalin spoke directly about this: "There is no better propaganda in the world than the press - magazines, newspapers, brochures. A seal is such a thing that makes it possible to make this or that truth the property of all. He characterized publishing as "large-scale machine production." [142] Political censorship was constantly strengthening in the country. For this purpose, appropriate structures were created. In particular, more than a third of the senior officials of the

Directorate for Propaganda and Agitation of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks were concentrated in the press department. This department, firstly, monitored the work of the central and local periodicals, putting into practice the instructions of the highest party organs; secondly, he oversaw the verification and selection of personnel for the editorial offices of newspapers and magazines; thirdly, he considered the thematic plans of the main publishing houses; fourthly, he was responsible for circulation policy, and finally, fifthly, he oversaw the work of the Telegraph Agency of the Soviet Union (TASS) and Glavlit. [143] Glavlit was established by a decree of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR of June 6, 1922 (full name - Main Directorate for Literature and Publishing Houses). Employees of Glavlit were engaged in previewing both handwritten and

printed periodicals and non-periodicals, photographs, drawings, maps, etc., intended for publication or distribution, and in addition, the implementation of orders and instructions on matters of printing, publishing houses, printers, libraries and bookstores. On October 5, 1930, the Decree of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR "On the reorganization of the Main Directorate for Literature and Publishing Houses (Glavlit)" was adopted, according to which the list of information prohibited for publication in the open press and voiced over the radio, mainly characterizing the situation negatively, was significantly expanded. inside the USSR.

In the 1930s The Organizing Bureau, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, Stalin personally had to solve various issues related to the activities of Glavlit more than once. Thus, in connection with the growing trend towards the "general militarization of the country", more and more attention was paid to the need to preserve military secrets. In 1933, representatives of the leadership of the People's Commissariat for Military and Naval Affairs of the USSR (People's Commissar K.E. Voroshilov and his deputy M.N. Tukhachevsky) addressed the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks with a special note on this issue. The document, in particular, noted the following: in the Union republics, as well as in the national republics, territories and regions of the RSFSR, the protection of state and military secrets is "absolutely unsatisfactory". The Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks adopted a resolu

"On Strengthening the Protection of State Secrets". According to this decree, the head of Glavlit (B.M. Volin) was entrusted with the duty of "authorized by the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR for the protection of state secrets." In the same resolution, measures were outlined to strengthen the protection of military secrets. The group of Glavlit of the RSFSR for the protection of state secrets was allocated to an independent department under the Commissioner of the Council of People's Commissars. In the union republics, under the chiefs of the Glavlits, corresponding structural subdivisions were created, also subordinate to the Commissioner of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR. The employees of these departments, who were called upon to protect state and military secrets, were considered to be in active military service. [144] On January 31, 1936, at a meeting of the Organizing Bureau of the Central Committee of the All-Union

Communist Party of Bolsheviks, the question of the state of affairs in the bodies of Glavlit was considered, and as a result, a draft of the corresponding resolution of the Central Committee was adopted. It was proposed to separate Glavlit and its local bodies from the Narkompros system, for which it was planned to create the Main Directorate for Censorship under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, as well as corresponding departments subordinate to it under the Council of People's Commissars of the Union and Autonomous Republics. The new structural unit was supposed, among other things, to solve the problem of preventing "the disclosure of state (military, economic, foreign policy, etc.) secrets in the press, on the radio and at exhibitions." The resolution of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks "On the work of Glavlit" also stipulated the consideration of a list of information constituting a military secret, and, in addition, it was planned to strengthen the composition of military censorship workers "who know military affairs and politically proven comrades." [145]

On October 21, 1937, the Orgburo adopted a resolution according to which censors of central newspapers were included in the nomenclature of workers approved by the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks. Accordingly, the censors of republican, regional and regional newspapers were approved by the Central Committee of the Communist Parties of the Union republics, the regional committees and regional committees, and the censors of regional newspapers were approved by the party committees. This measure was taken on the initiative of the leadership of the Department of Printing and Publishing of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks in order to "eliminate lack of control in the

work of Glavlit", as well as to "strengthen the censorship" of this department. [146] As of January 24, 1938, about 1,600 censors of district newspapers were approved by decisions of the bureaus of district committees, and about 230 censors of city, regional and republican newspapers were approved by decisions of the bureaus of regional committees, regional committees, and communist parties of the Union republics. [147] In 1938, a special institute of political editors was established, who checked the work of the censors, strictly monitoring the observance of a special "List of information constituting a state secret." [148]

By the end of the 1930s. Glavlit's control extended to 70,000 libraries, it covered about 1,800 journals. The censors have previously checked the content of almost 40,000 book titles with a total circulation of about 700 million copies. [149] The staff of Glavlit in 1938 was 5,800 people. [150] On February 9, 1923, by decree of the Council of People's Commissars of the RSFSR, the

Committee for Control over Spectacles and Repertoire was formed as part of Glavlit. In addition to the dramatic repertoire, this Committee was in charge of controlling any public spectacles and performances, be it lectures, reports, performances of pop and musical works. [151]

Later, in 1929, the Main Directorate for the Arts emerged, which, in turn, required the delimitation of the sphere of activity of this structural unit and the Repertoire Committee. On February 26, 1929, Narkompros adopted a special order on this issue. [152] The Repertoire Committee was supposed to exercise "political control over the repertoire of spectacular enterprises", without interfering, however, "in one or another interpretation or style of public performance (staging) of the work." But in practice, every now and then there was an "invasion" of him into this sphere. [153]

On February 26, 1934, the Council of People's Commissars of the RSFSR decided, firstly, to rename the Committee for the Control of Repertoire into the Main Directorate for the Control of Spectacles and Repertoire (GURK), and secondly, to transfer it to the People's Commissariat of Education of the RSFSR. In this decision

the General Provisions regulating activities, subjects of jurisdiction were stated, local bodies of the GURK were determined. [154] He was in charge of political and ideological control over the repertoire of cinema, theater, and also over the performance of musical works. Thus, the Repertoire Committee was

separated from Glavlit and turned into a structural unit division operating under the direct supervision of the People's Commissariat for Education.

The most important foreign policy department of the USSR was the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs (NKID). It included, in particular, the Press Department, which was responsible, among other things, for working with foreign correspondents. In the late 1930s The press department of the NKID also began to preview articles on international topics, which were intended for publication in the central Soviet press (except for the newspaper Pravda). [155] The Telegraph Agency of the Soviet Union, founded in 1925, was the central information

body of the USSR. In November 1934, a resolution of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks was adopted, according to which TASS was endowed with the exclusive right to disseminate foreign and public information within the country. [156]

Radio broadcasting, along with publishing activities, played an important role in the dissemination of Bolshevik propaganda. There was a whole system of central, republican and local programs with a total broadcast volume of 383 hours a day. [157] Central Radio Broadcasting, including broadcasts in 14 languages abroad, aired more than 30 printed sheets of text daily. [158] In addition, within the framework of the All-Union Committee for Radiodiffusion and Broadcasting under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR (VRK), established in 1933, the Foreign Department (Department of Inoradio) functioned. About 150 people were constantly engaged in broadcasting to foreign countries at that time. [159]

Cinema was very popular in the USSR and at the same time was, according to Stalin, "the greatest means of mass agitation." [160] More than once in his speeches he spoke about the meaning of cinema. In his opinion, each motion picture released in the USSR should have had a great social and political resonance. [161] With this in mind, Stalin and his closest associates exercised careful control over the production of motion pictures and even determined which topics Soviet filmmakers should cover in their works. [162]

The mass media tuned in to the perception of a significant contingent of people. In such conditions, the requests of small groups, and even more so of an individual, were not taken into account. Such a task was not set. In addition, the specifics of the mass media predetermined the absence of live feedback, which is characteristic of direct communication between people. It was required to additionally carry out oral agitation and propaganda work, which could not be replaced by the periodical press. It is no coincidence that oral propaganda in the late 1930s. more than 112,000 people were constantly engaged. [163]

Great was Stalin's craving for communication with writers. In turn, it was the writers who largely contributed to his exaltation. The ruling regime attached great importance to the leadership of literature and art. The intellectual elite was constantly in the field of view of the Bolshevik functionaries. Its spiritual potential was comprehensively used to promote the Soviet system and communist ideology. About 45 thousand writers, journalists, editors, as well as over 100 thousand people who belonged to "other cultural, political and educational personnel", tens of thousands of "art workers" [164] were called to participate in this difficult and in their own way dangerous activity. . [165]

The top military leadership paid special attention to political work among the personnel of the Armed Forces. People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR Marshal K.E. Voroshilov demanded that his political education be strengthened to the maximum. "We need a stubborn, well-produced

man work on the continuous political, class, party polishing of the army cadres," he said. [166] The general management of party political work in military formations and units was under the jurisdiction of the Political Directorate of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army (PURKKA), which was created in 1929 and functioned as an independent department of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks. According to the Regulations of November 22, 1934, PURKKA had the following structure. Subordinate to the head of the Political Directorate, who acted in close contact with the party commission, were 7 departments: leading party bodies; culture and propaganda of Leninism; personnel; political propaganda work in the air force; political propaganda work in armored units; political and propaganda work in the naval forces; department of supply of political education. On January 8, 1938, by the decision of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union

Communist Party of Bolsheviks, a new reorganization of the Political Directorate of the Red Army was carried out. In its composition, 9 departments began to function instead of the previous 7. The department of culture and propaganda of Leninism turned out to be divided into two: party propaganda, agitation and the press, and cultural and educational work. The Department of Political and Propaganda Work in the Naval Forces was enlarged, but two new ones arose: for work among Komsomol members and a mobilization department. PURKKA had a

powerful publishing base at its disposal. The central print organ was the newspaper Krasnaya Zvezda. In addition, the newspaper "On Guard" was published, covering the activities of mass defense organizations (since 1939, three times a week). The central newspaper "Combat Training" regularly published materials oriented to the personnel of the squad and platoon (it came out until July 12, 1941). The network of district publications was constantly growing. In 1938 there were 13 daily

newspapers of this kind, and in 1941 there were already 17. In addition, by June 22, 1941, 11 military magazines were being published. [167] The largest of them ("Propaganda and Agitator of the Red Army" and "Political Education of a Red Army Soldier") were the printed organs of the Political Directorate of the Red Army. The latter began to appear by decision of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks from February 1939 and was intended for group leaders (leaders) of political studies with personnel. [168] In 1939, its circulation was 80,000 copies. In 1939, the Organizing Bureau of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks decided to increase the circulation of the magazine by 25,000 copies. In 1939, the circulation of the magazines "Party-political work in the Red Army" and "Krasnoarmeyets" (50 thousand copies)

The army periodical press played a leading role in political propaganda work. In addition to the two central magazines and newspapers mentioned (Krasnaya Zvezda and Combat Training, with a circulation of 500-600 thousand each), [170] in April 1939, by decision of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, army newspapers began to be created. In the late 1930s In addition to 2 central, 16 district, 11 army, 3 corps, 589 newspapers of formations and educational

institutions were published. [171] On May 10, 1937, the institution of military commissars was introduced in the Red Army, who acted in all military units, from the regiment and above, in headquarters, departments and institutions. As part of the department of leading party bodies of PURKKA, there was a special department for the study of the political and moral state of commanders and commanding staff, where all the information about this category of leaders flowed. Stalin and his ideologists

ensured absolute control over the propaganda sphere. In such an environment, all innovations, political and ideological campaigns, in which the decisive role was given to propaganda, began only after the adoption by the Soviet leader of the relevant decisions, which were "voiced" by his closest associates. This created certain conditions for the stable functioning of the party-propaganda machine.

2.2 "Human factor": leaders and performers

As already noted, the system of total propaganda that reached its peak in the USSR in the second half of the 1930s was characterized by extreme centralization. The Bolshevik leadership took radical measures in this direction in order to turn it into a reliable tool for pursuing a policy of strengthening the ruling republic.

bench press.

Stalin's personnel policy resulted in the transfer of power from the old Bolshevik guard to the party youth, who advanced with his assistance. He intended not only to eliminate the potential threat from his ideological opponents and opponents through repression and intimidation, but also sought to establish himself as an autocratic dictator.

Stalin personally exercised complete control over party propaganda. In 1934 and in 1935, when distributing duties between the secretaries of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, the leader reserved for himself "observation" of the department of culture and propaganda. [172]

In the 1930s the Bolshevik ideology was actively introduced into the public consciousness, initially designed for perception by the broad masses. The Soviet leadership sought to use the postulates of Marxism-Leninism for its own purposes, to adapt them to the solution of current political problems. Stalin had a negative attitude towards the manifestation of unjustified "activity" by party functionaries, if it was not previously approved by the leadership of the Bolshevik Party in the person of the Central Committee and the Politburo. The following statement is attributed to him: "Have we heard that a Central Committee worker showed his own line, acted on his own initiative?" [173]

In addition, in the second half of the 1930s, a practice has already developed when even individual thoughts of the leader, sounded in table speeches in a narrow circle of his confidants, became key in conducting political and ideological campaigns. [174] So, on November 7, 1937, after the parade and demonstration on Red Square on the occasion of the 20th anniversary of the October Revolution, Stalin in his toasts, on the one hand, spoke in favor of the merciless destruction of "enemies of the people", "by actions and thoughts "encroaching on the "unity of the socialist state", on the other - for the "middle cadres" - party, economic, military, who, in his opinion, were the backbone of the Soviet system, ensuring the "success of the cause." Present among other Stalin's associates at the dinner, G.M. Dimitrov immediately announced that this instruction "will be taken into account in the party." [175]

During the political and ideological campaigns of the 1930s - early 1940s, propaganda structures adopted not only the fundamental statements and instructions of Stalin, but also the corresponding written and oral speeches of his closest associates. One of the main conductors of Stalin's ideas in the ideological sphere was Vyacheslav Mikhailovich Molotov (1890-1986). His father was a clerk; mother came from a wealthy merchant family. At the age of 16, Molotov (real name - Scriabin) joined the RSDLP, joined the Bolsheviks. He graduated from the Kazan real school (1908), and then studied at the economics department of the St. Petersburg Polytechnic Institute. Molotov failed to complete his university education, because he was arrested for revolutionary activities and sent into exile. Participated in the creation of the newspaper "Pravda", was its secretary (1912-1913). During the October Revolution of 1917 - an associate of V.I. Lenin, in the post-revolutionary period - one of the active supporters of Stalin, who replaced him as General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Bolshevik Party in 1922. In 1921, V.M. Molotov was elected a candidate member, and in 1926 a member of the Politburo. In 1930 he became the head of the Soviet government and was appointed chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR.

Since Molotov occupied high government posts, in the prewar years he turned out to be one of the functionaries of the Bolshevik party closest to Stalin. In his oral speeches and newspaper articles, published mainly under a pseudonym or without a signature at all, an assessment was made of the main events within the country and the foreign policy actions of the USSR. By itself, this circumstance pre-

predetermined the widespread use of the statements and instructions of V.M. Molotov in political and propaganda activities.

Undoubtedly, the desire to resist "bourgeois influence" motivated the demand made in 1940 by Molotov to the employees of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs: to directly participate in the daily ongoing propaganda on issues related to the international situation, which was conducted through the press, on the radio, in ty party education. Well informed and oriented in any change in the political situation, they were called upon to influence their readers and listeners accordingly. However, V.M. Molotov recommended that officials of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs who spoke in the press and on the radio use pseudonyms in order to prevent "undesirable speculations by foreign diplomats and journalists." [176] Molotov himself was the author of leading articles in the central Soviet newspapers, but these articles, as a rule, were printed without indicating his name. [177]

Mikhail Ivanovich Kalinin (1875-1946), who since 1938 was chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, was also involved in the leadership of propaganda activities. He was one of the Bolshevik functionaries, who, although they were useful to I.V. Stalin "by their pliability and political colorlessness," however, they never had authority with the leader. [178]

M.I. Kalinin - a peasant by origin, was educated in a rural school. At the end of the 19th century, while working as a turner at the Putilov factory, he began to engage in revolutionary activities, joined the Union of Struggle for the Emancipation of the Working Class. Since that time (1898), he was subsequently credited with the party experience. After the October Revolution, he was elected Mayor of Petrograd. At the suggestion of V.I. Lenin was replaced by the deceased Ya.M. Sverdlov as chairman of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, which he held until 1938. From December 1922 - chairman of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR. Since March 1919, a candidate, since 1926 a member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Bolshevik Party. M.I. status Kalinin corresponded to the high position he held in the USSR. At the same time, it was used as an "official sign" of the Soviet power, behind which Stalin and Molotov actually stood. However, thanks to propaganda, the image of the "all-Union headman", "grandfather Kalinin", a native of the common people, who allegedly held the reins of government in his hands, was created.

In addition to his other honorary duties as chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Armed Forces (presenting awards, congratulations on conferring titles, etc., etc.), M.I. Kalinin made presentations (including among army political workers) on issues of agitation and propaganda, met with representatives of the media. The texts of his speeches were reprinted by the central Soviet newspapers and magazines and published as separate pamphlets. The Stalinist struggle for power, which led to the end of the 1930s. to

the ousting from the political Olympus and even to the physical destruction of a number of prominent Bolshevik-Leninists, including the main "ideologists" of the party (N.I. Bukharin, G.E. Zinoviev, L.B. Kameneva, K.B. Radek and others), somewhat narrowed the circle of closest associates who acted as interpreters of the leader's fundamental ideas. Prominent figures in the management of political propaganda activities in the country since the

second half of the 1930s. were A. A. Zhdanov (1896-1948) and A. S. Shcherbakov (1901-1945). Zhdanov came from the family of an inspector of public schools. He graduated from a real school in Tver, studied at the Petrovsky-Razumovskaya Agricultural Academy. From the age of 16 he participated in the revolutionary movement. At the age of 19 he joined the RSDLP. He served in the Red Army (1918-1920), was a political worker, editor of the newspaper Tverskaya Pravda. At the age of 34 he became a member of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks. Thanks to a personal acquaintance with Stalin, Zhdanov, who worked as secretary of the Nizhny Novgorod (Gorky) provincial committee (district committee) of the CPSU (b), "went on promotion." After the death of S.M. Kirov (1934) became secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, as well as the Leningrad city and regional committees of the party. Since 1935, a candidate member of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks

In the mid-1930s, having not yet ascended the upper rungs of the party hierarchy, A.A. Zhdanov played an influential role in Stalin's circle. Zhdanov was initially entrusted with the agricultural, planning, financial, trade, and political and administrative departments, administration, and the department of executives of the Central Committee. However, he gradually began to show himself in a completely different, ideological sphere, trying to demonstrate to Stalin "an ambitious intention to establish himself in the field of leading party propaganda." [179]

In May 1934, the Politburo entrusted A.A. Zhdanov leadership in the preparation of the First Congress of Soviet Writers. It was he who made the main report at this congress, in which he directly formulated before the writers the task of serving the people, "the cause of Lenin - Stalin, socialism." Later, Zhdanov increasingly began to appear at various meetings of the creative intelligentsia, acting as a kind of Stalinist mouthpiece. So, with A.A. Andreev, he held a meeting of Soviet writers in late February - early March 1938, where the work of the SSP was discussed.

By decision of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks of April 16, 1937, Zhdanov was supposed to work in Moscow not ten days a month, as before, but one month out of two. He actively participated in the ideological support of the repressive actions of 1937-1938: he personally traveled to Bashkiria, Tataria, the Orenburg region, where he carried out a "purge" of local party bodies. Since November 27, 1938 A.A. Zhdanov was in charge of the department of agitation and propaganda of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks. His competence included "observation and control of the press and giving editors the necessary instructions." In March 1939 Zhdanov was elected a member of the Politburo. In fact, having freed Stalin from most of the current affairs in the Central Committee, he not only got the opportunity to exercise complete, almost sole control over the entire party-ideological sphere, but also began to oversee the Komsomol. [180] Probably, from that time on, the leader got into the habit of calling Zhdanov "the overseer

A.S. Shcherbakov comes from a working class family. He joined the Bolshevik Party in 1918. He received his primary education and worked at a factory. During the Civil War - at the Komsomol work in the city of Rybinsk, then - in the Central Committee of the RKSM. In 1925-1930. - under the command of A.A. Zhdanov in the Nizhny Novgorod regional party committee. It was Zhdanov who recommended Shcherbakov (his brother-in-law) to

Stalin. In 1932 A.S. Shcherbakov began working in the apparatus of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks: first as a deputy head, then as a department head. Behind him was a study at the Communist University. Sverdlov, which, however, he did not complete, but instead completed a full course of study at the Institute of Red Professors (IKP). Ultimately, Shcherbakov was included in the personnel "insurance reserve" with an eye on the leadership of party propaganda. With the support

of his "old boss" Zhdanov and on the recommendation of Stalin himself, he was appointed in 1934 the organizing secretary of the Union of Soviet Writers. This appointment could to some extent be facilitated by the appearance of A.S. Shcherbakov's interest in fiction. Although the SSP was formally headed by M. Gorky, Shcherbakov was entrusted with the solution of all administrative, economic and political issues. After the disbandment of Agitprop, he was in 1935-1936. headed the department of cultural and educational work of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks. [182] A.S. Shcherbakov could not but

irritate the Bolsheviks of the "Leninist call", in particular, A.Ya. Aroseva (1890-1938). Arosev, an active participant in the revolutionary events of October 1917 in Moscow, in 1926-1934. was the plenipotentiary of the USSR in Lithuania and Czechoslovakia. From 1934 to 1938 he was chairman of the All-Union Society for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries, and then repressed. AND I. Arosev, who at one time studied at the Faculty of Philosophy and Philology of the University of Liege (Belgium) and was fluent in several foreign languages, on March 5, 1935, recorded in his diary his impressions of the speech of the SSP General Secretary at the writers' plenum. "Shcherbakov ("not a writer," as Arosev called him), "pot-

shaking his arms and head in front of an imaginary enemy, at idle read a speech written to him on paper. When reading, he "led his finger over the text." "Everyone knew," emphasized A.Ya. Arosev, - that he is only a voice apparatus through which directives are transmitted you ... ". [183] Another old Bolshevik E.S. Varga,

Stalin's "economic adviser", described A.S. Shcherbakov as one of "the worst representatives of the autocratic bureaucracy". [184] Writer K.I. Chukovsky gave him the following description: "In terms of cultural level, he was a senior janitor ...". [185] Acting as a "voice box" for the transmission of party directives, Shcherbakov clearly "did not work well" with

the "engineers of human souls", which he frankly reported to Stalin in a letter dated January 2, 1936. [186] As a result, he was released from the leadership of the SSP. At the invitation of A.A. Zhdanov in 1936-1937. A.S. Shcherbakov served as 2nd Secretary of the Leningrad Regional Committee. On June 2, 1937, already at the initiative of G.M. Malenkov, according to the decision of the Politburo, was appointed First Secretary of the East Siberian (Irkutsk) Regional Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks. [187] In April - December 1938 - First Secretary of the Donetsk (Stalin) Regional Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, then elected First Secretary of the Moscow City and Regional Organizations of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks. Ultimately, A.S. Shcherbakov turned out to be a "compromising" figure, which suited not only A.A. Zhdanov, but also other secretaries of the Central Committee, in particular, A.A. Andreeva and G.M. Malenkov. [188] At the same time as

contemporaries testified, while in leadership positions, he combined extreme caution with a penchant for reinsurance. [189]

By the end of the 1930s. for Zhdanov and Shcherbakov, the path to the leadership of the political-ideological sphere was "cleared", since their immediate predecessors became victims of repression. This is A.I. Stetsky (1896-1938), party member since 1915, head of the department of party propaganda and agitation of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks since 1930; B.M. Tal (1898-1938), Bolshevik from 1918, in 1929-1937. successively served as deputy head of the agitation and propaganda department, head of the science sector, head of the press and publishing department of the Central Committee, member of the editorial board of the Pravda newspaper and deputy editor-in-chief of Izvestia.

As already noted, the Bolshevik leadership attached great importance to the periodical press, primarily the party press. In 1931, L.Z. became the executive editor of Pravda. Mekhlis (1889-1953), who replaced Lenin's sister M.I. Ulyanov. The fur fox belonged to the "limited circle of second-echelon leaders" from Stalin's entourage. [190] He was born in Odessa, in the family of an employee. Received home education in the amount of a full course of a real school. He started his career as a clerk, then as a teacher. In 1907 he joined the Jewish Social Democratic Labor Organization "Poalei Zion", in which he was until 1910. In 1911 he was drafted into the army and participated in the First World War (on the Southwestern Front). The revolutionary events of February and October 1917, the ensuing civil war, contributed to the involvement of L.Z. Mekhlis into active political activity. In 1918 he joined the Bolshevik Party; in the spring of 1919 he was mobilized to the front. He held the position of political commissar of a reserve marching brigade, division, army group, participated in battles in Ukraine against units of P.N. Wrangel, was seriously wounded in one of the battles.

After his recovery, he was "for special assignments" at the Revolutionary Military Council (RVS) of the Southwestern Front. Here I first met Stalin, a member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Front. The meeting with Stalin actually predetermined the further political career of Mekhlis. In 1921, while already in Moscow, he was appointed head of the office of the Council of People's Commissars, and in November he was transferred to work in the People's Commissariat of the Workers' and Peasants' Inspectorate, which was headed by Stalin, who in April 1922 became General Secretary of the Central Committee of the RCP (B.). In November 1922 L.Z. Mekhlis was appointed to the post of Assistant Secretary General. Two years later, he became Stalin's first assistant and at the same time head of the Bureau

retariat, which was subsequently transformed into a special one, and then into a secret one from the affairs of the Central Committee

of the Bolshevik Party. Thus, the former modest military commissar of the division headed an important structure engaged in the maintenance of the leading bodies of the Bolshevik Party, whose employees, according to the decision of the Central Committee of December 19, 1924, were engaged in "secret party work."

In January 1926 L.Z. Mekhlis, at his personal request, was relieved of his duties as head of the bureau of the Secretariat of the Central Committee and assistant secretary of the Central Committee and enrolled in Marxism courses at the Communist Academy. In 1930, he completed a full three-year course in the economic department of the Institute of Red Professors.

According to A.S. Aroseva, L.Z. Mekhlis was characterized by ignorance, characteristic of all newly appointed "cultural workers". [191] However, this was by no means an obstacle to Mekhlis obtaining the degree of Doctor of Economics, which was awarded to him in November 1935 by the decision of the Bureau of the Presidium of the Communist Academy ... without defending a dissertation. [192] Like A.S. Shcherbakov, who also

graduated from the IKP, L.Z. Mekhlis was among those who made up Stalin's "closest personnel reserve". Having turned into a "red professor", Mekhlis played his own role in the implementation of the leader's plans to fill the most important ideological organs of the party with his supporters. It was he who was entrusted to complete the defeat of one of the main Stalinist political opponents N.I. Bukharin. [193]

As executive editor L.Z. Mekhlis gained experience in ideological work, the skills of propagandistic indoctrination of the population. He considered the effectiveness of printed propaganda in terms of how talented people will work in the press and for the press. Mekhlis managed to attract well-known writers to work in Pravda. Fiction was considered by him as an integral part of ideology, and writers - exclusively as "workers of the ideological front."

Activities of L.Z. Mekhlis as an editor-in-chief of the central press organ of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks was duly appreciated by the Stalinist leadership. In May 1937, in connection with the 25th anniversary of the Pravda newspaper, he was awarded the Order of Lenin. September 4, by order of the Politburo L.Z. Mekhlis concurrently headed the Department of Printing and Publishing of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, replacing M.B. Tal. After the October Plenum of 1937, Mekhlis became a member of the Central Committee; he was also elected a deputy of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. On March 22, 1938, Mekhlis became a member of the Organizing Bureau of the Central

Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks. Thus, both formally and in fact, he managed to join the higher political elite.

The consequence of political repressions was the intensification of "intradepartmental fear". Chiefs and responsible persons "suddenly disappeared" from their important posts. This led to the fact that propaganda structures were filled, on the one hand, with educated people, but elementarily incompetent in the field of propaganda, and on the other hand, with poorly educated and uncultured people, and for this reason already unsuitable for political and ideological work. Such a specific and ubiquitous sphere under the

conditions of the Soviet regime as state censorship did not escape repressions. In this regard, it is impossible not to note the "fruitful" activity in this direction of Mekhlis, who "always was inclined to the most extreme measures." [194]

So, having barely taken the post of head of the department of printing and publishing of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, Mekhlis began to identify "unreliable". In October 1937, he sent Stalin, L.M. Kaganovich, A.A. Andreev, A.A. Zhdanov and N.I. Yezhov, a memorandum from which it followed that "the staff of newspaper censorship is littered with politically unreliable people." It is noteworthy that for such a conclusion, Mekhlis had

just a cursory "preliminary acquaintance" only with the censors of the central newspapers, who were summoned for this to the press and publishing department. In his opinion, of the 25 called in, at least 8 could not be trusted politically. The "doubtful" (politically unreliable) included those who had previously had connections with "enemies of the people" or were born abroad or spoke foreign languages. Among the censors of regional and district newspapers, the vigilant L.Z. Mehlis was also quick to identify those who were prone to making "political mistakes". He mercilessly denounced them for "numerous cases of divulging military secrets." [195]

Following this, the newly appointed head of the department of printing and publishing began to search for "sedition" in the leadership of Glavlit. November 22, 1937 L.Z. Mekhlis sent a note "on the political situation" in this department to the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and to the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR. The document stated that only in the previous 3 months, 11 people had been withdrawn from the central apparatus of Glavlit, including the first deputy head and head of the department of military censorship. In general, as Mekhlis emphasized, "under pressure from the press department" 60 people were fired from the central apparatus of the censorship department, of which 17 people were fired. expelled from the ranks of the CPSU (b). Mekhlis claimed that of the 19 candidacies for censors of central newspapers submitted for approval by the Central Committee, "almost half are politically dubious people." In addition, the leadership of Glavlit was blamed for: creating an atmosphere of mutual responsibility; clipping criticism and sycophancy; an instruction "on the distribution of tens of thousands of copies of lists of books to be withdrawn, indicating the name of the author." [196] It is clear why the last act was categorized by Mehlis as "criminal cases". Indeed, by sending out lists of seized literature published in mass circulation, the leadership of Glavlit actually disavowed the statements of the Soviet leadership about the existence of freedom of speech in the USSR. He did not ignore the fact of disclosure in the press, primarily through the fault of the employees of Glavlit, "the most important military secrets", in particular, permission to publish books that revealed the location of defense enterprises.

Special hostility, judging by the memorandum of L.Z. Mekhlis, the head of Glavlit S.B. Ingulov (1893-1938), who had held this post since June 1935. Mekhlis accused Ingulov of providing patronage to "enemies of the people", contributing to "clogging the apparatus", not wanting to "bolshevik" eliminate "the consequences of sabotage in Head and hide from the Party their anti-Party actions in the past. In the light of what was stated in the aforementioned memorandum, Mekhlis proposed to remove Ingulov from the post of head of Glavlit, to select a new candidate for his place with the help of the press and publishing department, and also to "cleanse the apparatus" of the censorship department "from politically dubious people." [197] As a result of the active intervention of L.Z. Mekhlis S.B. Ingulov was first released from work, and then arrested by the NKVD and repressed. His place was taken by A.S. Samokhvalov. But there were several "compromising" moments in his biography. So, in 1908-1917. he worked as a journalist in the newspaper "Nizhny Novgorod sheet". Since it was the press organ of the Cadet Party, in 1918 L.M. Kaganovich at the provincial conference in Nizhny Novgorod spoke out in favor of rejecting the candidacy of A.S. Samokhvalov as a candidate member of the provincial committee. One way or another, but Samokhvalov was appointed to Glavlit only as a "temporarily acting one." Prior to that, he served as head of the newspaper sector of Glavlit (until 1931), then, from October 1937, he was deputy to S.B. Ingulov.

Already on January 13, 1938, in his memorandum, A.E. Nikitin (subsequently, in 1939, repressed), who replaced L.Z. Mehlis, hastened to "report" to Stalin, L.M. Kaganovich, A.A. Andreev, A.A. Zhdanov, N.I. Yezhov and V.M. Molotov that A.S. Samokhvalov "by his business qualities is in no way capable, even for a short time, of standing at the head of such a purely political body as Glavlit." Nikitin made a proposal to appoint N.G. N.G. Sadchikov (1904-1967).

Sadchikov joined the Bolshevik Party in 1920. From 1920 to 1926 - at the Komsomol work. In 1929 he graduated from the komvuz there. Stalin in Leningrad, and in 1929-1931. worked in Astrakhan. In 1931-1933. studied in graduate school at the Leningrad Communist Academy, taught dialectical materialism at the Leningrad Institute of Railway Engineers. From 1933 to 1937 he was in charge of the Department of Propaganda and Agitation of the Oktyabrsky Republican Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks in Leningrad. [198]

In 1938-1939. the staff of Glavlit increased from 5800 to 6027 people, of which 4279 people. were censors. [199] However, as a result of repressions, its staff suffered very significantly. The cadres of local censorship bodies, in particular, regional commissioners of the obllit, did not escape repressions. It is no coincidence that the cultural and political training of this category of censors was at a low level. In addition, its representatives did not have practical experience in this field of activity. So, according to L.Z. Mekhlis, a certain Fedorov was appointed censor of the newspaper Industriya, who worked as a warehouse manager, a garage, had no education and turned out to be an illiterate person "in all respects." [200] The low educational level and incompetence of the censors sometimes led to curious cases. For example, on October 10, 1939, the secretary of the Leningrad Regional Party Committee reported in a memorandum addressed to A.A. Zhdanov that one of Obllit's district commissioners proposed to remove an article intended for publication in the newspaper about the work of the plant only because it mentioned turret machines. According to the censor, revolvers were made on revolving machines, and printing such material meant violating military secrets. [201]

Those "methods" of achieving nomenklatura posts that were used by L.Z. Mekhlis, A.E. Nikitin, some other functionaries, namely: writing denunciations accusing them of "political unreliability" as the main means for "eliminating" (sometimes literally) their opponents, turned out to be very effective in an atmosphere of repression. Every now and then interpersonal conflicts arose, which, according to the definition of L. Maksimenkov, "reached the level of intradepartmental hysteria." For example, the responsible head of TASS Ya.G. On February 10, 1937, Doletsky, in a letter addressed to Stalin, accused his deputy Ya.S. Khavinson that he is "mentally ill" "or insane." [202] In turn, Khavinson assured the leader in June 1937 that most of the foreign correspondents and employees of the TASS central apparatus did not inspire political confidence. Ultimately, he managed to achieve the arrest of Ya.G. Doletsky and subsequently take his leading position. [203]

As a result of the repressions, the staff of the NKID Press Department changed almost completely. The repressed professional diplomats and journalists were replaced by young employees who had already graduated or were still studying at short-term training courses at the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs. Many of them "scribbled denunciations and orated at meetings." These "shameless slanderers and careerists" periodically persecuted "objectionable" employees of the Press Department. [204]

The Stalinist leadership attached great importance to control over the state of party political work in the Red Army. Under these conditions, the activities of the Political Directorate of the Red Army acquired special significance. According to the "Regulations on the Political Directorate of the Red Army" adopted by the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR (November 22, 1934), the head of the PURKKA had broad powers in the area of his competence and had great rights. He supervised the activities of all political agencies, party and Komsomol organizations in the Red Army, the Military-Political Academy and courses for the improvement of political personnel, the organization of political studies with Red Army soldiers and junior commanding staff, the Marxist-Leninist studies of command personnel and cadets. In addition, the head of PURKKA was responsible for personnel policy, accounting, training and mobilization activities related to the political composition of the reserve, for supplying the troops of the political

the Federal Property Management Committee, carried out party-political control over publishing work in the Red Army and the Red Army press, etc., etc. [205]

L.Z. Mekhlis, who had already shown himself quite well as a reliable performer, was better suited than anyone else to lead such a responsible area of propaganda activity as political and ideological work in the Armed Forces. It is no coincidence that this particular party functionary, who possessed amazing energy and amazing capacity for work and at the same time "knew little about military affairs and did not recognize any statutory organization", [206] on December 30, 1937, by decision of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks) was approved by the Deputy People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR and the head of the Political Directorate of the Red Army with the simultaneous assignment of the rank of army commissar of the 2nd rank. L.Z. Mekhlis did not have close ties with the former army leadership, among whom the NKVD officers identified many numerous "enemies" of the people. At the same time, before the appointment of Mekhlis as the head of PURKKA, there was no person so educated and experienced in the political and ideological struggle, moreover, he was well adapted to the apparatus "games".

L.Z. Mekhlis, who replaced the repressed P.A. Smirnov, not only took the post of Deputy People's Commissar of Defense, but also became a member of the Main Military Council of the Red Army (GVS) under the People's Commissariat of Defense of the USSR. The GVS was formed by decree of the Council of People's Commissars and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks on March 13, 1938, consisting of 9 people. Since Stalin and Voroshilov were members of the Main Military Council of the Red Army, Mekhlis got the opportunity to directly go to the heights. neck political and military leadership of the country in solving priority tasks, standing in front of his department, which ultimately significantly strengthened the position of the head of the Political Directorate of

the Red Army. Having entered a new position, L.Z. Mekhlis directly faced the problem of the shortage of the political staff of the Red Army. This phenomenon was explained, firstly, by the high turnover of personnel, associated mainly with the "cleansing" of the army ranks in 1937-1938, and secondly, with the accelerated growth in the size of the Red Army and the creation of new military formations and units. From the very first days of Mekhlis's presence at the leadership of PURKKA, the leadership of PURKKA faced a twofold task: by all available means to fill the missing shortage of political workers, not forgetting the main mission that was entrusted to him by Stalin - to mercilessly eradicate and "uproot" from the ranks of the Armed Forces "enemies of the people".

The new head of PURKKA immediately set about resolving the issue of replenishing the missing cadres of political workers. January 8, 1938, by order of the Politburo G.M. Malenkov and L.Z. Mekhlis had to pick up the head of the personnel department of the Political Directorate within three days. Malenkov was also instructed to select 100 graduates of universities and the ICP for appointment to the positions of the political staff of the Red Army. Later, in order to attract more political workers to the army, the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks periodically made decisions on mass mobilization for political work in the Armed Forces, including purely civilian people. To eliminate the shortage in the middle link, political workers L.Z. Mekhlis proposed to organize a mass promotion of the most proven and competent Red Army soldiers and junior commanders, who were to work as deputies and assistants to political officers. According to him, there were at least 15-20 thousand such people. On January 20, 1938, Mekhlis applied to the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks with a request to allow this kind of nomination. At the suggestion of the Main Military Council of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, on April 1, 1938, it decided to select 5,000 of the best communists and Komsomol members - deputy political officers, enroll them in the army and navy and send them to study at courses for junior political officers. [207] Speaking at the All-Army Conference of the Komsomol organizations of the Red Army (May 1938), L.Z. Mekhlis dubbed this event "Stalin's call", which is of great historical importance for the organization of political work in the Red Army. However, the majority of those involved in political work during the "Stalinist draft" had mainly primary education, practically did not know

educational skills. As a result, unwillingness to fulfill their new duties was revealed. Mekhlis formulated the task of

"cultivating" political workers loyal to Stalin. He really made great efforts to fill the shortage of army political workers in the Red Army, but the effectiveness of his practical actions in this field was small, if we recall the goal that was formulated by the head of the PURKKA. However, this "shortcoming" in the work as the head of PURKKA L.Z. Mekhlis, it seems, more than "paid for" by implementing the Stalinist directive to "extirpate" "enemies of the people" from the army. The repressions fully affected the institution of political workers of the Red Army. It is noteworthy that the active struggle that began to liquidate the shortfall in the political composition, against which almost all the forces of PURKKA were thrown in 1938, by no means freed the political workers from the threat of repression. On the contrary, with the advent of L.Z. Mekhlis to the leadership of PURKKA, the campaign to expose the "enemies of the people" in the Red Army reached its climax. At the All-Army Conference of Political Workers (April 1938), a letter from the GVS was adopted, which was officially approved by the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks. In this document, in particular, it was emphasized that, despite the existence of the institution of military commissars, tangible results in the purge of the ranks of the Red Army

from "enemies of the people" is not achieved.

Not limited to identifying "saboteurs and spies" among the command staff of the Red Army, the Intelligence Directorate of the Red Army, Mekhlis personally led the purge of the PURKKA apparatus, starting with the personnel department. Less than 10 days remained in his post after the arrival of the new head of the Political Directorate, Brigadier Commissar M.R. Kravchenko, who was fired and immediately arrested. In his place, L.Z. Mekhlis appointed his deputy F. F. Kuznetsov (1904-1979), secretary of the Proletarian District Party Committee of Moscow, who was in the reserve of the Red Army. Kuznetsov joined the Bolshevik Party in 1926. Graduated from the Workers' Faculty (1931). Since 1937 - at party work; in 1938 he was drafted into the Red Army. Following this, N.Ya., the secretary of the PURKKA party organization, was subjected to repressions. Kotov.

The search for "enemies of the people" was actively engaged in the tenure of L.Z. Mekhlis as the head of PURKKA and in the political departments of the military districts. The heads of the political departments of the Transcaucasian, Siberian, Volga, North Caucasian, Central Asian, Kiev Special Military Districts were declared who were "hardened spy", who were "Trotskyists", who were participants in the "military fascist conspiracy" and were repressed. In parallel, a "cleansing" of the apparatus and political staff was carried out in the main and central departments of the People's Commissariat of Defense, military educational

institutions. One of the first documents signed by L.Z. Mekhlis in a new position, was a directive of January 14, 1938 on the participants of the so-called "anti-party army Belarusian-Tolmachev group." Prior to that, it was called the "internal army opposition of 1928." The priority of introducing this term into circulation belonged to the one who occupied in 1924-1929. post of head of PURKKA A.S. Bubnov (1884-1940) and belonged to the political staff of the Belarusian Military District and the communists of the Military-Political Academy named after. N.G. Tolmachev, who proposed measures to expand democratic principles in military development. Members of the "anti-party army Belarusian-Tolmachev group" were accused of anti-Soviet activities, treason, for which they were subjected to repression. L.Z. Mekhlis ordered the heads of political departments of districts, fleets, armies, military commissars and heads of political departments of formations, military academies and schools to identify all those who belonged to the "group" and make appropriate entries in their communist records, which should also be reported without fail.

Without stopping there, Mekhlis set about exposing the new "saboteurs" in the Red Army. At the All-Army Conference of Army Political Workers in April 1938, he called for another campaign to "extirpate the enemies of the people" in the Red Army. By that time, 1,100 people who made up the political staff of the Red Army had already been arrested.

But this number (5% of the entire political composition of the Red Army) seemed to Mekhlis not so significant: "enemies of the people" continued to be eradicated on an even larger scale in the Volga, North Caucasus, Central Asian and other military districts.

In accordance with the directive L.Z. Mekhlis dated May 26, 1938, a special course was introduced into the curricula of military and military-political schools, courses, military academies, divisional party and Komsomol schools, district houses of party education "On methods of combating espionage, wrecking, sabotage and terrorist activities of capitalist intelligence countries and their Trotskyist-Bukharinian agents. Each trial, according to the instructions of the head of PURKKA, was preceded by a noisy propaganda campaign in the army press.

The result of L.Z. Mekhlis for "uprooting" "enemies of the people" - 3.2 thousand people. political workers dismissed from the army only in 1938.

As already noted, in May 1937 the institute of military commissars was introduced in the Red Army. They were appointed by the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR on the recommendation of the PURKKA for political leadership and direct implementation of party political work in military units, formations, educational institutions, institutions and departments of the Red Army. Along with the commanders and chiefs, the military commissars bore full responsibility for educational work, for the political and moral state, and for the mobilization readiness of the personnel. In the field of party political work, the military commissars were charged with the responsibility of leading political agencies, party and Komsomol organizations of units and formations. They were responsible for organizing and holding the necessary party political events, for agitation and propaganda, cultural and educational activities. The commissars were obliged to systematically inform the command of units and subunits, higher political agencies about the political and moral state of the units and about measures to eliminate "negative phenomena". Together with the commanders and chiefs, they certified the commanding staff, for which they presented the appropriate political characteristics. [208] The institute of commissars was introduced, first of all, with the aim of exercising control,

supervisory functions. The priority of this function over the task of educating personnel, which also fell within their competence, was evident. It is noteworthy that such a trend was noted by the relevant authorities of the potential adversary of the USSR - Nazi Germany. In the autumn of 1938, a certificate was drawn up in the bowels of the German security police, which, in particular, stated that the duties of the political staff of the Red Army included political supervision of the army, as well as the education of the Red Army in the spirit of Bolshevik devotion to the system. [209] The orders of the People's Commissar of Defense (November 17, December 14, 1937) regulated the procedure for liquidating

the incomplete political staff of the highest and middle levels, formulated the main guidelines for conducting political work in the Red Army. At the same time, the urgent need to further strengthen the institution of military commissars was repeatedly emphasized, which was considered as the most important condition for strengthening the party political leadership and improving the education of the personnel of the Red Army. [210]

It was in the commissars that L.Z. Mekhlis supported himself in the implementation of "purges" of the command and political staff. At the All-Army Conference of political workers in April 1938, he referred to Stalin's definition: "The commissar is the eyes and ears of the party and government." He constantly reminded the commissars themselves of their duty to "verify and judge all political and command workers," including commanders. In a top secret directive of

April 17, 1938, L.Z. Mekhlis ordered the heads of political departments of districts, armies, commissars and heads of political agencies of formations, units and educational institutions twice a year (by June 1 and December 1) to submit

to include in PURKKA detailed political descriptions of the commanders of units and divisions, starting from the regiment and above, and the latter might not have known about it.

In 1935-1939, the following military ranks were introduced for the military and political composition of the Red Army: junior political instructor, political instructor, senior political instructor, battalion commissar, senior battalion commissar, regimental commissar, brigade commissar, divisional commissar, corps commissar, army commissar of the 2nd rank and army

commissar 1 -th rank. As a result of the "Stalinist call" initiated by L.Z. Mekhlis, in the ranks of the political composition, such a "hazing" position appeared as a deputy political instructor. They tried to nominate "politically reliable", "proven comrades" for this position. However, there were cases when people with not yet well-established political views and beliefs got into the lower level of the political composition of the Red Army, which was explained primarily by their ability to be careful in words and deeds, the ability to adapt to the created adverse conditions.

Here is just one example of this kind of "adaptability". In May 1939, following the "Stalin call", A.T. Semikhin, born in 1918, comes from a working-class family. Semikhin graduated from the 6th grade of elementary school, worked as an accountant at the State Bank, then, like L.Z. Mekhlis, served as a clerk. In September 1938, he was drafted into the ranks of the Red Army and, even before arriving at the place of service, joined the ranks of the Komsomol. He served in the artillery as a private in the economic unit.

A.T. Semikhin quickly realized: one should by all means avoid accusations against oneself of "political and moral instability", because, in his own words, "supervision was usually established for such". And Semikhin tried his best not only to participate in the collective reading of newspapers, magazines, other literature, listening to radio broadcasts, but also in regular attendance of various kinds of meetings and lectures. It was for this "external" diligence "that he was ultimately appointed deputy political instructor. By his own admission, A.T.

Semikhin, as a rule, Red Army soldiers were appointed to this position, from whom little was required: to be able to "read newspapers, literature, organize games, performances." At the same time, the deputy political commissar did not have any administrative rights and was only forced to follow "instructions and orders of the unit's political hand." [211]

Contradictions of the era of the 1930s affected the mode of action of people involved in party propaganda work. Demonstration of commitment to the idea, readiness to sacrifice personal interests were combined with manifestations of opportunism and conformism. In an atmosphere of systematic exposure of "enemies of the people" and spy mania, such qualities as callousness and careerism were formed.

Propaganda activities were corrected by party resolutions and instructional letters, which indicated not only the general direction, but also the smallest details of ideological work. From the late 1920s to the late 1930s. More than 30 resolutions of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks were adopted on issues of propaganda. Petty guardianship was carried out, gross interference in the affairs of the editorial offices of periodicals, which led to throwing employees from side to side. All this deprived propaganda of maneuverability, flexibility and efficiency. A type of political propagandist was being formed who could not take a single step without receiving guidance from "above". [212]

Under the conditions of the Stalinist regime, there was a specific perception of propaganda attitudes, including those related to preparations for war, which were introduced into the public consciousness. It depended not only on the intensity of the ongoing political and ideological campaigns, but was largely determined by the intellectual level and life experience of those for whom it was designed. And sometimes even those people who were appointed to carry out the most important "instructions of the party and government", daily encountering difficult problems and discovering a "gap" between propaganda

declarations and realities of life, were imbued with doubt and gradually turned into "politically unreliable".

This happened, for example, with the already mentioned low-level army political worker, assistant political instructor A.T. Semikhin. Having been called up for military service, he, in his words, "observed the methods of education in the army, the mood of the command and rank and file, their attitude to propaganda." These observations, accumulated life experience, forced him to draw a disappointing conclusion that "everything in the USSR was built on a counterfeit coin." Semikhin met people everywhere who were not happy with the Soviet regime, but were afraid to admit it out loud. There was a change of concepts. So, parents-collective farmers wrote letters to the Red Army men drafted into the Red Army about the lack of food, about a half-starved existence. Propaganda convinced these same Red Army men that both their parents and they themselves lived "a wonderful life of the 'Stalin era'". This contradiction between the propaganda attitudes of army political workers and real life, according to A.T. Semikhin, was only one of "millions of such injustices." However, to speak frankly about one's bitter thoughts meant "to go under execution." But he was simply unable to give up "the thoughts that had arisen". [213]

Thus, Stalin and the political and ideological apparatus under his control sought to ensure absolute control over the propaganda sphere. In the current situation, all innovations in which propaganda was assigned a decisive role were introduced only after the Soviet leader made the appropriate decisions, which were "voiced" by himself and his closest associates. This created the conditions for the stable functioning of the party propaganda machine. A serious test of this stability and a peculiar way of testing the reliability and loyalty of the cadre were: the participation of the Red Army in the hostilities in the Far East, against Poland and Finland, as well as during a short rapprochement with Nazi Germany.

CHAPTER THREE METAMORPHOSIS OF "GENERAL WAR"

3.1. "Capitalist Encirclement": Words and Deeds of the Bolshevik Leadership

In the early 1920s Soviet military-theoretical thought paid great attention to the development of the so-called "unified military doctrine". It was the doctrine of revolutionary offensive war, designed to ensure the victory of the world revolution. The main role in its creation belonged to M.V. Frunze. He argued that in view of the impossibility of a long peaceful coexistence of the proletarian state with the capitalist powers, the working class, with the help of the Red Army, would inevitably go over to the offensive against international capital when favorable conditions developed for this. Revolutionary wars, according to Frunze, must have a class character and approach civil wars in their type, since the offensive of the Red Army will provide it with all possible assistance and support from the working people of the capitalist countries. She played the role of a decisive force in achieving victory. Frunze demanded that every Red Army soldier in this direction should be educated in proletarian ideology and clearly realize that "under certain conditions" an offensive "beyond" the USSR is possible. Having taken the post of Chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR and People's Commissar for Military and Naval Affairs (January 1925), M.V. Frunze made it clear that the defensive orientation was given to the foreign policy of the USSR out of tactical considerations and depended on the specific historical situation. But the main strategic line remained "the transformation of our isolated revolution into a world revolution."

Stalin, most likely, shared a similar view of the military-political strategy. In particular, he spoke of the fact that after October 1917 the era of the world proletariat began.

Tara revolution, when the absence of objective conditions in individual countries no longer is an insurmountable obstacle to its accomplishment, since the system of the world imperialist economy "on the whole has already matured." [214] Stalin not only emphasized the special interest of the USSR in the development of the world revolution, but also designated it as an essential task, without the solution of which it is impossible to guarantee the Soviet country from the restoration of the bourgeois order and ensure the final victory of socialism in it. In accordance with this, he also determined

the strategic goal, which, in contrast to the frequently changing tactics, had to remain unchanged until it was achieved. According to Stalin, the dictatorship of the proletariat in the USSR should have been used "as a stronghold for overcoming imperialism in all countries", [215] and its army as an instrument for the liberation of the working people. The party of the proletariat, in order to play the role of a military headquarters, must arm itself with revolutionary theory and be able to seize the favorable moment. He considered the imperialist war as such a moment, which is "remarkable" in the sense that it "leads to the mutual weakening of the imperialists, to the weakening of the position of capitalism in general, to the approaching moment of the proletarian revolution, to the practical necessity of this revolution." [216]

The coming to power in Germany of the National Socialists led by Hitler (1933), the threat to peace posed by fascism, and the intensified militarization of Japan prompted representatives of the ruling Bolshevik elite to reassess the events taking place in the international arena.

In open public speeches by Stalin and his closest associates, the main focus was on the fact that it is imperialism that threatens the world with a new war, while the Soviet Union strictly adheres to the policy of peace and in no case thinks of attacking anyone. This thesis was "voiced" at the XVII Congress of the CPSU (b) (1934). General Secretary of the Central Committee Stalin outlined the general picture of the international situation that had developed at that time. The war unleashed by Japan against China aggravated the situation in the Far East. The victory of National Socialism (fascism) in Germany, the triumph of revanchist ideas led to increased contradictions in Europe. Finally, the withdrawal of Japan and Germany from the League of Nations served as a new impetus to the growth of armaments and the preparation of a new war. Stalin stated that under the conditions that had arisen bourgeois pacifism was "dragging out a miserable existence", "breathing its last", while the capitalist states were rapidly arming themselves. "Things are clearly heading for a new war," he concluded. [217]

The war was seen by Stalin as a way out of the political and economic crisis for capitalism. He did not rule out the possibility of unleashing it against the USSR. Such a development of events was even regarded by him as favorable, because after the attack on the Soviet Union, as Stalin believed, one should have expected the masses of the people of the capitalist countries to act in the rear of "their oppressors". He expressed confidence that the war against the Soviet Union "would lead to the complete defeat of the attackers, to revolution in a number of countries in Europe and Asia, and to the defeat of the bourgeois-landlord governments of these countries." [218]

At the 17th Congress of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, Stalin declared that in the face of the growing military threat, the USSR intended to adhere to the policy of peace. At the same time, any attempt to attack the Soviet Union, according to him, must inevitably be followed by a crushing rebuff to the aggressors, "so that from now on it would not be habitual for them to stick their pig's snout into our Soviet

garden." [219] Stalin was echoed by V.M. Molotov. Speaking at the 17th Congress of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, he noted that "in connection with the situation in the Far East" it is necessary to strengthen "vigilance and readiness to defend the great gains of the October Revolution." "Steadily pursuing a policy of peace and strengthening peaceful cooperation with other states," stressed

head of the Soviet government, - at the moment we must show special concern for the combat capability of our glorious Red Army. [220]

Based on the Stalinist concept, the danger to the USSR was not individual foreign powers (for example, Germany or Japan), but the entire foreign world ("capitalist encirclement"). Trying at a meeting of workers in the defense industry (June 14, 1934) to clarify the meaning of this term, Stalin, in particular, stated: "... we have a capitalist environment, which means that we are surrounded by enemies, enemies civilized and more cultured than we are, experienced enemies who will stop at nothing. [221]

The political and ideological campaigns carried out in the 1930s were double-edged in their content. To act openly meant to aggravate relations with the capitalist world. Therefore, Stalin and his entourage had to be careful not to inadvertently provoke anti-Soviet diplomatic or, worse, armed actions on the part of the object of such campaigns.

Soviet-German relations were rather complex and ambiguous after the victory in Germany of the National Socialist Party led by A. Hitler. March 29, 1935 M.N. Tukhachevsky, who served as Deputy People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR, completed work on the manuscript of the article, which he called "Hitler's military plans." The main pathos of Tukhachevsky's article was aimed primarily at exposing the aggressive anti-Soviet plans of the Nazi leadership. M.N. Tukhachevsky declared the following: "... the ruling circles of Germany direct the main arrow of their operations against the USSR." [222] Here it is appropriate to note that the

dismissive attitude of V. Suvorov (V. B. Rezun) to the sources on which he builds the narrative made itself felt in the form of a superficial, subjective-emotional analysis of the mentioned article by Tukhachevsky. Rezun remained in the dark about the fact that M.N. Tukhachevsky has undergone significant editing, which was introduced by Stalin. The leader changed the title of the article, "removed" 12 paragraphs of text written by the main author, and instead inserted his own passages. As a result, Tukhachevsky's judgments, which reflected his geostrategic concept, were withdrawn. Their place was taken by Stalin's statements, sometimes diametrically opposed to those set out in the original version of Tukhachevsky's manuscript. On behalf of a well-known military leader, well informed about the mood of the political leadership of Germany and the immediate plans of the Reichswehr, the conclusion was declared that the anti-French orientation of Hitler's foreign policy was prioritized over the anti-Soviet one. [223] Not knowing about the "co-authorship" of Stalin in writing the mentioned article, V. Suvorov, as it seems, completely in vain, directed all his sarcasm precisely against M.N. Tukhachevsky, exposing him as a kind of "uninvited adviser", who allegedly "allowed himself a lot", giving "valuable instructions to foreign states." [224]

On March 31, 1935, the article "Military Plans of Modern Germany" with radical Stalinist corrections appeared in Pravda. Protests immediately followed from the German ambassador to Moscow, Schulenburg, and the German military attache Hartmann, in which the name of Tukhachevsky sounded in a negative way. [225]

Meanwhile, Stalin, despite the aggravation of political relations with Germany, did not speed up the anti-Nazi propaganda campaign. Moreover, at a reception in the Kremlin for leaders and workers of the People's Commissariat of Railways (July 30, 1935), he called Hitler ... a talented person. [226] However, in the second half of the 1930s, in the face of growing aggressive tendencies in German foreign policy, this campaign was eventually launched in full. In the 1930s the old generation

of the Soviet elite, the Bolsheviks of the "Leninist guard", many of whom were repressed as "enemies of the people", were replaced by Stalin's "nominees". These energetic and ambitious people of young and middle age

Rastas were predominantly of proletarian or peasant origin, which, under Soviet conditions, undoubtedly contributed to career growth. Some of them were sent to party, Komsomol, economic work, others formed the basis of the command and political composition of the Red Army. Stalin and his closest associates were well aware of the

important role of the Armed Forces in the conditions of the impending war, when the Soviet Union practically entered the pre-mobilization period. The Bolshevik leader wanted to see their rank and file and commanders devoted not only to the "cause of defending the socialist Fatherland", but also to himself personally. For this, various methods were used. People with whom Stalin had been associated in the service since the time of the Civil War were appointed to the highest command positions. He gave special preference to the "first horsemen" - colleagues of 1919-1920. by the First Cavalry Army of the Southwestern Front. The "first horsemen" (K.E. Voroshilov, S.M. Budyonny, A.I. Egorov and others) gradually formed the leading backbone of the People's Commissariat for Military and Naval Affairs, displacing from command positions the adherents of the first head of the Soviet military department L .D. Trotsky.

Much attention was paid to the quantitative and qualitative growth of the command, technical and political staff of the Red Army. The network of military educational institutions and, in particular, academies, expanded. By the beginning of the 1930s. There were 6 military academies in the country. In Moscow, the training of senior and senior commanders was carried out in the Academies: them. M.V. Frunze, Air Force of the Red Army. NOT. Zhukovsky. In Leningrad, this task was carried out by: Military-technical, Military-political them. Tolmacheva (in 1938 transferred to Moscow), Military Engineering, Military Medical. CM. Kirov academy

missions.

The reorganization of the Soviet Armed Forces, the improvement of their technical equipment in the conditions of the impending war required the training of a large number of highly qualified commanders for the armored, chemical, engineering troops, signal units of the Red Army and, of course, the political staff. New military academies were created. In Moscow - Motorization and mechanization. Stalin, Military chemical them. K.E. Voroshilov, Military engineering them. V.V. Kuibyshev (all of the above - in 1932), the General Staff. K.E. Voroshilov (1936), the Air Force command and navigators of the Air Force (1940), the Air Force named after. A.F. Mozhaisky (1941), Military Transport named after. L. M. Kaganovich (transferred to Leningrad in 1938), Artillery im. F. E. Dzerzhinsky; Military legal; Military veterinary. The following academies have opened in Leningrad: CM. Budyonny (1932), Naval them. K.E. Voroshilov, Air Force; in Kharkov - Military economic (1935); in Kuibyshev - Military medical. In 1938, about 6,000 people were admitted to study at the military academies. [227]

In 1918, after two hundred years of being the second Russian capital, Moscow again received the status of the first capital, but of a new one, of the Soviet state (since 1922 - the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics). The orgy of destruction during the Civil War and the period of the Bolshevik campaign to destroy the monuments of the hated tsarist era, fortunately, did not affect the Grand Kremlin Palace. It was here in the early 1930s. breakfasts began to be practiced, which were arranged on behalf of the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR - the Collegium of the People's Commissariat for Military and Naval Affairs. Chairman of the RVS in 1924-1934. was the People's Commissar for Military and Naval Affairs, Stalin's closest associate (in the literal and figurative sense) K.E. Voroshilov.

Every year on May 1 (the day of the International Workers' Solidarity), a kind of review of the combat skills and technical equipment of the fighters and commanders of the Red Army was held on Red Square - grandiose military parades. Also every year, at the beginning of May, the ceremony of the next graduation of students of military academies took place in the Kremlin. By the beginning of the 1930s. it became customary to invite the participants of the May Day parades, and after them the graduates of the military academies ("military academics") to the Kremlin

for breakfasts accompanied by a small concert program. The parade participants were honored with such an honor the day after it was held (May 2). The "military academies" who were present at the graduation ceremony filled the front halls of the Grand Kremlin Palace immediately after its official part was completed (as a rule, it took place on May 4 or 5). This is where the feasts were held. In a relaxed atmosphere, the Red Army soldiers and commanders had the opportunity to communicate with the leaders of the Bolshevik Party and the Soviet government.

The initiator of the organization of breakfasts in the Kremlin for the rank and file and officers of the Red Army was K.E. Voroshilov, who in the early 1930s actually played the role of a full owner on them. Stalin, other members of the Politburo of the Central Committee, representatives of the Soviet leadership were guests at these feasts, albeit honorary ones. They stayed at the "Voroshilov breakfasts" for only 2-3 hours (feasts that began at noon lasted, as a rule, until 17 hours), and then, without waiting for the end, they left.

At the same time, Stalin did not miss the opportunity of direct communication with representatives of the military elite at these Kremlin feasts in order to present his own vision of the prospects for the development of the Armed Forces. Of particular interest is Stalin's brief drinking speech addressed to the participants of the May Day parade, who gathered in the Grand Kremlin Palace on May 2, 1933. In it, the Russian nation was called "the main nationality of the world", since it was she who made the greatest contribution to the creation of the Bolshevik state. Stalin allowed himself a short digression into the past, mentioning that the Russians sometimes suffered defeat in battles with their opponents. The Soviet government, he stressed, is doing everything to increase the combat capability of its Armed Forces. Stalin expressed confidence that if the Russians, whom he regarded as an advanced, talented nation, were provided with modern tanks, combat aircraft, and a powerful navy was created, they would be invincible. [228]

Later, on May 2, 1934, the Soviet leader again addressed the representatives of the military elite at the next "Voroshilov breakfast" in honor of the participants in the festive parade on Red Square. About 2,000 people arrived in the Kremlin to meet "party leaders and government members with participants in the May Day parade", representing all types of troops. In his table speech on May 2, 1934, Stalin consistently expressed the desire to strengthen the combat power of tankers, artillerymen, and infantrymen. The leader paid special attention to military pilots. Aviators were presented in large numbers at the aforementioned Kremlin feast. On the eve of May 1, more than 500 combat aircraft participated in the parade. At the helm of the heavy flagship bomber TB-3 was the head of the Red Army Air Force Ya.I. Alksnis, who received personal praise from the leader. [229] At a breakfast in the Kremlin on May

2, 1934, Stalin outlined his vision of the prospects for the development of Soviet military aviation, which had already passed the stage of formation. The leader expressed the hope that in the near future it would be possible to achieve an increase in the speed and altitude indicators of Soviet short-range bombers, fighters and reconnaissance aircraft. He also pointed out the need to improve the tactical and technical data of long-range aviation. Addressing Alksnis, Stalin urged him to "fight" for this task "for real".

Then Stalin noted those personal qualities that, in his opinion, aviators should have. He talked about the need to instill in them not just courage, but "prudent Bolshevik courage", a combination of a solid knowledge of military equipment with a deep understanding of the laws of nature, the ability to master these laws. Some pilots, Stalin further emphasized, in an emergency seek first of all to save not themselves, but the entrusted machine, "consider it shameful to use a parachute." And he declared that human life, the life of a pilot, is much more valuable than hundreds of aircraft. [230]

In June 1934, the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR was abolished, and the People's Commissariat for Military and Naval Affairs was renamed the People's Commissariat of Defense of the USSR, which was headed by K.E. Voroshilov. 1

December 1934 in Leningrad, a member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, a close friend of Stalin S.M., fell at the hands of an assassin. Kirov. In January 1935, the NKVD began the so-called "Yenukidze Case" (or the "Klubok" case). The task of the investigation was to prove the existence of a conspiracy to physically eliminate Stalin and other representatives of the narrow Soviet leadership. While the investigation was underway, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks approved on February 14, 1935 (on the proposal of the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs G.G. Yagoda) the decision "On the protection of the Kremlin." It was aimed at improving the entire security system of government buildings, as well as members of the Politburo and the Soviet government living in the Kremlin.

If until February 1935 the Central Executive Committee of the USSR and the People's Commissariat of Defense were responsible for security on the Kremlin territory and at the same time controlled the situation there, now the "stronghold of power" has completely fallen under the control of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs, which was gaining strength and completely subject to Stalin. The Kremlin became a kind of Stalinist stronghold, which was reliably guarded by employees of this punitive department.

Under the created conditions, K.E. Voroshilov, who was actually deprived of the opportunity to arrange feasts in the Kremlin for representatives of the military elite solely on his own initiative, decided to "ventilate" the situation. On April 19, he sent a note to the members of the Politburo and personally to Stalin with the following content: "In past years, the May graduation of the Military Academies was held in Moscow in the Kremlin in the presence of members of the Politburo and the Government. In May of this year, 1076 people graduate from the Academies, of which 145 people are located in Leningrad (sic. - **V.N.**). I would consider it necessary this year, according to the established tradition, to graduate the Academies in the Kremlin (May 4)." [231] Although this note by the Commissar of Defense was marked "Urgent", Stalin and other members of the Politburo for some reason did not find time to consider it until 28

April.

The day before, on April 27, the highest party body adopted a decision, also concerning representatives of the Soviet military elite: "On the reception by the Party and the Government of the troops participating in the May Day parade." Unfortunately, the initiative document that served as the reason for its adoption could not be identified. Most likely, here we can also talk about the "hand of Voroshilov."

The mentioned decision of the Politburo was formulated as follows: "To recognize as expedient the organization of the reception by the party and the government on May 2 in the Grand Kremlin Palace of representatives of the troops participating in the May parade (pilots, tankers, artillerymen, cavalrymen and other branches of the armed forces) in a total number of up to 1500 people ". [232] Stalin made a minor

correction to the originally submitted draft resolution of the Politburo, which, however, had an important semantic load. After the words "organization of the reception," the leader wrote in red pencil: "party and." Thus, attention was focused on the fact that the reception of participants in the May Day parade in the Kremlin is organized on the initiative of the Bolshevik Party, of which he was the leader, and the Soviet government, headed by one of his closest associates V.M. Hammer This was reflected in the aforementioned decision of the Politburo of 27 April.

The next day, the request of People's Commissar of Defense K.E. Voroshilov, set out in his note of April 19. On April 28, the Politburo adopted the following decision on this issue: "Produce graduation from the Military Academies in the Kremlin on May 4." [233]

Thus, at the end of April 1935, the highest party body adopted two most important resolutions that actually legitimized the already established tradition of organizing feasts for the command and rank and file of the Red Army. First, their status has risen significantly. Such feasts officially became known **as receptions** . In the resolution of the Politburo, it was recorded that from now on, not the People's Commissariat of Defense, but exclusively the leadership of the Bolshevik Party and the Soviet government, headed by

Stalin could act as organizers and hosts, i.e., **receive** representatives of the military elite.

Secondly, by the decisions of the Politburo of April 27 and 28, 1935, the venue for such receptions was the Grand Kremlin Palace.

The central press reacted accordingly to the important changes in the status of the Kremlin feasts. For example, Pravda published the following information: "May 2, at 6 pm, *in the halls of the Grand Kremlin Palace*, a reception was held for parade participants, **hosted by the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the government of the USSR** (highlighted by me. **V.N.**)". A report on this feast was published in the newspaper under the characteristic headline: "Participants of the May Day parade at a reception in the Kremlin on May 2, 1935." [234] Later, the newspaper described in detail "the reception of graduates of the military academies of the Red Army, hosted by the Central Committee of the CPSU (b)

and the government of the USSR" on May 7, 1939. [235] From May 1935 to May 1941, 14 banquets were held in honor of representatives of the Soviet military elite. On May 2, 1935, May 2, 1936, May 2, 1937, May 2, 1938, May 5, 1939, May 2, 1940 and May 2, 1941, participants of May Day parades acted as guests. On November 8, 1938, November 8, 1939 and November 8, 1940 - participants in parades in honor of the next anniversary of the October Revolution. May 4, 1935, May 5, 1936, May 7, 1939, May 5, 1941 large Kremlin receptions were

held in honor of graduates of military academies. The guests at the banquets were the best of those who participated in the May Day parades, mostly people who had made service in the Red Army or in the Navy their profession. At the same time, one fundamental principle of such selection was invariably respected: those invited to the reception at the Kremlin represented all branches of the military. As the aforementioned resolution of the Politburo of April 27, 1935, prescribed, Stalin's feasts in the Grand Kremlin Palace were invariably present: pilots, tankers, artillerymen, infantrymen, cavalrymen, sailors. Central newspapers noted that representatives of "all types of weapons" were invited to the reception on May 2, 1935 - more than 1,700 "Red Army soldiers and commanders." [236] A similar task of

selecting the most worthy had to be solved in the case of participants in traditional Kremlin receptions for graduates of the military academies of the Red Army. In 1935 their number reached 1076 people, in the next year it exceeded 2000 people, [237] and then continued to grow steadily. Banquets were quantitatively dominated by those who had been trained in Moscow. And "military academicians" from other cities of the USSR were represented by a small group of students who graduated with honors.

In May 1935, Stalin twice spoke at large Kremlin receptions in honor of representatives of the military elite. On May 2, he attended a banquet for participants in the May Day parade. Executive editor of the newspaper "Izvestia" N.I. Bukharin devoted an editorial to this momentous event. It contained enthusiastic epithets addressed to Stalin and his inner circle. Here, for example, as described by N.I. Bukharin the appearance of the "Soviet leader and his associates" in the St. George Hall of the Grand Kremlin Palace: "And suddenly applause that grows like a storm, covers everything, turns into a hurricane, into thunder, into a raging element of joy and delight. This includes members of the Politburo and the allied government headed by Stalin, to whom the cries of welcome from almost two thousand masses of fighters rush from all sides. The entire apotheosis of the grandiose action that unfolded on May 2, 1935 in the Grand Kremlin Palace was conveyed in Bukharin's note: "The leader rises from his seat, his comrades-in-arms follow him: members of the Central Committee and the government go around all the halls ... Dozens of hands reach out to Stalin. They raise him on the table (sic! - **V.N.**), first in one, then in another, then in the third hall - for the mass of fighters is boundless ... The fighters crowd around him, as if they want to physically touch him, to feel the full force of that powerful charge of the mind, energy, will, which are radiated in

all sides of this amazing, dearly loved person. Human waves pick it up...". [238]

At the end of the reception, addressing the representatives of the military elite, Stalin proclaimed a toast in honor of the fighters and commanders of all military branches. He proposed a toast "to the health of fearless submariners, well-aimed gunners, brave tankers, courageous pilots ... brave cavalymen, brave foot soldiers consolidating the victory." [239]

Stalin's drinking speech before the graduates of the military academies of the Red Army, pronounced on May 4, 1935 at a reception in the Kremlin for graduates of the military academies, had a great resonance, the main content of which is reflected in the famous slogan "Cadres decide everything!". A logical question may arise: why, addressing the graduates of military academies, did Stalin in this speech focus mainly on the problem of "educating cadres" and describe in detail the state of the Soviet economy? Indeed, only in the final part of his lengthy speech did he finally offer to drink to the "highest command cadres" of the Red Army, wishing them every success in organizing the defense of the country. [240] The answer is simple: among the thousand and a half graduates of military academies in 1935 [241], more than half were engineers, of which 80% were sent not to the troops, but to work in industry. [242] In his greeting addressed to them, M.I. Kalinin, in particular, emphasized: "... you, comrades, are not just engineers, but military engineers." [243]

Explaining to the "military academicians" why his speech was so lengthy, Stalin stated bluntly that he had previously been absent from their traditional graduation in the Kremlin two or three times and now wanted to "catch up on lost time." [244] Attention should also be paid to the following circumstance. Stalin, most likely, needed a familiar audience, the basis of which was representatives of the elite of the Red Army, in order to address them at the Kremlin reception with a **keynote speech**, which (unfortunately, this fact is forgotten in some historical studies) took the form of a fundamental table **speech**.

Among other things, this table speech can be considered inaugural, i.e. fixing the final stage of Stalin's assertion as the sole leader of the party and state. By that time, undoubted successes had also been achieved in the international arena, which were consolidated by the Soviet-French treaty of May 2, 1935. And Stalin hoped not just to once again demonstrate the unity of his party comrades-in-arms. Perhaps he also wanted to be convinced of the real existence of his **unity**, as a leader, with the masses. The Kremlin reception on May 4, 1935 showed that there was ground for such unity. The pre-edited text of Stalin's speech to the graduates

of the military academies ("Cadres decide everything!") was repeatedly published and became one of the fundamental ones in propaganda work among the personnel of the Red Army. So, on July 31, 1935, the Organizing Bureau of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks approved a resolution on a higher school for propagandists. The list of literature recommended for applicants to the Higher School of Economics also included the publication of Stalin's speech at the graduation of "military academicians" on May 4, 1935. .IN. Adoratsky turned to Stalin with a request to include this previously published text in a new edition - a one-volume of his speeches, to which consent was obtained. [246] From the certificate of Partizdat dated February 4, 1938, submitted to the Central Committee, it follows that only in 1937 the above-mentioned text was repeatedly reprinted with a total circulation of 50,000 copies. [247] From May 1935 to May 1941 Stalin he was invariably

present at all the big Kremlin receptions in honor of representatives of the military elite (participants in festive parades and graduates of the academies of the Red Army). However, after the famous speech "Cadres decide everything!" until May 5, 1941, he never again addressed them at such feasts with fundamental speeches.

This "gap" was more than compensated for by repeated speeches at various meetings and party forums. Thus, during the February-March Plenum of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks in 1937, Stalin considered it necessary to pay attention to the question of the inevitability of an armed clash with the "capitalist encirclement." He recalled, in particular, that Soviet power had won only in the USSR, which occupied 1/6 of the land, and that the remaining 5/6 of it "constitute the possessions of the capitalist states." In this regard, Stalin criticized those Bolsheviks who, carried away by economic construction, forgot about the existence of a "capitalist encirclement", calling it the main factor determining the international position of the Soviet Union, which is of "paramount importance" for the destinies of the country.

The Soviet leader was sure that attacks on the USSR from the "bourgeois countries" could be expected at any moment. The latter, in his words, are just waiting for an opportunity to start an intervention against the Soviet Union with the aim of "breaking it or, in any case, undermining its power or weakening it." Judging by the content of his speech at the February-March plenum of 1937, he associated precisely with this the activation of "saboteurs, spies and murderers" who were sent into the USSR from outside or were recruited by foreign intelligence services inside the country. After all, Stalin concluded, all of them usually dated their "main work" precisely "to the period on the eve of the war or the war itself." [248] In February

1938, in response to a letter from I.F. Ivanov, Stalin again pointed out the danger of "capitalist encirclement". The leader emphasized (for the umpteenth time) that there continues to be a threat of military intervention against the USSR from outside, which can only be denied by "bunglings or hidden enemies" who seek to "demobilize the people." [249]

All these and other such Stalinist speeches and declarations were combined with attempts to show that there were serious contradictions within the "capitalist encirclement", which had already led to the beginning of an armed clash between the major powers. As already noted, at the 17th

Congress, Stalin designated two hotbeds of war in the world, named two states responsible for its actual unleashing - Japan and Germany. This thesis was comprehensively developed and concretized in the Short Course on the History of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks (1938), written with his active participation. According to the version of the authors of this book (more precisely, in Stalin's interpretation), international relations in late 1935 and early 1937 were characterized by the following main trends. In the Far East, first of all, "thanks to the Japanese fascist imperialists" (sic! - **V.N.**), the first hotbed of war was formed. The second hotbed of military danger arose through the fault of the German fascists in the center of Europe. [250]

The capture of Abyssinia by Italy (1935) led to the emergence of a new "node of war", which developed "on the shortest sea routes from Europe to Asia." [251] The intervention of Germany and Italy against Republican Spain, begun in 1936, the Anschluss of Austria, carried out by Hitler in March 1938, led to the fact that "in the south of Europe, in the region of Austria and the extreme west" of the European continent "new knots of war were tied up". Finally, the invasion of Japanese troops into China, which began in 1937, led to the emergence of another "node of war."

All these facts, skillfully selected in the "Short Course ...", gave Stalin reason to conclude that "the second imperialist war has in fact already begun." [252] Not without internal satisfaction, he stated the following important circumstance: the "second imperialist war" was unleashed by aggressive states - Germany, Italy and Japan, and it was waged in the final analysis "against the capitalist interests of England, France, the USA." The main goal of the new war is "the redistribution of the world and spheres of influence in favor of aggressive countries," carried out "at the expense of ... the so-called democracies."

ratic states. The "democratic" states, primarily England, fearing the "workers' movement in Europe and the national liberation movement in Asia", and also considering fascism a "good antidote" against these "dangerous movements", sought to limit themselves to the policy of "persuading the presumptuous fascist ordered." However, Stalin and his co-authors of the "Short Course ..." expressed confidence that such tactics would not lead to anything good and, in the end, "the ruling circles of England and their friends in France and the USA" would have to receive "their historical retribution." At the same time, the "Short Course ..." contained a warning about the danger of a "second imperialist war" for the USSR.

The book also gave an official assessment of the position of the Soviet Union in the current situation. The USSR, it emphasized, while pursuing its peaceful policy, at the same time did everything in its power to strengthen its borders, strengthen the defense capability of the Red Army and Navy. These events were combined with some diplomatic steps, such as the entry of the USSR into the League of Nations (1934), the conclusion of agreements with France, Czechoslovakia (1935), the MPR (1936) on mutual assistance, and the signing of an agreement on non-aggression with China (1937). [253]

Such was the interpretation of the events of the second half of the 1930s, connected with the genesis of the Second World War, in the presentation of the "Short Course in the History of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks" or, rather, according to Stalin. It was intended for the perception of the many millions of the population of the Soviet Union. This is exactly how the leader and his closest associates interpreted what was happening in the international arena in their open speeches.

At the same time, Stalin was well aware that diplomatic demarches in no way exempted from participation in the war. As early as June 13, 1934, i.e., before the USSR joined the League of Nations and before the signing of treaties with France and Czechoslovakia, speaking at a meeting of workers in the defense industry, he stated literally the following: "When they say that the danger of war exists - it's not a phrase. The fact that we conclude pacts does not exclude war, but vice versa. [254] Later, in the "Short Course of the History of the CPSU(b)", the League of Nations was called "some, albeit weak, instrument of peace", the Soviet Union joined it, fully aware of its weakness. [255] An editorial in the newspaper Pravda on September 9, 1938, devoted to the publication

of the Short Course in the History of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, emphasized that "our struggle is far from over. We are facing decisive battles for the final victory of socialism against the capitalist encirclement...". [256] In this regard, the significance of the "Short Course ..." was seen in the fact that it "arms our leading cadres with the theory of Marxism-Leninism ... and strengthens confidence in the final victory of the great cause of the party of Lenin-Stalin, the victory of communism throughout the world". [257] September 30 - October 1, 1938 in Munich, representatives of Germany, Italy, England and France signed an agreement that actually

predetermined the fate of Czechoslovakia. The USSR was not invited to the meeting of the Munich Conference. At the beginning of October from

The Soviet leadership passed it on through diplomatic channels, which has nothing to do with the agreements reached in Munich. [258]

Meanwhile, as early as the summer of 1938, military measures were taken in the USSR in connection with the Czechoslovak crisis. Firstly, at the end of July 1938, the Belarusian Military District (BVO) and the Kiev Military District (KOVO) were respectively renamed into special military districts. 6 army groups were concentrated on their territory. Secondly, new military districts were created at the same time - Orlovsky and Kalininsky.

During the Czechoslovak crisis, according to the directive of the People's Commissar of Defense K.E. Voroshilov, infantry and cavalry divisions, tank units, as well as combat aircraft were concentrated on the border with Poland, allegedly for the purpose of conducting "major exercises." On September 24, formations of border military districts (more than 40 divisions and other units and subunits) were alerted and began large exercises.

Of undoubted interest are Stalin's speeches made during the Munich crisis at a meeting of Moscow propagandists and workers of party ideological institutions, which was held on the initiative of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks on September 28 - October 1, 1938. The main purpose of the meeting was to determine the content and forms of study of the "Short Course in the History of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks", the publication of which was carried out in the newspaper Pravda (completed on September 19, 1938). [259]

In the conditions of the beginning political crisis in Europe, fraught with danger for the USSR, Stalin, in his speech at the meeting, could not but touch upon the question of the attitude towards the "capitalist encirclement" and the prospects for war with it. He categorically refuted the "defensive", "pacifist" views on the prospects for the coming war. It followed from his words that the Bolshevik leadership perfectly saw the "difference between different wars" and did not rule out taking the initiative for an armed uprising. In this connection, Stalin recalled Lenin's pre-revolutionary work "On the United States of Europe", which emphasized that after seizing power in one country and organizing socialist production there, the proletariat of that country would certainly have to come out "against other backward, reactionary capitalist countries" in order to help the proletarians. already these countries "free themselves from the bourgeoisie

Asia".

Stalin spoke frankly on October 1, 1938, setting out in essence his creed in regard to an offensive war. According to him, the Bolsheviks were not pacifists, sighing for peace and beginning to "take up arms only if they were attacked." No, Stalin explained, it is possible that "the Bolsheviks themselves will attack, if the war is just, if the situation is right, if the conditions are favorable, they themselves will begin to attack. They are not at all against an offensive, not against any war. "The fact that we are now shouting about defense," Stalin emphasized, "is a veil, a veil. All states disguise themselves: 'you live with wolves, you have to howl like wolves'. The last phrase, judging by the transcript, caused outright laughter from those present. [260]

At the same time, as far as one can judge on the basis of Stalin's statements at the conference on October 1, 1938, a suitable situation and favorable conditions for "attacking oneself" have not yet been created. And therefore, Stalin recalled one of the most important functions of the Soviet state - the function of "defense, protection of life, property and territory" of the USSR, for which he called for the creation of a "qualified army." This army, in his opinion, should not be based on a militia or territorial system, but be permanent, trained, qualified, having first-class modern weapons and equipment. [261]

Stalin's reporting report at the 18th Party Congress on the work of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks (March 10, 1939) received a great response, in which special attention was focused on characterizing the international situation and the position of the USSR. At the same time, the Soviet leader essentially repeated the conclusions that were made on this subject in the "Short Course on the History of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks". So, he briefly described the events of 1935-1939. (the capture of Abyssinia by Italy; the participation of the latter, together with Germany, in the military intervention against Spain; the Nazi Anschluss of Austria and the annexation of the Sudetenland to the Third Reich; finally, the aggressive actions of Japan against Manchuria and China), which, in his opinion, marked the "beginning new imperialist war. This war, as noted in the "Short Course ...", "aggressor states" (Germany, Japan and Italy) were waged against "non-aggressive states" (England, France and the USA).

Formulating at the 18th Congress of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks the immediate tasks of the Bolshevik leadership in the field of foreign policy in the current difficult international situation, Stalin, in particular, noted that the Soviet Union intended "to continue to pursue a policy of peace and strengthening business ties with all countries." Further, "to be careful and not let our country be drawn into conflicts by provocateurs of war, accustomed to rake in the heat

by someone else's hands." Finally, Stalin formulated the urgent task of strengthening the combat power of the "Red Army and the Red Navy" in every possible way. [262]

Stalin's instructions about the inevitability of an armed clash with the "capitalist encirclement" were reflected in propaganda activities. Thus, in the journal "Political Studies of the Red Army" the growing threat to peaceful construction in the USSR was constantly emphasized, in connection with which the task was to strengthen the combat readiness of the army in order to "respond to the enemy's blow with a triple crushing blow." [263] Propaganda in the spirit of preparing for revolutionary wars found its expression primarily in the fact that the idea of the inevitability of war between the USSR and the capitalist countries was constantly inspired. Such a statement, with reference to the statements of Lenin during the Civil War, was justified by the impossibility of peaceful coexistence between them for a long time. The Stalinist leadership maintained that the struggle against

the "capitalist encirclement" was far from over. [264] Moreover, the solution of this issue was supposed to be transferred to the international arena "after its successful resolution in favor of socialism within the country." [265] Accordingly, the journal Political Studies of the Red Army Men pointed out that the thought of "capitalist encirclement" and its extreme danger should run like a red thread through the entire system of Bolshevik propaganda. In support of this, a wide variety of arguments were offered: preparations for an attack on the USSR, the threat to world peace due to the inevitability of imperialist wars, the unceasing resistance of the remnants of the defeated classes within the USSR, and finally, the possibility of restoring capitalism in it and the need to preserve the state.

gifts in building communism.

The elimination of the danger of "capitalist encirclement" was associated with the need to liquidate it, possible "only as a result of a victorious proletarian revolution in at least several countries." In this regard, it was emphasized that "the victory of the proletarian revolution in the capitalist countries is the vital interest of the working people of the USSR." [266] Confidence in the possibility of such a revolution was reinforced by indications of the maturation of the idea of an assault on capitalism in the working masses of the capitalist countries, but most importantly, by repeated statements that the USSR was a powerful base for the deployment of the world proletarian revolution. The fighters were required to be always ready at any moment to fulfill their obligations not only to their homeland, but also to the international proletariat. Thus, the Bolshevik leadership headed by Stalin in the second half of the

1930s. was well aware of the danger that threatened the USSR from the "capitalist encirclement" and the need to strengthen the defense capability of their country. At the same time, the possibility of launching, under favorable conditions, offensive military operations against the "capitalist encirclement" at the initiative of the Soviet side was not ruled out.

3.2. Combat test: Hasan and Khalkhin-Gol

The emergence and course of events that occurred during the armed clash between the USSR and Japan near Lake Khasan in the summer of 1938 are interpreted by researchers in different ways. According to one version, well-established in Soviet historiography and preserved in some works of the post-Soviet period, Tokyo accused Moscow of violating the state border in the Far East between the USSR and the state of Manchukuo, launching a wide propaganda campaign around this. Supporters of this version accuse the Japanese side of causing the Khasan armed conflict. According to another version, it was the Soviet side that essentially led to the outbreak of an armed conflict with Japan, contributing to the development of events in this direction. [267] Appears to be closest to understanding the essence of the events at Lake Khasan

S.G. came up Osmachko. In his opinion, the armed conflict arose from the border territorial disputes, which in principle lend themselves to peaceful resolution in the event of mutual readiness for such an outcome on both sides. But, unfortunately, such readiness was not observed. [268]

Since the border between the USSR and Manchukuo (the Manchurian state), created by Japan in 1932 on the territory of Northeast China - Manchuria, passed mainly along the watershed points (hills) and was not demarcated, each side was assigned those heights occupied by the troops of the respective side. The stumbling block in the Soviet-Japanese diplomatic duel that unfolded in the summer of 1938 was the question of the territorial belonging of the border hills Bezmyannaya and Zaozernaya (the height of each of them did not exceed 150 m), located near Lake Khasan. In early July, a group of Soviet border guards appeared on Zaozernaya, and then Red Army soldiers secretly arrived there, who launched fortification work on it. They hastily built trenches and barbed wire. On July 15, Charge d'Affaires of Japan in the USSR H. Nishi demanded that the Soviet government withdraw military units from the height of Zaozernaya (Changkufeng in Chinese). On July 20, with a similar statement to the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR M.M. Litvinov was approached by the Japanese ambassador to Moscow, M. Shigemitsu. Referring to the data available to his government, he declared that the disputed height belonged to the Manchurian state. In addition, on the Changkufeng hill, the local Manchu population performed religious rites.

Faced with the inflexible position of Litvinov, who disputed the Japanese side's claims that the height of Zaozernaya Manchukuo belonged to and that the territorial integrity of this state was violated by the Soviet military units, Shigemitsu made the following belligerent statement. He argued that "Japan has rights and obligations to Manchukuo, for the fulfillment of which it can resort to force and force the Soviet troops to evacuate the territory they illegally occupied." [269]

At the same time, the Japanese Minister of War, Itagaki, and the Chief of the General Staff, Prince Kan'in, presented to Emperor Hirohito an operational plan for combat operations in the Zaozernaya height area. According to this plan, two Japanese infantry regiments were supposed to push the Soviet units from the top of the Changkufeng (Zaozernaya) hill. The ultimate goal of the planned counterattack was to as a result of "reconnaissance in force" ascertain the further intentions of the USSR. For his part, Stalin was very resolute and expressed his readiness to "hit the samurai in the teeth."

In the meantime, on July 29, a small detachment of Soviet troops occupied the southern (facing Manchuria) slope of another hill - Bezmyannaya (Xiachaofeng), located 2 km from Zaozernaya. This prompted the Japanese to active hostilities. On July 29, they crossed the border and, despite resistance, on July 31 they captured the heights of Bezmyannaya, Zaozernaya and Machine-gun Hill, having advanced almost 4 km deep into Soviet territory.

By the time the armed conflict began near Lake Khasan in the Far East, the Special Red Banner Far Eastern Army (OKDVA) was deployed, whose headquarters was in Khabarovsk. By order of the People's Commissar of Defense, OKDVA was transformed into the Red Banner Far Eastern Front (since July 1, 1938) under the command of Marshal of the Soviet Union V.K. Blucher. The front included: the 1st Seaside (brigade commander K.P. Podlas) and the 2nd Separate Red Banner (corporal commander I.S. Konev) armies.

After the Japanese troops crossed the border and captured the heights of Zaozernaya and Bezmyannaya, which were of great operational and strategic importance, the reinforced 39th Rifle Corps was immediately sent to the area of the armed conflict (commander - Chief of Staff of the Far Eastern Front Commander G.I. Shtern). The number of Red Army troops here exceeded 32,000, armed with about 1,000 machine guns, 237 artillery pieces, 285 tanks, and 250 aircraft. They were opposed by Japanese units reinforced with artillery and machine guns (about 20,000 people in total). Directly in

more than 13.5 thousand people participated in hostilities from the Soviet side, and about 7 thousand people from the Japanese side. [270]

On August 2, units of the Red Army began combat operations to oust the Japanese from the heights of Zaozernaya and Bezmyannaya, which initially turned out to be unsuccessful and were accompanied by unreasonably large losses on the Soviet side. The decisive battles of the times returned on August 6-9. Despite the fierce resistance of the Japanese, these heights, as well as the machine-gun hill, were occupied by units of the Red Army. However, the Japanese troops tried to take revenge. As a result, hostilities near Lake Khasan continued until 12 noon on 11 August. Ultimately, the conflicting parties managed to reach an agreement on a ceasefire and the restoration of the status quo on the border between the USSR and Manchukuo.

Despite all its transience, the armed border conflict in the area of Lake Khasan led to heavy losses in manpower. The Japanese lost about 500 people. killed and 900 wounded. According to updated data, the losses of the Red Army amounted to: about 1000 people. killed, died from wounds and diseases, 2752 people. wounded, 75 people. they fell without a trace or were taken prisoner.

In connection with the aggravation of the situation near Lake Khasan, by order of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, L.Z. Mekhlis. As early as July 28, he telegraphed Stalin that he had dismissed over 200 political workers from the army, most of whom were arrested. VC. Blucher believed that it was the Soviet border guards who were responsible for the incident in the area of the Zaozernaya height, from which the armed conflict began. He tried to warn the top Soviet leadership against unnecessary military action. However, in Moscow this version was regarded as complete "nonsense".

At the same time, delaying the development of events, while waiting for orders from Moscow to suspend the concentration of troops and punish those responsible for violating the border, the command of the Far Eastern Front failed to appreciate in time the full importance of what was happening. By his actions (or rather, inactivity) V.K. Blucher created a situation of ambiguity and irresponsibility in combat command and control. He also did not take timely measures to strengthen the state border in the area of Lake Khasan. To crown it all, Marshal Blucher did his best to suppress attempts to give a worthy rebuff to the provocations of the Japanese on the Soviet-Manchurian border. The matter ended with the fact that Stalin called Blucher and asked the commander of the Red Banner Far Eastern Front the question: does he even have a desire to repulse the Japanese?

It is no coincidence that, having arrived in the area of the armed conflict, L.Z. Mekhlis hurried to inform Stalin about the "double dealing" of the commander of the Red Banner Far Eastern Front, which "poured water on the mill of the Japanese." Ultimately, Marshal V.K. Blucher was removed from office, arrested and died during the investigation.

During the incident at Lake Khasan, it turned out that the Soviet orientalists, translators, participants in the events did not yet have the skills in the field of propaganda for the Japanese wars. ska in order to undermine their morale, since such a task was not set. L.Z. Mekhlis, having summoned the assistant chief of the intelligence department of the headquarters of the Primorsky Group of Forces B.G. Sapozhnikov, told him: "After all, you are a communist and you must be able to conduct propaganda in order to morally weaken the enemy." Mekhlis put forward a specific task: to draw up a leaflet-appeal "to the Japanese soldiers, workers and peasants", in which it was required to tell that they "fight for the cause of the Japanese exploiters, which is foreign to them, against the workers and peasants of Soviet Russia." The leaflet was also supposed to contain a call "to lay down their arms and leave our (Soviet. - **V.N.**) and return to the territory of Manchuria." The question of the need to master the methodology of propaganda against the troops of a potential enemy was of great relevance. According to B.G. Sapozhnikov, it was a kind of "art that requires political maturity, knowledge and consideration of the characteristics of the "audience" (the future reader, his mores, customs, individual psychology), the characteristics of historical experience." [271]

During his stay in the Far East, L.Z. Mekhlis did everything to establish the cult of the leader - Stalin. It was Mehliis who authored the famous slogan "For Stalin, for the Motherland", which the head of PURKKA introduced during the battles near Lake Khasan

dignity.

According to the official report, the party-political apparatus demonstrated during this armed conflict devotion to "the socialist homeland, showed the ability to carry out any Stalinist task, at any time, under any conditions." At the same time, the leadership of PURKKA had to admit that they had to face a number of difficulties in organizing political propaganda work.

Firstly, the political departments of the active units were not staffed either at the regimental or divisional level. During the fighting, an acute shortage of polit was regularly noted. So, in the political department of the 39th rifle corps, there should have been 11 people, but by the beginning of the fighting there were only 3 people. His staff was "literally knocked together" during the Khasan events. In addition, political workers had no experience of practical work in combat conditions, and the study of the theater of military operations was difficult, because, as emphasized in the final document of PURKKA, "enemies of the people who were in the leadership" of the 39th rifle corps, "deliberately did not allow the command and political staff of this sector." As a result, not only were the chiefs of political departments and commissars of individual units unaware of the situation, but even in the political administration of the front, "certain responsible workers" did not know what exactly the military units were doing and where the troops were on a given day and hour. [272] The percentage of casualties among political workers on the battlefield was relatively high. Out of 90 people dead, representing the middle and senior command staff, 18 people. (20%) were political workers. [273]

Secondly, an important omission in the work of party-political bodies during the fighting at Lake Khasan was the actual **ignorance** of the personnel about the true state of affairs and the specific combat situation. Thus, units of the 40th Infantry Division had already engaged in battle with the Japanese and suffered heavy losses. And in the 32nd Rifle Division and the 2nd Mechanized Brigade, which had just begun to move in the direction of the Zaozernaya height, in the meantime, briefings were being carried out, explanations were made about the upcoming ... exercises. On the march, the Red Army soldiers and commanders met vehicles with wounded soldiers. Some of the lightly wounded even asked the enemy to avenge them. And at the same time, political workers of the 32nd Rifle Division and the 2nd Mechanized Brigade continued to repeat to their subordinates that "they are going to big exercises." As a result, as emphasized in the final document of PURKKA, "a gross mistake was made, which was not good, not to raise the patriotic spirit of the personnel, but to the detriment of the political and moral state of the troops."

Finally, thirdly, during the period of the battles for the heights of Zaozernaya and Bezmyannaya, there were also minor shortcomings in the conduct of political propaganda work among the personnel. His record was poorly set, and in a number of parts there were not even lists of names. Practically nothing was reported by the political agencies about the hostilities conducted by the 40th Infantry Division. The large-circulation newspapers of the 32nd Rifle Division and the 2nd Mechanized Brigade were not only not distributed, but sometimes were not published for several days in a row. The information work of political agencies as a whole, as the leadership of PURKKA was forced to admit, during the period of the Khasan events had a number of shortcomings, which ultimately led to the emergence of "general ardor" and did not allow one to really take into account the morale of the Red Army soldiers and commanders. [274]

The lessons that were learned during the fighting of the Red Army units near Lake Khasan were carefully studied by the troops and headquarters, for example, during major exercises related to the Czechoslovak crisis (end of September 1938). It is no coincidence that in the statements of some Red Army soldiers and commanders who were involved in the exercises, the idea was carried out that they could "show how to fight," just as their "Far Eastern comrades showed at Lake Khasan." One of the Red Army soldiers, in part

In fact, he declared: "... our Far Eastern comrades taught the Japanese samurai a lesson how we want to show the same heroism and courage in the West." [275]

However, the propagandistic significance of the events near Lake Khasan was sometimes exaggerated. So, when the report of A.S. Shcherbakov at a solemn and mourning meeting dedicated to the 15th anniversary of the death of V.I. Lenin (January 21, 1939), after mentioning these "memorable battles", the following passages were inserted into his text: "Japanese samurai have learned the power of Soviet weapons. Our aviation and artillery turned the Japanese guns into fragments, their dugouts were erased into dust. Our tanks crushed the Japanese trenches with everything that was there. Our machine guns rained deadly fire on the Japanese invaders. Our infantry has completed the work begun by aviation, artillery and tanks. [276] Meanwhile, in the transcript of A.S. Shcherbakov this paragraph was missing. [277] In

mid-1939, a new Soviet-Japanese armed conflict broke out, now on the territory of the Mongolian People's Republic, on the Khalkhin Gol River. [278] Japan planned to capture the eastern ledge of the territory of the MPR, located across this river, between the state border of the USSR, Mongolia and the Greater Khingan mountain range. With its capture, a convenient springboard would be created for further actions in order to capture a significant section of the Trans-Siberian Railway. In May 1939, the Japanese invaded the territory of the MPR. As early as November

1934, an oral Soviet-Mongolian agreement on mutual support was reached, which provided for assistance in the event of a third party attacking the USSR or the MPR. On March 12, 1936, it was replaced by the Mutual Assistance Protocol, under which the Soviet military contingent ended up on Mongolian territory. The Japanese, who launched an offensive in the area of the Khalkhin Gol River, were opposed by the Mongolian units and Soviet troops. Taking into account the complexity of the situation, in Moscow it was decided to strengthen the existing Soviet grouping and send the deputy commander of the Belarusian Special Military District, Divisional Commander G.K. Zhukov. Arriving at their destination, Zhukov was ordered to immediately take direct command of the troops. He made a decision, taking up an active defense, at the same time preparing a strong counterattack. Meanwhile, on July 2, 1939, the Japanese troops went on the offensive again.

They managed to cross to the western coast of Khalkhin Gol and begin concentrating on Mount Bain-Tsagan. Initially, success was on the side of the enemy. However, G.K. Zhukov succeeded, using the reserve 11th tank brigade of brigade commander M.P. Yakovlev, who was thrown into battle without the cover of rifle units, but with the support of artillery and aviation, turn the tide in their favor. The Japanese retreated, threatened with encirclement, and by 5 July their resistance had been broken. However, they were still in Mongolian territory and were preparing to take revenge for the

defeat. To eliminate the source of tension in the area of the Khalkhin-Gol river, it was necessary to expel the invaders and restore the state border of the MPR. G.K. Zhukov took drastic measures to defeat the Japanese group, located on Mongolian territory. The 57th Special Corps operating in the Khalkhin Gol region was transformed into the 1st Army Group, and Zhukov became its commander. The Soviet-Mongolian grouping consisted of 57 thousand people, 542 guns and mortars, about 500 tanks, 383 armored vehicles, over 500 fighters and bombers. It was opposed by the 75,000-strong 6th Special Army of the Japanese General O. Rippo, which was armed with 500 guns, 182 tanks, and more than 300 aircraft. [279] And although the numerical superiority was on the side of the enemy, Zhukov achieved superiority over him in tanks (3 times) and aircraft (1.7 times). In addition, large quantities of ammunition, fuel and lubricants, and food were delivered to the troops, counting on a two-week military operation. A lot of work was done to disinform the enemy.

Ultimately, all this was successfully used in the upcoming battles in the Khalkhin Gol region.

Having launched the offensive on August 20, 1939 in accordance with a pre-developed plan, G.K. Zhukov preempted the enemy, who planned to strike on August 24. During a fierce battle on August 23-24, the 1st Army Group managed to surround and completely destroy the enemy troops. Not having a numerical superiority over the Japanese, she successfully carried out a major offensive operation to destroy superior enemy forces, as a result of which the border of the MPR was restored.

To some extent, the losses suffered by the parties involved can testify to the scope of hostilities. The Soviet troops lost over 6,800 people killed, over 15,200 wounded and shell-shocked, and 1,143 missing in action; Mongolian - 165 people killed and 400 wounded. Japanese losses during the armed conflict on the Khalkhin Gol River: at least 25,000 killed, 25,000-30,000 wounded, almost 500 captured. [280] Party political work during the battle on the Khalkhin-Gol River had its own specifics. The day before, in the autumn of 1938, a number of political workers were

repressed in the 57th building. By his special directive of September 8, L.Z. Mekhlis ordered a massive change in the political composition of the corps. In October, Mekhlis arrived in the MPR, and under his direct leadership, this action was carried out up to the battalion. As a result, by the beginning of the May battles in the region of the Khalkhin-Gol River, the positions of the head of the political department of the corps, his deputy, and the released party and Komsomol workers were still vacant. And the newly appointed personnel did not have combat experience and did not know well

their subordinates.

Already during the fighting, attempts were made to eliminate the shortage of political staff. From the reserve of the 1st Army Group, 272 people were seconded to the unit. 60 political workers were transferred from PURKKA and military districts to Khalkhin Gol, from the Military-Political Academy named after. IN AND. Lenin - 60 people, from military-political schools - 311 people. Finally, L.Z. Mekhlis, by his orders of June 12 and July 7, sent another 54 people to the place of hostilities. [281]

On June 26, Mekhlis sent written instructions to the political administration of the Trans-Baikal Military District on the tasks of the party-political apparatus of formations and units "to organize a rebuff to the Japanese military on the river. Khalkhin Gol. First of all, he ordered to stop vacations for political workers, obliged to return to service those of them who were already on vacation, as well as on business trips and on various courses and work outside their units. It was planned to create a reserve of political workers within 5 days. The task was to conduct conversations with the commanding and political staff in the regiments and formations in order to take into account "past mistakes, when the units were brought to a state of combat readiness." Mekhlis ordered the Red Army men to explain the meaning of the events "in connection with the Japanese provocations on the border" and in the MPR and "the task of bringing the units to full combat readiness." Political departments, editorial offices of formations, political enlightenment - property - everything had to be prepared for the upcoming campaign, it was necessary to have the necessary supplies of paper and paints. According to L.Z. Mekhlis, to give a "battle tone". [282] On the same day, by his telegram, Mekhlis ordered that the TASS report on the events in the MPR be published in the army press and brought to the attention of the personnel, and on June 29 he telegraphed the reprinting of the feuilleton "Ignorant braggarts from the headquarters of the Kwantung Army" from Pravda.

During the fighting near Lake Khasan, the main combat mission of the personnel of the Red Army units was to protect the borders of the USSR. It is no coincidence that the corresponding patriotic attitude of propaganda was well absorbed by the servicemen. The situation was more complicated during the armed conflict near the Khalkhin-Gol River. At first, a serious miscalculation was made in determining the content of propaganda among the personnel involved

who fought in the hostilities: the main attention was paid to the ideological support of the slogan about the need to fulfill the mutual assistance treaty with the friendly Mongolian people. This slogan was incomprehensible to the majority of the Red Army soldiers operating on Khal Khin Gol. For example, one of the participants in the hostilities, the Red Army man Gusev, expressed bewilderment: "After all, we have enough land of our own, and then we must take into account that there are German fascists who can attack the USSR." [283]

Later, in May 1940, speaking with a report on military ideology, L.Z. Mekhlis was forced to admit that at the first stage of military operations at Khalkhin Gol, the propaganda work among the personnel was based on the slogan on the implementation of the mutual assistance agreement with the MPR, which turned out to be ineffective. And already in the course of the fighting, Mekhlis stated, an amendment had to be made. Political workers explained to the Red Army soldiers that "the MPR is the key to our borders" and, by protecting it, the Red Army thereby "defends the territory of the Soviet Union from Baikal to Vladivostok", while simultaneously preventing Japan from creating a bridgehead for the war against the USSR. This thesis was understood with understanding by the Red Army soldiers and commanders, who realized the significance of the battles at Khalkhin Gol for the defense of their homeland.

[284] At the same time, it was during the fighting at Khalkhin Gol that the first experience of counter-propaganda was acquired. L.Z. Even before the decisive battles unfolded in the region of the Khalkhin-Gol River, Mekhlis approved in June 1939 a program of semi-monthly collections of editorial offices and printing houses of newspapers in foreign languages. The assigned staff had to get acquainted with the geography, economy and political situation of the countries in whose language it was planned to publish newspapers, with the organization of the armed forces of a potential enemy. The heads of the collections were also called upon to train the employees of the editorial offices of newspapers to methods of decomposition of the army and the rear of a potential enemy.

On July 10, to solve the problems of conducting counter-propaganda against the enemy troops, a special group of political workers was created. However, the printing base from the Trans-Baikal Military District arrived only on August 16-17. At the same time, the department for work among the enemy troops was finally formed, which had two editions (Japanese and Chinese) and the necessary equipment. [285]

Arriving in the battle area near the Khalkhin-Gol River, L.Z. Mekhlis personally led the propaganda activities to disintegrate the enemy troops. Under the political administration of the 1st Army Group, a corresponding department was created. By the time the Soviet counter-offensive began on Khalkhin Gol, a special group for the decomposition of enemy troops was already functioning, led by a graduate of the Military-Political Academy M.I. Burtsev. However, it was deployed 120 km from the front and was practically inactive: there were no translators, no printing house, no editorial office of the newspaper. Mekhlis ordered that the editorial offices of newspapers in Mongolian, Japanese and Chinese that were available there be immediately transferred from Chita. The only sound-broadcasting detachment was called from Moscow. A prototype sound broadcasting station was created by scientists from the Leningrad Scientific Research Institute of Broadcasting Reception and Acoustics. The equipment arrived on the territory of the MPR at the end of July 1939. The station was based on 4 vehicles (ZIS-5 and ZIS-6), had two powerful groups of loudspeakers, an equipment studio, and a power plant. The equipment made it possible to broadcast transmissions over a distance of up to 10 km. A special sound

broadcasting detachment was created to serve it. The detachment included, in addition to the engineering and technical group, operators, drivers, also representatives of PURKKA (instructor, regimental commissar I.M. Polyakov) and an announcer with knowledge of Japanese (teacher of the Military Academy named after M.V. Frunze quartermaster of the 2nd rank G.A. Selyaninov). In preparation for the August offensive, the sound broadcasting station was used to play imitation noise programs. [286] For example, it was used to simulate defensive work, while units of the Red Army were actually preparing for an offensive. Through sound broadcasting installations, counter-propaganda work was carried out against the enemy troops.

The head of PURKKA personally wrote the text of the first four counter-propaganda leaflets addressed to Japanese soldiers and officers. He appealed to the enemy in the same terms, with the same arguments, as to his own servicemen. The leaflets contained swear words addressed to the Japanese emperor, which turned out to be a clear "blunder". The appeal addressed to the Japanese soldiers - "to overthrow the emperor - the main culprit of social injustice and bloodshed in the fields of Mongolia", had completely opposite results from the original plan. After reading a leaflet with such appeals, the Japanese soldiers, who were brought up in such a way that they saw in the face of the emperor a descendant of the gods and their sacred representative on the land of Japan, encouraged by their commanders, went into desperate attacks on the positions of the corps (army group) of the Red Army. Ultimately, these counter-propaganda materials were withdrawn from use by the political departments, because, having familiarized themselves with them, the Japanese troops became more fierce in battle.

Periodicals were widely distributed among the troops of the 1st Army Group. On the eve of the decisive August battles, personnel received more than 54,000 copies. newspapers and 8345 copies. magazines. During the armed conflict in the region of the Khalkhin-Gol River, the publication of the newspaper "Combat Krasnoarmeyskaya" was launched, in which much attention was paid to popularizing the experience gained by representatives of various branches of the armed forces (infantrymen, artillerymen, tankers) in battles with the Japanese. [287]

Naturally, the effectiveness of political propaganda work is difficult to assess, new only on such quantitative indicators as the circulation of periodicals distributed among the troops, or referring to the topics of publications of army newspapers. In combat conditions, it largely depended on what kind of personal example the commanders and political workers set for their subordinates. Unfortunately, not always and not everywhere they served as a role model. During the battle in the area of the Khalkhin-Gol River, representatives of the command and political staff of the 1st Army Group removed their insignia on the battlefield, trying to avoid the fire of enemy snipers. In this regard, the commander of the 39th rifle corps commander G.M. Stern and the military commissar of the corps, Brigadier Commissar Semenovskiy, were even forced to issue an order in which each individual case of removing insignia was regarded as a direct manifestation of cowardice. All commanders, according to this order, should have been explained that such behavior is simply unacceptable. In this regard, it should be noted that in this armed conflict, the losses among political workers were large: 120 people. killed and 243 wounded. [288]

At the final stage of hostilities, L.Z. Mehlis made an attempt to generalize the experience that had been accumulated in political propaganda work among the personnel. On August 29, 1939, he gave a corresponding order on this matter to the political directorate of the 1st Army Group. Referring to the task set by the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR in connection with the defeat of the Japanese, Mekhlis urged to ensure that "individual unit leaders were not dizzy from success." Special responsibility, in the opinion of the head of the PURKKA, fell on the political apparatus and on the commissars. He proposed to develop a plan of party political work, taking into account the situation and the specific tasks facing the 1st Army Group. L.Z. Mekhlis ordered the use of all forms of agitation (meetings, rallies, conversations) with personnel in order to "debunk the Japanese generals as mediocre leaders and raise the role (sic. - **V.N.**) of our commanders and commissars." Political instructors transferred to help the propagandists, Mehlis further developed his idea, were supposed to put together leaflets intended both for the soldiers of the Red Army ("without calf delight" in the text) and for the enemy, so that the Japanese could "take stock" fighting on the Khalkhin Gol River.

The head of PURKKA also urged not to weaken propaganda work in the units and immediately begin compiling a book on party political activity during this armed conflict. But first it was necessary to develop a detailed plan from Denmark, involving political agencies, commissars, and writers. Special attention to L.Z. Mehlis co-

advised to draw on the accumulated experience of measures "to decompose the enemy" and to provide specific materials on this issue. [289]

As already noted, a department for work among enemy troops was created under the political directorate of the 1st Army Group. At the suggestion of PURKKA, the People's Commissariat of Defense of the USSR issued an order on the formation in peacetime of editorial offices and printing houses of newspapers in the languages of the states adjacent to the USSR. Such newspapers were to be published in Japanese, Chinese, German, Polish, Finnish, Korean, Mongolian, Estonian, Latvian, Romanian, Turkish, and even Farsi. The Special Propaganda Department of the 1st Army Group distributed 5,368,000 copies of printed matter in the language of the enemy. Among them - 99 leaflets and 30 slogans in Japanese and Chinese with a circulation of 2,464,000 copies, respectively. and 1,294,000 copies. These printed materials were scattered

mainly from bombers (SB and TB-3). [290] However, there was an acute shortage of qualified cadres of interpreters, referent interpreters, and orientalist officers. Coordination between the division of the political body and the department of the headquarters of the corps (army group) was insufficient. The main drawback was that the propaganda officers were not familiar with the national psychology of the enemy troops, had no idea about the degree of their religiosity and devotion to the monarch. One way or another, but the experience of propaganda among the enemy troops during the armed conflict on the Khalkhin-Gol River was preparations for the creation of a widely ramified, organizationally well-thought-out propaganda apparatus. In the political departments of the Far Eastern and Trans-Baikal military districts, departments began to form for propaganda among the troops and the population of the enemy. Educational and training newspapers were created in Japanese, Chinese, Mongolian and English. Crews were trained to equip sound broadcasting installations on cars, etc., etc.. [291] and the direct participants of

which they were, and the official propaganda interpretation of the same events, which ran counter to reality. As a result, there were critical statements addressed not only to the command of military units, but also addressed to the leaders of the Soviet state. In the "Information summary on the negative statements of the commanding and commanding and Red Army personnel during the fighting in the region of the Khalkhin Gol from July to October 1, 1939", prepared by army political workers and NKVD officers, 894 cases of this kind of statements are mentioned. Of these, 234 "fell" on the command staff and 660 - on the junior command staff and the Red Army. 216 statements (almost 25% of the total) were qualified by the "competent authorities" as anti-Soviet; in 155 cases there was dissatisfaction with service in a combat situation. 86 recorded statements were regarded as defeatist, 82 - as provocative, 74 - as a manifestation of cowardice and unwillingness to go into battle, 70 - as dissatisfaction with the leadership of the battle. 37 times there was a verbal threat to the commanding staff, 29 times the praise of the enemy's military equipment (Japanese). [292]

Although in 1938-1939. and some attempts were made to generalize the experience of the battles near Lake Khasan and on the Khalkhin Gol River (including propaganda), but already in 1940 he was actually forgotten. At a meeting at the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks (April 17, 1940), Stalin declared that these armed clashes were only "separate episodes on a patch, strictly limited." "Japan," he explained, "was afraid to start a war, we didn't want that either, and some test of strength on a patch showed that Japan had failed. They had 2-3 divisions, and we have 2-3 divisions in Mongolia, the same number in Khasan. Stalin's conclusion based on the results of the conflicts at Khasan and Khalkhin Gol boiled down to the following: "Our army has not yet waged a real, serious war." [293]

3.3. The burden of the pact

In the second half of the 1930s. relations between the USSR and Germany began to noticeably worsen, where the Nazis (as it was customary to write and say, German fascists) came to power, led by Hitler. The ideological differences between the Soviet and Nazi regimes led to the deployment of a real propaganda war between them.

On the pages of a number of central newspapers (Pravda, Izvestiya, Za rubezhom, Literary Gazette, etc.) and magazines (International Literature, Znamya, Oktyabr, etc.), a special place was given to works of anti-fascist writers I. Becher, L. Feuchtwanger, R. Rolland, A. Zegers, J.R. Blok, V. Bredel, M. Andersen-Nekse and many others. In a number of publications, attention was focused on the fact that German fascism has a misanthropic, aggressive nature, and is actively preparing for a war of conquest. This theme became dominant in Soviet periodicals, especially after Hitler began to carry out his expansionist plans (1938). [294]

Leading Soviet historians (E.V. Tarle and others) were involved in the cause of exposing the Nazi regime. Thus, the press organ of the Institute of History of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, the journal "Istoriya-Markist" (it was published once every two months) declared that the following tasks were among the tasks it solved: "to expose the falsification of history by the fascists and their right-Trotskyist agents ". [295]

Heroic examples of victories over the Germans in the past, for example, the Battle of the Ice in 1242, were interpreted by Bolshevik propaganda as a kind of reminder of the "Gerrings and Goebbels." [296] It is no coincidence that the release of the film "Alexander Nevsky" on the Soviet screen, which was based on the events associated with the victory of the Novgorod prince over the Teutonic (German) knights on the river. Neva. By the end of 1937, the first version of the script for the painting, written by the writer P.A. Pavlenko was ready. [297] However, its text was subjected to merciless criticism, primarily from the well-known historian M.N. Tikhomirov. The production version of the script was developed by P.A. Pavlenko together with S.M. Eisenstein. So they both set about fixing the shortcomings and inaccuracies in the script. This work was completed in 1938, when the third version of the script appeared, entitled "Alexander Nevsky". On December 1, 1938, a film of the same name was released, which, according to historian Yu.N. Zhukov, was even more tendentious in its direction than the film "Peter the Great" (1937), where the Russian emperor "appeared before the audience not only as the title character, but also as an openly positive hero." [298]

At the same time, work was underway to prepare screenplays and release films that denounced the order of the Nazi Reich. So, according to the scenario of the German writer-emigrant F. Wolf, director G.M. Rapoport in 1938 created the film "Professor Mam Lok". On January 8, 1937, Stalin received L. Feuchtwanger in the Kremlin as an honored guest. As a result of visiting the USSR, the latter published the book "Moscow. 1937". He later wrote the screenplay based on his novel The Oppenheim Family. For this work, Feuchtwanger, on Stalin's orders, received a fee in the amount of 5,000 US dollars. In 1939, director G.L. Roshal staged the eponymous feature film based on the script for The Oppenheim Family. [299] Both paintings had a strong anti-fascist orientation. With the expansion of the anti-Nazi propaganda campaign in the USSR in the second half of the

1930s. cultural and scientific ties with Germany have already come to be seen as undesirable. Thus, on March 11, 1937, by decision of the Politburo, the Soviet-German society "Culture and Technology" ceased to exist. [300] November 4, 1937 L.Z. Mekhlis in a memorandum addressed to the secretaries of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the head of government

V.M. Molotov, stated indignantly: advertising literature on technical topics coming from Germany, "widely distributed to all ... institutions and industrial enterprises, is a veiled form of fascist propaganda." Even various German calendars and notebooks in Russian received through the People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade were classified by Mekhlis in the same category, since they contained "indications about fascist holidays, Hitler's birthday," victories "of German weapons." After receiving this memorandum, the corresponding order of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks to the Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Trade A. Merekalov followed, who, in turn, proposed that employees of the NKVD and Glavlit authorities subject diplomatic mail and luggage to a special check in order to exclude penetration publications of this kind to the Soviet Union. [301] For a number of years after Hitler came to power in Germany, it was portrayed in Soviet propaganda (and this gradually entered the public consciousness) as the most

aggressive power that directly threatened the interests of the USSR. In its interpretation, an almost complete coincidence of the image of the internal and external enemy was found. It was constantly suggested that the leading military leaders of the Red Army (Marshal M.N. Tukhachevsky and others) were executed after a trial in the summer of 1937 for their connection with the German Reichswehr, and repressions against Lenin's former closest associates were interpreted as a fight against treason on the eve of the war against Germany.

In the second half of the 1930s. in Soviet propaganda, the prevailing attitude was about the coming war as a war on foreign territory, about the possibility of an easy victory in it with "little bloodshed", about the prospects for an armed clash with the German army. The latter acted as a military adversary of the Soviet Union (albeit in hypothetical situations) in the famous story by N.N. Shpanova "First Strike", as well as in the films "If there is war tomorrow". In full accordance with the prevailing propaganda guidelines, at

the behest of Shpanov, the Germans "invading" Soviet territory were "repulsed" and "defeated" in just 11 hours of hostilities! Stalin especially liked the film *If Tomorrow*, and he tried to demonstrate it to his foreign guests on occasion. [302] Soviet poets introduced into the public consciousness the idea that the Germans were opponents in the past and, most likely, they will become such in the near future.

Especially characteristic in this regard is the work of V.I. Lebedev-Kumach. In 1938, he published a book of poems, which included the words from the very popular song "Don't Touch Us" for the film "Mitko Lelyuk" "Ukrainfilm", which became very popular. In the song, in particular, there was the following verse: *We treat uninvited guests with a sharp saber and lead, - They beat the German, they beat the pan And we will break others, if necessary! Our lava, valiant lava Do not appease and do not beat back, Do not take away the Soviet land, Do*

not break the heroic strength!

There is no pan and German

power to stop us! [303]

In a poem by V.I. Lebedev-Kumach "Do not mow us down with a sharp saber" there were such lines: ... *And*

a Ukrainian Cossack flew into the

enemies with a menacing

cloud. The Germans and pans scattered,

*The Gaidamatsky rabble
dispersed... Let the fascist guests come,
Go the way, if life is not sweet!.. ... Then
not flocks of crows flocked Under
the willow to feast, - The
Gaidamaks and the Germans
tried to tear Our land apart. [304]*

And in the song "Kind Brothers" ("Railway Defensive") it was quite unambiguously declared: *We
are friends with the Red
Army, Together we serve the
Motherland, And when thunder
strikes, Together they
will give battle to the Nazis A
machine gunner and a
machinist In an armored train alone! [305]*

The Czechoslovak crisis of September 1938 almost led to an open "battle with the fascists." But when the danger passed, the events connected with it served as one of the reasons for the activation of the anti-Nazi political and ideological campaign. In the military units of the Red Army, located in the border military districts, anti-fascist propaganda unfolded. Its results were not slow to tell. The Red Army soldiers expressed their readiness to "wipe the fascist reptiles off the face of the earth", "defeat the fascist bastard". [306] Meanwhile, at the end of the 1930s. The Bolshevik

leadership was faced with a choice of further foreign policy. Peace or war - such alternatives were at the disposal of Stalin, who watched with alarm as the territory expanded in Nazi Germany, which, after the Munich Treaty of 1938, occupied most of Czechoslovakia, really threatened Poland. Ultimately, he agreed to a non-aggression pact with the Germans, which was signed in Moscow on August 23, 1939. Molotov, this treaty was called the "Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact".

Literally from the first day of the pact, a new political and ideological campaign unfolded in the Soviet Union, the content of which was completely different from the previous one, which had an anti-fascist orientation. Now it was necessary to introduce into the public consciousness that the USSR and Nazi Germany were not opponents, and therefore all kinds of "phobias" regarding the Third Reich, its Fuhrer and the Germans themselves should be immediately got rid of.

As early as August 24, an editorial in the Pravda newspaper noted that differences in ideological gies and political systems of the states that have concluded this treaty should not and cannot serve as an obstacle to the establishment of good neighborly relations between them. "The friendship between the peoples of the USSR and Germany, driven into a dead end by the efforts of enemies ... - it was emphasized in the article, - from now on must receive the necessary conditions for its development and

flourishing." [307] A week later, speaking at an extraordinary session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR (August 31, 1939), V.M. Molotov repeated the same thesis almost word for word. He transparently hinted at the need to curtail anti-fascist and anti-German propaganda, emphasizing that in the USSR some "short-sighted people" were fond of "simplified anti-fascist agitation." [308]

In Molotov's speeches, the main instructions for the restructuring of Soviet propaganda, which began after the non-aggression pact of August 23, 1939, were "voiced".

allowed to abandon the old anti-fascist attitudes and open propaganda campaigns against the Nazis.

Meanwhile, the message about the conclusion of the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact caused a real shock in the public mind. First of all, a mass of conflicting assessments appeared among the personnel of the Red Army. The years of anti-fascist propaganda did not go unnoticed for the majority of the Red Army soldiers and commanders, and their statements, recorded by the NKVD, mainly contained a negative attitude towards the fact that the USSR had gone for rapprochement with Nazi Germany.

"Friendly" outpourings made on behalf of the entire Soviet people caused irritation and bewilderment. Doubts were expressed at political classes: "Does the [non-aggression] pact with Germany contradict Lenin's teachings?" [309] The declared "friendship" with her seemed inexplicable and incomprehensible. The German attack on Poland caused alarm and a critical attitude towards the pact of August 23, 1939. Thus, the junior commander of the rifle company of the Kalinin military district, Semyonov, believed that "the Soviet Union made it possible to start a second imperialist war. If we had not concluded an agreement with Germany, she would have been afraid to start a war with Poland, and now Hitler is carrying out his plans. [310] Among the representatives

of the commanding staff of the Red Army, involved in propaganda activities, there was complete bewilderment. The following confessions were characteristic: "... you don't know what to write and how to write, we used to be brought up in an anti-fascist spirit, but now it's the other way around," or: "Agitation and propaganda against fascism cannot be carried out, because our government does not see no disagreements with fascism."

Stalin himself gave an exhaustive answer to the question "what to write and how to write". He abruptly stopped the attempts of the editorial board of the Krasnaya Zvezda newspaper to publish information about Germany that differed from the new official point of view, and in a conversation with L.Z. Mehlis ordered to immediately stop the publication of materials critical of fascism. The belief began to spread that in general "there would be no need to fight Germany." Explanatory work was carried out with those who held the opposite point of view, as required by the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and PURKKA,

after which the latter "recognized their errors." [311] According to the British journalist A. Werth, after the signing of the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact, "millions of Russians were simply shocked by what had happened." After all, from the moment the Nazis came to power, the Soviet Union was "all the time in the forefront of the anti-fascist struggle." [312] While V.I. Vernadsky, there was a "great hidden ferment of thought in connection with a sharp contradiction between reality and the official presentation of the situation." The discrepancies "between these two realities that always exist in public life" increased sharply, revealing a strong

dissonance. [313] People gathered to listen to the agitators, while discussing the fragility of the non-aggression pact. Some said out loud that Germany could not be trusted, and her fall on the USSR in the future was inevitable. According to the correspondent of the American newspaper The New York Times, the screening of the anti-Nazi films Professor Mamlok and The Oppenheim Family, as well as the films Alexander Nevsky, was stopped in Moscow, and in the Theatre. Vakhtangov - a performance based on the play by A. Tolstoy "The Way to Victory" (about the German intervention during

the Civil War). [314] The news of the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact was especially painfully received by representatives of the intelligentsia, brought up (and brought up others) in an anti-fascist spirit. After all, the negative characteristics of the Nazi Party given in the "Short Course on the History of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks" were fresh in my memory, as well as the definitions of Germany as an extremely

aggressive country, inherent in Soviet propaganda. August 24 L.V. Shaporina, the wife of the composer Yu.A. Shaporin, wrote in her diary, referring to the mention of Soviet newspapers about the "ef

friendship between "the peoples of the USSR and Germany": "Who are these enemies? And also the warm bodies of those killed (by the Germans. - **V.N.**) in Spain, Czechoslovakia? ... I can't - I am overwhelmed with such incredible anger, hatred, contempt ... " [315]

On the same days in Leningrad, at the courses of agitators, the speakers were asked questions, the answers to which were very difficult to find: "How could it happen that the main focus of the war, the center of aggression (meaning Germany. - **V.N.**) about non-aggression. How will the working class of Germany react if we conclude a non-aggression pact with the fascist government? To this and other similar questions, explanations were given, far from exhausting the essence of the matter.

Meanwhile, in conversations and conversations, a clear distrust of official propaganda was manifested, since the usual anti-fascist attitudes were rejected without any explanation. So, the commercial director of the Skorokhod factory (Leningrad) said: "We are elderly people and got used to a lot under the Soviet regime. We have learned not to be surprised. But young people are not only surprised, but also indignant. In the demonstration of friendship with the pogromists (Nazis. - **V.N.**), she sees simply treason on the part of the party leadership. The youth were taught to hate fascism, and suddenly STALIN stood next to the pogromists. Supporting the interlocutor, the master of the same factory stated that " the Soviet government often persuaded the people, together with it, to scold what yesterday unanimously ascended to heaven, and vice versa, but what was published on August 24 (1939 - **V.N.**), is already beyond the reach of understanding. You look at the photograph - the Germans have a triumphant look, while STALIN and MOLOTOV have an ingratiating look. [316]

For people involved in party propaganda work, the period of rapprochement with Germany became a real test, fraught with dangers and unpredictable consequences. In this connection, mention should be made of the unenviable proportion of grassroots agitators who, in the situation that arose, were forced to directly appeal to high party authorities, asking for clarification about the sharp turn in relations with Nazi Germany. So, at a meeting of party activists in the city of Michurinsk (Tambov region), the question was asked: "How to combine Hitler's current policy and his book "My Struggle"? Could it not turn out that by our friendly relations with Germany, especially in trade, we will strengthen her for an attack on the USSR? Answering this and other similar questions, lecturers, agitators and propagandists were often forced to use the following "iron argument": there is no reason not to believe the German-Soviet non-aggression pact, since it was concluded in the presence of Comrade Stalin. Such "explanations", however, testified to the helplessness and inability to explain events, the essence of which few of them fully understood. [317] It is no coincidence that one of the agitators, who chose the pseudonym "Countryman", under the impression of the non-aggression pact with Germany of August 23, 1939, sent a letter to A.A. Zhdanov. The letter, in particular, drew attention to the contradiction between the former Stalinist guidelines given at the XVIII

Congress of the CPSU (b) (March 1939) and in other speeches of the leader, picked up by Bolshevik propaganda, and new trends incomprehensible to the "lower classes" in towards Germany and its regime. "Countryman" recalled Stalin's words at the 16th and 2nd Congress about German aggressive aspirations, as well as about Stalin's characterization of Germany as one of the most aggressive countries. An anonymous Zhdanovskiy correspondent caustically emphasized: now, that is, after the signing of the treaty of August 23, 1939, "you see, the warmongers in Europe are England and France," and the German people are allegedly "traditionally associated with us." In this case, incomprehension was directly declared about the newspaper publications inspired by the speeches of V.M. Molotov 31 August. The "Countryman" letter contained a rhetorical question: "... how can we, the local workers, answer (**or rather, lie**) to the workers and collective farmers? **We don't find an answer** " (you shared by me. - **V.N.**). [318]

Even more ambiguous was the position of the employees of the central mass media, various propaganda departments and organizations. D. F. Kraminov recalled that members of the editorial board of the Izvestia newspaper perceived the non-aggression pact with Germany as a radical change in Soviet foreign policy. This circumstance plunged them into amazement: all that remained was to shrug and shrug their shoulders. Kraminov himself, who had already received an order on August 24, 1939, to prepare the first version of the editorial about the pact for publication in Izvestia, did not know what to write, since he retained anti-fascist sentiments. It required the intervention of the acting editor-in-chief of the newspaper, Ya.G. Selikha, who, in turn, turned to the People's Commissar for Defense K.E. Voroshilov. The latter "suggested" that the non-aggression pact with Germany should be interpreted as a kind of respite, similar in meaning to the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk in 1918. [319] The analogy between the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk and the Soviet-German agreement of 23

August 1939 was probably "from above" (most likely, by Stalin himself). It is found, for example, in the diary entries of V.V. Vishnevsky for September 1939, [320] and in the memoirs of K.M. Simonov, dated later, March 1979. [321]

However, in the diary of L.V. Shaporina interprets this analogy in a completely different way than both of these writers. On August 24, Shaporina wrote: "Non-aggression pact with Hitler, with Germany. What non-aggression? What, the Germans were afraid that we would attack them? And further: "Probably, all raw materials, oil, coal, and so on, will go to Germany. We are on the cart, fertilized the noble German soil. Hitler's hands are untied. Poland will follow Czechoslovakia. A threat to France, our second Motherland... the secondary Moscow-Brest Treaty with Germany... Yes, they survived. The triumph of communism! A lesson to all ages and peoples, where the "workers' and peasants'" government leads. In my opinion, every honest communist and revolutionary should now put a bullet in his forehead. [322]

Writer V. Kondratiev recalled the events of 1939 decades later: "We didn't know anything at all then. Although they felt in their gut that something was wrong with this pact and with Germany. [323] Judging by the recollections of another eyewitness of the events, the reaction to the signing of the Soviet-German treaty among young people, Komsomol members, "was stormy and negative." Since it was impossible to condemn this step of the Stalinist leadership "out loud at a rally or meeting", in "unofficial conversations" young people, "who absorbed anti-fascism and the desire for a" world revolution "with their mother's milk, invariably raised the issue of the fallacy of the agreement with Nazi Germany. [324]

The "misunderstanding" of the circumstances that led to the Soviet-German rapprochement, made the agitators and propagandists unable to clearly explain the meaning of what was happening, forced the official authorities to qualify the "interpretations" of some people on this score as "anti-Soviet". According to the information of the UNKVD of the Leningrad Region, a certain chemical engineer, not without irony, said in a private conversation: "... how will our historians feel now, because they shouted about knight dogs, about the battle on the ice, about Alexander Nevsky, etc., and now you have to shout about a hundred years and even centuries of friendship (with Germany. - **V.N. J.**) After all, if two years ago they started talking about it, then at best they would have been imprisoned, or

even shot at all. [325] On the same days, V.I. Vernadsky wrote down in his diary his impressions of reading the book Against the Fascist Falsification of History, published literally on the eve of the non-aggression pact with Germany. This book was prepared by the Institute of History of the USSR Academy of Sciences with the participation of prominent Soviet scientists E.A. Kosminsky, S.D. Skazkin and others. The book also included an article by E.V. Tarle, Eastern Space and Fascist Geopolitics. Vernadsky remarked on this occasion: "Tarle has oversalted." [326]

It is clear that censorship could not pass by the manuscripts of E.V. Tarle. In Leningrad, a ready-made reprint of the historian's article "Fascist falsification of historical science in Germany" prepared for the journal "Literaturny Sovremennik" (1939. No. 7-8) was confiscated.

The censor fixed his gaze on the following passage contained in the mentioned article:

in the pearl of creation, has already managed to make it completely impossible for them to exist not only in historical science, but also in general in the humanities and social sciences. In addition, the censor's red pencil went over all the formulations that concerned the expansionist policy of Germany, the conquests of lands in the East in the past, and also contained negative assessments of Nazi bosses (Hitler, Goebbels and others). The censor sent a note to the editors of Literaturny Sovremennik, in which he ordered that the publication of this article be banned. [327] After the signing

of the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact, even in the central print organ of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, the censors forced to correct part of the circulation due to "incorrect" coverage of relations between Germany and the USSR. For sharp criticism of fascism, the books of the leader of the German communists E. Telman "Battle speeches and articles" (1935), S. Vishnev "How the fascist warmongers armed" (1939), and others were withdrawn from circulation, since the Nazis and The Fuhrer was characterized in them "as

terrorists and bandits." [328] The political intuition of the censors of Glavlit was so perfect that literally from the first days after the signing of the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact and the "announcement" of V.M. Molotov of the beginning of the "friendly era" in relations with Germany, they began to look for everything in handwritten and already published literary works that contradicted the new "political attitude" of the Bolshevik leadership. The censors even managed to find a text in a collection of articles on the topic of ... religious propaganda on one of the pages that "contradicted relations with Germany". Naturally, this text was immediately corrected, and the aforementioned collection was published with cuts. In other cases, representatives of Glavlit acted less meticulously. For example, they destroyed all Anglo-French literature that contained criticism of the Ribbentrop Molotov Pact. [329]

Paradoxically, in the collection Proceedings of the Leningrad Conference on Typification of Technological Processes published in 1939, an experienced censor managed to find an excerpt "with sharp objections (sic! - V.N.) **against** fascism." And as an example, the following passage was cited, identified in one of the articles included in this collection: "At a time when furious fascism destroys the achievements of science and technology and leads its countries to the horrors of the Middle Ages ...". Naturally, this excerpt was "removed" by the

censor. [330] On September 28, German Imperial Foreign Minister J. von Ribbentrop again arrived in Moscow, where, after his negotiations with Stalin and V.M. Molotov signed the Soviet-German treaty of friendship and border. After the signing of this treaty, the censors became even more vigilant to ensure that printed materials published in the USSR "did not darken" "friendship" with Germany. On February 10, 1940, the head of the Glavli and N.G. Sadchikov sent the deputy head of the UPA of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks a list of books to be withdrawn from sale and from libraries. In particular, it mentioned N. Kornev's book "The Third Empire in Persons", published by the Khudozhestvennaya Literatura publishing house in 1937. The censorship considered that the author of the book wrote "very sharply" the social base on which he rested. The conclusion of the leadership of Glavlit was unequivocal: "In the conditions of the present, the described content of the book does not correspond

to our foreign policy." [331] "It is said badly about Hitler..." – this is how the censors assessed E. Otwalt's book "Hitler's Path to Power", published by the Sotsekgiz publishing house in 1933. A number of formulations were found in it, which, after the conclusion of the USSR treaty of friendship and the border with Germany was regarded as "undesirable". And as an example, the censor cited the following paragraph: "Now fascism is triumphant. He celebrates bloody orgies throughout the country (Germany. - **V.N.**), destroying communism. [332]

Looking through the certificate of the content of the curriculum in economic geography of the Leningrad State University, as well as in the new history of the Leningrad Political and Educational Institute. N.K. Krupskaya, the staff of Leningrad State University discovered that Germany was considered in them as the main culprit in unleashing the First World War. The head of the department of economic geography was pointed out by the censor "to an irresponsible attitude (sic! - **V.N.**) to the preparation of programs" and it was proposed to "withdraw" them immediately. [333]

June 11, 1940 Deputy Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, First Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs A.Ya. Vyshinsky informed his boss V.M. Molotov that he was present at the "closed performance" - the opera "Semyon Katko" by S.S. Prokofiev at the Theater. K.S. Stanislavsky. Vyshinsky considered it expedient to make changes to the libretto of the opera, "eliminating the episodes with the Austro-German occupiers." Naturally, the composer Prokofiev had no choice but to agree "with this proposal." [334]

In October 1940, the head of the Glavlit N.G. Sadchikov reported to the UPA of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks that, among other books seized for censorship reasons, the song collection of the poet V.I. Lebedev-Kumach "May Moscow", published by the Musical Publishing House in 1937. The reason was simple: the presence in the text of the song "Don't Touch Us" published in the collection of the song "Several paragraphs of an anti-German character" [335] (we cited them above).

In general, V.I. Lebedev-Kumach thoroughly "got" from the censors. Traces of their interference can be found if we compare the content of the mentioned collection of poetry, published in 1938, [336] i.e., before the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact, with a book of poems published after the signing of this pact and the treaty of friendship and border with Germany. [337] In the new book, instead of "Germans and lords", whom the dashing Red Army men defeated "to smithereens", "remained" ... only lords (Poles); accordingly, there is no longer a trace of the "German force" in the censored collection of 1940, and the place of "fascist guests" was simply taken by "uninvited guests".

After the signing of the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact, any attempts to reflect in works of art topics related even to a hypothetical armed clash between the USSR and Germany began to be immediately suppressed. [338]

Most likely, after the visit of J. von Ribbentrop to Moscow and the conclusion of an agreement on friendship and the border with Germany on September 28, 1939, L.Z. Mekhlis personally received instructions from Stalin as to exactly in what terms it was necessary to explain to the personnel of the Red Army the reason for such a sharp turn in foreign policy and the "new course" in the behavior of the Soviet leadership regarding the National Socialist regime. The leadership of PURKKA reacted to the agreements signed between the USSR and Germany with a special directive from the Mekhlis (September 29). In it, in particular, the leadership of the political departments of the districts and the armies was conveyed the following idea: the non-aggression pact "eliminated the threat of war" and meant "a brilliant victory for the Stalinist foreign policy." [339]

Meanwhile, even the people's internal rejection of the propaganda campaign that had begun in the spirit of "friendship" with Hitler's Germany did not serve as a hindrance to the manifestations of conformism. November 15, 1939 M.M. Prishvin noted in his diary: "As before, people do not talk among themselves about politics, but it is so great that it has entered into everyone, and everyone is a politician to himself, lives inside great events." [339] The reality of the Soviet regime forced him to be a "politician to himself". The atmosphere of mistrust sometimes led to the fact that even in conversations with relatives and friends, people were afraid to speak out "too frankly". The course towards rapprochement with Nazi Germany, "friendship" with it was chosen by Stalin, and, as the overwhelming majority of the population of the USSR believed, it was simply dangerous to openly oppose her personal opinion. The belief prevailed that a leader could not make mistakes. [340]

At specially organized rallies and meetings, it seems that the significance of the Soviet-German rapprochement was deliberately exaggerated: "Here is the correct post-

new question. It can be seen that people of action gathered and, without wasting time, signed such an agreement (non-aggression pact. - **V.N.**), which others have been considering for years. At the same time, considerations were expressed that the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact provided an opportunity for a respite for more thorough preparation for the upcoming military trials: the need to arm even more." [341]

On December 23, 1939, Hitler sent a congratulatory telegram on the occasion of Stalin's 60th birthday. It expressed the wishes of "good health" to the Bolshevik leader and "a happy future for the peoples of the friendly Soviet Union." The Führer was echoed by Ribbentrop, who did not forget in his greeting addressed to the Bolshevik leader to mention the beginning of a turn in relations between the USSR and Germany, "creating the basis for a long friendship between them." Stalin did not remain in debt and sent a reply message on December 25 to Hitler and Ribbentrop. Stalin's text stated: "The friendship of the peoples of Germany and the Soviet Union, sealed by blood, has every reason to be long and strong." [342]

At the end of July 1940, I.G. returned to Moscow from Paris. Ehrenburg. Alarmed by the tragic events taking place in the West associated with the defeat and capitulation of France, he, unaware of how sensitive the ideological damage inflicted by the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact turned out to be, continued to maintain his conviction about the real threat to the USSR from Germany. Meanwhile, in Moscow, according to Ehrenburg's definition, "the mood was more like a wedding". The press praised the growing Soviet-German friendship. The writer turned to the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, intending to share his own impressions of what he saw in France, to talk about the moral and political image of German soldiers. I.G. Ehrenburg was received by Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs S.A. Lozovsky. He explained that "information confirming the correctness of the chosen policy" was urgently needed, and not vice versa: "above" did not want to hear anything that would darken the Soviet-German "friendship". [343] Indeed, in a report on the foreign policy of the

Soviet Union, made at a meeting of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on August 1, 1940, V.M. Molotov stated that "the basis of the existing good-neighborly and friendly Soviet-German relations are not random considerations of an opportunistic nature, but the fundamental state interests of both the USSR and Germany." [344]

In August-September 1940, a year passed since the signing of the Soviet-German agreements on non-aggression, as well as on friendship and the border. These events were marked by a series of publications in the Soviet press. In June 1940, the higher leadership instructed the Deputy Director of the Institute of World Economy and World Politics of the USSR Academy of Sciences A.F. Bordadyn to write an article about the state of the German economy, with a stern warning: "Nothing bad can be written about Germany." Prior to his appointment as deputy director of the institute, Bordadyn was successively the head of the political department of the MTS, the secretary of the district committee, and the secretary of the factory party organization. Later, he emphasized in a letter addressed to A.A. Zhdanov (May 12, 1941), that during the entire time he was in the CPSU (b) he did not make "political mistakes", and "always coped with the assigned work in good faith." A.F. Bordadyn, by his own admission, did not have the opportunity to engage in systematic scientific research, being loaded as deputy director of the Institute of World Economy and World Economy of the USSR Academy of Sciences exclusively with organizational and economic issues. He sincerely relied on the political insight of the director of the institute, E.S. Varga, from whom he received the assignment to write the mentioned article. Bordadyn subsequently admitted in an address to Zhdanov that Varga invariably coordinated his own "theoretical conclusions" "in higher organizations."

Taking into account the authority of his immediate superior, the novice researcher prepared a manuscript of an article on the military economy of Germany, relying on materials available at the institute, mainly on the German press. E.S. got acquainted with this manuscript. Varga. His written review followed, in which the article was rated as "not bad".

Manuscript A.F. Bordadyna after its editing by E.S. Varga was carefully read by the press department of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs. As a result, conclusions about the presence of weaknesses in the German economy were deleted from it. The author himself was never able to get acquainted with the changes made, since he was sent on a long business trip far beyond Moscow. Bordadyn later admitted: "It seemed to me that since the article received a positive review from Varga and was passed by the NKID, there was nothing politically wrong in it." [345] As a result, the material of A.F. Bordadyn, which virtually ignored the weaknesses of the German war economy, was published on the anniversary of the Soviet-German non-aggression pact. [346] The GUPPKA press organ, the journal "Political Studies of the Red Army", included him in the list of journal publications recommended for study at political classes in countries adjacent to the USSR. [347]

The hostile attitude toward the Nazi regime, which had been instilled by Soviet propaganda until August 23, 1939, was "compensated" (not without its own help) by the confidence in a quick victory over the Germans in the event of a direct armed clash with Germany. However, the triumphant successes of the German army gave rise to somewhat different feelings. Even V.V. Vishnevsky, who can hardly be suspected of Germanophilism, was amazed by the power of the Wehrmacht. On June 18, 1940, he wrote in his diary: "Germany is crushing, sucking in country after country... The Germans are intoxicated... It is hard to think that their organization can really be higher than all the organizations in the world. It is the organization: mechanicalness, discipline, blind obedience, automatism, a little bit of myths, mystics ... Germans, Nazism - this is Europe's answer to Versailles and Bolshevism. A strange combination - strange, but grandiose, strong. When 5 European countries are brushed off the world map in 3 months, there is something to think about. And we thought and studied this phenomenon insufficiently." [348] A tendency emerged

(among the youth in particular) for a simplified but unequivocal perception of German military successes in the West. In the summer of 1940, the property of the secretary of the Komsomol committee of the IFLI A.N. Shelepin became the diary of an Inflian student who frankly admired the Germans, "who in a short time split such a great power as France." [349] Thus, contrary to popular belief, the notion of the Wehrmacht as "a well-oiled machine that rushes like an avalanche of steel", [350] arose not after, but before the German attack on the USSR, when it was not yet a real enemy. As already noted, I.G. Ehrenburg, who sought to convey to the reader information about the reasons for the defeat

of France, faced great difficulties. He intended, relying on his own publications in the central press, to explain that the rapid defeat of this country was due not to the miraculous power of the Wehrmacht, but to the moral weakness of the ruling French regime. But in the foreign department of the Izvestia newspaper, the writer was told that his articles would not be published. Then Ehrenburg turned to the newspaper Trud. Now the head of the foreign department of the central press organ of the Central Committee of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions Z.S. Sheinis tried to explain to him that one should not "write anything about the Germans", but "scold the French traitors" is allowed. [351] Finally, the writer informed members of the editorial board of Znamya magazine of his intention to publish excerpts from his new novel, The Fall of Paris, on its pages. Trying to justify this intention, I.G. Ehrenburg noted: "The reader is now rightly interested in the reasons for the defeat of France. If we cannot talk about much, even a part is useful. [352] Thus, the political gain from the agreements with Germany in 1939 was overshadowed by ideological costs and contradictions. The official settings

periodically "voiced" in the speeches of V.M. Molotov, left no hope for their smoothing out. The targeting of propaganda to cultivate "friendship" with the Nazi Third Reich after several years of intense anti-Nazi campaigning against the backdrop of Hitler's increasing aggressiveness in Europe caused bewilderment and irritation in the public.

Literary works, periodicals, theatrical performances, and film distribution were "freed" from the subject matter related to a possible military conflict between the USSR and Germany. In Soviet propaganda (and this was reflected in the public consciousness) references to the successes of German weapons began to appear. The fact that, for tactical reasons, it was determined to ensure the slogan of "the blossoming of friendship" with Germany was misleading and was perceived as a kind of "deviation" from the former anti-fascist orientation. Hard times have come for those who were involved in propaganda structures. They had to show special political intuition in order to avoid unacceptable "deviations" from the officially proclaimed line of rapprochement with "sworn friends". But in such a situation, any change in the new "line" and the return of the Stalinist leadership to the former ("correct") anti-

fascist path would inevitably have to be perceived as a real, and most importantly, desirable outcome of events. Obviously, in order to compensate to some extent for the expectation by most people of the next turn in

propaganda, the Stalinist leadership, immediately after the signing of the non-aggression pact with Germany, hastened to present evidence of the undoubted advantages for the USSR from rapprochement with it. A short period of "liberation campaigns" of the Red Army began, which were accompanied by broad political and ideological

campaigns.

Chapter Four UNEQUAL ENEMY: POLAND AND FINLAND UNDER THE PROPAGANDIS SIGHT (1939-1940)

4.1. In the heat of "red imperialism": the anti-Polish campaign of 1939

The second paragraph of the secret additional protocol to the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact, in particular, read: "In the event of a territorial and political reorganization of the regions that are part of the Polish state, the border of the spheres of interests of Germany and the USSR will approximately run along the line of the rivers Narew, Vistula and Sana". In the long term, both parties took upon themselves the decision of the question of the expediency of preserving an independent Polish state, assuming that it "can be finally clarified only in the course of further political development." In any case, the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany intended to resolve this issue "by way of friendly mutual agreement." [353] By the end of August 1939, Hitler had no doubts as to exactly how

the Polish problem would be resolved. Since April, the Nazi military-political leadership has been actively preparing for an attack on Poland. The Fuhrer was clearly playing ahead of the curve, hoping for successful military operations in the Polish campaign, provided that the Western allies of the Poles - the British and French - did not actively intervene in the matter. Stalin's plans for Poland were less definite. He acted cautiously, proceeding from the development of events in the already inevitable German-Polish conflict. In addition, he was forced to closely monitor the situation in the international arena and, in particular, in Eastern Europe. With the German attack on Poland (September 1, 1939), the Kremlin began to prepare for practical steps to develop the "spheres of state interests" previously specified in this protocol in Eastern Europe.

In an atmosphere of uncertainty and expectation of events in which the USSR would be an active participant, the NKVD organs recorded the statements of Red Army soldiers and commanders.

ditch, which were not based on reliable information, but in essence were an attempt to "unravel the code" of Stalin's further actions in the international arena. They sounded assumptions about the existence of a secret part to the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact, which stipulated the further actions of the Soviet Union in the event of a German-Polish war. So, the deputy head of the 5th department of the 5th directorate of the Red Army, Shulkin, believed that the non-aggression pact with Germany had "another **secret part** (highlighted by me. - **V.N.**)", which stipulated the security of the western borders of the Soviet Union. Head of the Department of the Military Academy. IN AND. Lenin Volkov believed that the text of the treaty, which was not published in full, contains a clause on the transfer to the Germans in the event of a war with Poland of the territory that belonged to the German Empire before 1914. In turn, the USSR "must take Western Ukraine and Western Belarus". [354] Vedernikov, a cadet at the Perm Aviation School, argued that by concluding this diplomatic agreement, Germany had freed its hands "for aggressive actions against the countries of Western Europe." And the junior commander of a rifle company directly stated the following: the USSR contributed to the outbreak of World War II. Without signing a non-aggression pact, the Germans would be afraid to "start a war with Poland, and now Hitler is carrying out his plans." [355] Immediately after the Wehrmacht's invasion of Polish territory, at least three "messages from above" followed from the Kremlin, which can be qualified as signals for the deployment of a political and ideological campaign aimed at propagandistic support for the "liberation campaign" of the Red Army in Western Ukraine and Western Belarus. Stalin's conversation with the General Secretary of the Executive Committee of the Communist International (Comintern) G.M. Dimitrov in the

Kremlin on the night of September 7-8, 1939 in the presence of V.M. Molotov and A.A. Zhdanov. Referring, in particular, to the attitude towards Poland in the conditions of the outbreak of the Second World War, Stalin pointed out that earlier (in history) it was a national state, therefore "revolutionaries defended it against division and enslavement." Now, he developed his idea, this is a "fascist state" that oppresses "Ukrainians, Belarusians, etc.," which should have been destroyed. In this regard, the Soviet leader asked a rhetorical question: what would be wrong if "as a result of the defeat of Poland" the socialist system spread "to new territories and populations"? [356]

Despite the brevity of Stalin's statements about the prospects for the existence of the Polish state in the conditions of the outbreak of World War II, which were voiced in the "narrow circle" of his closest associates, they convey the main thesis of the leader: Poland will inevitably be defeated, and the very fact of its fall should be a signal to start process of territorial increments of the USSR. In early September 1939, the Poles, who were not militarily supported by their Western allies - the British and French, were forced to wage a clearly unequal

armed confrontation with German aggression. Stalin, realizing that under the circumstances the defeat of the Polish state was inevitable, decided with the help of the Red Army to return by force the territories of Western Ukraine and Western Belarus ceded to the Commonwealth in 1921 through the Treaty of Riga. At the same time, Berlin tried to convince Moscow to act as soon as possible, but Stalin had nowhere to rush, because the events in the west of the

were clearly in his favour.

Meanwhile, literally on the eve of the "liberation campaign" of the Red Army in Poland, an article by the regimental commissar N.Ya. Osipov about the Marxist-Leninist understanding of the "character of wars in the modern era". [357] The author, relying on the works of K. Marx, F. Engels, V.I. Lenin and, finally, on the "Short Course in the History of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks", explained that there are only two types of wars: fair and unjust, and, if the first ones are necessarily "a continuation of politics

progressive, revolutionary classes" and are always "connected with the interests of the people", the latter, on the contrary, are "predatory", "anti-popular and reactionary" in their essence. Consequently, it does not matter at all on whose territory the hostilities are being conducted, and in general, who started them first. Something else is much more important: "The Red Army will wage war for the cause of all advanced, progressive mankind, against the monsters of reaction, exploitation, counter-revolution" and under certain conditions "can prevent the attack of aggressors (italics mine. - **V.N.**) on the fatherland of socialism." As figuratively stated in the titled article, the Red Army "will take the robber by the throat" with an "iron hand" before he "has time to draw his bloody knife." Further, the author explained that the characteristic qualities of the Red Army are "activity and offensiveness", and therefore "the possibility is not ruled out when "by the very course of the historical process, the working class will be forced to take the initiative in military operations." N.Ya. Osipov relied on the conclusions of M.V. Frunze, who at one time justified such actions, which created "a complete coincidence of the requirements of military art and general policy." In conclusion, Regimental Commissar Osipov stated the

following: since the Red Army is intended to carry out international tasks, then if its help "can give decisive political and military results", such help will be provided. Addressing bourgeois "politicians" and "strategists", he assured: "the just nature of the war of the USSR and our fundamentally peaceful policy" do not at all exclude "offensive actions of the Red Army in the military-strategic and operational-tactical sense." [358] Further N.Ya. Osipov referred to Lenin's authoritative statement, made at the VIII All-Russian Congress of Soviets (1920), the essence of which was as follows: constant calls for a defensive war are a sign of "petty bourgeois pacifism." [359] The above-mentioned article in one of the leading PURKKA publications ended with the conclusion: "Faithful to Lenin's precepts and Stalin's instructions, the Red Army will cross the borders of the aggressor,

crush the enemy with the might of its weapons and help the working people of the aggressor countries to overthrow capitalist slavery with an armed hand." [360] In the meantime, following the Stalinist instructions given in a personal conversation with Dimitrov, Molotov, and Zhdanov, a second, now public, "mess from above" was carried out to launch an anti-

Polish political and ideological campaign. The newspaper Pravda published an editorial with a very characteristic title and, more importantly, very remarkable in its content. Its text was prepared by A.A. Zhdanov. Stalin took part in editing the article. Only after Stalin's editorial corrections did the article take on a finished form and appear on the front page of the Pravda newspaper, but without indicating the author's name. [361] The article argued that the Polish state, based on the oppression of the Belarusians and Ukrainians living on its territory, "turned out to be incapacitated" and, at the first military failures, "began to disintegrate." According to the political setting, "voiced" by Stalin during the above-mentioned conversation in the Kremlin, Soviet propaganda was aimed at creating a dual image of Poland. On the one hand, the hostile reactionary Polish government, on the other, the "half-brothers" Belarusians and Ukrainians, groaning under the yoke, who were impatiently awaiting liberation from the USSR, by the forces of the Red Army. Abroad, the leading article of the newspaper Pravda of September 14, 1939 was unequivocally interpreted as a signal for preparations for the occupation of Western Ukraine and Western Belorussia by the Soviet Union. [362]

Thus, even *before the beginning* of the campaign of the Red Army in the territories of Western Ukraine and Western Belarus, that is, before September 17, 1939, the Soviet propaganda structures received instructions from the top leadership on the key in which the anti-Polish political and ideological campaign should be

conducted. The main ideas outlined in the above-mentioned conversation between Stalin and G.M. Dimitrov and in the aforementioned editorial of the Pravda newspaper, boiled down to the fact that the Polish

turned out to be internally untenable, and its armed forces were not ready to repel an attack from outside and, therefore, were doomed to defeat. The presence of acute contradictions between the "oppressive" (Poles) and "oppressed" nations (Belarusians and Ukrainians) was especially emphasized. The interpretation of precisely these Stalinist instructions was directed to the activities of propaganda bodies (the Propaganda and Agitation Directorate of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, the Political Directorate of the Workers 'and Peasants' Red Army, Glavlit, the Committee for Arts under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, the mass media).

Representatives of the Soviet intellectual elite: writers, journalists, filmmakers, made their contribution to the coverage of the "Polish" theme at the stage of preparation and conduct of the "liberation campaign" of the Red Army. S. Vashentsev, V.I. Lebedev Kumach, A.T. Tvardovsky, E.A. Dolmatovsky. [363] Caricaturists also made a significant contribution to the "common cause". By the end of the 1930s. Dozens of Soviet artists worked in the

genre of political caricature. But the greatest fame and recognition were received as masters of the genre by L.G. Brodaty, Yu.A. Ganf, V.N. Goryaev, B.E. Efimov, A.M. Kanevsky, Kukryniksy, K.P. Rotov. It was their cartoons, including those on "Polish" topics, that were most often published in the central Soviet magazines and newspapers on the eve and during the Second World War.

According to A.V. Golubev, in the 1920s-1930s. Poland "occupied" the 6th place in the Soviet caricature in terms of the number of drawings dedicated to it and published in the "Crocodile". [364] We can name such well-known works as "Pilsudski sharpens his teeth on the USSR", "Union" of a rider with a horse by B. Efimov, "Clear-noble Poland the dog of the Entente", "On the Polish arena" by V.N. Denis and others. By the end of the 1930s. in the

Soviet caricature, certain images-stereotypes were formed, associated with the perception of certain foreign countries or their leaders. According to A.V. Golubeva, the "sophisticated reader" of the magazine "Crocodile" recognized these characters without any captions under the caricatures, focusing on "familiar details". For example, Yu. Pilsudski was "characterized" by the unchanging confederates and mustaches. [365] In the second half of the 1930s. Soviet political caricature was

dominated by such plots as Poland's rapprochement with the "limitrophes" (Estonia, Finland), as well as with Romania, France and, finally, with Germany, which was seen as a source of potential military threat to the USSR. With the German attack on Poland and the outbreak of World War II, such "passing" stories came to naught. In connection with the curtailment of anti-German and anti-fascist propaganda in the Soviet Union after the signing of the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact and the intensification of Soviet-German cooperation in various fields (political, diplomatic, economic, military), in the conditions of the beginning of a new political and ideological campaign aimed exclusively at In Poland, the methodology for "presenting" cartoons with "Polish" themes has also changed.

As V. Tokarev noted, she "broke a year-long pause in the satirical portrayal" of this country. In October-November 1938, the Soviet and Polish leaderships took reciprocal steps to normalize bilateral relations, which became aggravated due to the position of Warsaw, taken in the conditions of the pre-war political crisis. Then a kind of moratorium was introduced on the caricature reflection of the Polish theme. According to Tokarev, this moratorium lasted until September 17, 1939. [366]

This observation seems to require some correction. The first cartoons representing Poland in the context of the new political and ideological campaign began to be prepared already at the beginning of September 1939. This conclusion can be drawn, in particular, by referring to the drawing by K. Eliseev "The Essential Moment". [367] The materials for the issue of the magazine "Krokodil", where this drawing is placed, were prepared by September 5, when there were still 12 days before the Red Army entered Polish territory, and it was signed for printing on September 21, 1939.

The aforementioned drawing by K. Eliseev depicts a Polish cavalry officer. At the feet of his horse, a rifle is stuck in the ground with a bayonet. This detail, obviously, was intended to show the confusion of the Polish military, the unpreparedness of the Polish army to resist the advancing enemy, that is, the Germans. Addressing the peasants looking at him (judging by their clothes, these are Ukrainians or Belarusians), the Polish officer exclaimed: "Panove, our fatherland (that is, Poland. - V.N.) is in danger. " And I heard in response: "We don't know how yours is, but ours is now completely safe."

Most likely, the author of the cartoon in an allegorical form conveyed the idea of the inevitability of the fall of Poland under the blows of the Germans. At the same time, it can be assumed that through the mouths of the peasants depicted in the caricature, belonging to the oppressed "national minorities" of Poland, K. Eliseev declared the idea of a diplomatic agreement with Germany of August 23, 1939, beneficial for the USSR ("the fatherland of all the

oppressed"). On September 15, 1939, the selection of materials (text and drawings) for the next, 26th issue of the Krokodil magazine was completed. In this issue (it was signed for printing on September 27, 1939, the day when the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Third Reich J. von Ribbentrop arrived in Moscow to sign a new Soviet-German agreement) there is a drawing by Yu.A. Ganfa "Polish emigrants".

... On the autumn road, a pair of horses carries a tarantass. On the irradiation - as many as three "coachmen": a Polish general in a confederate and two civilians. The "passengers" were seated in the back seat in uncomfortable positions. This, judging by the special inscriptions to the picture, is "poor that", "hunger" and "lawlessness". Tarantass leaves Polish territory. The author of the cartoon, obviously, set himself the task of showing that now these lands will forever be freed from poverty, lawlessness, and hunger. Yu.A. Hanf once again focused the attention of the readers of Krokodil on the fact of the defeat of the Polish army: an officer's cap is lying on the ground; the saber is stuck into the ground

to the very hilt. [368] While the Poles retreated farther and farther from their western border under the blows of superior German forces, units of the Red Army concentrated on the eastern borders of the Commonwealth. By September 17, two fronts were created - Belorussian and Ukrainian (8 rifle, 5 cavalry, 2 tank corps; 21 rifle, 13 cavalry divisions, 16 tank, 2 motorized brigades). They numbered over 600 thousand people. They were armed with about 5,000 guns and mortars, over 4,700 tanks, and about 3,300 aircraft. [369] Military units numbering 340 thousand people were stationed in the eastern voivodeships of Poland. with 540 guns and 70 tanks. [370]

Naturally, the presence of such a numerous grouping of the Red Army forces, which significantly exceeded those forces that participated in the armed conflicts near Khasan Lake and the Khalkhin-Gol River, determined the nature of the activities of the party political bodies, primarily PURKKA. Propaganda support for the "liberation campaign" of the Red Army in Poland began to be prepared ahead of time, at least two weeks before it began. L.Z. Mekhlis, having arrived at the headquarters of the Belorussian Special Military District, on September 15, by his telephone message, instructed the heads of the political departments of the military districts to urgently reprint in the district newspapers the leading article of the Pravda newspaper "On the Internal Causes of the Military Defeat of Poland". Based on this article, mass explanatory work should have been launched. At the direction of L.Z. Mehliis, front-line units were created to conduct anti-Polish propaganda. In the political departments of the Belorussian and Ukrainian fronts, departments were formed to work among the enemy population and prisoners of war, 6 editorial offices of newspapers in foreign languages and printing houses were deployed in wartime states. [371] On the night of September 16-17, 1939, only 180,000 copies were issued to the troops of the Ukrainian Front. appeals to the soldiers of the Commonwealth, printed in Polish. The front-line political departments, also in Polish, published the newspapers Word of a Soldier and Voice of a Soldier. [372]

In the course of preparations for the introduction of troops into Polish territory, the circulation of district newspapers increased significantly: in BOVO - by 60% (from 80,000 to 130,000 copies), in KOVO - by 70% (from 90,000 to 150,000 copies). 47 newspapers were published on the Belorussian Front (3 front-line, 8 army, 36 divisional and brigade) with a total circulation of 515 thousand copies; on the Belorussian front - 59 newspapers (3 front-line, 8 army, 48 divisional and brigade). The editorial office of the divisional newspaper "For the Motherland!" (Ukrainian Front) issued a special combat leaflet with TASS materials twice a day. In the divisional newspaper of the 10th Rifle Division of the Belorussian Front, "On a combat post", a special information bulletin was issued daily.

As already noted, one of the fundamental documents in the course of the unfolding political and ideological campaign to substantiate and explain the foreign policy actions of the Soviet leadership in relation to Poland was the above-mentioned leading article published in the Pravda newspaper on September 14, 1939. Thus, the army political directorates of the Belarusian and Ukrainian fronts in their directive documents, published immediately after the publication of the editorial in the newspaper Pravda, focused on the fact that the Ukrainians and Belarusians living in the Polish territories had already rebelled against the landlords and capitalists. Under these conditions, the Red Army acted as a liberator army. The commanders of the military formations of the Red Army, concentrated on the border with Poland, were given the following explanation: the task of the upcoming campaign was that "Panish Poland should become Soviet." [373] Another, also public, "message from above" in the unfolding anti-Polish political and ideological

campaign was V.M. Molotov on September 17, 1939, the text of which was immediately published in the central Soviet newspapers. [374] In the early morning of the same day, the Red Army crossed the Soviet-Polish border and rushed west. Addressing the "citizens and women of the Soviet Union", Molotov, justifying this armed action, essentially retold Stalin's thesis about the failure of the Polish state. In his speech on the radio, there were also "voiced" and installations, which were reflected in the official note of the government of the USSR, handed to the Polish ambassador in Moscow W. Grzybowski at 3.15 am on September 17, 1939. is not the capital of Poland, the government of the country collapsed, in connection with which the former Soviet-Polish treaties can be considered invalid. Under these conditions, the Soviet Union decided to give a "helping hand to its brothers" - the Ukrainians and Belarusians inhabiting its territories, and the Red Army received an order to cross the border and "take under its protection the life and property of the population of Western Ukraine and Western Belarus." [375]

Having received instructions "from above" and perceiving them as a guide to action, the Soviet propaganda apparatus immediately launched its work with all its might. Propaganda organs in cities and villages, in the Red Army, made every effort to bring to as many people as possible, to instill in their minds the attitudes formulated by representatives of the highest party and state leadership Zhdanov and Molotov, behind which, as they understood many, stood Stalin.

Guided by the specific instructions of the head of PURKKA L.Z. Mekhlis, army political workers focused the attention of the personnel on the fact that the "liberation campaign" that had begun in Western Ukraine and Western Belarus was in fact a "revolutionary offensive war", the main goal of which was to deliver the fraternal Slavic peoples - Ukrainians and Belarusians from capitalist oppression. Mekhlis, being in the combat formations of the Red Army units before their entry into Polish territory, followed the deployment of political propaganda work among the personnel. PURKKA prepared theses to substantiate this military action of the USSR. They contained a call to "beat the Polish lords", and clearly did not take into account the fact that "pan" in the Commonwealth was called any male citizen, wealthy and propertyless. And only 5 days after the start of the "liberation campaign" with

permission from Stalin and K.E. Voroshilov, the corresponding corrections were made to the abstracts.
tivy.

The message about the entry of units of the Red Army into the territory of Western Ukraine and Western Belarus caused a mixed reaction in various sectors of Soviet society. For example, the workers of some factories welcomed this news, believing that the Red Army was coming to beat the Germans. [376] According to M.I. Meltyukhov, as a result of the political work carried out, a powerful patriotic upsurge arose in the troops. The personnel, wrote Meltyukhov, expressed a desire to fulfill the order "on the release of brothers Ukrainians and Belarusians." The historian cited the corresponding statements of the Red Army soldiers and commanders, which sounded the approval of the foreign policy of the Stalinist leadership. [377]

Indeed, the figures testify to the significant efforts made by the leadership of PURKKA to provide information to the personnel of the Byelorussian and Ukrainian fronts. In the military units that took part in the "liberation campaign", from September 17 to October 15, 1939, 3,264,000 copies were distributed. various central periodicals. [378] On the Ukrainian front alone, from September 17 to October 15, over 1 million copies were distributed to Red Army soldiers and commanders. central newspapers and more than 9 million copies. various propaganda

literature.

But despite all the efforts of army propagandists, some servicemen made statements that clearly ran counter to the official assessments of events. These statements, which were qualified by the NKVD organs as anti-Soviet, essentially questioned Stalin's well-known propaganda guidelines about "aggressive" and "non-aggressive" states, about "war provocateurs" who "are accustomed to rake in the heat with the wrong hands", etc. . and so on.

For example, the senior clerk of the 180th Infantry Division, Karpov, had no doubt that the active actions of the Soviet Union were justified by the existence of an agreement with Germany on the division of Poland, according to which the Germans received its western part, and the Soviet Union - the eastern one. Ivanov, a Red Army soldier of the 2nd Separate Red Banner Army, reasoned in a similar way. The USSR, in his opinion, not only "untied the hands of the aggressor", i.e. Germany, but together "with this aggressor destroyed and divided Poland". His co-workers spoke in a similar way. So, private Vostrikov believed that "Germany wanted to seize Poland for itself, and the Soviet Union is seizing it for itself." The Red Army men Kharchenko and Zarubaev actually condemned the armed action of the Soviet Union against Poland. The first of them said literally the following: "When concluding a pact (on non-aggression. - **V.N.**), the USSR and Germany obviously agreed among themselves on the division of Poland and now they are practically implementing it." According to the second, the order for the Red Army to cross the Soviet-Polish border could quite reasonably induce the "capitalists" to make a statement that the USSR was raking in "the heat with the wrong hands." The campaign in Poland, Zarubaev concluded, "is not help, but simply the Soviet Union itself got involved in the war."

It is noteworthy that even some army political workers, who were called upon to bring to the attention of the personnel the instructions of the directive bodies about the motives for the "liberation campaign", sometimes acted contrary to the same guidelines. Thus, the propaganda instructor of the 138th cavalry regiment, senior political instructor Karavaev, expressed confidence that the partition of Poland was taking place before everyone's eyes. He also expressed the following assumption: the decision on this division was made at the time of the conclusion of the non-aggression pact between the USSR and Germany.

The statements of Soviet propaganda about the peace-loving policy of the USSR and the well-known slogan "we do not need foreign land" were interpreted in a peculiar way in such conversations. The Red Army soldier of the 13th Rifle Corps, Kruzhilin, in connection with the beginning of the "liberation campaign" in Poland, asked himself with a perplexed question: "The Nazis did not attack us and we don't want to take an inch of foreign land, so why are we speaking out?". In the same

the spirit of the Red Army soldier Muravitsky spoke out, who wondered why it was necessary to "defend Western Ukraine and Belarus, because we have a policy of peace, let them free themselves"; no one attacked the USSR, "well, okay." The Red Army soldier Sheludchev echoed them: the crossing of the Soviet-Polish border by units of the Red Army, in his opinion, contradicted the slogan "we do not want foreign land." In Poland and in other countries, Sheludchev reasoned, there are communist parties, the proletariat, so "let them make a revolution themselves and get rid of the landowners and capitalists on their own."

At times, in the statements of military personnel, noted by employees of the special departments of the NKVD, there was a condemnation of the foreign policy of the Stalinist leadership, which was directly characterized as predatory. A serviceman from one of the military units of the Leningrad Military District, Makarov, was sure that the USSR "actually began to help Hitler in the capture of Poland." The assertions of Soviet propaganda about peacefulness evoked only protest from him: "They write about peace, but in reality they have become aggressors." As for the population of Western Ukraine and Western Belarus, then, according to Makarov, they did not need any help at all. He formulated his conclusion as follows: these territories "we (i.e., the Red Army. - **V.N.**) ... are seizing and only formally informing us that we are not fighting, but are

standing up for their defense." In the same context, a statement was made by a Red Army soldier from one of the military units of the Kharkov Military District Korasyk. He argued that, like the Germans who entered Poland as invaders, the Red Army played a similar role in relation to this country, among other things, contributing to new bloodshed by its actions. The Red Army soldier Pozdnyakov, who served in the 2nd Red Banner Army, declared: the USSR entered the territory of Poland, already defeated by the Germans. It turns out, he reasoned, "that we, too, are raking in the heat with the wrong hands." Finally, according to Iofchik, a serviceman from the Leningrad Military District, the USSR felt the weakness of the Polish army, "and let's engage in an aggressive policy." As a kind of result of his reflections - a conclusion often found in the statements of military personnel - although Soviet propaganda condemned aggression verbally and in writing, the USSR "in essence" itself became an aggressor. [379]

Much further than the Red Army, who, as a rule, had a low educational level and a limited outlook, went in their assessments of the events of the second half of September 1939, representatives of the command staff of the Red Army. Thus, a student of the 3rd year of the Academy of Chemical Defense Adamishin assessed the actions of the Red Army in Poland as a manifestation of "red imperialism". According to his observations, the slogan "we do not want foreign land", which was one of the most common in propaganda, was forgotten as soon as Moscow "saw that it was possible to seize a piece". Adamishin drew an analogy between the events of 1938, when the Germans justified the capture of the Sudetenland by the need to protect their compatriots living in this territory, and the Red Army's campaign in Western Ukraine and Western Belarus under the banner of "liberation of half-brothers." And if earlier the USSR condemned the German aggressors, now it has committed aggression itself. "It's good to rake in the heat with the wrong hands. The Germans defeated Poland, and we are ready to go," concluded Adamishin.

When the Red Army entered the territory of the Polish state, some political workers (mostly at the lower level) were completely at a loss and did not know how to interpret the events that were taking place. Political instructor of the 4th Tank Brigade of the Ukrainian Front Poteleshko, one of the participants in the "liberation campaign" in Poland in 1939, expressed his bewilderment at the instructions of "superior officials". The commander and commissar of the battalion in which he served announced to the personnel: "We will fight." However, Poteleshko stressed, they did not say who exactly the enemy was. In addition, the political instructor reasoned, no one declared war on the Soviet Union, its leadership is pursuing a policy of peace, trying not to be drawn into it, and suddenly they began to march and actually became involved in hostilities. Poteleshko expressed his conviction:

naya policy clearly contradicted the "teachings of the party of Lenin-Stalin." After all, "Lenin taught that you can't bring a revolution on bayonets, either to Poland or to another country." It was perfectly clear to him that "wrecking" was evident here. "Someone had a hand in this to change our policy," Poteleshko assured.

At the same time, the NKVD authorities noted in the statements of the Red Army servicemen a tendency towards a direct apology of "Red imperialism". Characteristic in this sense is the opinion of an employee of the General Staff of the Red Army, Major Shvetsov. He believed that the Soviet government should get Germany's consent to the restoration of the USSR in the west of "the borders of old tsarist Russia." After all, you still have to fight against the Germans, and therefore, he believed, Berlin should be required to transfer the entire Polish territory to the Soviet Union. In return, give Germany Danzig and the regions of Poland inhabited by the Germans. [380] Some misunderstanding

of the "liberation" slogans under which the Red Army entered the territory of Poland, which emerged already in September 1939, did not lead to a change in the content of the propaganda itself. According to S.G. Osmachko, this was due to the transience of hostilities, the sluggishness of the system of educational work in the troops, and the lack of corrective instructions "from above". Although, as noted by

Torik, in many political reports, a critical attitude to the content of "slogan politics" was stated. [381]

After the start of the "liberation campaign" of the Red Army in Western Ukraine and Western Belarus, the anti-Polish political and ideological campaign of Soviet propaganda reached its climax. It is no coincidence, therefore, that the theme of the defeat and flight of the Polish army, now under attack from the East, is reflected in a number of cartoons published in the magazine Krokodil. On October 5, 1939, the 27th, special issue of the magazine was signed for publication under the general meaningful title: "The Crocodile Crosses the Border." On the cover Yu.L. Gunf placed a crocodile: the reptile walked calmly along the wide road. Behind is a border post shot down (obviously by Soviet tanks) with the national symbol of Poland - a white eagle. Ahead - rapidly scattering in different directions: a Polish general, a "bourgeois" and a priest (priest). The general is depicted in a uniform, but for some reason without a confederate, which is lying nearby on the ground, and barefoot. Most likely, Yu.L. Hanf wanted to once again emphasize the swiftness of the flight of the Polish units that opposed the Red Army from the battlefield. In order to once again arouse rejection of the clergy, the artist portrayed the priest in an obscene form: he picked up the skirts of his cassock like a woman, exposing the calves of his legs. [382]

The theme of stampede from the battlefield is reflected simply and succinctly in the drawing by V.N. Goryaev "Graph in motion": a Polish officer in military uniform, with a bag, is rapidly running along the railway tracks. Using a hyperbolic image, he The train worker tried to show with his drawing that the speed of the movement of a character that was clearly not sympathetic to him exceeds ... the speed of the train. For the umpteenth time in this caricature, the theme of the rapid retreat of the Polish Army under the onslaught of the Red Army was carried out. [383]

Yu.L. Gunf. In the aforementioned special issue of Krokodil, his drawing was published, in which Polish refugees are depicted in the background. In the foreground is a general in a confederate, with orders on his chest, and a decently dressed gentleman. The general, addressing his interlocutor, says: "I have kept my uniform spotless." To which the civilian replies: "Sure, you were the first to run." [384]

Together with Ganf's drawing, a caricature by D. Dubinsky was placed, the plot of which was a poem by A.N. Nekrasov "A man with a fingernail". [385] A Red Army soldier standing at his post is talking to a teenager who is leading two bound prisoners

Polish officers. To the question of the sentry "Where from, boy?" (that is, where did the Poles come from, they say?), the teenager's answer follows: "From the forest, of course. Father, you see, they (Poles. - V.N.) catches them, and I take them away!

In a number of cartoons published in the magazine "Krokodil" in the autumn of 1939 and in 1940, the significance of the date of the beginning of the "liberation campaign" - September 17, 1939 was emphasized. In one case, the idea was put forward that this date marks the end of the landowner oppression of the "Polish pans" over the peasants - Belarusians and Ukrainians. This theme was revealed, for example, in N. Radlov's drawings under the general title "How a sovereign magnate measured his land." The first drawing, which bears the explanatory inscription "until September 17, 1939," depicts a Polish landowner watching with undisguised pleasure as a surveyor uses a theodolite to measure his land holdings. The introduction of the image of a land surveyor, obviously, should have once again emphasized the material viability of the "possessing magnate". At the same time, the artist, depicting in the background a dilapidated peasant shack and the peasant, exhausted by overwork, plowing a field on a rundown horse, conveyed the idea of the poverty and poverty of the working people in "panor Poland". Another drawing depicts events that took place "after September 17, 1939." Now the former "ruling tycoon" was running away with all his might with a suitcase in his hand, apparently trying to avoid punishment from the peasants. Behind him - eloquently raised pitchforks and a scythe - indispensable attributes of a peasant revolt. [386]

In a different context, the same date was interpreted by the artist K. Eliseev. He used "September" symbols along with "October" (revolution of 1917) in the caricature "Pan's Life". [387]

... A fat, well-dressed man with a bag in his hand is running along the road. His run is so swift that a headress (cylinder) fell off the head of the runner. He exclaims as he runs: "It turns out that besides October there is another terrible month of September." Here is a clear hint that the events of October 1917 in Russia and September 1939 in the eastern Polish lands are phenomena of the same order and mark revolutionary social al changes.

September 1939, as a landmark date, was used in Soviet caricature and for improvisations on the theme of the fall of the Polish statehood. The drawing by N. Radlov "The music did not play for a long time" depicts a classroom in a Polish school. The teacher, addressing his students, says: "This, children, is the end of our study of the history of the Polish state." The characteristic detail introduced by Radlov only emphasizes the dramatic nature of the situation: the date "September 1939" is marked in the notebook of one of the students. All this, according to the already established peculiar tradition, is depicted against the backdrop of the flight of the Polish army. Outside the window of the school class, an overturned gun and panicked cavalymen are visible. [388] One of the principles applied by the representatives of the caricature genre is the principle of transformation.

In particular, in some cases, various parts of the body of a person and an animal (bird) are connected in a caricature. It should be noted that the Soviet cartoonists who covered in 1939-1941. "Polish" themes, often resorted to such a method

todica.

And this is not a mere coincidence. According to V. Tokarev's observations, there are some absolute national values that have the same meaning for all generations and continue to remain so throughout various historical eras. Soviet propaganda neglected this principle without looking, starting "with complete mockery of those symbols that designated Polish sovereignty", in particular - over the coat of arms of the Polish state ("White Eagle"). Tokarev referred to the caricatures of V. Boriskin and V. Fomichev, A. Reznichenko, A. Kozyurenko, published in early November 1939 in the newspaper Moskovsky Bolshevik. [389]

In this connection, two drawings by A.M. Kanevsky under the general title "Polish Eagles Are Flying", published in the magazine "Crocodile". [390] The purpose of the author of the drawings was not only to depict the disorderly flight of the Polish army, but also to show, with the means of caricature available to him, the end of the "gentry" rule in the eastern lands of Poland.

... In the first picture - Polish generals and officers fleeing the battlefield in a panic. To emphasize the swiftness of this flight, Kanevsky added to some of them frail eagle wings, more like chicken wings. However, the "owners" of these degenerate eagle wings are clearly ahead of their comrades-in-arms, because thanks to this atavism given to them by the author of the caricature, they have the opportunity to rise into the air and soar (fly), albeit not high, above the "sinful earth". The second drawing depicts a peasant standing on the roof of a landowner's house, who knocks down the symbol of Poland - the White Eagle with a pitchfork.

"Cartoonization" of the state Polish symbols was widely used by artists who worked in the magazine "Crocodile". For example, in the figure A.M. Kanevsky "That, but not that," the general, holding a bag of money in his right hand, casually squeezed a white eagle under his arm with his left hand. An analysis of the materials of the capital and provincial

periodicals of the USSR in 1939-1940, in which cartoons on the "Polish theme" were published, was given by V.A. Tokarev as
novation to draw the following conclusions.

Poland was depicted in Soviet cartoons and propaganda posters as a kind of "panopticon of national oppression, social evil and degeneration." Social and political vices were represented by the " **basic** (highlighted by V.A. Tokarev. - **V.N.**) value" and a kind of companion of the Polish ruling regime

ma.

The semantics of the image in the Soviet caricature was offensive to the institutions of the Polish statehood. The "Polish standards" characteristic of it amounted to ridiculing the foreign policy of the Commonwealth, its Armed Forces and an apology for the victories of the Red Army over the Poles.

The European events of September 1939 were presented by the Soviet caricature "as the natural end of the flawed Polish statehood." These events were interpreted by her as

a military revenge on the part of the USSR, a kind of
nogo "gravedigger of the Polish state".

In general, according to V.A. Tokarev, the works of Soviet satirical graphics in the autumn of 1939 were an "information surrogate", which in many ways contributed to the disorientation of Soviet citizens. The negative portrait they created of "panor" Poland and comments on it "ennobled" Stalin's actions in relation to the nearest western neighbor of the USSR. At the same time, they were not adequate to the real drama and the role of Poland in the events of those days. In fact, the image created by satirical graphics contributed to the hushing up of German aggression

against this country. Thus, concluded V.A. Tokarev, the tragedy of Poland "was taken out of **the context** (highlighted by Tokarev. - **V.N.**) of the events of the world war", which allowed Soviet propaganda to turn it "from a victim into a culprit, from a martyr into a laughingstock". [391]

Agreeing on the whole with the profound observations of our esteemed colleague, it is necessary, in our opinion, to add the following to them. In the Soviet cartoon of the autumn of 1939, the theme of the military defeat of the Commonwealth and the fall of its statehood was one of the leading ones. She was "played out" mainly by depicting a stampede from the battlefield of the Polish military leadership. A peculiar stereotype of a Polish officer and general during the September 1939 campaign was formed. This is a serviceman in a confederate cap, with a saber, award badges on his chest, in boots with spurs, but, as a rule, not going on the attack, but rapidly running away from the enemy, under to whom

the Red Army zoomed in. It is noteworthy that its commanders and fighters practically did not appear in Soviet cartoons of this kind. This gives grounds for ambiguous interpretations of such a "method" of presenting graphic material. In any case, different interpretations of the concept of caricaturists have the right to exist. The image of the Polish Army, more precisely, its commanders, unable to

organize resistance to the enemy, which was introduced into the public consciousness in the USSR in the autumn of 1939, was characterized by bias and bias. The cultivation of this image in Soviet propaganda in general and in caricature in particular only reinforced the negative perception of the Poles. On September 28, 1939, an agreement between the USSR and Germany on

friendship and borders and secret additional protocols to it were signed in Moscow. The fate of the Polish state was sealed. Its territory was divided between the Soviet Union and Germany. By the beginning of October, the "liberation campaign" of the Red Army in Western Ukraine and Western Belarus was completed. Almost simultaneously, the Wehrmacht's military operations against the Poles ended with the misfortune of German weapons.

It would seem that in the current military-political situation, the anti-Polish political and ideological campaign should have come to naught. However, the specificity of Soviet propaganda was that even after the defeat of the real enemy (Poland), its accusatory intensity did not decrease. A clear manifestation of this trend was the actual **continuation**, of course, in the new foreign policy conditions that developed after the fall of the Polish state, of this campaign, which unfolded as early as the beginning of September 1939.

But it had its own specifics. Summing up at the session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on October 31, 1939, a peculiar result of the just completed "liberation campaign" against the eastern neighbor, V.M. Molotov declared that a short blow, first from the German army and then from the Red Army, was enough to leave nothing of the Polish state, which he contemptuously called "the ugly brainchild of the Treaty of Versailles." [392] And yet, in Soviet propaganda, after such a statement, which was made by the head of the Soviet government and was essentially a guiding instruction, the theme of the defeat of the Polish army as a result of a successive blow from Germany and the USSR is clearly not traced.

In a slightly modified form, it appeared in a cartoon during the celebration of the 20th anniversary of the First Cavalry Army, when Stalin's personal greeting to the "first horsemen" was published. [393] The Stalinist greeting unequivocally carried the idea that the First Cavalry proved worthy during the war against Poland in 1920, and the Soviet cavalry, in turn, covered itself with glory "in the battles for the liberation of Western Ukraine and Western Belarus from the oppression of the Polish lords" in 1939.

Stalin's appeal was perceived as a kind of signal for the continuation of the anti-Polish propaganda campaign. In the same issue of the Pravda newspaper, where the leader's greeting on the occasion of the 20th anniversary of the First Cavalry was published, there is a drawing "Collection of the beaten by the Red Army", the author of which was the Kukryniksy. On this caricature in the form of "goats" and "insects" Yu. Pilsudski and "pans of 1939" were depicted. This was a graphic illustration of Stalin's thought about the continuity of the First Cavalry Army and the Red Army, which invariably beat the Poles in 1920, under Pilsudski, and two decades later, already under other, "unlucky" rulers of the Commonwealth.

More "delicately" presented the same "passing" plot in the figure by Yu.L. Ganfa "Combat experience".

... On the wall - a caricature generalized "portrait" of the Polish general. On his head is an indispensable confederate, his jaw is tied with a handkerchief. The caption reads: "Polish lords defeated in 1920." It also depicts an elderly man who passes to a young Red Army soldier, holding a hammer in his hand and preparing to nail another to the wall

picture, another "portrait". On it is the same, recognizable Polish general, but already fairly aged, with a single, miraculously preserved tooth and with a drooping gray mustache. His jaw is also tied with a handkerchief. The inscription to this picture: "The Polish lords were defeated in 1939." [394] The events of the autumn of 1939 - the signing of the treaty of friendship

and the border between the USSR and Germany, the defeat of the Polish army and the division of Poland, together with the intensive political propaganda work carried out among the troops, gave impetus to new assessments by the personnel of the Red Army of the current situation. The moment of uncertainty and surprise of the first days of September gradually passed. Doubts were replaced by awareness of their own significance, complicity in important events that took place.

According to the agreement reached between the USSR and Germany on September 28, 1939, the withdrawal of the troops of both powers behind the demarcation line began. At the same time, military personnel sometimes showed displeasure in connection with the order to suspend the offensive to the west, expressed regret over the fact that it was necessary to return the newly occupied territories. Some of them asked: "Is it really necessary to retreat to the Bug again?" Indeed, in this case, the "working people", whom the Red Army came to liberate, "will again be under the yoke of the landlords and capitalists, and fascist reprisals will be (committed. - **V.N.**) over them." For example, a Red Army soldier of the 96th Infantry Regiment, Nasibulin, expressed bewilderment: "We went, we went forward, and now we are going back, because there are a lot of Ukrainians and Belarusians here (beyond the demarcation line. - **V.N.**) . Why couldn't we free them

child."

At the same time, as M.I. Meltyukhov, the "new direction of political work" at the final stage of the "liberation campaign", associated with the clarification of the Soviet-German treaty of friendship and border, gave positive results. For example, the following statements were heard: the Bolshevik Party and the Soviet government correctly decided "to withdraw our troops across the Western Bug River, now no one can accuse us of using the liberation war to seize foreign territory" (a Red Army soldier of the 96th Rifle Regiment Pashkovsky). An employee of the Chemical Directorate of the Red Army, a military engineer of the 2nd rank Petrov, asserted: the Soviet-German "border was drawn taking into account all the moments, and it is correct. Western Belarus and Western Ukraine went to the USSR.

However, the NKVD authorities also revealed "seditious" statements, indicating the presence in the minds of military personnel of signs of "red imperialism". Thus, an employee of the 3rd department of the Artillery Directorate of the Red Army, Major Volodin, directly stated: "I am infected with red imperialism: we need to capture Warsaw." Major Gerasimov, an employee of the 5th Directorate of the Red Army, thought in a similar way: "We should not be limited only to Western Belarus and Western Ukraine. It is necessary at all costs to secure for the USSR an area at least as far as the Vistula. Warsaw should also be ours, because this is a Russian word (sic! - **V.N.**). Now is a favorable moment to return all the territory taken from us several years ago. Deputy political officer Neverov said: "Warsaw was given to the Germans - this is a heavy loss."

Willingly or unwillingly, adherents of the idea of "red imperialism" in the ranks of the Red Army ultimately acted as antagonists of the official Soviet propaganda, which, after August 23, 1939, was set up to rapprochement with "friendly" Nazi Germany. This, in turn, was qualified by the NKVD as a sign of "unhealthy" moods. For example, they could not be "interested" in the opinion of a Red Army soldier of the 283rd Infantry Regiment named Rudavka, who put the question in the following way. At first, the Soviet-German border was planned to be drawn along the Vistula River, and then - along the Bug River, is this not "is this a concession of the USSR to Germany?" The assistant commander of the 14th Infantry Regiment, Shcheplanov, argued that the Soviet government was wrong to "yield to this scoundrel" (Hitler), since he would attack anyway. And the junior commander of the 60th Infantry Division, Rastyagaev, was anxious about the Soviet-German agreement of 28 September.

October 1939: "It seems to me that something is wrong here, we have ceded a lot (territories. - **V.N.**) to Germany." [395] Finally, the commander of military unit 296 of the Kharkov military district, Captain Gorokhovik, believed that "Poland is seeds for Germany. Hitler wants to be the second Napoleon. Here he took Czechoslovakia, and now Poland; in 1939-1940 France, and in 1941 - the USSR (sic! - **V.N.**). Hitler with a head - he has concluded an agreement with us, and he himself will click everyone one by one, and then he will get to us. [396]

Meanwhile, after the end of hostilities in Western Ukraine and Western Belarus, L.Z. Mekhlis ordered by November 15-20, 1939, to summarize the experience of party political work with personnel. At the same time, it was necessary to dwell in detail on the characteristics of each stage of the "liberation campaign". The head of PURKKA also demanded a comprehensive study of the experience of ideological indoctrination of the personnel of the enemy army. The military councils and heads of political departments of the fronts had to provide information about the composition of officials and about those specific structures that were responsible for ideological work in the Polish army, about the role of Catholic priests in it, etc., etc.

October 31, 1939, that is, on the day when V.M. Molotov publicly called Poland "an ugly offspring of the Versailles system", Lengorlit compiled a "summary of deletions and confiscations" on the basis of viewing printed materials that were being prepared for publication. In the economic geography curriculum of the Leningrad State University, they managed to discover a clear "sedition": the Polish state was considered "incorrectly," since the compilers of the methodological manual did not say a word "about its failure and collapse." [397] In general, the first experience of mastering the "spheres of

interest" of the USSR, stipulated in the secret additional protocols to the Soviet-German agreements of 1939, turned out to be successful. An integrated approach to the propaganda justification of territorial increments at the expense of Poland, the very legitimacy of whose continued existence was called into question by the Stalinist leadership, showed its effectiveness. The defeat of the Poles in the fighting against Germany in 1939 allowed Soviet propaganda to portray the leaders of the Commonwealth in a very unfavorable light. Finally, the ideological rationale behind the advance of the Soviet Union to the West turned out to be quite successful for the perception of the public consciousness in the USSR, namely: the slogan "liberation of half-brothers, Ukrainians and Belarusians", who for a long time were "in

Mepolskie lords".

In the course of the anti-Polish political and ideological campaign of 1939, the forms and methods of propagandistic support for the Kremlin's foreign policy actions were tested in practice, and a peculiar mechanism for the practical implementation of such actions was formed.

4.2. Cruel Sobering: "Winter War"

The Soviet Union and Finland formally declared their neutrality in the context of the outbreak of World War II. At the same time, the foreign policy and strategic positions of the USSR were significantly strengthened as a result of the "liberation campaign" of 1939 and the annexation of Western Ukraine and Western Belarus. Their further strengthening was facilitated by the signing by the Soviet Union of agreements with Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia (late September - early October 1939), which made it possible to deploy Red Army contingents on the territory of these countries. Helsinki understood that these agreements had led to a violation of the balance of power in the Baltic in its favor. In the event of a toughening of Moscow's position, as the Finnish leadership assumed, it could find support in Germany. In practice, however, Hitler at that time considered his intervention "superfluous." [398] Equally ephemeral seemed to be Finland's hopes for the active assistance of the Fuhrer's military opponents - England and France.

Under these conditions, Stalin could count on obtaining territorial concessions from the Finnish side by means of direct pressure. He suggested that the Finns conclude an agreement similar to those that the Soviet Union had previously signed with the three Baltic republics. The consent of the Finnish side to this proposal would lead to the creation of military bases and to the deployment of Soviet military contingents on Finnish territory, which was so feared in Helsinki. Naturally, it was rejected.

Then Stalin took the initiative to transfer to the USSR a number of islands in the Gulf of Finland and part of the Rybachy and Sredny peninsulas in the Barents Sea in exchange for giving the Finns twice the size of the territory of Soviet Karelia. But the attitude of the Finnish leadership to the issue of leasing or selling the Hanko Peninsula to the Soviet Union for the purpose of building a naval base there turned out to be purely negative.

In early November, a Finnish delegation headed by V. Tanner and Yu.K. Paasikivi to conduct diplomatic negotiations with Soviet representatives. At the same time, an article appeared in the Pravda newspaper, from which it followed that the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Finland, E. Erko, allegedly called for war against the USSR. [399] In fact, Erko, in his speech on November 1, emphatically emphasized: "Finland cannot accept the offer of the Soviet Union and will defend its territory, its inviolability and independence by any means." This statement was reproduced in Pravda. The Finnish Minister of Foreign Affairs of Finland was immediately pointedly compared in Moscow with his colleague from Poland, which ceased to exist, J. Beck, who allegedly made a mistake, orienting himself in politics to the Western powers. The mentioned article contained an undisguised threat against Finland itself: "Our answer (Finland. - **V.N.**) is simple and clear. We will cast aside any game of political gamblers and go our own way, no matter what, breaking any and all obstacles on the way. [400]

V.M. Molotov explained to the Soviet envoy in Sweden A. M. Kollontai, who arrived in Moscow on the eve of the third stage of the Soviet-Finnish negotiations, that in the event of military operations against Finland, the Red Army troops would already "be in Helsinki in three days." And it was there, stressed the head of the Soviet Foreign Ministry, that the stubborn Finns would have to "sign the treaty that they reject in Moscow." [401] Such unambiguous formulations indicated that in response to the anti-Soviet campaign already unfolding in Finland, the Kremlin intended to start adequate propaganda actions.

On November 3, when the Pravdinskaya editorial was published, Molotov categorically declared to the representatives of the Finnish delegation: "We, civilians, do not see the possibility of further advancing the matter: now it is the turn of the military to have their say." [402] The personnel of the Leningrad military district on the border with Finland was very determined. The report of the political department of the district reported that after the anti-Finnish publication of Pravda on November 3, the belief began to spread among the Red Army soldiers: "We, if necessary, will advance the border from Leningrad not only by tens, but by hundreds of kilometers." [403]

At the initial stage of the Soviet-Finnish negotiations in Moscow, Stalin came up with a kind of argument in favor of the Finns accepting the conditions he proposed. Referring to his conversation with Ribbentrop on September 27-28, 1939, the Bolshevik leader explained: the Germans started the war against Poland because they wanted to "push the Polish border away from Berlin": after all, before it began, "there were about 200 kilometers from Poznań to Berlin." The Soviet side, Stalin emphasized in a conversation with Paasikivi and Tanner, asks "that the distance from Leningrad to the border be 70 km." This was followed by Stalin's remark: "We cannot move Leningrad, and therefore the border must be moved back." The meaning of Yu.K. Paasikivi came down to the fact that Finland would not cede to the USSR the territories of Hanko and the regions of the Karelian Isthmus that they demanded. [404] As in the above statements by V.M. Molotov, in the anti-Finnish passages of the newspaper

Pravda of November 3, 1939, in Stalin's rhetoric, there was an undisguised threat against Finland. As early as

October 29, 1939, the military council of the LVO presented the Commissar of Defense to Marshal K.E. Voroshilov "Plan of operation to defeat the land and sea forces of the Finnish army." Among other things, the plan, in particular, provided for the following actions: "Upon receipt of an order to attack, our troops simultaneously invade the territory of Finland in all directions in order to separate the enemy force grouping and, in cooperation with aviation, inflict a decisive defeat on the Finnish army." [405] The personnel of the Leningrad Military District was significantly reinforced with additional units

mi.

On November 10, 1939, a closed meeting of L.Z. Fox fur with writers covering "defense topics". One of those invited to the meeting, playwright V.V. Vishnevsky recorded in his diary the main content of the speech of the head of PURKKA, who, in particular, emphasized that the USSR would certainly achieve its goal in Finland "not with kindness, but with blood." Units of the Red Army were already standing on the Soviet-Finnish border in readiness, since, as L.Z. Mehlis, it was impossible to miss the "exceptional case in the Baltic." [406] Undoubtedly, the head of PURKKA confided to the defense writers Stalin's point of view on the prospects for the further development of events.

At this time, the head of the Finnish delegation, Minister of Finance V. Tanner, who received a direct instruction from E. Erko, toughened his position in negotiations with Stalin and V.M. Molotov in Moscow, as a result of which they were interrupted on November 13, 1939, and the Finnish representatives returned to Helsinki.

On November 17, Stalin categorically declared: "We will have to fight with Finland." On the same day, the Soviet plenipotentiary in Helsinki V.K. Derevyansky in his memorandum addressed to V.M. Molotov recommended that the following measures be taken to put pressure on the Finns: the creation of an aggravated and tense situation, up to the organization of provocations at the border; launching a propaganda campaign in the press; initiation of rallies and demonstrations under anti-Finnish slogans and, ultimately, the breaking of the non-aggression pact with Finland. [407] This part of the plenipotentiary's proposals

began to be implemented already in the second half of November 1939. Soviet newspapers threatened the "Finnish bullies", wrote about the "invincibility" and "invincibility" of the Red Army. Through diplomatic channels, information was transmitted to Moscow about the growing dissatisfaction of the reservists drafted into the Finnish army, about the fall in discipline in it and the appearance of signs of "decomposition". [408]

Immediately after the breakdown of the Soviet-Finnish negotiations, K.E. Voroshilov ordered the Military Council of the LVO to complete the concentration of troops by November 20 and submit a plan for specific military operations. The next day, a corresponding order was sent to the troops. The USSR aimed at offensive military operations, and the Finns - at defensive ones. This can be evidenced not only by the above-mentioned "Operation Plan to Defeat the Ground and Naval Forces of the Finnish Army", but also by some other documents. For example, in combat order No. 2, addressed to the personnel of the 19th rifle corps of the 7th army (the order was signed on November 23, 1939, i.e. a week before the start of the Soviet-Finnish war), the task of destroying the opposing Finnish units and the continuation of offensive military operations in the future. The final phrase of this combat order is characteristic: "The day of the transition to the offensive will be indicated separately." [409]

After the termination of negotiations with the USSR, an anti-Soviet campaign unfolded with renewed vigor in Finland. The Finnish government recommended that the periodical press emphasize the unacceptability of Stalin's proposals on the territorial question, the purpose of which was to draw the country "into the sphere of influence of the Soviet Union." However, like the Polish leadership, the Finnish side did not expect decisive action from the USSR.

stviya. Even five days before the start of the Winter War, the headquarters of the Finnish army in one of the analytical documents depicted the matter in such a way that the grouping of Soviet troops concentrated on the border with Finland was not offensive. [410]

Meanwhile, work was underway in the Soviet mass media to provide ideological support for the anti-Finnish campaign. Thus, in the journal Propagandist and Agitator of the Red Army (in the section "Consultation"), an article was placed under the faceless heading "Finland: (Brief information)". [411] Based on the imprint, the issue in which this material was placed went into production between 11 and 22 November. Incidentally, the note also included such meaningful passages: "The Soviet people **will respond in a worthy manner to the provocative shots** of the Finnish rulers who have gone too far and lost their minds. The Finnish bourgeoisie and those circles, at the behest of which **the provocations of the Finnish army are being built on our border** (highlighted by me. - **V.N.**), will long remember the answer of the Soviet government ... ". But about the "provocative shots" from the Finnish side,

allegedly fired at the border, Soviet officials spoke only on November 27-29, 1939, in connection with the incident near the village of Mainila (this will be discussed in more detail below). It remains only to assume that the author of the "Brief Information" (who hid behind the initials "F. L.") was already aware in advance that accusations against Helsinki for shelling Soviet territory should be placed at the forefront in propaganda materials.

In general, the above note was defiant, rude in form. In particular, its author considered it appropriate to recall that Lenin called the members of the government of Finland, headed by Svinhufvud, "pigheads" because they did not show much loyalty to the Bolsheviks. The text also stated that 7 Finnish divisions were concentrated on the Karelian Isthmus, 32 km from Leningrad, and an unequivocal conclusion was made: "The press and government leaders (Finland. - **V.N.**) are inciting frenzied anti- **Soviet propaganda** . They **directly threaten war** (highlighted by me. - **V.N.**) to the Soviet Union. The note, among other things, listed (apparently based on the reports of Soviet representatives who were in

Helsinki) the negative consequences of the military measures of the "Finnish bosses", which allegedly led to the impoverishment of the working people and famine in Finland. On this occasion, the author of the publication pointedly exclaimed: "It would not hurt the Finnish "pigheads" ... to remember the fragility of their rear. Isn't it time **to shut up these presumptuous "warriors!"** (highlighted by me. - **V.N.**) . Next, we cited the passage we have already quoted from the leading article of the Pravda newspaper of November 3, 1939, about the Soviet "answer" to the Finns.

The "Brief Reference" about Finland ended with the following characteristic statement: "The Soviet people will not succumb to the provocations of the owners of the Finnish bourgeoisie, but they will also not leave the vile sally of the gorokhov jesters without retribution (an obvious allusion to the Prime Minister of Finland A. Cajander. - **V.N.**) from the offspring of "pigheads".

In the same issue of the magazine Propagandist and Agitator of the Red Army, and also in the section "Consultation", an article was published, the author of which, in particular, reminded the "warmongers" that the Soviet Union was capable of conducting not only defensive military operations. "We will destroy any enemy on his own territory," he repeated the well-known slogan of Soviet propaganda. [412] In the conditions of the conflict between the USSR and Finland, which was growing like a snowball, such statements made in the central press organ PURKKA looked very ominous.

Meanwhile, in response to the intransigence of Finnish Prime Minister A. Kajander, who on November 23 publicly refused to meet the Soviet proposals for territorial concessions to Finland, the newspaper Pravda published a very sharp editorial with an anti-Finnish content. In it, Cajander was contemptuously called the "pea jester." [413]

The direct reason for the start of the war of the USSR against Finland was already the above-mentioned incident near the village of Mainila.

... On November 27, the central Soviet newspapers published two articles about this incident. [414] The first of these is a TASS report under the characteristic heading "Bold provocation by the Finnish military." In it, referring to the headquarters of the LVO, it was stated that on November 26 at 15:45, Soviet troops located on the Karelian Isthmus, a kilometer northwest of the village of Mainila, were subjected to unexpected shelling from Finnish territory. A total of seven gunshots were allegedly fired. The TASS report also talked about the casualties suffered as a result of this shelling: three Red Army soldiers and one junior commander were killed; seven Red Army men, one junior commander and one junior lieutenant were wounded. It was also indicated that Colonel Tikhomirov, head of the first department of the headquarters of the LVO, was sent on the spot to investigate what had happened. The second material about Mainil,

published in the central Soviet newspapers, outlined the content of the note of the Soviet government, handed to V.M. Molotov to the envoy of Finland A.S. Irya-Koskinen. The note, with reference to a higher authority - the General Staff of the Red Army, presented the same version of what happened as in the aforementioned TASS report. However, it was drafted in rather harsh terms, which are by no means characteristic of diplomatic documents. Thus, the Soviet note contained an a priori assertion that the shelling near Mainila was carried out by regular Finnish military units, which had already concentrated in large numbers at the very border, creating a direct threat to the city. In this regard, the Finns were asked to immediately withdraw military units "away from the border on the Karelian Isthmus" - 20-25 kilometers. Their actions in the note handed to V.M. Molotov A.S. Irye-Koski nenu on the evening of November 26, 1939, were called provocative and qualified only as an "attack on Soviet troops."

Moscow made it clear that Helsinki had violated the Soviet-Finnish non-aggression pact and the peaceful settlement of conflicts (1932). The official version of the Mainil incident, from which it followed that the Finns were the first to open fire and shell the Red Army units, was the basis for the interpretation of subsequent events: the unilateral denunciation of the 1932 treaty by the USSR and the beginning of an armed conflict with Finland. In the Soviet Union, it was actually the only one in describing the circumstances of the emergence of the "Winter War" of 1939-1940.

However, this version was already called into question at the end of November 1939. S.A. Irje Koskinen, on behalf of the Finnish government, then emphasized that as a result of the investigation of the incident, it was possible to establish the following: the gunshots mentioned by Molotov were fired near Mainila "from the Soviet border strip." Clearly fearing an escalation of the conflict, the Finnish government proposed to Moscow that a joint commission be set up "to consider the differences that have arisen." However, the Kremlin did not give Helsinki an answer to this proposal. At the same time, the Finnish Government's note, which followed the official Soviet statement of November 26, 1939, was regarded as a document designed to "bring the crisis in relations between the two countries to the extreme." Years and decades passed, and interest in the Mainil incident did not

fade away. This story, mainly due to the publication of eyewitness accounts of the events, gradually began to acquire new details, acquiring already a sensational shade. [415] Thus, three Finnish border guards, in their testimony, given by order of their immediate superiors on November 27, 1939, unanimously stated that gun shots were indeed fired, but ... from the Soviet side, from the village of Main Nila. The version about the shots "fired by the Russians" has become widespread in Finland. In 1985, retired General Okunevich provided exciting new details about the origins of the Mainil incident. Allegedly, being a major of the NKVD,

On November 26, 1939, he, accompanied by two "ballistics experts", carried out "test firing with a new secret weapon." It happened ... near the village of Mainila. After the publication of some previously inaccessible documents from the Russian archives, another, completely unusual version of the Mainila incident appeared: no shots were fired from either Soviet or Finnish territory on November 26, 1939 at all. In the war diary of the 68th Infantry Regiment of the 70th Infantry Division of the Red Army, which was stationed in the Mainila area, among other archival materials, a curious entry was made on the very first page. On November 26, the regiment came under shelling; seven shells exploded; three people died and six were injured. However, the veracity of this record was questioned by the Russian historian P.A. Apothecary, who first put it into circulation. Indeed, official Soviet statements about the "shots at Mainila" spoke of four killed and nine wounded soldiers of the Red Army. Further, paradoxically, all the entries in the mentioned journal from November 1939 to March 1940 were made with one hand, although during the specified time there were as many as four chiefs of staff of the regiment and, accordingly, four of their assistants, whose duties included keeping a journal of combat operations. actions. From

it followed that the recordings were made in it not in hot pursuit, but retroactively, quite possibly - already after the signing of the Soviet-Finnish peace treaty of March 12, 1940. To this we can

add the following. In the operational reports and reports of the command of the 70th Infantry Division preserved in the archive, nothing was reported about seven artillery shots from the Finnish side, as well as about the presence of Finnish long-range artillery near Mainila. In the same way, information about the number of the 68th regiment, which was part of it, for November 25, 26, 27 and 28, 1939, found among other archival materials by P.A. Pharmacist, give grounds to refute the allegations that this military unit suffered any casualties on these days.

Moreover, new intriguing details gradually began to emerge. For example, it was by no means the operational duty officer of the LVO headquarters who reported to Moscow about the shots near Mainila (as it followed from the reports of the Soviet press), but, on the contrary, it was initially from the General Staff of the Red Army that they turned to him for clarification about the incident that had already occurred. That is, at first V.M. Molotov made an official statement on November 26, 1939 about the shelling of the Soviet territory by the Finns, and only then followed from the General Staff a bewildered question addressed to the command of the Leningrad Military District: "What kind of provocative shooting (highlighted by me . - **V.N.**)

was from the side of the Finns?". Finally, the commanding staff of the 19th Rifle Corps, which included the aforementioned 70th Division and the 68th Regiment, learned about what happened at Mainila on November 26 only at 21.00, i.e. five hours after the alleged shelling of Mainila by the Finns. And, again, from the message ... Soviet radio!

The operational report sent in the evening of the same day (at 22.00) from the headquarters of the LVO to Moscow turned out to be extremely vague: "In the Mainila area, the location of our troops was fired on by the Finns, 7 shots were fired, there were killed and wounded, their number is being clarified." It should be recalled that the TASS report, broadcast on November 26 on Soviet radio, called the exact number of Red Army soldiers who allegedly became victims of shelling. Finally, as it is clear from

the archival document revealed by the historians of Finland - the report of the Finnish border guards, on the Soviet side that day, training firing from mortars was carried out, however, nothing was said about the "seven shots" that allegedly sounded at 15.45. And only after the mass media of the USSR transmitted the well-known message to TASS, these border guards changed their previous testimony: allegedly it was the "Russians who were shooting" at their own territory. Such radically changed statements of eyewitnesses formed, apparently, the basis of the response statement.

Irye-Koskinen's response to Molotov's note. In particular, it spoke about the likelihood of an accident that occurred "during training exercises" on the Soviet side.

Thus, until now, all the circumstances of the incident at Mainila have not been fully clarified. But the very fact of the shelling of Soviet units from Finland in this area raises doubts. At the same time, one can hardly dispute the fact that this particular incident was immediately used by the Kremlin as a pretext for launching an armed invasion of Finnish territory. From the documents of A.A. Zhdanov follows: after the "shots at Mainila" it was planned to launch a broad anti-Finnish propaganda campaign. The components of this campaign were: forcing general indignation against the Finns (who miraculously turned into "White Finns"); distribution of propaganda leaflets; a speech by the head of the Soviet government listing the "aggressive actions" of the Finnish side; and, finally, the publication of the so-called "Appeal of the Central Committee of the Finnish Communist Party to the working people of Finland." [416] This whole chain of events actually took place between November 26 and December 1, 1939. [417]

After the incident at Mainila, propaganda preparations for a war against Finland intensified. During this period, the theme of the recent military defeat of Poland in the most bizarre way not only "returned" to the Soviet periodical press, but was also reflected in the satirical graphics. As already noted, Finnish Foreign Minister E. Errko was significantly compared in Moscow with his unlucky colleague from Poland that ceased to exist, J. Beck. In Soviet propaganda, literally on the eve of the Winter War, the idea was actively carried out that the "lost head" Finnish statesmen were starting an armed conflict with the USSR, but the bitter fate of the unlucky Polish "unfortunate rulers" would inevitably await them. This statement was quite actively introduced into the public consciousness by the media. Judging by the reports of Soviet central newspapers, in response to an official note by V.M. Molotov addressed Finland on November 26, 1939, numerous rallies were held in Moscow and other cities of the Soviet Union. The participants in these rallies threatened the Finnish leadership, hinting that the fate of J. Beck and the former Polish president I. Mostitsky (1926-1939) awaits them. [418]

A kind of graphic illustration of the new propaganda installation was the Kukryniksy's drawing "War Provocateurs". ... Two headless

gentlemen (obviously, designed to portray the "lost head" of the Finnish leaders) are holding a dog on a leash, shod in ... military boots (here is a clear allusion to K.G. Mannerheim, commander-in-chief of the Finnish army in 1939-1940), which barking at a Soviet tank standing at a border post with the inscription "USSR". Above all this - two ghosts floating in the clouds with crutches in their hands. The Kukryniksy left no doubt as to who is who in their caricature: both ghostly figures are "marked". Naturally, these are the notorious Beck and Mostitsky ... And the caption to the caricature was clearly "launched from above": "The war is started by the rulers of Finland who have lost their heads. But let them remember that their fate will be as bitter as the fate of the Polish unfortunate rulers (From speeches at rallies at Moscow enterprises). [419]

The main "message" for the deployment of a broad anti-Finnish political and ideological campaign was the appeal of V.M. Molotov to Soviet citizens, read on the radio late in the evening of November 29, 1939. In his speech, Molotov claimed that the Finnish government pursued a policy hostile to the USSR, organized "outrageous provocations" on the border, "up to artillery shelling" of the Red Army. He accused the Finns of intending to "continue to keep Leningrad under direct threat." For this reason, as the head of the Soviet government emphasized, Moscow came to the conclusion that it was impossible to maintain normal relations with Finland, and the Red Army and Navy were ordered to be ready-

mi "to all sorts of surprises and immediately stop possible new sorties from the Finnish military." [420]

Following this, in the army and navy units, in the workshops of factories and factories, in schools and universities, active propaganda unfolded, in which the external enemy - the Finnish leadership - was portrayed in the most negative light. Against this background, the crossing of the Soviet-Finnish border by the Red Army on November 30 at 8.00 and the start of hostilities looked quite reasonable and justified.

Undoubtedly, after the incident at Mainila, it was no longer necessary to count on a peaceful settlement of the conflict. All-round inflating it with Soviet propaganda took place simultaneously with the concentration of four armies (7th, 8th, 9th and 14th) to attack Finland. On the eve of the "Winter War" the Soviet leadership was dominated by hatred moods. It is noteworthy that at a meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks on November 27, 1939, it turned out that the leadership of the People's Commissariat of Defense had a vague idea of the nature of the fortifications that crossed the Karelian Isthmus - the "Mannerheim Line", and for the first time members of the Politburo heard about the presence of a personal composition of the Finnish army of automatic small arms [421] Shapkozadelny moods were also present among the command staff of the Red Army. Some commanders and political workers did not want to carefully study a potential enemy, to get rid of conventions in combat training. At the same time, they referred to ... "instructions from higher authorities." [422]

Stalin, his comrades-in-arms, the command and political staff of the Red Army probably had every reason to be optimistic. By the beginning of hostilities, the units of the Red Army intended for the offensive numbered about 450 thousand people, 2000 guns, about 1000 aircraft, 2000 tanks. [423] They were opposed by the Finnish group of up to 340 thousand people, armed with up to 900 guns, 270 aircraft and 60 tanks. [424]

Official statements by V.M. Molotov, which were voiced on the very eve of the Soviet attack on Finland, especially those concerning the Mainil incident, were interpreted accordingly by propaganda. Thus, the response note of the Soviet government, which followed Helsinki's attempt to respond to the Kremlin's accusations of organizing shelling of the Red Army, "had a pronounced propaganda character." And although it noted that the USSR did not intend to "inflate this outrageous act of attack", the press immediately published "responses of citizens", expressed in an anti-Finnish spirit. The headlines under which these materials were printed, although not particularly original, spoke for themselves: "Bold provocation of the Finnish military", "War-mongers will not evade responsibility", "Hit the hands of presumptuous provocateurs", "We will not tolerate provocations ", " About teaching provocateurs of war ", " Let's grind the provocateurs into powder, etc., etc.. [425]

At the same time, the NKVD authorities also noted "undesirable" responses to the official statements of V.M. Molotov, clearly at odds with the attitudes given by the Kremlin regarding the "shots at Mainila". Mainilsky and other incidents on the border that followed him were assessed as the result of the underground activities of the Finnish communists. Allegedly, acting on orders from Moscow, they organized the provocation. According to another interpretation of events, a Finnish officer (or commander of the Red Army) was offered to shoot at Soviet territory for a moderate fee. It has been suggested that the fatal shots were fired by NKVD agents. For the most astute people, it was not difficult to understand: "shots at Mainila" were used as a pretext for invading the territory of a neighboring country and

her conquests.

Soviet propaganda, literally on the eve of the Red Army crossing the border with Finland, tried to instill in the public consciousness confidence in the invincibility of the USSR and its Armed Forces, which were ready to deliver a powerful blow to the Finnish "war provocateurs". Newspapers were full of headlines: "The enemy will be destroyed", "In any mi-

chickpeas are ready for battle", "The warmongers will be beaten", "Ready to defeat the enemy on his own territory", "We are waiting for the signal of combat

alarm", etc. [426] After the Red Army units crossed the Soviet-Finnish border, President of Finland K Kallio announced at a meeting of the Council of State that the Republic was in a state of war. [427] In September 1939,

starting the "liberation campaign" in Poland, the Bolshevik leadership skillfully used the real fact that the Polish government left its capital and moved to Romanian territory. It was taken into service in Soviet propaganda to denounce the "unlucky leaders" of the Commonwealth and justify the anti-Polish action. When plotting the Finnish campaign, Moscow intended to use this kind of unseemly pretext in order to cast a shadow on the Finnish government. V.M. Molotov, receiving the Swedish envoy V. Winter in Moscow on December 4, 1939, categorically stated that the Soviet side did not recognize the government that "left the city of Helsinki and headed in an unknown direction." At the same time, the head of the Soviet Foreign Ministry recalled the signing of an agreement on friendship and mutual assistance between the USSR and the People's Government of the Finnish Democratic Republic (NPFDR), calling it "a reliable basis for the development of peaceful and favorable relations between the USSR and Finland." [428]

The so-called "Democratic Republic of Finland", according to the official Soviet version, was created on December 1, 1939 in the town of Terijoki, which had just been occupied by units of the Red Army. This was allegedly preceded by the "Appeal of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Finland" dated November 30, addressed to the "working people" of the country, which analyzed the causes that led to the outbreak of the Soviet-Finnish armed conflict, and also called for the creation of a government of leftist forces. [429]

However, this version does not stand up to scrutiny. The texts of the aforementioned "Appeal ..." and the "Declaration of the People's Government of Finland" were not received with the help of "radio interception", as claimed by the Telegraph Agency of the Soviet Union. According to the memoirs of G.L. Khodakov, who was then a student of the Military Academy of Communications. CM. Budyonny (Leningrad), the inhabitants of the city took these messages "for granted, since it was dangerous to doubt at that time." However, the leadership of the military academy, where Khodakov studied, decided "for greater persuasiveness" to place in a large-circulation newspaper material that the above-mentioned "Appeal ..." and "Declarations ..." were intercepted at the training radio station. The two cadets were given the task of giving a large-circulation note that they managed to intercept the appeal of the Finnish People's Government at shortwave stations, that is, in addition to the TASS message, confirm the fact of "radio interception" and radio reception. For greater persuasiveness, the commissioner of the faculty hinted that refusing to carry out this task could lead to dire consequences. He even tried to accuse both cadets, who doubted the legitimacy of the "responsible case" proposed by him, in an attempt to "dispute the authenticity of the TASS report." Ultimately, they were forced to carry out the planned "radio interception". [430]

As for the drafts of the "Appeal ...", "Declaration ..." and the so-called "Treaty of Mutual Assistance and Friendship between the Soviet Union and the Finnish Democratic Republic", concluded on December 2, 1939 in Moscow, they were drawn up in Russian (and not translated from Finnish) to the USSR People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, subjected to handwritten editing by V.M. Molotov and A.A. Zhdanov. [431]

Molotov emphasized in the text of the "Appeal ..." that the original goal of the "people's government" was "not support for the Soviet Union", but "an uprising against the existing government of Finland." He suggested adding to the document the thesis that "an independent and independent Finland is possible only in friendship with the USSR." [432] In turn, it was A.A. Zhdanov wrote the words "Radio interception. Translation from Finnish", which

accompanied by the title "Declaration of the People's Government of Finland". He also entered the names of the members of the "government of the Finnish Democratic Republic" listed in this document. [433]

Thus, both the "Appeal ..." and the "Declaration ..." were a kind of "homework" of the Stalinist leadership at the initial stage of the armed invasion of Finland. November 28, 1939 O.V. Kuusinen confidentially informed the resident of Soviet intelligence that in Moscow the recognition of his (Kuusinen) government would be announced in the near future, and "in 2-3 days there would be a message about the signing with the government of the Democratic Republic of Finland ... an agreement on cooperation and mutual assistance" . [434] On November 30, Kuusinen held a meeting in Leningrad with the future members of his "cabinet", where the immediate tasks of the not yet proclaimed DRF were outlined. [435] As for the text of the "Appeal of the Central Committee of the

Communist Party of Finland", it abounded in propaganda clichés clearly not of Finnish origin. So, the document said: "For more than 21 years, our country (sic. - **V.N.**) was, like **Pan Poland** (highlighted by me. - **V.N.**), a nest of anti-Soviet intrigues ... ". But, as already mentioned, Soviet propaganda had a dubious priority in the invention of the meaningless term "pan Poland". In the aforementioned "Appeal ..." it was stated that the government of Finland (not to be confused with the "People's Government of Finland!") Can not defend the cause of peace, because it is a government of warmongers (emphasis **mine** . - **V.N.**) ". It is well known that the expression "warmongers" is one of the most common Soviet propaganda clichés of the 1930s.

gg.

In the "Appeal ..." and in the "Declaration ..." there is a statement: the Red Army allegedly will come to Finland not as a conqueror, but as a liberator of the Finnish people, not as an enemy, but as a friend of this people. [436] Meanwhile, the stereotyped wording "we are marching not as conquerors, but as liberators," addressed to the personnel of the units of the Red Army, was already used during the anti-Polish September action of 1939. It is also found in the order to the troops of the Leningrad Military District, issued in day of the beginning of the war against Finland. [437]

The "Declaration..." recorded the following statement: "In order to participate in the joint struggle hand in hand with the heroic Red Army of the USSR, the people's government of Finland has already formed the first Finnish corps, which in the course of the upcoming battles will be replenished with volunteers from the revolutionary workers and peasants and should become strong core of the future people's army of Finland. [438] Meanwhile, the formation of the "Finnish Corps" ("Finnish People's Army") began in November 1939, the Soviet military department. In the written orders of the People's Commissariat of Defense, dated November 11-19, the task was set of staffing a special formation (106th rifle division) from among the Finns and Karelians. On November 23, on the basis of this division, the administration and units of the mountain rifle corps began to be created, which then received the name of the 1st mountain rifle corps of the Finnish People's Army. [439] The program of Kuusinen's "government" proclaimed on December 1, 1939, in particular, unequivocally emphasized: "The first Finnish corps is given the honor to bring to the capital (Helsinki. - **V.N.**) the roof of the presidential palace, to the joy of the working people and the fear of the enemies of the people. [440] In the above passage, the ominous term "enemies of the people" clearly shows the "Moscow" authorship of the entire document. All the above facts and observations give grounds to assert that the "Appeal of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Finland", addressed to the

"working people" of the country, and the "Declaration of the People's Government of Finland" dated December 1, 1939, were purely propaganda documents drawn up in Moscow under dictation V.M. Molotov and A.A. Zhdanov, having no legal force. The text of the so-called "Mutual

assistance between the Soviet Union and the Finnish Democratic Republic" dated December 2, 1939, compiled by employees of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs A.A. Sobolev and S.P. Kozyrev, and the work on its compilation was completed no later than November 22. [441]

It is no coincidence that sane contemporaries of the events responded adequately to the Soviet press reports about appeals made allegedly on behalf of the new Finnish government. Some assumed that these materials were previously prepared in Moscow, and only then broadcast over the radio. A contemporary of the events wrote in his diary on December 3, 1939: "Of course, this agreement (with the NPFDR. - **V.N.**) has no legal and factual significance, because that government is not yet a government. It will become such when he is imprisoned at least in Helsinki. But this treaty has a colossal agitational significance, because the Finnish army must be shown that, in essence, there is nothing to shed blood for." [442] The "Soviet nature" of the propaganda preparations for the "Winter War" did not inspire

confidence. The contrasting of a "people's government" with a legal, called "plutocratic" government of social democrats and centrists in itself seemed incredible to the Finns. The agreement of December 2, 1939 provided for the revision of the borders. In it, as well as in the "Appeal ..." and the "Declaration ..." it was said that the "age-old dream" of the Finnish and Karelian peoples about reunification "in a single independent Finnish state" has the opportunity to come true. [443] For most Finns, this meant the annexation of Finland to the Soviet Eastern Karelia, whose population was subjected to repressions. The fleeting "recognition" by the Kremlin of the "government" of Kuusinen, the assertions of Soviet propaganda about the rampant "White Guard terror" in Finland itself, which contradicted reality, strengthened the resolve of the Finns to defend their independence with weapons in their hands. [444]

Meanwhile, the head of PURKKA L.Z. Mekhlis, as before the start of the Polish campaign, arrived at the troops (in the Leningrad Military District) in advance. He took an active part in the development of the order to the troops on the eve of hostilities, and in the preparation of the texts of propaganda appeals "To the Finnish soldiers" and "To the working people, peasants and intelligentsia of Finland." Mekhlis contributed to the creation of departments for work among the troops and the population of the enemy in all the armies of the North-Western Front, formed at the beginning of the war against Finland. Each of the army newspapers had a circulation of 5,000 to 15,000 copies. To meet the needs of the increased front-line publications, it was allowed to spend newsprint from the emergency reserve (NZ). At the same time, only the circulation of the newspaper of the 7th Army, "Battle Red Army", increased to 20,000 copies. [445] In addition, about 40 million leaflets were issued. The 7th and 13th armies had 7 sound broadcasting stations. As in the course of the fighting in the Far East, during

the "Winter War" there were comparatively large losses among the political staff of the Red Army. So, in December 1939 alone, they amounted to 525 people, or 15% of the total number of those killed and wounded. I had to take emergency measures to replenish this loss, which affected primarily the lowest level of political workers. Initially, on January 29, 1940, it was decided to introduce the positions of a platoon political instructor and a battalion (division) military commissar to the staff of rifle and artillery regiments. However, on February 12, 1940, the People's Commissar of Defense canceled this obviously ill-conceived decision. Now the military councils of the active armies received permission to nominate deputy political commissars for the positions of political commissars with the assignment (after 4 days of training in the army) to the rank of junior political commissar. [446]

During the Soviet-Finnish war, when the attitude about the possibility of achieving an easy victory "with little bloodshed on foreign territory" collapsed, the moral and political state of the personnel of the Red Army was seriously tested. Among the Red Army soldiers and commanders, despite the threat of punishment in court under the laws of war, there was widespread talk about the unfair nature of the actions of the USSR against Finland, about the unwillingness to fight against it. [447] Various

Numerous cases of non-compliance with orders, unauthorized departure from the front line were noted by the authorities. It was during that period, despite the official, very optimistic propaganda settings in the minds of the Red Army soldiers and commanders, "spontaneous myths" began to arise, which include rumors about the so-called "cuckoos" (Finland snipers), "multi-story", "covered with rubber" bunkers on the Mannerheim Line, from which "artillery shells bounced off", etc., etc. to sharply negative ones. Characteristic were the statements in

which the condemnation of the foreign policy action of the Soviet leadership against Finland was expressed. It was directly called aggressive and predatory. The announcement of the signing of the "Agreement..." with the People's Government of Finland served as one of the impulses for the manifestation of this kind of sentiment. Thus, the commander of the 173rd Rifle Regiment of the 90th Rifle Division, Krivilev, said bluntly that "the agreement with the people's government of Finland is only a screen with which the Soviet Union cultivates public opinion, and there, when we end the war, then restore Soviet power (in Finland. - **V.N.**) and deal with the end. He was echoed by the Red Army soldier Simonenko, who served in the reconnaissance battalion of the 8th Army. The Soviet leaders, he noted, started the war because they could not negotiate peacefully with the Finnish statesmen. Therefore, they "found some kind of People's Government, which no one has seen and does not know, perhaps it does not exist, and concluded an agreement with it. They help the workers and peasants of Finland, whom we also did not see. They are running from us."

Red Army soldier P.P. Lyakovsky expressed confidence: "The USSR is waging war not with the aim of liberating the Finnish people, but with the aim of capturing Finland. These actions of the Soviet government cannot in any way be considered correct. It's a policy of capture." Privates Tseplenkov and Kuznetsov reasoned in the same way. The first of them declared with the start of hostilities against Finland: "... we have become (sic! - **V.N.**) "liberators" and we are transferring the revolution on bayonets abroad." The second, who served in the 123rd Rifle Division, noted: "The Soviet Union wants to establish Soviet power in Finland, so it went to war. After Finland, it's Sweden's turn. Our rulers liked to take what was not theirs. They took Poland, Estonia and Latvia too, but choked on Finland. And a serviceman of the 138th Infantry Division of the 7th Army, Veselov, said indignantly: "We give the Finns a brotherly hand, but in our villages they sit without bread. Have you just started the war, and already there is no bread. We liberate the Finnish people who do not exist. The war started because ours **simply wanted to capture** (highlighted by me. - **V.N.**) Finland.

As in the period of the anti-Polish "liberation campaign", the truth of the well-known propagandistic assertion that "we don't care about foreign land" was questioned. In the Urals Military District, far from hostilities, Mokrynsky, the commander of the machine-gun company of the 128th Infantry Division, not without sarcasm, noted that cash
This slogan was by no means an obstacle to the "appropriation" of neighboring territories. He addressed the Soviet leaders with the following reproach: "We have taken Poland, they will take Finland, and then they will fight with Turkey." [449]

On December 14, 1939, by decision of the Council of the League of Nations, the USSR was expelled from this international organization for aggressive actions against Finland. On the same day, the central Soviet newspapers published the text of the TASS report, which, in particular, emphasized that, "in the opinion of Soviet circles", such a decision "causes an ironic smile, and it can only discredit its unlucky authors." In turn, the Kremlin presented its own claims to England and France, "under the dictation" of which the Council of the League of Nations acted. The Western powers were accused of "holding in their subordination the vast territories they had long seized in Asia, in

Africa" and for this reason alone "have neither the moral nor the formal right to speak about the 'aggression' of the USSR and about the condemnation of this 'aggression'". [450]

The news about the exclusion of the USSR from the League of Nations gave an additional impetus to critical statements addressed to the Soviet leadership. Technician quartermaster of the 163rd Rifle Division of the 9th Army Ustinov expressed confidence: "12 states organized themselves against the USSR, all of them help Finland. The situation is difficult, they will put us all here, for which it was necessary to do this, because now there is nothing to cover up our aggression.

At the front and in the rear, the NKVD noted conversations in which the course of hostilities on the Finnish front was negatively compared with the anti-Polish campaign of the Red Army in September-October 1939. Red Army soldier of the 205th rifle regiment V.S. Peredchenko believed that, in general, the Soviet Union "climbed in the wrong place, and Finland could not be defeated." There is no need to think, Peredchenko reasoned, that it will be "like in Poland" here, since it was "smashed by a German". And he made a disappointing conclusion: "We are here (in Finland. - **V.N.**) we will all disappear and they will kill us all." [451]

In the rear, there was also dissatisfaction with the course of the war against Finland. For example, disappointment sounded in the statements of Muscovites. The certainty that the fighting would "end in 4-5 days" was replaced by a feeling of involuntary respect for the Finns, who showed their unity and perseverance in the armed struggle against the Red Army. [452] On January 4, 1940, when the first news began to come about her unsuccessful actions against the Finnish troops and heavy losses, V.I. Vernadsky wrote in his diary: "Obviously, a major mistake has been made: poor intelligence. They went too far." [453] Indeed, representatives of the intelligence of the Leningrad Military District were set up in such a way that "from the very first days of the war, the White Finns will flee, there will be chaos in their rear." Therefore they, in

in particular, they considered it quite sufficient to give their agents a simple task: "by radio to report on the retreat routes of the Finnish army." [454]

Later, in May 1940, the leadership of the People's Commissariat of Defense was forced to admit that there was no real "political intelligence" among the population in areas where Red Army units had to operate. It simply did not know "with what slogans to go to this population and work among it." In general, the collision with reality often "stupefied" the fighters and commanders, who knew the population of foreign countries by "clichéd slogans and simplified propaganda." [455]

The hatred moods of the previous time, as well as the "victorious" mood of the political and military leadership, also caused their harm. In early December 1939, some of the writers sent to the Finnish front as military correspondents, in full accordance with V.M. Molotov, wished each other "see you in three days in Helsingfors" (Helsinki). At the beginning of the Finnish campaign, there was an idea that "it is enough for the Red Army to blow, and the whole world of capitalism will crumble like a mirage." The directives of a political nature that were given to the troops were based on the fact that there would be no serious opposition "from the side of the working people and ordinary soldiers" of Finland. Introduced into consciousness and the following conviction. The population of Finland, in the event of its entry into the war against the USSR, will not regard the Red Army as an adversary, and will almost immediately rise up and go over to its side. [456] Later, the poet A.A. Surkov reproduced his conversation with the commander of the ski battalion, who had the military rank of captain, who suffered heavy losses in battles with the Finns. To a direct question from

Surkov, addressed to the captain, who exactly is to blame for "this terrible embarrassment", that is, the defeat of his unit, the latter replied: "Firstly, I am to blame, secondly, the command, thirdly - most of all films "Do the Exterminators" and "Hot Days". [457] These films, made in 1939 and 1935 respectively, portrayed military service as a lightweight pastime.

By the beginning of January 1940, the Soviet offensive on the Finnish front had stopped. The fighting took on a positional character. However, the Finns managed to block

units of the 18th, 163rd, 168th, 44th rifle divisions and the 34th light tank brigade. Repeated attempts to unblock the encircled Soviet troops led to heavy losses.

On January 21, 1940, when the active army in Finland found itself in a difficult situation, a meeting was held in Moscow, at the Bolshoi Theater, dedicated to the next anniversary of the death of V.I. Lenin. After listening to the report of A.S. Shcherbakova, Stalin and his closest associates (members of the Politburo, military leaders, including K.E. Voroshilov and S.M. Budyonny, General Secretary of the Executive Committee of the Comintern G.M. Dimitrov) "in a friendly atmosphere" gathered at the laid table. Judging by Dimitrov's diary entry, Stalin not only did not proclaim the traditional toast for Lenin (as happened during other feasts and on other occasions), but during dinner on January 21, 1940, in none of the toasts did he mention his "teacher and educator." However, he obviously could not help remembering what happened in distant Finland. The Red Army

suffered unreasonably large losses in the war against the Finns, the fighting continued for more than seven weeks, and the expected turn in its favor was not achieved. The main content of Stalin's monologue delivered at the dinner on January 21, 1940, and its main toasts were directly and directly related to the course of hostilities on the Finnish front. He was forced to admit that only now it became clear how well the Finns had prepared for the "big war" against the USSR. The Soviet leader mentioned their additional "strength" - members of the paramilitary organization *shutskor*, which, according to his information, numbered 150,000 people. "We killed 60,000," Stalin assured his interlocutors, "we must kill the rest, then de

lo will end."

If at a banquet arranged on the occasion of his 60th birthday (December 21, 1939), Stalin proclaimed a toast "to the comrades who fought heroically in the snowy fields of Finland", [458] then a toast to the participants in the battles in Finland, proclaimed a month later, turned out to be completely unusual and unexpected. Raising a glass, the Soviet leader offered to drink to the Red Army, "which was not sufficiently prepared, poorly dressed and shod, which we now dress and shoe, which fights for its honor - to a certain extent compromised, fights for its glory!" The pronoun "we", which Stalin resorted to, stating the fact that urgent measures are being

taken to arrange the supply of the Red Army soldiers and commanders fighting in Finland, makes us think about the following. Apparently, he considered himself as the main initiator of the speedy overcoming of the shortcomings and blunders made by the high command of the Red Army. [459] Thus, it was simply not necessary to talk about some kind of "liberation mission" of the Red Army, which itself found itself in a difficult situation on the Finnish front at

the beginning of 1940. In addition, starting from December 1939, the political reports of the corps and armies operating against the Finnish army contained a lot of "perplexed questions" that followed from the fighters: why, they say, "brothers in the class" are so actively resisting. And the leadership of the Political Directorate of the Red Army, having rebuilt literally on the move, immediately consigned to oblivion the slogan that was put forward at the first stage of the war: "We are going to Finland not as conquerors, but as liberators." On February 4, 1940, PURKKA directive No. 29 "On the tasks of agitation and propaganda work in connection with the Finnish war" was sent to the active army. The directive stated the following: instead of everyday clarification to personnel that the main task in this war is to ensure the security of the northwestern borders of the USSR and Leningrad, some (of course, not named) "commissars, political workers, propagandists and agitators", as well as army and The divisional press either kept silent about this altogether, or brought to the fore the question of the international duties of the Red Army and "of helping the Finnish people in their struggle against the oppression of the landlords and capitalists." The directive stated that those acting in this spirit "schematically, bookishly

solve questions of the political education of the masses, break away from specific situations
ki".

It is noteworthy that in February 1940 a PURKKA telegram was sent to the military districts in connection with the 22nd anniversary of the Red Army, which mentioned its battles "for the security of the northwestern borders of our Motherland" and "for the liberation of the Finnish people from under the yoke of the Mannerheim gang. S.G. Osmachko noted on this occasion that the internationalist slogans of Soviet propaganda were not completely rejected at that time, but only faded into the background. [460]

Ultimately, thanks to huge sacrifices, the Soviet leadership managed to turn the tide in the war against Finland in its favor and conclude a peace treaty in Moscow on March 12, 1940. However, after the end of hostilities, along with a sense of joy and satisfaction that the brutal bloodshed had finally stopped, there was also clear regret in the ranks of the Army in the Field. For example, the junior commander of the Military Medical School Dobromyslov believed that the Soviet government had acted incorrectly by signing a peace treaty with Finland: "It was necessary to beat the Finnish White Guard to the end." In the same vein, the quartermaster of the 2nd rank of the 39th Infantry Regiment Yasinov argued in the same spirit. He considered the peace agreement with Helsinki "politically unfavorable": "How many fought, how many victims suffered, but such a small country (Finland. - **V.N.**) could not be taken." At the same time, some Red Army soldiers and commanders expressed confidence that the "White Finns" had deceived the Soviet leadership by agreeing to peace with them, and in the future "you will still have to fight" with Finland. [461]

Already after the signing of the Soviet-Finnish peace treaty, propaganda materials, as well as in the speeches of Stalin's associates, noted regret that the Finnish territory was not completely occupied. In the brochure published in the series "To Help the Marxist-Leninist Education of the Commanding Staff of the Red Army", one could literally read the following: "The USSR, which defeated the Finnish army and had the full opportunity to occupy all of Finland (sic. - V.N.), did **not** go for this, did not demand indemnities and, showing generosity towards Finland, limited himself to the minimum necessary to secure its northwestern borders. [462] And in May 1941 M.I. Kalinin frankly lamented, speaking in a closed audience, that it was not possible to "attach" Finland to the USSR. [463] At the end of June 1941, when Finland and the USSR again found themselves in a state of war, the regional newspaper of the Leningrad Military District unambiguously emphasized that the signing of the peace treaty of March 12, 1940 was "the first example in history when the army - the winner (Red Army. - **V.N.**) stopped in her swift offensive march, condescending to the entreaties of the defeated enemy. [464]

The fighting against Finland put on the agenda the question of the need to rethink the political propaganda and educational work with the personnel of the Red Army. Already on March 14, 1940, L.Z. Mekhlis ordered that by April 1, 1940, the political agencies should provide final, summarizing materials on their activities during the period of the fighting. In April 1940, PURKKA prepared a secret publication "About propaganda, agitation and the press in a combat situation. (Conclusions and suggestions on the experience of the war in Finland). It contained a number of innovative provisions: Shapkoza was criticized throwing moods, it was emphasized that it is not enough and even harmful to educate personnel only on the experience of the civil war. At the same time, the need was noted to orient the command staff towards new methods of conducting combat operations with the maximum use of artillery, aircraft, tanks, and automatic weapons. [465]

L.Z. Mekhlis emphasized after the end of the war with Finland that during it the truth came to light: without military knowledge, commissars and political workers could not be "full-fledged leaders." [466] A vivid picture that gives a visual representation of the level of propaganda work among the personnel of the Red Army in the initial period of the Finnish campaign is presented in the memoirs of one of its participants, intelligence

chick of the 17th separate ski battalion. This unit, while still on the border with Finland, during a short respite before the campaign, received "a patriotic charge from the illiterate political instructor who turned up (sic! - **V.N. J.**)" The explanations of the latter boiled down to the following: "Our planes are bombing and bombing, and the Finns are running away." [467] War with

Finland 1939-1940. found its reflection in Soviet cinema. Front-line cameramen filmed material for the newsreel-documentary film "The Mannerheim Line". V.V. On April 30, 1940, Vishnevsky described in his diary his impressions of viewing this picture: "Yesterday I watched Mannerheim's Line. Not a single applause. Spectators silently, searchingly look at the severity of the war. The naturalism of the document is utter... Death and destruction hovers... And everything that is possible has been cut out: there are no genuine deaths, wounded, no frostbite, no tragedy..." [468] A feature film directed by V.V. Eisymont "Front-line

girlfriends", which was supposed to show "the heroic work of Soviet female nurses during the struggle against the White Finns." [469] This film was a hit with audiences. According to Yu. Baranov, the film showed "real military truth, harsh and cruel." At the same time, there was no "unfortunate hat-throwing" in it, which was present, for example, in the films "Fighters" and "If Tomorrow is War". [470]

The war against Finland became a serious test not only of the combat readiness of the Red Army, but also of the effectiveness of Bolshevik propaganda. On the one hand, the viciousness of the former attitudes about the military weakness of a potential adversary, relying on lightning-fast military operations with "little bloodshed", "on foreign territory" was manifested. On the other hand, the ideas of ideological support for the "export" of the revolution to Finland and propagandistic support for the puppet "government" of Kuusinen were not developed. It is no coincidence that immediately after the end of hostilities and summing up the results of the "Winter War", which were disappointing for the Soviet leadership, the Red Army and PURKKA, a comprehensive restructuring of propaganda began, during which the task of a certain adjustment of views on its nature and content was set.

Chapter Five

5.1. Mastering combat experience and strengthening "mobilization readiness"

In March-April 1940, the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Soviet military-political leadership undertook a broad campaign to study the experience of the Winter War against Finland, during which much attention was paid to issues of propaganda, agitation and military ideology. On March 26-28, at the plenum of the Central Committee, a report was heard from People's Commissar of Defense Marshal K.E. Voroshilov "Lessons of the war with Finland". Voroshilov was forced to admit "not a rather serious attitude of the military department to all activities related to the preparation of hostilities. The head of this department, who during the Winter War was the Commander-in-Chief, Chairman of the Main Military Council of the Red Army, stated, speaking at the March 1940 plenum: "It was assumed that the war with the Finns would be fleeting and, in any case, would not present difficulties for our ar missions." [471] On April 14-17, 1940, a meeting was held at the

Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks of the commanding staff of the Red Army to summarize the experience of military operations in Finland. In essence, it was an expanded meeting of the Main Military Council. It was attended by employees of the central office, individual institutions of the People's Commissariat of Defense and representatives of military academies (about 90 people). Among them - People's Commissar of Defense K.E. Voroshilov, head of the PURKKA army commissar of the 1st rank L.Z. Mekhlis, his deputy corps commissar F. F. Kuznetsov, head of the department of agitation and propaganda brigade commissar

M.G. Gurevich, head of the Political Academy, divisional commissar F.E. Bokov. Direct participants in the Winter War (commanders, members of military councils of armies, commanders of corps, divisions, regiments, chiefs of staff at various levels), as well as employees of the Main Directorate of State Security of the NKVD of the USSR, were also invited to the meeting at the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks. (still over 130). Thus, about 220 people took part in its work. [472]

Stalin delivered a long speech on April 17, the last day of the meeting, in which, among other things, he touched upon the shortcomings in the propaganda sphere that had come to light during this war. According to him, first of all, the "hattering psychology" that arose as a result of euphoria from the anti-Polish campaign of 1939 prevented the Red Army from adapting to the difficult conditions in which the campaign of the Red Army against Finland unfolded. The Red Army allegedly "did not immediately understand that the war in Poland it was a military walk. "We were terribly damaged by the Polish campaign, it spoiled us," Stalin concluded. In his speech at a meeting of the highest commanding staff on April 17, 1940, the leader called for abandoning the "cap-throwing" moods, consigning to oblivion the thesis about the "invincibility" of the Red Army, and getting rid of the vestiges in the mind associated with the cult of the civil war. The "traditions and experience" of this war, Stalin emphasized, are completely insufficient. "A commander who believes that he can fight and win, relying only on the experience of the civil war, will die as a commander," he urged.

These Stalinist assessments cannot but cause surprise. Indeed, back in 1938, the Soviet leader himself "cultivated the cult of civil war." For example, at a reception in the Kremlin of the deputies of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR (January 20, 1938), he publicly proclaimed a toast "to the heroes of our civil war", "who will soon make themselves talked about", and most of them "still show themselves". [473] The propaganda work that was carried out among the personnel of the Red Army, on the whole, reflected such moods of the leader. In 1938, in the documents of PURKKA, "heroes of the civil war" were repeatedly cited as an example - V.I. Chapaev, N.A. Shchors, G.I. Kotovsky, A.Ya. Parkhomenko, S.G. Lazo. [474]

In his speech on April 17, 1940, Stalin stated that modern warfare requires politically steadfast and knowledgeable political workers. Moreover, the leader emphasized, "that the political worker will verbally repeat the party of Lenin - Stalin, all the same as hallelujah, hallelujah." He "should be politically staunch, politically educated and cultured" and, of course, know military affairs. [475]

At the end of the meeting under the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, a special commission was created, which was tasked with summarizing the work on the proposals made and making appropriate amendments to the charters and instructions that were overdue "in connection with the recent wars", especially during military operations against Finland. The members of the newly created commission were to submit materials on the results of their activities to the Main Military Council. It included over 60 people, including Stalin, K.E. Voroshilov, L.Z. Mekhlis, representatives of the People's Commissariat of Defense and participants in the fighting in Finland. Marshal K.E. was appointed chairman of the commission. Voroshilov.

[476] Within its framework, several special subcommittees began their work, including one on party political work in wartime. This subcommittee consisted of 9 people. (under the chairmanship of L.Z. Mekhlis). At the first working meeting, she considered a number of issues, including the organization of military propaganda in the country and in the Red Army, and political work among the enemy troops. On the whole, the meeting participants gave a positive assessment of the level of party political work. At the same time, they did not ignore the serious shortcomings in the education of personnel, which were as follows: propaganda and agitation in peacetime often obscured the "difficulties of combat conditions", varnished combat reality, thereby reducing the "steadiness people in battle. They also noted that the military propaganda in the country was "delivered unsatisfactorily", suggesting a number of measures to correct the situation. [477]

On the evening of April 21, 1940, a plenary meeting of the Commission of the Main Military Council was held in the Kremlin to summarize the proposals made at the meeting in the Kremlin. Stalin, who spoke at the meeting, proposed the creation of another - "narrower" - commission to consider issues that were not discussed in the subcommittees. [478] He, in particular, proposed a fundamental revision of the entire military ideology. For this, the leader believed, it was necessary to create new journals, circles in which one could freely gather and speak out on various problems related to the development of the Armed Forces.

Stalin declared on this occasion: "We must educate our command staff in the spirit of active defense, which includes the offensive. We need to popularize these ideas under the slogans of security, defense of our fatherland, our borders." Further, he proposed to "peck out the cult of civil war", which, according to him, only reinforced the backwardness of the Red Army. "The experience of the civil war," Stalin explained, "is good, but insufficient for today, and whoever does not understand this, he perished. We have in the command staff a dominance of participants in the civil war, who may not give way to young cadres. The leader proposed to put forward new command cadres, which are the "hope and change" of the Red Army. Stalin's reasoning about the need to abandon admiration for the experience of the civil war, about the urgent problem of overcoming the "dominance" of its participants in the command staff of the Red Army and replacing them with "young cadres" closely echoed the thoughts that he "voiced" in a speech on April 17, 1940 [479] The leader also pointed out the need to "dig up the archives of the Germans, French, Russians" concerning the "imperialist" (World War I) war, "dance from the experience" of this war and at the same time study the specifics of the hostilities of the late 1930s [480] At the suggestion of Stalin on April 21, 1940, a commission of the Main Military Council was created, consisting of 29 people. under the chairmanship of Marshal K.E. Voroshilov, who continued to work on summarizing the results of the Winter War.

Particular attention in the work of the GVS commission was paid to the issue of military ideology. On May 10, 1940, at its plenary session, a report by L.Z. Mekhlis on this issue. The speech of the head of PURKKA was addressed to the members of the commission present (23 people), as well as specially invited representatives of the Political Administration, heads of military academies, members of the editorial board of the Krasnaya Zvezda newspaper (over 50 people listened to the report in total). [481]

As Yu.V. Rubtsov, L.Z. Mekhlis put down Stalin's instructions made at a meeting at the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks of the commanding staff of the Red Army to summarize the experience of military operations (April 17) and at the plenary meeting of the GVS commission (April 21). [482] In addition, on the eve of his speech, the head of PURKKA had conversations on issues of military ideology with Marshal S.K., an active participant in the war against Finland. Timoshenko, who on May 7, 1940 was appointed to the native commissar of defense of the USSR, replacing K.E. Voroshilov. Rubtsov asserted that the main pathos of the report of the head of PURKKA "consisted in some frolic - under the influence of the results of the Soviet-Finnish war - from capricious moods." [483]

L.Z. Mekhlis began his report by actually repeating Stalin's thesis that the Red Army began to become a modern army only after an armed clash with the Finns, as well as the leader's instruction about the need to get rid of the "cult of civil war experience." The head of PURKKA was forced to admit with all bluntness: the fighting in Finland revealed a number of significant shortcomings in the education of personnel, in particular, in the content of propaganda and agitation. The reasons for such shortcomings lay, according to Mekhlis, primarily in the fact that the military culture of the army personnel was at a low level, and from this, in turn, followed distorted ideas about the nature of modern warfare and a misunderstanding of Soviet military doctrine. He further mentioned the presence of false

installations in the education and propaganda of the Red Army, namely: putting forward slogans about its absolute technical superiority and invincibility, about the Soviet Union as a country of heroes and patriots, incorrect coverage of international tasks, etc. Finally, L.Z. Mekhlis noted the weak level of military scientific work in the army and the country; forgetting the lessons of the past (in particular, the combat experience of the Russian army); neglect of the study of military theory; the presence of a "cult of the experience of the civil war", while this experience was not always possible to apply in the conditions of conducting modern hostilities. Blind admiration for him, Mekhlis stressed, inevitably leads to copying what was characteristic of a completely different era, for qualitatively different conditions. Among other things, it hindered the advancement of young command cadres.

Mentioning the existence of the propaganda thesis about the invincibility of the Red Army, Mekhlis repeated Stalin's idea that in fact "history knows no invincible armies." He cited the Napoleonic Wars as an example. The army of Napoleon I for almost two decades "kept the whole of Europe under the soldier's boot", but in the end was defeated and ceased to exist. L.Z. Mekhlis also recalled that the Japanese army twice "in separate areas" (near Lake Khasan and on the Khalkhin Gol River) was beaten by units of the Red Army.

Boastful statements about invincibility are harmful, concluded the head of the PURK KA. Meanwhile, he noted, both in the regulations of the Red Army and in the entire system of propaganda and agitation, the "false understanding of invincibility" was widespread. These "harmful tendencies" also took place during the fighting near Khasan Lake and during the armed conflict on the Khalkhin Gol River. Particularly destructive, admitted L.Z. Mekhlis, they affected in the initial period of the war against Finland, for which they had to "pay with extra blood." The general conclusion of the head of PURKKA did not go beyond the framework of Stalin's judgments on this matter: talk of invincibility leads "to arrogance, superficiality and neglect of military art" and, ultimately, to "individual defeats and temporary setbacks." Fighting in the late

1930s - early 1940s revealed in a significant part of the Red Army the readiness to defend their homeland on foreign territory. Such readiness created the basis for the use of the Red Army in the offensive, but only with the obligatory indication of the defensive nature of the war. The latter testified to the fact that the leadership adjusted itself to the mass consciousness so as not to contradict it with its actions. This created a certain inconvenience for him, but, as foreign policy practice showed, it was not an insurmountable obstacle.

It is no coincidence that in his report on May 10, 1940, L.Z. Mekhlis pointed out that in propaganda work there was an incorrect coverage of the international tasks of the Red Army. In the periodical press and in oral speeches, the thesis about the liberating role of the Red Army was brought to the fore, which was also confirmed in the draft Field Rules of 1939. exploiting classes." However, the head of PURKKA explained, "in practical work one cannot throw slogans at all." He expressed the opinion that this provision should not be included in the text of the Field Manual of the Red Army, since each propaganda slogan "should have its place and its time." Meanwhile, the thesis about its international tasks "quite often is given outside of time, without taking into account the conditions and without taking into account who is being appealed to." L.Z. Mekhlis recalled in this regard the events on the Khalkhin Gol River and the battles in Finland. These examples, Mekhlis argued, show that political workers often approach the issue in a "school-like" way. Having learned from books the correct proposition that the Red Army "is the liberator of the working people of the capitalist countries, they still do not know how to apply the theory in life, to conduct propaganda and issue slogans based on the specific situation."

The next question raised in the report by L.Z. Mekhlis, was associated with the propaganda of the technical power of the Red Army. Without arguing in general that it has first-class military equipment, Mekhlis pointed out that "the sweeping, boastful propaganda of technical power ... obscures the existing gaps in the field of armaments and leads to complacency." And this, in turn, led to complacency and concealment of serious shortcomings in the field of weapons and to underestimation of the enemy.

Mekhlis pointed out that the level of military-scientific work in the Red Army lagged behind the requirements that were imposed on "advanced Soviet science." At the same time, the military turned out to be constrained, and its development was retarded. As noted by L.Z. Mekhlis, periodicals that specialized in this topic, in particular the newspaper Krasnaya Zvezda, reduced their activities to insufficient popularization of the statutory provisions, without raising "new, acute and fundamental questions". At a low level, just "in the paddock", was, according to the head of PURKKA, the study of foreign scientific thought and foreign languages. Even the official materials of the period of the First World War were not fully published. The detrimental

consequences of the separation of Soviet military theory from world experience manifested themselves with particular force in the late 1930s. Stalin at the February-March 1937 plenum demanded an intensified study of the German and French experience, for which, in particular, foreign textbooks on military affairs should be translated into Russian. However, in reality, this led to repressions for quoting authors "from the fascist-bourgeois camp" and for "praising the fascist countries" - Germany and Poland. [484] It is

noteworthy that in the report of L.Z. Mekhlis, attention was drawn to the fact that military history, especially Russian, is poorly studied. The next passage of his speech seems to contain an internal contradiction. On the one hand, the head of the PURK KA stated: "We are carrying out the wrong slandering of the old army, and meanwhile we had such wonderful generals of the tsarist army as Suvorov, Kutuzov, Bagration, who will remain forever in the memory of the people as great Russian commanders, whom the Red Army honors An army that inherited the best fighting traditions of the Russian soldier. On the other hand, Mekhlis argued: "These outstanding commanders are forgotten, their military art is not shown in the literature and remains unknown to the commanding staff." Despite this contradiction, A.V. Suvorov, M.I. Kutuzov and P.I. Bagration, as Yu.V. Rubtsov testified to certain shifts in the military ideology of the late 1930s. [485]

Developing his thesis about the need to study the experience of wars waged by the Russian Empire, the head of PURKKA pointed out the following circumstance. Starting hostilities in Finland, the command staff of the Red Army did not know that Russia in the 18th and 19th centuries. repeatedly fought in this theater, including - in the winter. L.Z. Mekhlis urged to study the experience of past wars, as well as the experience gained in 1938-1939. (Khasan, Khalkhin-Gol, campaign in Western Ukraine and Western Belarus; wars in Abyssinia, Spain,

Poland). In his report, Mekhlis also pointed out that the study of the experience of the armies of a potential enemy and possible theaters of military operations is completely unsatisfactory. In particular, he stressed, the "harmful prejudice" was deeply rooted that the population of the countries against which the Soviet Union would conduct military operations would rise up almost without exception and go over to the side of the Red Army, and "the workers and peasants would greet us with flowers." ". This is a false statement, L.Z. Mekhlis, grows out of ignorance of the actual situation in neighboring countries. In such a situation, a collision with reality "demagnetizes our fighter and commander, who is used to viewing the population of foreign countries from a general, superficial point of view." The level of work on the

study of a potential enemy was defined by Mekhlis as very low. Although at the beginning of 1939, with some delay, the editions

newspapers in foreign languages, they, in the opinion of the head of PURKKA, still did not meet the necessary requirements, because they did not include writers who knew the language, way of life, history and culture of neighboring countries well enough. He also called for overcoming the neglect and arrogance towards the armies of small countries bordering the USSR. After all, if these countries joined on the side of the big capitalist powers in the coming war against the Soviet Union, they could draw significant forces onto themselves. Consequently, L.Z. concluded. Mekhlis, it is necessary to "carefully study and know the strengths and weaknesses of all the armies of neighboring countries, including the ma

lykh".

The existing shortcomings in the field of military ideology (the cultivation of the thesis of the invincibility of the Red Army, the template in the propaganda of heroism, hatred), according to Mekhlis, significantly reduced the effectiveness of educational work among personnel. The same shortcomings were characteristic of military propaganda among the population. In the periodical press, as the head of PURKKA put it in his report, she was "in the backyard", and the propagandists were badly engaged in "militarization of the population." L.Z. Mekhlis directly pointed out that the military departments of party committees "pay little attention *to the ideological preparation of the population for war*" (emphasis added by me. - **V.N. .**).

In order to eliminate the existing shortcomings in military propaganda and ideology, Mekhlis proposed to get rid of the "cult of the civil war", to eradicate the idea of the invincibility of the Red Army, to do everything possible to combat arrogance and hatred moods. He called for raising the military culture of commanding cadres, laying the foundation for the study of the history of the Bolshevik Party, military history and literature. At the commanders, considered L.Z. Mekhlis, it was necessary to bring up honor and dignity, love for military affairs, develop organization and exactingness. The command staff of the Red Army had to constantly improve their knowledge, study and everyday life in the army to build in relation to the conditions of the combat situation, by all means to instill in the personnel a "warlike spirit", remember traditions and adopt positive examples from the history of the Russian army.

As Yu.V. Rubtsov, the head of PURKKA cannot be denied a certain courage and innovation. For example, criticizing the organization of party political work in the Red Army, L.Z. Mekhlis expressed an almost seditious thought: this work should not be limited to the theory and history of the Bolshevik Party. Indeed, the head of PURKKA in his report stated literally the following: having been carried away by the propaganda of the "Short Course in the History of the CPSU(b)", one should not forget that it, on the whole, should "react to everything". [486] Speaking about the tasks of the Red Army, Mekhlis

pointed out that it is an instrument of war, and therefore its personnel should be educated in peacetime based on the main goal - preparation for war with the capitalist world, which will be "fair, progressive." At the same time, as the head of PURKKA emphasized, the Red Army men and commanders must act "actively, achieving the complete defeat and crushing of the enemy, transferring military operations to enemy territory." He set the task of educating the personnel of the Red Army and the entire country as a whole "in the spirit that any war waged by the army of socialism will be a progressive war, will be the most just of all wars ...". L.Z. Mekhlis clarified in this regard: "We are talking about the active action of the victorious proletariat and the working people of the capitalist countries against the bourgeoisie, about such active action when **our state and its Workers 'and Peasants' Red Army will initiate a just war** (emphasis mine. - **V.N. .**). At the same time, the head of PURKKA considered it necessary to quote from the works of F. Engels and V.I. Lenin about the possibility and necessity of armed action by victorious socialism "for the liberation of other peoples from the bourgeoisie".

Giving an assessment to the report of L.Z. Mekhlis on military ideology, made in May 1940, Yu.V. Rubtsov wrote: "The measures proposed by the head of PURKKA for a radical restructuring

ke processes of political education of personnel sounded undeniably, relevant, they are long overdue. At the same time, as the historian noted, "complacency only took root in us deeply," that even the cruel lessons of the "Winter War" could not completely eradicate it. [487] On May 13-14, 1940, at

the plenary meeting of the GVS commission, a discussion was held on the report of the head of PURKKA. About 20 people took part in the debate. At the end of the debate, the last word was given to L.Z. Mekhlis, and then the newly appointed People's Commissar of Defense Marshal S.K. Tymoshenko closed the work of the commission. [488] In general, those who spoke on the report of L.Z. Mekhlis tried not to go beyond the questions posed in it. Against this background, to some extent, the judgments expressed by the commander of the 2nd rank K.A. Meretskov, commander of the troops of the Leningrad Military District, and commander D.T. Kozlov. According to P.N. Bobylev, what Meretskov said, in general, was of fundamental importance. "Until now," the commander of the LVO troops emphasized at the plenary meeting of the GVS on May 13, 1940, "in the representation of the whole country, as well as in the army, there was an opinion that we would fight only when we were attacked." Hence the upbringing of the younger youth, based on the general attitude: "As long as they don't touch us, we won't fight." K.A. Meretskov spoke in the spirit that the Red Army " **is preparing for an attack** (highlighted by me. - **V.N.**), and we need this attack for defense ... We must provide our country not with defense, but with us dullness."

On this occasion, P.N. Bobylev noted the following. Words by K.A. Meretskov did not go unnoticed. Moreover, they did not contradict the views of the political leadership. To confirm this conclusion, Bobylev cited facts from Meretskov's biography: June 1940 - appointment as deputy people's commissar of defense; August 1940 - Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army. It was under the leadership of K.A. Meretskov developed a plan for the strategic deployment of the Red Army in the event of war in the West and in the East for 1940-1941, which was approved by the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks in October 1940. [489]

Equally radical judgments about the nature of the Soviet military doctrine belong to D.T. Kozlov. Speaking in the debate on the report of the head of the PURKKA, Kozlov called for educating the personnel of the Red Army and the entire population of the country "in the spirit of the offensive doctrine." "Not a single magazine, not a single newspaper should say that we will only defend ourselves and beat the enemy on our own territory," he said. On the contrary, continued D.T. Kozlov, "it should be written that we will defend ourselves only by the offensive and beat the enemy and thereby defend our socialist fatherland and its borders ...".

The participants of the meeting, assembled on June 25, 1940, at the initiative of the editors of the Krasnaya Zvezda newspaper, the Znamya magazine, and the SSP Defense Commission spoke in a similar way. At the aforementioned meeting, the editor-in-chief of the Krasnaya Zvezda newspaper E.A. Boltin (he was among those invited to the plenary meeting of the GVS and had the opportunity to listen to the report of LZ Mekhlis on May 10, 1940) touched upon two main groups of questions. The first was connected with military ideology and the ensuing tasks of educational work. The second concerned the current tasks of the editorial board of the "Red Star" and the "social order", which was intended to present to the writers of the military political chess guide.

As the responsible editor of the Krasnaya Zvezda newspaper emphasized, the doctrine of the Red Army was offensive. However, he continued, taking into account the experience of fighting in Spain, at Khalkhin Gol and especially in Finland, it was necessary to make some adjustments. Among the shortcomings of military ideology, which came to light mainly in the Winter War, Boltin named the fact that they tried to instill in the personnel "a kind of Soviet pacifism." In the periodical press and in literature, there was often an expression that "The Red Army is an instrument of peace," but meanwhile, according to E.A. Boltina, you need to learn

people to another truth: "the army is an instrument of war." He emphasized that one should not be arrogant, one should not underestimate the experience of hostilities between Germany and her opponents - England and France in Europe, and that the lessons of the campaign in Finland should

be constantly studied. Summing up his reflections on the tasks of military ideology, Boltin formulated the main guidelines that had to be followed. First, to educate people in the understanding that the Red Army is an instrument of war. Secondly, it was necessary to inculcate the idea of the just nature of the war of the USSR against any capitalist state, regardless of who would initiate it. Noting the presence of moods like: in the coming battles, we, i.e., the Red Army and the USSR, will defend ourselves, "but we ourselves will not get into a fight," E.A. Boltin called them wrong. He further formulated the credo of the Bolshevik military leadership: "We must be ready, if necessary, to strike first ... It is absolutely clear that the nature of the Red Army's combat operations will be active." Naturally, an offensive spirit should have been instilled in the personnel of the Red Army.

Thus, along with discussions about the need to eradicate "harmful prejudices", Soviet military propaganda ("hawking", arrogance, underestimation of the experience of modern wars) also emphasized the inviolability of the main ideological setting: the Red Army must prepare for active, offensive battles against the "capitalist encirclement", and it is possible that it will strike the first blow. Member of the

Defense Commission of the SSP V.V. At a meeting on June 25, 1940, Vishnevsky raised the issue of the obstacles that arose from military censorship in relation to propaganda materials covering the actions of the Red Army during the period of the "liberation campaign" in Poland and the war against Finland. Vishnevsky stressed that there is constant talk about the Baltics, as well as "about the prospects on the southern flank (in the Middle East. - **V.N.**), etc.". It was necessary to discuss these problems widely and publicly in the pages of Krasnaya Zvezda. However, writers and journalists who covered "defense" topics, according to Vishnevsky, could testify that there is not a single military topic that would not be spoiled by "editors", that is, censors.

Touching further on the prospects of covering the offensive operations of the Red Army and the upcoming "liberation campaigns" by means of cinematography, V.V. Vishnevsky complained that writers were not yet really involved in the creation of newsreels and documentaries about the events near Lake Khasan, on the Khalkhin Gol River, in Western Ukraine. "If we (USSR. - **V.N.**), - emphasized V.V. Vishnevsky, - we will have to deal with the Black Sea, the Caucasus, the Balkans, etc., let's think about it in a month ... Everything should be done silently, in an organized manner, in advance, in the military departments of the Film Committee, in the editorial offices of the SSP. As for the direct experience in creating chronicle-documentary films imbued with "extraordinary military precision," Wisniewski advised to borrow the experience of German cameramen filming Wehrmacht combat operations against Poland.

In the speech of V.V. Vishnevsky contained a direct allusion to censorship prohibitions, which were also practiced in Krasnaya Zvezda. Executive editor of the newspaper E.A. Boltin reasonably objected: "It is unlikely that anyone will now allow us to raise the question in the way Comrade suggests. Vishnevsky in relation to the future fate of the southeast, etc. We should not write about many such things, since it would be harmful. The editor of Krasnaya Zvezda promised journalists assistance in publishing "really bold things", but emphasized that the newspaper should not be put "in a false position regarding its international positions", because the military reviews published in it were quoted by the entire foreign press. [490]

In accordance with the order of the People's Commissar of Defense Marshal S.K. Timoshenko dated July 26, 1940, the Political Directorate of the Red Army was renamed the Main

Department of Political Propaganda of the Red Army (GUPPKA). And already on August 28, 1940, the GUPPKA issued Directive No. 20 "On the restructuring of party political work." It was addressed to the military councils and heads of political propaganda departments of the districts and the Far Eastern Front. The directive, in particular, noted: "Many commanders and political workers have tuned in to a peaceful way, they don't understand that the fire of a world war is blazing in the West and East, that we live in a military situation, when every serviceman must be internally mobilized" (italics added) . mine - **V.N. J.** In this regard, the importance of studying neighboring countries has already been pointed out for the umpteenth time.

Political propaganda and agitation were considered in the document not as an end in itself, but as a means of increasing the combat readiness of the Red Army, strengthening discipline and a high moral and political state of the personnel. The directive prescribed to give them a "combat character", to permeate them with "Stalin's purposefulness and principledness." For the study of neighboring countries, it was planned to make extensive use of the books and geographical maps previously sent out to PURKKA. Particular attention in lectures on neighboring countries was recommended to be paid to the military-geographical position, economic potential, the state of the armed forces and the tactics of their armies. Propaganda departments among the troops and the population of the enemy, as well as members of the editorial boards of newspapers in foreign languages, were involved in this work. [491]

In pursuance of the requirements of the GUPPKA directive of August 28, 1940, a lecture group of 101 people was created in its composition. Winter 1940/1941 lecture halls for commanders were organized in all houses of the Red Army. As of January 1, 1941, there were more than 2.2 thousand people in the propaganda collectives of the Kyiv Special Military District, over 2.6 thousand people in Leningrad, and over 2.8 thousand people in Moscow. Propaganda of the lessons of military operations in Europe, the experience of the Winter War, the use of tanks and aircraft, the military and economic potential of the warring countries and the tactics of their armies occupied a large place in the themes of the work of propaganda teams and lecture halls. [492]

In the draft of the new Field Manual of the Red Army, work on which was intensively carried out in 1940, for the first time there was a requirement: to study the political and moral state of foreign armies, to learn how to conduct propaganda and agitation among them in order to undermine morale. M.I. Burtsev, who was appointed head of the department of propaganda among the troops and the population of the enemy (7th department) of the GUPPKA, was given the task of drafting a directive to political agencies on the procedure for their ideological work focused on enemy troops. Burtsev perceived this assignment as unusual, since since the time of the Civil War the Political Directorate of the Red Army had not developed such directives or instructions. Preparation of the draft directive required a lot of effort. The head of the GUPPKA personally followed its progress. The project was discussed and revised many times, so that M.I. Burtsev had every reason to call the document "the fruit of collective thought." [493] On October 12, 1940, the

GUPPKA approved this important directive under No. 0267. The document's preamble noted that prior to 1939, this direction of military propaganda was underestimated. As a result, the political apparatus of the Red Army was not ready to wage an ideological war. The directive intended to decisively put an end to this shortcoming. The following task was formulated: "On the very first day of hostilities ... to bombard the enemy with leaflets, slogans and posters in order to decompose his army, demoralize his rear and, thus, help the command of the Red Army achieve complete victory in the shortest possible time and with the least sacrifices" . In propaganda, it was supposed to widely use both printed publications (leaflets, newspapers, posters, brochures) and radio, including sound broadcasting amplifying stations.

"The ideological war with the enemy," the directive of October 12, 1940, emphasized, "is a complex and, at the same time, an extremely responsible matter." Therefore, the chief

GUPPKA ordered to pay special attention to this area of political work. The heads of the political propaganda departments of the districts, armies, and the Far Eastern Front received a stern warning that they were directly responsible for preparing for an ideological war with the enemy. [494]

Subsequently assessing the contribution of the 7th department of the GUPPKA to the drafting of directive N 0267, M.I. Burtsev also noted the weak, in his words, places in the text of the document. Thus, the task of forthcoming work among the troops and population of the enemy was covered in sufficient detail, based on the intention to fight "on foreign territory", and the issues of ideological influence on the soldiers and officers of enemy armies in various conditions of the combat situation, as well as the specifics of work with prisoners of war. After the approval of the GUPPKA directive of October 12, 1940, employees of the 7th department went to the border military districts, where propaganda meetings were held, presentations were organized to the commanders and political workers, practical assistance was provided in drawing up work plans for the editorial offices of educational newspapers in the languages of potential opponents. However, judging by the memoirs of M.I. Burtsev, the formation of a propaganda system against the troops and population of the enemy (V.V. Vishnevsky called it "external political work") was not easy. Cadres of propagandists, included in the 7th departments, did not immediately turn "face to militant agitation." They were more focused on research activities. Often, due importance has not yet been attached to "ideological means in armed struggle." [495] Since the autumn of 1940, especially after the visit of V.M. Molotov to Berlin, the tension in relations between the

USSR and Germany became more and more clear. The speeches of Stalin's comrades-in-arms became more disturbing in content, aimed at realizing the full complexity of the current situation. So, A.A. Zhdanov, in a speech at the joint plenum of the Leningrad Regional Committee and the City Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks on November 20, 1940, in particular, mentioned the appearance of a "peaceful, serene state" among the people. The secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks was especially concerned about the fact that this kind of inclination towards "vegetative" life, a careless attitude towards questions of defense, were widespread among the activists and young people. Explaining the position of the Bolshevik leadership on this issue, Zhdanov emphasized that the USSR is still conducting a peaceful competition with capitalism, but it will inevitably develop into a military competition, and then the problem of "who wins" will arise. He went on to cite Stalin's statement about the need to prepare for the unexpected so as not to be taken by surprise by us, and pointed out the shortcomings in the study of the forms and methods of war. A.A. Zhdanov noted that "some comrades" are horrified at the thought of the inevitability of human casualties and material losses in the coming war. Replying to possible opponents, he stated: "We should not create any such kind, sentimental qualities, and if we have to fight, then we should be no less energetic and no less cruel than our military opponent. We must educate in the people such qualities as decide

strength, selflessness and heroism.

Speaking further in his usual ironic and threatening style regarding the adherents of the idea of waging war with "little bloodshed", Zhdanov paid special attention to the new trends that emerged in the course of hostilities between Germany and its opponents in the West. The whole pathos of Zhdanov's statement on this occasion boiled down to the fact that it is necessary "in the most urgent manner, without wasting a day or an hour, perfection to develop military equipment, military organization, taking into account the experience of the modern offensive, with all its striking means and forms in the form of a breakthrough of tanks, mechanized divisions, air raids, paratroopers ...".

Referring to Stalin's instructions about such a quality inherent in a real "Bolshevik and revolutionary" as the ability to "break old traditions and build new ones," Zhdanov formulated the specific task facing party organizations, industry leaders, and the military. It was necessary to learn to overcome outdated traditions

of the Civil War, replacing them with new traditions, "more in line with the modern situation." [496]

The introduction of unity of command in the Red Army and the abolition of the institution of military commissars (August 1940) served as an impetus for the formation of a kind of "gap" between the tasks that were set and solved by the personnel of units under the leadership of commanders, on the one hand, and the activities of deputy commanders for on the litchasti - on the other. In his speech at the first party conference of the Baltic Special Military District (PribOVO) on December 13, 1940, the head of the GUPPKA rather frankly described this phenomenon as negative. In particular, he noted that some political workers "understood the tasks of perestroika in a very simplified and formal way." Separate political propaganda departments "dismissed their people to study," while they themselves continued to "scribble unintelligible, stereotyped directives to everyone, everyone, everyone." As an example, information was given about excessive activity in this direction, which unfolded in the Kharkov military district. According to the head of the GUPPKA, the employees of the political propaganda department of the district within only three months managed to write ... 36 directives, and he assessed most of them as "completely unnecessary" or "simply absurd". [497]

The same problem was also touched upon at a meeting of the highest command staff of the Red Army on December 23-31, 1940. Corps Commissar, member of the Military Council of the Transcaucasian Military District Ya.A. Doronin was forced to admit: "Many political workers are still sitting in their offices, writing papers, applying seals, appearing in units as rare guests and the Red Army soldiers do not know them." One of these political workers explained his constant absence among the personnel by the lack of time, since he supposedly "writes a lot." Political studies in the district were completely divorced from the tasks of increasing combat readiness, because after the introduction of unity of command, political officers "completely moved away from questions of combat training."

At this meeting, the idea of strengthening the "mobilization readiness" of the younger generation was voiced. Commander of the 6th Army, Lieutenant General I.N. Muzychenko emphasized: "We have too little popular literature about military heroes, about the difficulties they had to overcome in the performance of their military duty. Extremely little is written or known about it." He proposed to raise the issue of publishing special military magazines for the civilian population, on the pages of which, in an interesting, fascinating form, the new replenishment of the Red Army could be told about the difficulties and problems of military service. [498]

Commander of the KOVO troops, General of the Army G.K. Zhukov offered a somewhat updated interpretation of the events of the Soviet-Finnish war. Noting the shortcomings that had taken place in the preparation and conduct of hostilities, he emphasized that this howl was notable for the demonstration, and "for the first time in modern military history", of the art of breaking through the "first-class fortified zone" ("Mannerheim Line"), carried out with the help of "powerful modern technology" provided by the Soviet country and its socialist industry. [499] This speech, to some extent, testified that the campaign to combat the "hatter" moods, initiated by Stalin in connection with the failures in the war with Finland, was fading away by itself. These failures began to be associated exclusively with the difficult natural conditions in which the Red Army had to operate. The resilience of the Finnish soldiers was seen as a kind of anomaly. A disdainful attitude towards a potential enemy did not allow commanders and political workers, especially those who did not participate in hostilities, to think properly about the reasons for the spread in the military environment of ideas about the ease of victory and to seriously prepare for the difficulties of the coming war. [500]

In the closing remarks at the aforementioned meeting, People's Commissar of Defense Marshal S.K. Timoshenko stated: "There is still a lot of formalism and can-

purposefulness. Instead of living, concrete work among the masses, many political workers are engaged in administration, excessive enthusiasm for paper management; and some of them, not understanding the essence of the measures being taken in the Red Army, took the position of neutral observers and very timidly, timidly get involved in the political education of fighters and commanders. [501]

As "mobilization readiness" intensified, attention began to be paid to ensuring that as little information as possible about the state of the Soviet economy, the defense industry and the deployment of units and subunits of the Red Army would penetrate into the Soviet press. So, on January 15, 1941, the Organizing Bureau of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks put N.G. Sadchikov and the editor-in-chief of the 10th volume of the "Small Soviet Encyclopedia" for the fact that the publication contained data "not subject to disclosure in the open press": on the location of power plants in the border zone, on the volume of gross output produced in the largest Soviet cities etc. etc. [502]

On February 4, 1941, at a meeting of the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, the issue of the content of two textbooks on economic geography for universities published in 1940 was considered. textbooks on economic maps of border areas and regions, as well as the announcement of information about their industrial development. It was decided to delay the publication of these publications, and expose the culprits. The secretariat of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks instructed Glavlit to establish careful control over printed materials containing "data on the economic development of regions and regions of the USSR", especially border ones. On February 7, 1941, a draft resolution of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks "On measures to strengthen the protection

of state (military and economic) secrets in the press" was prepared. The document emphasized that in the periodical press, as well as in books and pamphlets, in open resolutions of the people's commissariats and other institutions, numerous information of a defense nature was disclosed. The unsatisfactory work of the Glavlit organs was noted. In 1940 alone, its employees made 38,500 "strippings" from materials prepared for publication. These materials revealed the places where 37 military formations, 20 corps, 51 divisions, as well as other units, military camps, schools, and defense enterprises were stationed. As noted in the draft resolution of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, on behalf of the UPA, Glavlit prepared a new list of information constituting state secrets, replacing the outdated one dating back to 1926. It is noteworthy that "Additions for wartime" of 18 points were attached to the list. [503]

In addition to purely military propaganda structures, such as, for example, the GUPPKA, a tendency towards increased "mobilization readiness" also took place in purely "civilian" departments. On December 25, 1940, the responsible head of TASS Ya.S. Khavinson addressed the head of the UPA of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks with a memorandum from which it followed that the Propaganda and Agitation Department of the Central Committee intended to familiarize themselves with the work of this institution. Khavinson suggested discussing some proposals related to the solution of organizational issues. In particular, he emphasized that the unification of the activities of various Soviet organizations working abroad (meaning, first of all, the work of TASS) is of particular importance "for the purpose of serious, state-sponsored, preparation in case of war." "It is quite obvious," the responsible head of the Telegraph Agency of the Soviet Union explained his position, "that already now the most thorough preparation of a radio broadcasting base for neighboring countries is necessary, as well as training of personnel for broadcasting: the selection of certain literature of a reference and descriptive nature; preparation for printing of brochures, posters, leaflets in various languages... polygraphic base and plan of publications... backup means of communication, etc."

Khavinson also proposed, taking into account the special importance of "the case of military propaganda in our press", to create an editorial office (department) of military information and propaganda within TASS.

dy with the tasks of serving the entire press not only with information materials, but also with articles. This edition, in his opinion, was supposed to group the best Soviet military publicists around the Telegraph Agency and prepare a contingent of "qualified war correspondents" on the basis of "study of relevant experience" (including foreign experience). [504] On March 3, 1941, the head of the editorial office of foreign information TASS

D.D. Monin sent to the UPA of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks his own "Proposals on the structure of the central apparatus of TASS and the improvement of the work of the editorial office of foreign information." The document urged to increase the share of its own analytical material and "Bolshevik pointed information on the main questions of the international situation." At the same time, D.D. Monin proposed proceeding from the need to resolve the main task - giving propaganda an "active combat tone" in order to "keep the people in combat readiness." [505] March 10, 1941 Ya.S. Khavinson sent to the UPA draft regulations on the Committee for Information Affairs, on improving the work of

TASS. Along with the strengthening and expansion of the Tassov correspondent network in Germany, England, the USA, Japan, the Middle East, and Turkey, Khavinson suggested paying "special attention to colonial and semi-colonial countries." The responsible head of TASS believed that, focusing on providing comprehensive information about the economic situation in the capitalist countries, it was necessary to organize "a daily display of deprivation, hunger, unemployment and poverty of the working masses and their struggle against the oppression of capitalist exploitation", and especially - "food difficulties."

In his "Proposals ..." Khavinson did not forget the field of "defense propaganda and information." To this end, he considered it expedient to organize, together with the GUPPKA at the central office of TASS, "training of war correspondents." More specifically, the idea of using Tassov opportunities for "mobilization purposes" was carried out in the draft "Regulations on the All-Union Committee for Information Affairs under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR." This committee was supposed, according to the initiators of its creation, "to carry out all the necessary measures for the preparation and staffing of the agitation and propaganda apparatus in case of war." [506]

Proposals by D.D. Monin and Ya.S. Khavinson were transferred on the 20th of April

1941 for consideration by the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks. [507]

Needless to say, measures to strengthen "mobilization readiness" were proposed to be carried out by those structures that belonged to the military department. On February 22, 1941, the head of the GUPPKA A.I. Zaporozhets sent in the name of A.A. Zhdanov a lengthy memorandum on the state of military propaganda among the population. [508] It is possible that the document was drawn up on the basis of Stalin's instructions: on that day, Zhdanov and Zaporozhets spent three hours (along with numerous other visitors) in the leader's Kremlin office. [509] The proposals of the head of the GUPPKA, which followed from the negative characterization of the production of military propaganda in the country outlined in his memorandum, boiled down to the following. He considered it necessary to create a military department in the Directorate of Propaganda and Agitation of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks to coordinate and direct the activities of state and public organizations, as well as city committees and district committees. A.I. Zaporozhets did not rule out the possibility of militarizing the Pioneer and Komsomol, physical culture organizations, focusing on the preparation of a physically strong, "militant" generation. At the same time, the pioneer camps were supposed to turn "from rest houses into really training and military camps."

Zaporozhets planned to create a special military magazine for the commanding staff. The publishing house of the People's Commissariat of Defense, according to its plan, should have supplied the country's population with military literature. The head of the GUPPKA planned to increase the circulation of Krasnaya Zvezda in order to provide the military departments of the party committees, school military instructors, and commanding staff of the reserve with the newspaper. Zaporozhets considered it necessary to

to set up the main organs of the press to systematically conduct military propaganda among the population, and for this purpose, to create military departments in the editorial offices, recruiting representatives of the commanding staff there. He proposed to organize a military department in Politizdat, to arrange the publication of literature on the Marxist-Leninist theory about the war and the army and to provide the party activists with military literature. The entire press, according to A.I. Zaporozhets, was supposed to increase coverage of the economic and political situation in neighboring countries, acquainting primarily with their armies and technical achievements in the military field. In the lecture halls, it was planned to organize series of lectures on neighboring countries on topics related to "modern warfare".

The People's Commissariat of Education, the Committee for Higher Education under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the relevant scientific organizations should have been involved in drawing up a scheme of measures for the study of foreign languages and, most importantly, the languages of neighboring countries, as the head of the GUPPKA described them, "our probable opponents." The military department, formed in the publishing house "Iskusstvo", was seen by A.I. Zaporozhets as an organ necessary for "the mass and timely production of posters mobilizing the population for the defense of the country." Muzgiz was instructed to revise his plans in order to publish a large number of musical works in tune with the military situation. "The Union of Soviet Writers," Zaporozhets further emphasized, "should resolutely take the path of creating Soviet patriotic defense literature. Connect writers with the army, ***force them to live and work in the army*** (italics mine. - **V.N.**), in order to better know life, the situation, people, new forms of combat. And in general, in his opinion, the SSP and the Committee for Arts under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, in his opinion, the time has come to start creating plays that instill feelings of patriotism and fearlessness in battle.

Did not ignore A.I. Zaporozhets and the activities of filmmakers. It was necessary to propose to the Committee for Cinematography under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR to create "authoritative teams" to work on films depicting "modern war". The release of a series of short films "which would acquaint the population with modern methods of warfare, with the life of the army, its heroes, would agitate for the development of military training and sports" also belonged to the same category. Finally, Zaporozhets proposed to oblige the All-Union Radio Committee to begin systematic military propaganda in all radio broadcasts, and not be limited to broadcasting Red Army news. [510]

Even a simple enumeration of practical measures, which, in the opinion of the head of the GUPPKA, were of paramount importance for strengthening military propaganda in the country, shows how much his "mobilization" plans exceeded the competence of this body. It is enough to imagine what significant material costs the implementation in practice of even a small fraction of these plans would entail, not to mention structural shake-ups and massive personnel changes, for which it would be necessary to attract a lot of people, tearing them away from purely peaceful affairs. It is unlikely that this is why Zaporozhets formulated his proposals without first receiving the "go-ahead" from Stalin or from his closest associates.

Acting in full accordance with the proposals of A.I. Zaporozhets, directed by A.A. Zhdanov on February 22, 1941, the leadership of the GUPPKA paid close attention to cinema as an important tool in preparing for war. On March 25, together with the Committee for Cinematography under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, it held a special meeting to which film directors (including S.M. Eisenstein and G.V. Aleksandrov) were invited, as well as screenwriters V.V. Vishnevsky and A.N. Afinogenov. At the meeting, a proposal was made to create a special sector under the Committee "composed of competent representatives of the Red Army", which would be responsible for the "defensive work of cinematography". In addition, the idea arose to create a Defense Commission of Cinematographers, following the example of a similar body that existed under the Union of Soviet Writers. [511] At a meeting on March 25, 1941, Zaporozhets stated that the situation with military and defense films was unimportant, and therefore the

meeting with writers and directors. They spoke about "the power of the Armed Forces", reflected in the newsreel-documentary film "With the Name of Stalin". [512]

March 27, 1941 A.I. Zaporozhets turned to A.A. Zhdanov with a memorandum, which, in particular, emphasized that the Committee for Cinematography under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR did not create a "mobilization stock of short *combat* (my italics. - *V.N.*) films about a potential adversary" and, moreover, did not take into account the experience of "military cinematography and film propaganda" in the West. Further, the memorandum reported on the meeting at the GUPPKA with the participation of writers and directors, and also outlined the personal proposal of Zaporozhets to create a Military Department under the Committee for Cinematography. The leadership of the newly formed department, in the opinion of the head of the GUPPKA, should have been staffed by regular military personnel with a higher military or political education. [513] On April 4, 1941, a meeting of the activists of the Main Directorate for the Production of Feature Films (GUPHV) of the Film Committee took place, at which a number of speakers raised the issue of preparations

for the Great War. Head of GUPHV K.A. Polonsky urged to concentrate attention "on preparing the citizens of the Soviet Union for the great historical tasks facing ... the country in the current international situation." "The entire experience of Soviet art," Polonsky emphasized, "should be concentrated and aimed at *increasing the mobilization readiness* (italics mine. - *V.N.*) of the working people of the Soviet Union." He urged to pay exclusive attention to the staging of films "on defense themes, modern themes." Those present at the meeting of the GUPHV activists supported K.A. Polonsky and, referring to the results of a meeting in the People's Commissariat of Defense on March 25, 1941, noted that the military-political leadership was interested in filmmakers creating as many films of this kind as possible. The main idea that was voiced in almost all speeches by representatives of the activists of the Main Directorate for the Production of Feature Films of the Film Committee boiled down to the following: the USSR is preparing for the Great War, international events put it before the need to enter this war.

At the meeting of the GUPHF on April 4, 1941, it was also noted that filmmakers were in fact not really ready to fulfill the task set by the party and military-political leadership of making defense films. In his closing remarks, the chairman of the Committee on Cinematography once again pointed out this shortcoming. To correct the situation, I.G. explained. Bolshakov, it was decided to carry out "a number of organizational measures". In particular, a special defense commission was created, whose task was not only to prepare scripts and actually films on the named subject, but also to establish daily close ties with NGOs. In the system of the People's Commissariat of Defense, it was planned to organize a film group, including the best cameramen of film news. [514] Thus, propaganda structures began to prepare ahead of time for the upcoming Great War. But the direct instructions **of what** and **how to** do in the process of this preparation, the people involved in them, understood quite well only after Stalin's speeches in the Kremlin on May 5, 1941.

5.2. New appointments

On May 7, 1940, in the midst of the work of the GVS commission to summarize the experience of the Winter War, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR issued a decree appointing Marshal S.K. Timoshenko People's Commissar of Defense. By the same decree, Marshal K.E. Voroshilov took the post of Deputy Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars and Chairman of the Defense Committee under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR.

Following this, in the summer-autumn of 1940, some personnel changes in the leadership of the Armed Forces followed, which also affected the political agencies. On July 24, 1940, by order of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, the composition of the Main Military

advice. Among others, A.A. Zhdanov. Head of GUPPKA L.Z. Mekhlis remained a member of the GVS. Following this, on August 12, the Politburo approved the resolution "On strengthening the unity of command in the Red Army and the Navy", which was published as a Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. According to this decree, the institution of military commissars was abolished. From now on, in all formations of the Red Army and the Navy, the position of deputy (chief) for political affairs was introduced. Commenting on these events, the historian Yu.N. Zhukov expressed the opinion that although they were called upon to "eliminate the

petty party tutelage of the Armed Forces," "it has not yet been possible to completely eliminate the party presence" in them. And yet, according to Zhukov, the influence of the party leadership on decision-making by the commanders was reduced to a minimum. [515] However, it is hard to imagine that the highest party body, which was the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, could approve a decision to eliminate "petty party guardianship" in the Armed Forces.

In September 1940 L.Z. Mekhlis moved from the post of head of the GUPPKA to the post of head of the newly created People's Commissariat for State Control. On October 5, the leadership of the all-army political agency was entrusted to A.I. Zaporozhets (1899-1959). Zaporozhets joined the Bolshevik Party in 1919. During the Civil War, he was a Red Army soldier, political officer of the company. He went from a regimental commissar to a military commissar of the General Staff, a member of the Military Council of the Moscow Military District. At the XVIII party conference (February 1941) A.I. Zaporozhets was elected a candidate member of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, in March 1941 he was appointed Deputy People's Commissar of Defense. In February 1941, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks decided to support the dachas of the head of the GUPPKA and the heads of the district political propaganda departments at the expense of budgetary funds, [516] which can be considered as the dissemination of nomenclature "benefits" on a wider scale.

G.V. Kostyrchenko explained the appointment of A.I. Zaporozhets as the head of the GUPPKA for the following reasons. First, the Stalinist leadership undoubtedly noted the reorientation of the "expansionist aspirations of the Hitlerite military machine from west to east", and therefore began to "think about the need to morally prepare the people for the coming trials." In this regard, the army became "the object of paramount attention of the Soviet leaders." Secondly, as Kostyrchenko believed, Zaporozhets was patronized by A.S. Shcherbakov, "who advocated the speedy restructuring of army ideological work by referring to the historical paradigm of Russian military glory." In light of this, L.Z. Mekhlis has allegedly become an unsuitable figure as the head of the army's political agencies. Although he tried to "adapt to the new propaganda course" and even declared the need to educate the personnel of the Red Army on the examples of the heroic military past of the Russian people, however, in his heart he remained, according to Kostyrchenko's wording, "an adherent of orthodox internationalist Bolshevism." [517] In this connection, obviously, it should be recalled that literally on the eve of the German attack on the USSR, on June 21, 1941, L.Z. Mekhlis was again appointed head of GlavPur, replacing A.I. Zaporozhets, and performed these duties during the first year of the German-Soviet war. This testifies to the controversial interpretation proposed by G.V. Kostyrchenko.

Noteworthy is another judgment on this issue, expressed by Yu.V. Rubtsov. As the historian noted, Mekhlis, who at the end of May 1940 called on commissars and political workers to master military affairs on an equal footing with commanders and predicted that otherwise they would fall out of the "cart of leadership work," he himself "fell out" of it. In accordance with the established tradition, wrote Rubtsov, together with K.E. Voroshilov, the former People's Commissar of Defense, "the entire top of the military department left." [518]

On September 6, 1940, according to the decision of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, A.A. Zhdanov began to carry out only a general observation of the work of the Propaganda and Agitation Department of the Central Committee

VKP(b), and Georgy Fedorovich Alexandrov (1908-1961) was appointed head of the department. According to G.V. Kostyrchenko, G.F. Alexandrov was "a bright representative of the new galaxy of career party ideologists." [519] Alexandrov was born in St. Petersburg in a working-class

family. During the years of the Civil War, he turned out to be an orphan, was brought up in an orphanage and in a labor colony in the city of Borisoglebsk (Voronezh region). He graduated from the provincial Soviet party school in Tambov. Becoming a member of the Bolshevik Party at the age of 20, G.F. Alexandrov soon moved to Moscow. At 24, Alexandrov received a diploma from the Historical and Philosophical Literary Institute (IFLI). Then he studied at the Institute of Red Professors, at the Communist University of Teachers of Social Sciences (KUPON), worked in the editorial and publishing department of the Executive Committee of the Comintern (1938-1939). He taught Marxist-Leninist philosophy at the Faculty of Philosophy of IFLI, was a conductor of Stalin's ideas in the eradication of political enemies - "Trotskyites" and "Bukharinites". He acted as dean, headed the department of the history of philosophy, the philosophical department, and was the secretary of the IFLI party committee. In January 1939 G.F. Aleksandrov was appointed deputy head of Agitprop. With the formation of the UPA of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, Aleksandrov

became deputy chief, head of the party propaganda department. In February 1941, at the XVIII All-Union Conference of the CPSU(b), he was elected as a candidate member of the Central Committee of the Bolshevik Party. G.F. Alexander did not speak foreign languages, it was difficult to classify him as a well-read people. But this did not stop him, like L.Z. Mehlis, to get a doctorate (major in philosophy). [520] The writer K.I. Chukovsky gave him the following characterization: "He is mediocre, ignorant, boorish, stupid, vulgarly petty ... You only had to look at him for five minutes to see that he was a bureaucrat-careerist who had nothing to do with culture." [521] Equally negative was the characterization given by G.F. Alexandrov M. Djilas. The Yugoslav political and military leader recalled: "Aleksandrov did not make any definite impression on me - uncertainty, almost facelessness, was his main, distinguishing feature. He was short, stocky, bald, and his pallor and fullness showed that he did not leave his office. [522]

The closest assistants of G.F. Aleksandrov according to the UPA were D.A. Polikarpov (1905-1965) and A.A. Puzin (1905-1987). At the age of 34, Polikarpov became the head of the department of cultural and educational institutions of the Propaganda and Agitation Department of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, and at the age of 35 he was approved as the first deputy head of the UPA. A.A. Puzin, who had been head of the propaganda department of the UPA of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks since August 1939, was appointed deputy head and head of the press department. From November 1940, he also became the executive editor of the Bolshevik Press magazine.

On September 20, 1938, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks adopted a resolution on the preliminary approval of employees of a number of people's commissariats in positions in the Central Committee of the Party, including the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs. [523] This resolution, in particular, applied to the Press Department of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs. On June 23, 1940, the Secretariat of the Central Committee approved N.G. Palgunov (1898-1971) deputy head, and on June 17, 1941 - head of the press department of the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs. [524] Since 1920 Palgunov has been in the party work, he was the editor of regional newspapers in Kursk and Yaroslavl. In 1934-1940. he was a TASS correspondent in Iran and Finland, head of the TASS department in Paris. Judging by the recollections of people who knew him through joint work, N.G. Palgunov had a characteristic quality - caution, and "on the verge of fantasy." There was an anecdote in the NKID: even that it was raining in Paris, Palgunov reported from the French capital, referring to the publication of the local newspaper Tan. [525]

Palgunov, in his memoirs, claimed that the doors of the press department of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs "were wide open to all Soviet people who applied to it", and cultural figures, among whom he named I.G. Ehrenburg. [526]

And here is how the famous writer himself told about one of these meetings. Upon his return from Paris to Moscow in 1940, Ehrenburg tried to publish poems about the tragic fate of France defeated by the Nazis. Having received a refusal, he turned to N.G. Palgunov. He could not believe, reading Ehrenburg's lyrical poem, that the word "sycamore" mentioned in it means just a tree, a kind of maple. At the same time, Palgunov asked: "Do you understand what responsibility I have?" [527]

Such caution by the head of the press department of the NKID, however, was fully justified. According to the figurative expression of Z.S. Sheinis, N.G. Palgunov literally "walked on the edge of a knife": [528] the fate of his predecessors, who worked in this department, was tragic. Sensitive damage to the NKID was inflicted as a result of dismissals, persecution and condemnation in the 1930s. a significant part of its most qualified personnel. [529] After M.M. Litvinov repression fell on the heads of his closest employees. In May 1939, he was arrested, and then the head of the press department of the NKID E.A. was convicted. Gnedin. On December 19, 1939, by the decision of the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, the deputy head of the department, A.P. Medvedev, who agreed to the publication of an article that "grossly contradicted the foreign policy of the USSR." Moreover, he was generally forbidden to work in the NKID. [530] A tragic fate befell Professor of

Philosophy A.A. Shcheglov, who was appointed head of the press department of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs after the arrest of E.A. Gnedin. Shcheglov, by the nature of his service, had to attend receptions in Stalin's office in the Kremlin. [531] After one of these receptions, he allowed himself to say "superfluous" about the content of the conversation with Stalin and Molotov, was arrested and spent time in the camps until 1956. [532]

In his memoirs, N.G. Palgunov noted that since "there was no head of the department", he was listed as "first deputy", and officially became the head only in 1941. [533] A similar situation developed in the editorial offices of the central newspapers. The position of deputy chief editor of the Izvestia newspaper in 1939 was performed by Ya.G. Selih, and the post of editor-in-chief remained vacant for several years. [534] The situation was similar in the periphery. The Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks was even forced to address the editorial boards of regional newspapers with an appeal to put an end to such a situation, when for years their regular issues were signed by temporary acting officers ("vridas") and deputies ("deputies"). [535] The phenomenon of the "temporary officer" was a specific product of the political repressions of the 1930s. and was fully characteristic of propaganda structures.

The top party leadership has repeatedly stated the unsatisfactory state of the personnel of the regional periodical press. On August 20, 1940, a resolution of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks "On district newspapers" was adopted, which noted the low level of a number of district newspapers, the elementary illiteracy of their employees, the poverty and dryness of their language, and the presence of numerous typographical errors in publications. The task was to eliminate these shortcomings. [536] But in the district newspapers, people continued to work as editors who did not show interest in international events, did not read fiction, were simply illiterate, and made spelling mistakes in publications. [537] Like the local censorship agencies, the cadres of the district press were subjected to periodic "processing" campaigns.

In connection with the repressions, in great haste, the selection of the leadership of the editorial offices of army newspapers was carried out. For example, the newspaper of the junior commanding staff of the Red Army "Combat Training" (it was published three times a week) was headed by the regimental commissar P.M. Litovchenko. But since he was not directly related to military affairs, he could not cope with his duties. The content of "Combat Training", as noted in the order of the GUPPKA of March 3, 1941, was extremely low, often misprints and gross errors were made in the materials. [538]

As early as the autumn of 1939, party workers joined the ranks of the army, who for the most part had almost the same military experience as the conscripts of the Red Army. These people had no experience of political work in the army environment, since they had previously been engaged in purely civilian activities in educational programs, political departments of the MTS and state farms, at shock construction sites, workers' schools and institutes. Some of them, in accordance with their high positions in the civil service, immediately received the rank of regimental commissars, and often even higher - brigade, divisional commissars. Others mastered military affairs as political officers, quickly moving up the career ladder. Starting in battalions, divisions and squadrons, regiments, after some time most of these former purely civilian people were sent to the political departments of divisions and corps: the "acceleration" inherent in that time had an effect. The junior political staff was nominated from the rank and file of the Red Army men who joined the party, former Komsomol activists. More than 70 thousand people were engaged in political propaganda work in the army units in 1940 (including over 40 thousand people newly appointed in 1938-1939),

that is, three times more than in 1937. At the same time, 1780 people belonged to the highest level (regimental commissars and above), 22,500 people belonged to the senior (senior political officers and battalion commissars), 45,900 people belonged to the middle (junior political officers and political officers) .. [539] From May 1940 to February 1941, 99,000 reserve political workers were re-certified, and by February 1, 1941, more than 122,000 people were registered. [540] For comparison, the number of command and command staff of the Red Army (including Air Force) on January 1, 1941 was 540 thousand people. [541]

The most important personnel changes took place at the beginning of May 1941 in the highest echelons of the party and state leadership of the USSR. On May 4, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks adopted a resolution "On strengthening the work of the Soviet central and local bodies." [542] The preamble of the resolution clearly justified the need for its adoption: this was done in order to "completely coordinate the work of Soviet and party organizations and unconditionally ensure unity in their leading work, as well as in order to further raise the authority of Soviet bodies in the current tense international situation, which requires the utmost strengthening of the work of Soviet bodies in the defense of the country. In accordance with this main task, the Politburo unanimously approved the appointment of Stalin as Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR. He remained the first secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and, since he could no longer "dedicate enough time to work on the Secretariat of the Central Committee", A.A. became his deputy for the Secretariat. Waiting for new. Previously, Zhdanov carried out general supervision of the activities of the Directorate of Propaganda and Agitation, but now he has been relieved of this duty. A.S. Shcherbakov, by decision of the Politburo, was appointed secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and head of the Propaganda and Agitation Department of the Central Committee, while retaining the post of first secretary of the Moscow Regional Committee and City Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks. V.M. Molotov, who had previously been Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, became Stalin's deputy for the Council of People's Commissars and "head of the foreign policy of the USSR", while remaining in the post of people's commissar for foreign affairs. On May 4-5, 1941, by a survey of members of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks (71 people in total), drawn up in the minutes of the Plenum of the Central Committee, the Politburo resolution "On strengthening the work of Soviet central and local approved.

There is a discussion in the literature on the question of what explained such a decisive step by Stalin, who took over the leadership of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR. According to O.V. Khlevnyuk, this step meant an increase in "the importance of the government and its apparatus in leading the country and making decisions." [543] R.F. Ivanov disputed the view that Stalin's decision to assume the duties of head of the Soviet government was dictated by "political motives of an internal nature." According to Ivanov, this appointment was caused primarily by reasons of a foreign policy nature. [544] L. A. Bezymensky wrote in this regard: "Most likely, it was not an external, but an internal political signal about the seriousness of the situation." [545]

According to Yu.N. Zhukov, in an effort to maintain the impression abroad "about the uncertainty that allegedly remained in the Kremlin in assessing the international situation", hesitations in the development of a foreign policy course, the Soviet leadership at the same time did not doubt the inevitability of a war with Germany, and therefore came to understand the need to end the process of "creating a military cabinet". With Stalin in mind, the historian wrote that after May 4, 1941, "the first secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, who for more than eighteen years formally remained in the shadows (sic! - V.N.), finally **took over** personally the entire full responsibility, moreover officially, for all subsequent actions taken by the government of the Soviet Union. The combination in one person of the two highest posts of the two then existing branches of power, noted Yu.N. Zhukov, only "emphasized the significance of both the moment" and the role that from now on "purely state structures" were called upon to play. Stalin, according to Zhukov, from that moment "carried out overall leadership, united and coordinated both power structures." Zhdanov headed the party apparatus, directing its work with the help of two departments - personnel and propaganda. Shcherbakov, on the other hand, rapidly "took off in the rankings" and in just two and a half years

"climbed into a narrow leadership." [546] I.V. Pavlova actually agreed with the conclusions of Yu.N. Zhukov that the appointment of Stalin was justified by the reasons of the foreign policy order. She emphasized that Stalin's power by May 1941 "was unlimited and without any legitimate formalities." Pavlova suggested that the real meaning of the decision to appoint Stalin as Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, which was "a part of that state secret that was hidden for decades thanks to the mechanism of power created by him," was dictated by the inevitability of the impending war. It is no coincidence in this connection that Stalin brought Zhdanov and Shcherbakov closer to him. [547] G.V.

Kostyrchenko is categorical in his conclusions regarding the transfer of the post of Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR to Stalin. This was required by the increasingly growing "threat of the Soviet Union being drawn into the Second World War." At the same time, Kostyrchenko wrote with some pessimism about the transfer of Zhdanov, which was predetermined by a Politburo resolution of May 4, 1941. Allegedly, the release of A.A. Zhdanov from the duties of "monitoring the Department of Propaganda and Agitation" and the appointment of A.S. Shcherbakov was motivated by the fact that the latter was young and energetic. Kostyrchenko further expressed what seems to be a controversial judgment: in the aforementioned resolution of the Politburo "... Zhdanov, **as if as a consolation** (emphasis mine. - **V.N.**) was declared Stalin's deputy for secretary of the Central Committee, although he had already b

5.3. Genesis of ideological confrontation with Germany

At first glance, in the series of "external enemies", whose images were so actively used in Soviet propaganda materials at the turn of the 1930s-1940s, there was no place left for Germany and German fascism. Such a version seems to be solid, taking into account the version widely spread in memoirs and research literature that Stalin recklessly believed in the reliability of the non-aggression pact with Hitler. However, adherence (if any) to the non-aggression pact did not prevent him from maintaining a hostile attitude towards Germany.

So, instructing General of Aviation I.F. Petrov, who was on his way to Germany in March 1940 as part of a state commission to get acquainted with samples of military equipment, Stalin emphasized: "Please note: although we signed an agreement with Germany, fascist Germany was and remains our worst enemy." [549] The famous aircraft designer A.S. Yakovlev, referring to the impressions of meetings with the leader, recalled the setting by him of a specific task: to assimilate the design features of German aircraft in order to ultimately learn how to "beat them." [550] Stalin, who favored the Polish writer V. Wasilewska, who became a Soviet citizen,

attended her privately in his Kremlin office on June 28, 1940. [551] As the writer claimed, he told her that the war with the Germans would begin sooner or later. [552] Since the summer of

1940, when the anniversary of the non-aggression pact was celebrated, the Bolshevik propaganda structures, having been forced to "mothball" their anti-fascist and anti-German orientation, began to show increasing activity in obtaining negative materials about Germany. Thus, in the 10th issue of the Historical Bulletin for 1940, the censor detained A. Manusevich's article "On the History of the Versailles Treaties," because, "outlining historical facts, the author accompanied them with comments in the spirit of complete sympathy for Germany. From these comments it was possible to draw conclusions about the validity of all the claims of Germany. [553]

After the visit of the Soviet delegation headed by V.M. Molotov to Berlin on November 12-13, 1940, the anti-German sentiments of the Soviet leadership began to intensify. If we believe the testimony of the manager of the affairs of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR Ya.E. Chadayev, on the evening of November 14, at Stalin's dacha, a message was heard from the head of the Soviet government and People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs V.M. Molotov on the results of the negotiations in Berlin. Stalin said then that Hitler "does not want to reckon with the legitimate interests of the Soviet Union," and also made an angry denunciation of the

foreign and domestic policies of the Fuhrer, the ideology of national socialism. [554] In a conversation with V.M. Molotov, G.M. Dimitrov and V.G. Dekanozov November 25, 1940, Stalin stressed that the relations of the USSR with Germany are "polite", but there are "serious frictions" between the two countries. On the same day, G. Dimitrov had a conversation with the head of the Soviet government. Dimitrov stated that the Comintern was pursuing "a course towards the disintegration of the German occupying forces in different countries." Stressing the intention of the ECCI Secretariat to "strengthen even more" this work, Dimitrov asked V.M. Molotov: Will such actions interfere with the foreign policy of the USSR? The latter answered rather unambiguously: "Of course, this must be done. We would not be

communists if we did not follow such a course. You just ***need to do it silently***" (*my italics*. - **V.N.**). [555] At the same time, those propaganda structures began to be criticized, in the materials of which excessive attention was paid to Germany. On January 17, 1941, representatives of the leadership of the UPA of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks G.F. Aleksandrov, A.A. Puzin, N.G. Palgunov and D. A. Polikarpov sent G. M. Malenkov memorandum "On the work of TASS". Along with the shortcomings of a purely organizational nature, revealed in the activities of the Telegraph Agency of the Soviet Union, the authors of the report drew attention to the following omission. Until the summer of 1940, the Bulletin of Foreign Military and Military-Technical Information TASS, along with materials from German authors, published reprints from English, French and American periodicals with a critical analysis of the armed forces of the Third Reich. Since the summer of 1940, as noted by the staff of the UPA of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, German propaganda articles about the "absolute invincibility" of the Wehrmacht began to prevail in this publication. They talked about the good armament of the German army, its advanced tactics, extolled "the moral superiority of the German soldier and Hitler's military leadership." One such article stated, for example, that thanks to the actions of the Luftwaffe, the Maginot Line in France had been broken through. A number of materials reprinted by the Bulletin of Foreign Military and Military-Technical Information TASS from

German periodicals were reduced, as they believed in the Propaganda and Agitation Department, to proof of the "brilliant supply of the German army." [556] In January 1941, the turn came to a control check by the "highest authority" of the printed matter of the journal International Literature. The leadership of this magazine, which was traditionally considered anti-fascist, in the specific conditions of the Soviet-Nazi rapprochement, found it possible to focus on reproducing

Manskaya periodicals. To solve this problem, it had the necessary materials (newspapers, magazines and other printed publications), regularly received from Germany. In 1940, notes began to appear on the pages of International Literature about the publication in German in the Third Reich of works of Russian classical literature, about the staging of plays by pre-revolutionary playwrights, and operas by Russian composers. In 1941, publications of this kind were continued, and along with them were printed materials, naturally, previously censored, actually about the cultural life in Nazi Germany. [557] The special commission of the UPA of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks in January 1941, which

examined the printed matter of the journal International Literature, first of all drew attention to its German edition. It turned out that in 1940 it contained the publications of 85 German and only 30 Soviet authors, which caused censure. The members of the UPA committee considered it completely inappropriate to appear in the International Literature of information about the celebration in Germany of the 500th anniversary of the invention of European printing, at the origins of which was the German humanist I. Guttenberg.

They also considered mocking the title under which a collection of satirical works by M.M. Zoshchenko, P.S. Romanova, V.Ya. Shishkova, V.P. Kataev. German publishers called the collection: "Sleep soon, comrade!". [558] Concerning the named book, the writer V.V. Vishnevsky noted: "I read with disgust that Hitler published Zoshchenko, Kataev, Shishkov, P. Romanov, etc. They choose bit by bit satire, a disguised gloomy description of our life ...". [559] Hitler's own book "Go to sleep, comrade!" very entertained. On April 28, 1940, Goebbels noted in his diary that he had read "jokes" from this publication to the Führer. "We laughed a lot together," stated the Minister of Propaganda of the Third Reich. [560]

On June 4, 1940, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks adopted a resolution on the participation of the USSR in the spring Leipzig Fair of 1941. [561] The progress of the fair, which opened on March 2, 1941, was covered by correspondents of Soviet newspapers, including the writer E Petrov. [562] During the construction of the Soviet pavilion, the Germans carefully watched to prevent the popularization of the USSR. They were worried about the "ideological department" - an exposition of Soviet book production and materials from the field of cinema. Even the portrait of the commander A.V. Suvorov, who was planned to be placed in the center of the Soviet pavilion (it was a shot from the film of the same name), did not please the owners of the fair. [563]

Often the German side resorted to harsh speeches against the "propaganda activities" of Soviet journalists in Berlin. Press conferences for foreign journalists were held every day at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and at the Ministry of Propaganda of Germany even twice a day. They were attended, in particular, by representatives of the Telegraph Agency of the USSR, headed by the director of the TASS branch in Berlin, I.F. Filippov. The Nazis saw the main purpose of these press conferences as preventing the dissemination of unwanted information through the Incor network. In essence, they sought to impose their version of the events on foreign journalists, trying to stop any initiative on the part of the latter to disseminate their own, different from the official, interpretation of what was happening. [564] However, the organizers of these press conferences were not always able to reliably control the information coming from sources not controlled by the German authorities. In such cases, conflicts arose between the organizers of the meetings and foreign

in particular, Soviet journalists.

One such incident occurred in October 1940. On October 12, Germany officially announced the entry of its military formations into Romania. The Germans, through the Danish press, circulated a version according to which the Soviet government was promptly informed about this step of theirs. On October 16, the TASS Report stated that such statements by the German side "do not correspond to reality." [565] The Germans, in turn, began to distribute among foreign cor-

respondents in Berlin, materials that discredited TASS and called into question its competence and the seriousness of the information they transmitted.

Representatives of the Telegraph Agency of the Soviet Union, at a regular press conference at the German Foreign Ministry, provided their foreign colleagues with the text of the above refutation in Russian and German. The head of the press department of the German Foreign Ministry, P. Schmidt, sharply condemned such actions of Soviet correspondents. On this occasion, he said: "We will not allow propaganda activities to be carried out here." Responsible officials of the German Foreign

Ministry constantly quarreled with TASS correspondent in Berlin I.F. Filippov about publications in Soviet newspapers that "speak unfavorably about certain aspects of German life." Filippov, in turn, presented the German official with anti-Soviet articles published in the German press. [566]

From the autumn of 1940, when relations between the USSR and Germany began to deteriorate, Soviet propaganda began to be used more and more actively as a weapon of ideological confrontation with the Germans, albeit muted under the conditions of the nonaggression pact and the treaty of friendship and border. For example, on January 8, 1941, the readers of Trud found in the newspaper L. Feuchtwanger's materials reprinted from the Post Meridien (USA). They entered the foreign department of Trud on a call from Stalin's secretariat. The employees of the department were in confusion, because Feuchtwanger, under the conditions of the Soviet-German agreements of 1939, found himself among the "undesirable" authors in the USSR. At that time, negotiations were taking place in Moscow, which were conducted by the People's Commissar for Foreign Trade A.I. Mikoyan and a high-ranking official of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Third Reich K.Yu. Shnurre. The Germans tried to impose on the Soviet side unfavorable terms of the agreement. Then "above" decided to "throw them a bitter pill." The publication of L. Feuchtwanger's articles in Trud aroused the fury of the Nazi leadership. The Germans were forced to soften their demands. And then the Soviet side backtracked. On January 9, 1941, the publication of L. Feuchtwanger's articles in Trud ceased without explanation.

In early March 1941, a new incident occurred, now between the head of the press department of the German Foreign Ministry, P. Schmidt, and TASS correspondents in Berlin, A.M. Lavrov and S.M. Kudryavtsev. It was associated with the official Soviet reaction to the entry of German troops into Bulgaria. On March 1, the Bulgarian Foreign Ministry informed the Plenipotentiary Representative of the Soviet Union that the Bulgarian government had agreed to the introduction of German units into the territory of their country. In response, on March 3, Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs A.Ya. Vyshinsky made a statement, from which it followed that Moscow reacted extremely negatively to this step. The statement, in particular, emphasized: "The Soviet government cannot share the opinion of the Bulgarian government on the correctness of the position of the latter on this issue ...". [568]

It is noteworthy that the office of J. Goebbels did not show their attitude to this official statement of the Kremlin. On March 5, the Minister of Public Education and Propaganda of the Third Reich wrote in his diary about this: "In my opinion, the explosion of indignation is only on paper. We won't respond to it." [569]

However, the German side's negative reaction to Moscow's official statement was not long in coming. On March 4, before the next press conference at the German Foreign Ministry in Berlin, A.M. Lavrov and S.M. Kudryavtsev, who had only one copy of the text of A.Ya. Vyshinsky, "answered the questions of foreign correspondents." Lavrov and Kudryavtsev sought to clarify, using the text at their disposal, "separate passages of this communication." The next day, P. Schmidt again, as had already happened in October 1940, made "threats" against the TASS workers. According to the sol of the USSR in Germany V.G. On March 8, Dekanozov protested against such speeches by P. Schmidt, made "in a high tone and in a rude manner." [570] March 10 V.M.

Molotov, in a conversation with F. von Schulenburg, touched on this burning topic. Molotov indignantly remarked that "threats against the representatives of the USSR cannot do anything good and in general such threats should not take place." He also emphasized: "Threats cannot win friends, but you can lose friends." [571]

But despite the unwillingness for the time being to go into confrontation with Germany, in the spring of 1941 in Moscow they nevertheless decided to take some veiled anti-German actions. In March, the creators of the feature film Alexander Nevsky (1938) were awarded the Stalin Prize. As already noted, this film, which had a pronounced anti-German orientation, was taken off the screen after the signing of the well-known agreements between the USSR and Germany on August 23 and September 28, 1939.

In connection with the high award that the creators of the picture received, the newspaper Pravda published an article about the work of S.M. Eisenstein, containing his high appreciation. [572] In April 1941, when tensions arose in connection with the events in the Balkans, the film reappeared at the box office. The award of the Stalin Prize to her was perceived as an anti-German action. [573]

In March-April 1941, TASS began direct preparations for a propaganda war against the Goebbels department. Relevant materials were collected (excerpts from Hitler's Mein Kampf, articles on the Nazi "new order" in Poland and Yugoslavia, etc., etc.). As part of TASS, a new edition of propaganda arose (still in great secrecy), headed by Ya.S. Khavinson. However, officially this edition launched its work only after June 22, 1941. [574]

In general, anti-German motives in the early spring of 1941 were seen only in classified propaganda materials, which were intended for an extremely limited circle of people. There were no clear signs of a wider turn towards anti-fascist propaganda. On March 29, 1941, G. Dimitrov had a conversation with V.M. Molotov. The question was raised about the approaching 55th anniversary of the leader of the German Communists, E. Thalmann, who was in a Nazi prison. Molotov expressed doubts about the advisability of launching any propaganda campaign on this anniversary, since, according to him, the USSR continued "to pursue a non-hostile policy towards the Germans." [575] It is clear that in this case the Stalinist position was stated. March 25, 1941 Yugoslavia joined the "axis" Germany - Italy - Japan, which caused discontent in

Moscow. However, on the night of March 26-27, 1941, as a result of a coup d'état, the government of D. Simović, anti-German, came to power in Yugoslavia. During negotiations in Moscow on April 5, 1941, the Yugoslav ambassador gave Stalin verbal information about Germany's preparations for an attack on the USSR. He allegedly thanked the diplomat for the information provided and said: "We are ready, if they [the Germans] want, let them come." [576] On the same day, the Soviet Yugoslav treaty of friendship and non-aggression was signed. [577]

At the beginning of April 1941, in propaganda materials intended for the personnel of the Red Army, the idea began to be carried out on the basis of historical analogies that Russian troops had extensive experience of victories over the Germans. In *the* issue of the journal "Political Studies of the Red Army Man", **signed** for print on April 8, 1941, an article appeared that began with the following statement: enemy face to face and a crushing blow to destroy his manpower ... ". This main thesis was illustrated by the description of the Battle of the Ice in 1242, the Battle of Grunwald in 1410, in which the German invaders were "beaten, **as the annals of the territory note**" (*italics mine. - V.N.*).

, on their own

Finally, data were given on the offensive operation of the Russian troops on the Southwestern Front during the First World War, the so-called "Brusilov breakthrough" (1916), as a result of which the German and Austro-Hungarian armies were defeated. [578]

April 22, 1941, the birthday of V.I. Lenin, a reception was organized in the Kremlin for the participants of the decade of Tajik art. Stalin made a short speech at the reception, in which, in particular, he focused on the peculiarities of the Bolshevik policy in the field of national relations. According to him, Lenin created a party that adhered to a completely "new ideology" of friendship and equality of peoples, opposed to "the old, obsolete ideologies of racial and national enmity." [579]

These Stalinist words were received with keen interest among the Soviet "ideological workers". So, V.V. Vishnevsky noted in his diary that Stalin's speech "talked about Lenin, about the new ideology, about the brotherhood of peoples, about the **destructive and dead** (emphasized by V. Vishnevsky. - **V.N.**) ideology of racism." Vishnevsky noted for himself that the main content of Stalin's speech on April 22, 1941 was reflected in the publications of the newspaper Pravda. [580] Indeed, on May 1, an editorial appeared in it, which, in part, stated: "The Soviet Union is a country where ... a dead ideology has been thrown into the dustbin of history, dividing people into "higher" and "lower" races. ". [581]

Stalin's telephone call to the writer I.G. Ehrenburg. The latter, as noted above, then

the case ran into serious obstacles from the side of censorship, which did not allow his articles and works that were anti-fascist in nature to be printed. Dissatisfaction in the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks was also shown in relation to Vishnevsky, who intended to publish Ehrenburg's novel *The Fall of Paris* in the magazine *Znamya*. In turn, Z.S. Sheinis was accused of "warming up" I.G. Ehrenburg, whom non-well-wishers called the "defector".

Z.S. Sheinis decided to send a letter "to the higher spheres", proving the absurdity of the accusations. Most likely, this letter had an effect. On April 24, 1941, Stalin telephoned Ehrenburg and asked if non-German fascists would be depicted in the novel *The Fall of Paris*. The writer answered positively, but expressed uncertainty about the possibility of publishing the third part of the work, where he intended to show the beginning of Germany's military operations against France and the first weeks of the occupation of the French capital by the Germans: after all, his use of the word "fascist" even in the dialogue irritated the censors. Stalin promised assistance.

The writer, firstly, understood from this conversation that a war between the USSR and Germany would soon be inevitable, and secondly, that it was not at all a matter of literary predilections: Stalin was well aware: "such a call would be talked about everywhere."

Ehrenburg immediately went to the editorial board of the *Znamya* magazine and told about the telephone conversation with Stalin. Immediately from the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) called V.V. Vishnevsky and was told that "there was a misunderstanding." [582] Regarding this incident, Vishnevsky himself wrote in his diary on May 5, 1941 the following: "Impressions of the last days. Ehrenburg's story about how he got a call from the Central Committee and how Stalin talked about the "Fall of Paris", etc. Apparently, this is a **politically necessary topic** " (*italics mine*. - **V.N.**). [583]

Stalin's call to Ehrenburg was a kind of signal that testified to the decision of the Bolshevik leadership to once again use anti-fascist motives in propaganda. His contemporaries interpreted the events in a similar way. From Moscow, the information reached Yaroslavl, where Yu. Baranov learned about it from members of the local writers' organization. He wrote in his diary that the book of the famous anti-fascist I.G. Ehrenburg's "The Fall of Paris" received Stalin's approval. Stalin "offered Ehrenburg to write **everything as he thinks** (my *italics*. - **V.N.**), that is, to put it simply, he took this anti-fascist book under his protection." [584] Hitler was extremely dissatisfied with Stalin's actions in the

spring of 1941. In a conversation with Foreign Minister Ribbentrop, he stated that the Soviet-Yugoslav pact was "a clear affront to Germany", a clear departure from the Treaty of Friendship and Borders of September 28, 1939. At the end of April 1941, Hitler received Schulenburg in Vienna and told him about his

concerns about a rapprochement between the USSR and Yugoslavia. According to the Fuhrer, it serves as a warning to him. The coup in Belgrade and the agreement of April 5, 1941, Hitler cited as an example of the unreliability of the Soviet Union as a partner of Germany. All this pushed him to speed up the preparations for the war against the USSR. During an audience in Vienna on April 28, the Fuhrer told Schulenburg that after the agreement between Yugoslavia and the USSR, he had the feeling that the USSR intended to scare Germany. In addition, Hitler had little faith in the effectiveness of Soviet supplies stipulated in economic agreements with the Soviet Union, since he believed that these supplies were limited by transport capabilities. [585] There were persistent rumors in Moscow that the troops participating in the May Day parade would be

sent to Minsk, Leningrad and the Polish border. [586] From the beginning of April 1941, talk of an approaching war began to be recorded on the territory bordering the USSR. Among the population of the General Government (the German part of Poland), who observed the movements and concentration of German troops, the most stable was the assumption that Hitler was about to attack the Soviet Union. On May 2, 1941, F. Schulenburg reported to Berlin that, together with his colleagues from among the employees of the German Embassy in Moscow, he was constantly fighting "with rumors of an imminent German-Russian military conflict", since they created "obstacles to the ongoing peaceful development Soviet-German relations. [587]

As already noted, in Stalin's dinner speech at the reception of the participants of the decade of Tajik art, a ghostly allusion was made to the "perniciousness" of the ideology of national socialism. The anti-German motives sounded with greater certainty in Stalin's speeches to the graduates of the military academies of the Red Army on May 5, 1941.

Chapter Six MAY AND JUNE 41st

6.1. Stalin at the reception of "military academicians" May 5, 1941

On May 5, 1941, at 18:00, the conference hall of the Grand Kremlin Palace was filled with graduates, professors and teachers from 16 academies of the Red Army and 9 military faculties of civilian universities, representatives of the high command of the Red Army and the RKVMF. About two thousand people gathered in the Kremlin. People's Commissar of Defense Marshal S.K. Timoshenko opened a solemn meeting on the occasion of the next graduation of "military academics". Then the chairman gave the floor to the head of the Department of Military Educational Institutions of the Red Army, Lieutenant General I.K. Smirnov, who made a brief report on the results of the work of his department. M.I. addressed the graduates with parting words. Kalinin, who urged them to quickly put into practice the experience gained during their studies. Finally, Stalin appeared on the podium, who delivered a 40-minute speech. After Stalin's speech, by 19.00 the guests, among whom "military academicians" and their mentors (leading and teaching staff) predominated, filled the ceremonial halls, the ancient Faceted Chamber of the Grand Kremlin Palace. Members of the Politburo and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, people's commissars, deputies of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, representatives of the high command of the Red Army and the Navy, diplomats were present here.

The second act of the graduation ceremony for students of military academies. - a grand reception (banquet) - began with the fact that Stalin appeared in the St. George's Hall, accompanied by his members and candidate members of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks. According to the already established tradition, Marshal S.K. Tymoshenko addressed those present with a brief welcoming speech. Then representatives of military academies spoke: them. M.V. Frunze; mechanization and motorization of the Red Army. I.V. Stalin; Artillery them. F. E. Dzerzhinsky; command and navigation staff of the Red Army Air Force; chemical protection them. K.E. Voroshilov.

Further, judging by the official newspaper report, Stalin's toast followed in honor of the entire leadership and teaching staff of the military academies. He expressed confidence that the graduates would come to their units armed with a profound knowledge of the new technology. Having described the significance of individual branches of the Red Army, Stalin essentially repeated (slightly expanded) the toast proclaimed earlier, at a reception on May 2, 1941, for the participants of the May Day parade V.M. Molotov. [588] The leader offered a toast for artillerymen, tankers, pilots, cavalrymen, infantrymen, engineers, technicians, sappers, signalers, scooters, paratroopers, "in honor of representatives of all types of weapons." S.K. again received the floor.

Timoshenko. He appealed to the heads of military academies with an appeal to raise their work to the level of the increased demands placed on the Red Army. The reception, which lasted for several hours, was accompanied, according to the established order, by a large festive concert. [589] Returning to Stalin's 40-minute speech

addressed to the graduates of military academies, it should be noted that it consisted of two main parts. The first one was devoted to assessing the state of the combat readiness of the Red Army; the second spoke briefly about the international situation and gave a brief description of the Wehrmacht. [590]

Stalin claimed that the process of rearmament of the Red Army had been completed, with the result that it had become a modern army. The real experience in the restructuring of the Red Army, he emphasized, was obtained as a result of military operations against Finland in 1939-1940; The lessons of "modern warfare in the West", that is, armed confrontation between Germany, on the one hand, and England and France, on the other, were

also taken into account. Stalin further stated that one third of the divisions in the Red Army were mechanized. In turn, from among the mechanized, according to him, 1/3 are tank, and the remaining 2/3 are motorized. "They don't talk about this," Stalin confidentially noted, addressing those present in the hall, "but you should know this."

He mentioned the tanks of the "first line", which had armor 3-4 times thicker than that of the combat vehicles of the "second line". Stalin convinced those present: it was the "thick-walled" tanks that "would tear the front" of the enemy in future hostilities.

Tanks of the "second" - "third line", so
giving birth to infantry.

About his favorite brainchild - aviation, Stalin told the representatives of the military elite the following: combat vehicles, which had a speed of 400-500 km per hour, were replaced by more advanced ones: 650 km per hour. Completing a generalized description of the technical equipment of the Red Army, Stalin, in particular, said: "... To manage all this new equipment - the new army, command cadres are needed who know modern military art to perfection." He hastened to assure those present that changes had taken place in the technical equipment of the troops, but, in his opinion, the content of the educational process in military academies still lagged behind the urgent requirements of the day. Having described the state of the Red Army, Stalin moved on to the second part of his speech, devoted to foreign policy problems. He dwelled

in detail on explaining the reasons for the defeats of the Western Allies and the victories of Germany during the hostilities of 1940-1941. In his speech on May 5, 1941, Stalin first of all focused on the fact that the main opponents of Germany - Britain and France - were not strong enough.

The French and British leaders contributed to the creation of an atmosphere of "disregard for the army, for the military." There was no concern for the army, and there was no moral support for it. A new morality has appeared, corrupting the army. The military was treated with disdain. In Stalin's interpretation, it turned out that a serviceman in these countries was lower in social status than a shopkeeper, manufacturer, rentier. At the head of the military

departments of England and France "there were random people, little understanding." France "chila on laurels." Its army became after 1918 the strongest on the European continent. But military thought did not move forward, remaining at the level of the First World War. In the words of the Soviet leader, the French were "head spinning from victories, from complacency," as a result of which they "lost their allies."

It's different in Germany. In his speech on May 5, 1941, Stalin paid special attention to characterizing the positive changes that had taken place in the training and armament of the German army after the end of the First World War. In his opinion, the Germans critically reviewed the reasons for their defeat and found ways to better organize their own army, its training and armament. The military thought of the German army moved forward. The army was armed with the latest technology, trained in modern methods of warfare, and thereby acquired extensive combat experience. Stalin noted as an indisputable fact that at that time Germany had the best army both in technology and organization. The German leadership drew political

lessons from the Franco-Prussian War of 1870 and from the First World War of 1914-1918. In 1870, the Germans fought against France alone, having neutral Russia in the rear, and defeated the French. In 1914-1918. Germany had already had to fight on two fronts - in the west against England and France, and in the east against Russia, as a result of which the Germans were ultimately defeated. In 1939, starting the war, they "attracted Italy to their side" and "neutralized" the USSR with the help of the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact. Thus, Stalin summed up, the German leadership was politically well prepared for the Second World War. It entered this war "under the progressive slogan of the struggle against the oppression of Versailles", which made it possible to find sympathy from many Germans. It was under the anti-Versailles slogans, as Stalin noted, that "Hitler achieved a number of successes."

However, after enumerating the advantages of the military and political organization of the German army, the Soviet leader categorically stated that Germany was "on the rise" only up to a certain point. The task that he set in his speech on May 5, 1941, of course, was not limited to a simple enumeration of the advantages of the Wehrmacht and the shortcomings of its military opponents. The audience expected from Stalin an assessment of the further prospects of the world war, a clearer definition of the role of the Red Army in it.

And Stalin, in a sense, lived up to this kind of expectation. He pointedly stated that despite the undoubted successes achieved by Germany in combat operations, a "big struggle" lay ahead of her. This conclusion turned out to be closely linked in Stalin's speech with an attempt to answer the fundamental question of "the invincibility of the German army." The leader answered this question sharply in the negative. For him there was no doubt that "invincible armies" do not exist. Further, in his speech on May 5, 1941, Stalin described in detail the bleak prospects for Germany and the Wehrmacht for the further course of the war. His reasoning was as follows. The political situation has changed since 1939. Germany began the war under the progressive slogan, which aroused sympathy not only among the Germans, but also among other peoples, for liberation from the "chains of Versailles." However, in the spring of 1941 it had already gone over to military operations "under the flag of subduing other peoples", "under the flag of hegemony". The Germans, according to Stalin, "became conquerors." Now they acted under a new slogan: "lead Europe". However, he assured, the German army would not be successful in an aggressive war.

Soldiers and officers of the Wehrmacht found themselves among the conquered peoples, not meeting with their sympathy. The army, which must fight with hostile territories and populations under it and in its rear, is exposed to serious dangers, Stalin concluded. At this point in his speech, he allowed himself a historical digression, citing Napoleon I as an example. While the French commander waged a war for liberation from serfdom, he won, but when he became an enslaver, placing the conquered states on the thrones

his relatives and marshals, in response he received disobedience and numerous uprisings. Thus, as soon as Napoleon started a war to conquer and subjugate other peoples, his army began to suffer defeats, and he immediately found many enemies, which ultimately sealed the fall of the first French emperor. In the German army, Stalin assured the graduates of military academies, complacency began

to prevail, and it began to lag behind. The Germans appeared "dizzy from success", arrogance. It began to seem to German officers and soldiers that they could do anything, that their army was strong enough and, in general, there was no need to improve it further. However, according to Stalin, in terms of military growth, "the German army has lost the taste for further improvement of military equipment." Indeed, the leader reasoned, there is nothing special in the armament of the German army, and neither in tanks, nor in artillery, nor in aviation. "Now many armies have such weapons, including ours," Stalin argued to "military academicians."

Developing his thought, he insisted that the Red Army was armed with artillery and mortars, which not only were not inferior, but even surpassed the German artillery and mortars. As Stalin noted, the German tanks did indeed outnumber the Soviet tanks in mass. However, he explained the following: the designers of the USSR created the T-34 medium tank and the KV heavy tank, which surpassed similar German vehicles in their combat qualities. But the Soviet industry was only mastering the serial production of these tanks. Stalin noted with regret that "still few" were produced. The leader assured that everything possible was done to replace him in the shortest possible time.

the term of obsolete tanks with new

ones. Assessing the German combat aircraft, Stalin, according to some evidence, was forced to admit that so far it was she who was "the best in the world." According to other sources, he argued that the combat aircraft of the Soviet Air Force were "better than the German ones," and in general, Germany, in terms of aviation, began to overtake not only the USSR, but also America. In particular, the Soviet aircraft designers, according to him, at an accelerated pace created models of aircraft for various purposes, which surpassed the German ones.

Stalin stated: not only the USSR, but also England and the USA are studying the experience of the war, German military equipment, creating samples of artillery pieces, tanks and aircraft, superior in quality to German ones. Germany, in the opinion of the leader, stubbornly ignored these facts, continuing to believe that her army had excellent weapons and that no state was capable of creating more advanced military equipment. All of the above, according to Stalin, showed that the German

army was not
is invincible.

The Soviet leader added to his arguments the following conclusion: a significant part of the German army is losing its ardor, which was available at the beginning of the war. Boasting, self-satisfaction, arrogance allegedly penetrated its ranks. But in vain the Germans believe that their army is ideal, invincible. "There are no invincible armies," Stalin proclaimed once again.

Finishing his speech to the graduates of military academies, Stalin summed up his calculations regarding the reasons for Germany's victorious military operations in Europe. He clearly made it clear that one should not exaggerate the strength and power of the German army, which won victories mainly due to the military weakness and unpreparedness for war of its opponents, primarily France.

In conclusion, Stalin congratulated the graduates of the military academies and wished them success. At the end of the solemn part of the People's Commissar of Defense S.K. Tymoshenko invited everyone to the banquet. At the banquet, Stalin first proclaimed a toast to the leading cadres of the military academies. Then - for representatives of various branches of the armed forces: artillerymen, tankmen, pilots, signalmen, "glorious infantrymen".

This was followed by the key moment of the entire grandiose action that took place on the evening of May 5, 1941. Stalin asked for the floor after a toast proposed by the major general of the tank troops. This Stalinist remark was the quintessence of the leader's statements made at the graduation ceremony of the military academies in the Kremlin:

"Major General of Tank Troops is speaking. Proclaims a toast to the peaceful Stalinist foreign policy.

Tov. Stalin: Allow me to make an amendment. A peaceful policy ensured peace for our country. Peace politics is a good thing. For the time being we carried out a defensive line - until we re-equipped our army, supplied the army with modern means of struggle. And now, when we have reconstructed our army, saturated it with equipment for modern combat, when we have become strong, now we need to move from defense to offensive.

In defending our country, we must act offensively. From defense to move on to a military policy of offensive operations. We need to reorganize our education, our propaganda, agitation, our press in an offensive spirit. The Red Army is a modern army, and a modern army is an offensive army.

One feature of Stalin's speeches on May 5, 1941 is striking - an undisguised apology for the Red Army, combined with a scornfully critical assessment of the combat readiness and combat readiness of not only the British and French, but also those who won a number of victories in the military campaigns of 1939-1941. against the European countries of the Germans.

The thought may arise that Stalin's optimism about the combat readiness of the Red Army and its technical equipment was unfounded. However, if we try to look at this issue from a different propagandistic point of view, such a contradiction does not look so glaring. Later, in the second half of May 1941, Stalin, in a conversation with People's Commissar of Defense S.K. Timoshenko and Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army G.K. Zhukov emphasized that in his speeches at the celebrations in the Kremlin, firstly, he wanted to "cheer those present so that they think about victory," and, secondly, to refute the assertions "about the invincibility of the German army, which is trumpeted by newspapers all over the world." ra." [591] Based on this Stalinist explanation, it becomes clear why the leader devoted so much attention to proving his thesis about the Red Army as a modern army and why he so critically characterized the armed forces of Nazi Germany that won one victory after another. The above evidence concerning Stalin's assessment of the fighting qualities of the Wehrmacht on the eve of the German-Soviet war leads to the following reflections. Stalin, in his speech to the graduates of the military academies of the Red Army, clearly sought to hide his irritation (if not more) from the military victories of the German army. The anti-German orientation of Stalin's speech

on May 5, 1941, combined with the apology for the Red Army, left no doubt that the Wehrmacht would become the closest military adversary. The praise given by Stalin to a potential military adversary who managed to take into account the lessons of the defeat in the First World War, improve the armed forces and defeat France in 1940, in fact turned out to be only the basis for the critical assessments that followed. The leader even resorted to

manipulating his favorite thesis ("there are no invincible armies"). If in April 1940, at a meeting at the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, Stalin applied this thesis, characterizing the shortcomings of the Red Army, then in May 1941

already attributed it exclusively to the Wehrmacht.

In the pre-war period, the Soviet leader perfected the "ritual style" of his speeches. As a rule, they were no longer subject to discussion, but gave a signal for the next all-Union "study", were propagated and explained, anticipating a new political and ideological campaign. It is no coincidence that everything said by the leader on May 5, 1941 at a solemn meeting and at a reception (banquet) on the occasion of the graduation of students from military academies was a guide to actions for the closest Stalinist entourage.

6.2. Unfinished political and ideological campaign

Undoubtedly, Stalin's speeches to the graduates of military academies were the main "message from above", which served as a signal for the deployment of a political and ideological campaign under the slogan of an offensive war. However, this "message", as it happened before, was not the only one.

Declarations are often used to carry out political propaganda. Under the conditions of the Stalinist regime, declarations as a method of ideological influence primarily included statements, reports, and denials of the Telegraph Agency of the Soviet Union, which were periodically published in the central Soviet newspapers. In a speech to the party activists of Leningrad (November 1940) A.A. Zhdanov urged the audience to follow the nature and style of the so-called "TASS denials", which, in his opinion, made it possible to better judge the international position of the USSR. [592] Stalin himself not only decided which important reports of foreign news agencies received by TASS should be published, but often wrote their texts with his own hand.

This happened, for example, at the beginning of May 1941. On May 9, the central Soviet newspapers published a "TASS Refutation" concerning reports from foreign media about the concentration of large military formations of the Red Army on the western borders of the USSR. The "Refutation..." retold the information transmitted by the information agency Domei Tsushin (Japan) about the transfer of Soviet troops from the Far East and from Central Asia, about the transfer of 2,700 combat aircraft to the Kiev Special Military District, about the strengthening of the navies on the Black and Caspian Seas. [593] The text of this "Refutation ..." as the

compilers of the documentary collection "1941" assured, belonged to Stalin. They substantiated this conclusion by the presence of Stalin's mark: "t. Molotov. I think that such a refutation could be given. [594] Referring to the original of the mentioned document makes it possible to concretize the ideas about the circumstances of the compilation of the "TASS Refutation" dated May 9, 1941 and about Stalin's "contribution" to the writing of its text.

The TASS leadership, as was often the practice, sent Stalin "Office Release" No. 127/c with a summary of reports from foreign news agencies transmitted by TASS correspondents from abroad. One of these messages was titled "Domei-Tsushin on the concentration of Soviet troops on the western borders", indicating the place of departure (Tokyo) and dated May 7, 1941. Obviously, Stalin was interested in this information. The leader made handwritten corrections to the text. So, it was he who entered the epithet "suspiciously loud", referring to the message of Domei-Tsushin. The main idea of Stalin's edited paragraph "Refutations of TASS" was that the information given by Domei Tsushin was incorrect. On behalf of the Telegraph Agency of the USSR, it was asserted: there is no concentration of large military forces of the Soviet Union on its western borders and is not expected. [595]

Goebbels' diary entry dated May 9 recorded his reaction to the publication of this "Refutation ...": "Obviously, Stalin is still afraid. What is the difference between the TASS denials a few months ago, in which we (Germany. - **V.N.**) were frankly or implicitly insulted. This is how everything changes when uncovered muzzles of guns are directed at you. [596]

However, it can be reasonably assumed that the publication of the aforementioned "Refutation ..." was an integral part of the political propaganda campaign unfolding in the USSR. Its content (information about the transfer of rifle units and combat aircraft from East to West), despite the sharp disagreement with such statements, was most likely intended to demonstrate

tell the Nazi leadership that Stalin and his entourage are preparing for an armed confrontation with Germany.

As emphasized by O.V. Vishlev and M.A. Gareev, the TASS refutation of May 9, 1941 coincided not by chance with the transfer of Soviet reserve armies from the depths of the territory of the USSR to the west. The latter was not even disguised, but was, as it were, deliberately demonstrated by this refutation, being by its nature more of a political than a military action with the aim of exerting a restraining influence on Germany's military preparations. [597] Concrete evidence can be cited to support this conclusion. For example, on the day the TASS Denial was published, by order of the Chief of Staff of the Odessa Military District, Major General M.V. Zakharov's weapons, military equipment and property of the NZ were transferred to a state "ready for immediate use." [598] At the same time, having read the text of the "Refutation...", the Red Army soldiers stationed on the border with the allied Germany, Romania, expressed their bewilderment. The "clarification" on this score by one of the political officers is noteworthy: "All these statements (meaning the aforementioned "Refutation of TASS" - **V.N.**) and pacts (i.e., agreements with Germany of August 23 and September 28, 1939 - **VN**) are written for civilians, but we must understand that we were not sent here for pancakes. We know who our enemy is, and we will fulfill with honor any task set before us by the party. [599]

As already mentioned, in the "TASS Refutation" dated May 9, 1941, it was stated that there were no transfers of Soviet troops from the Far East to the western borders of the USSR. However, the organs of the NKVD repeatedly recorded the "unhealthy statements" of servicemen in this regard, which suggest the truth of the message of the Japanese agency Domei-Tsushin in this regard, rather than Tass (or rather, Stalin's) denials. Thus, among such statements dated May 12-13, there are the following considerations of Lieutenant Dashevich from the 75th Infantry Division of the Western Special Military District, moving towards the border: "The Soviet government is engaged in deception and refutes reality." On May 20, the NKVD authorities recorded the statement of a dental technician from one of the Toshman military hospitals, who directly stated: "War with Germany will be necessary. Mobilization is currently taking place in the USSR. A large batch of pre-conscripts was sent from Rovno. In addition, a lot of troops are being transferred from the Far East Territory (DVK) to the West ... Now it is clear what was in the Japanese newspaper (we are talking about the message of the Domei-Tsushin agency. - V.N.), is entirely **true**. The military doctor Dvornikov echoed him: "Although the government is engaged in denials, you yourself must understand that there will be a war. Today I myself received a replenishment from the DVK." Finally, the Red Army soldier Voronkov, referring to the "TASS Refutation" of May 9, 1941, declared that it "does not correspond to reality." Voronkov testified that the military units "arrive from the Far East, the high command is moving in and, presumably, there will be a war in the near future." [600]

Stalin's speeches at the graduation of students of the military academies of the Red Army and the subsequent publication of the TASS Denial of May 9, 1941, the text of which was written by Stalin, played an important role in the unfolding political and ideological campaign. Their logical development was the publication in the central printed organ of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, the journal Bolshevik, of Stalin's work "On Engels' article 'The Foreign Policy of Russian Tsarism' ". Stalin's intention to carry out this publication in the secretariat of the Central Committee became known from a note dated May 13, 1941, by P.N. Pospelov, addressed to A.A. Zhdanov. [601] Back in

1934, Stalin sent a letter to the members of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks with his own assessment of the article "Foreign Policy of Russian Tsarism" and the text of this article itself. With particular pathos, Stalin emphasized in his letter the "error" expressed by Engels at the end of the 19th century. thoughts about the desirability of Russia's defeat in the coming armed clash with Germany.

But the Bolshevik leader in 1934 did not express a desire to publish the named work in the journal of the Bolshevik Party.

The publication of Stalin's letter with an assessment of Engels's article "On the foreign policy of Russian tsarism" in May 1941 is considered in the latest historiography as evidence that the Soviet leader, "albeit in a relatively closed form," indicated the need for further strengthening "new core in ideology. Thus, the functionaries involved in ideological propaganda (representatives of the party and state apparatus, propagandists, historians and writers), who consciously or intuitively "bet" on great power and patriotism, made an unmistakable choice. Ultimately, the publication of Stalin's text was supposed to show that the class-internationalist principle in Bolshevik propaganda began to give way to the "state-patriotic" approach. [602] It seems that in the specific historical situation of May 1941, Stalin's critical remarks

on Engels's article on the foreign policy of prerevolutionary Russia, published in the leading press organ of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, were probably presented just in time. They acquired particular relevance in the conditions of the beginning propaganda campaign, which had an anti-German orientation.

Thus, Stalin's oral speeches to graduates of military academies, the publications inspired by him ("TASS refutation" of May 9 and a letter regarding Engels's article "Foreign policy of Russian tsarism") can be regarded as "messages from above", which served as a signal for the deployment of political-ideological campaign under the slogan of offensive war. This signal, of course, was taken as a guide to action by people from Stalin's inner circle, who headed the propaganda structures of the country. First of all, the thoughts and ideas expressed by Stalin in speeches at a reception in the Kremlin on May 5, 1941 were taken into service. This could not but affect the change in the nature of military propaganda.

On May 13, the Film Committee gathered members of its Defense Commission, created after the aforementioned meeting of A.I. Zaporozhets with writers and directors, which took place in March 1941. What was said at this meeting can be judged, in particular, on the basis of a brief recording of V.V. Vishnevsky. Describing the created situation, A.I. The Zaporozhets declared: "Things are clearly heading towards a new war." [603] It is noteworthy that this phrase, but in a slightly modified form, as indicated, was also heard in Stalin's speech on May 5, 1941. This fact, as well as the fact that Vishnevsky made a note on May 13 with a summary of Stalin's speech to the graduates military academies, suggests that it was at a meeting in the Kinokomite that he became aware (it is possible that from the head of the GUPPKA) the content of this speech. The meeting discussed the annual plan for the creation of military-themed films for the People's Commissariat of Defense and the People's Commissariat of the Navy, and also discussed the organization of operational film crews (writer-screenwriter, director, cameraman; there are names of E.L. Dzigan, R.L. Carmen, M.S. Donskoy, E.I. Shub, D. Vertov). [604] Received from A.I. Zaporozhets instructions were laid by V.V. Vishnevsky as the basis of his note on mobilization measures in cinematography and on the plan for the release of defense films in 1941-1942, dated May 14, 1941 and addressed to the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks. Vishnevsky emphasized that no attention is paid to the creation of a defense, mobilization organization in cinematography (the cadres of cinematographers for the army and navy are not taken into account, there are no sufficiently cohesive creative teams that could immediately start working in combat conditions, appropriate filming equipment has not been developed that meets front-line conditions, the experience accumulated in the creation of military newsreels by E. K. Tisse, R. L. Karmen and other documentary filmmakers has not been generalized and not brought to all Soviet cameramen and filmmakers).

Further, the note concluded: "The most urgent measures are needed to put the entire film industry in order from the point of view of mobilization." V.V. Vishnevsky under-

he listed in detail the measures that, in his opinion, should have been immediately taken for the comprehensive preparation of the cinema for the coming war: mobilization registration of film workers in Moscow and other large cities; creation of operational film crews consisting of: writer, director, cameraman; familiarization with the available stock of military films; showing possible areas of future armed struggle; the creation of films about the Red Army and the Navy, about individual branches of the military, etc., etc. Vishnevsky also dwelled in detail on the issue of film coverage of the image of the enemy in the coming war. "In the experienced, skillful hands of writers and directors-editors," he emphasized in his note to the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, "film-library materials will turn into agitation-sharp war films." Vishnevsky, in particular, suggested: "A number of German and other films ... need to be re-edited and brought down on the heads of opponents with a new, Bolshevik text." Among those German chronicle-documentary films that could be "processed" for propaganda purposes, Vishnevsky named the films "Campaign to Poland" and "The Siegfried Line" received in 1940 from Germany, filmed by front-line cameramen of the Wehrmacht.

He also considered it necessary to use the experience of "creative task forces" (writer, director, cameraman) who filmed materials about the offensive actions of the Red Army units to break through the "Mannerheim Line" in Finland. As already noted, V.V. Vishnevsky at first was critical of the newsreel "The Mannerheim Line". Meanwhile, this film was awarded the Stalin Prize, and the writer, in his memorandum to the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks dated May 14, 1941, already spoke positively about it.

Vishnevsky determined the themes of "full-length scenarios about the future war" for screening in 1941-1942. Among them: "Breaking through the fortified area near the German border", "Paratroop landing in action against them (fortified areas. - **V.N.)**", "Raids of tanks and cavalry in cooperation with aviation." [605] It is clear even to a person who is far from military affairs that such topics were by no means intended for propagandistic support of the **defensive** operations of the Red Army in the coming war.

V.V. Vishnevsky made the following characteristic notes for memory during the meeting on May 13, 1941: "Enemy ... Dict[orsky] text + additional filming and done", "The picture is about the breakthrough of the German (Yetsky) Ur-on (fortified area. - **V. N.)**", [606], relying on which, it can be assumed that the ideas of using the available German documentary films for propaganda purposes and writing a script about the assault on the German border fortifications did not belong to Vishnevsky himself, but were outlined by the head of the GUPPKA.

The production of V.V. Vishnevsky, the last of the named topics, which was proposed for film adaptation along with another: "Forcing the rivers (San, Vistula, etc.)". [607] As is known, it was at this time that the General Staff of the Red Army was completing the development of "Considerations on the plan for the strategic deployment of the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union in the event of a war with Germany and its allies" (dated no earlier than May 15, 1941). The Considerations, in particular, proposed a preemptive strike against German troops deployed near the western borders of the USSR. The ultimate strategic goal of the actions of the Red Army was the defeat of the enemy and the capture of the "territory of the former Poland." [608] In the course of the implementation of her plan, she inevitably had, firstly, to break through the German border fortifications, and secondly, to force the rivers San and Vistula, located on the former Polish territory, which was ceded to Germany in accordance with the Treaty of Friendship and Border of September 28 1939 Apparently, the members of the Defense Commission of the Film Committee were informed to some extent about such strategic developments. Otherwise, it is not clear where V.V. Vishnevsky, who stood at the origins of the creation of this commission, the idea of creating "feature films" about the assault by the Red Army of the fortified area of the German border and overcoming the named water barriers could have arisen. In his aforementioned note to the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks dated May 14, 1941, there is a noteworthy recommendation: a plan for

no films of military subjects for 1941-1942. it was necessary to build "with full consideration of all the wishes and requirements" of the defense people's commissariats, in the first place - NGOs. [609] In any case, the possibility of coincidence of the plans of the General Staff of the Red Army, the most important body of the People's Commissariat of Defense, and the creative plans of the writer

V.V. Vishnevsky seems unrealistic. In addition to Vishnevsky, the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks was also approached with proposals to strengthen "mobilization readiness" by the creators of the film "The Mannerheim Line", the Stalinist laureates of 1941, cameramen S. Ya. Kogan and V. S. Yeshurin. They sent a letter addressed to A. A. Zhdanov. The letter is not dated, but it can be assumed that it refers to the period after June 5, 1941. On that day, M.I. Kalinin, speaking to graduates of the Military-Political Academy. IN AND. Lenin, said: "We don't know when we will fight: tomorrow or the day after tomorrow, and under such conditions we need to be ready today." [610] The said letter contains a paraphrase of Kalinin's statement: "We don't know when we will fight, maybe tomorrow, and it seems to us that today we should be fully prepared for all sorts of surprises."

S.Ya. Kogan and V.S. Yeshurin was offered to organize a brigade of newsreelers who already had combat experience and put them on military records. The members of this brigade would have to undergo military training, to adapt film equipment "for possible work in the war." The authors of the letter addressed to A.A. Zhdanov believed that the situation with the production of "defense paintings" was very bad. Training of operators in case of war, according to S.Ya. Kogan and V.S. Yeshurina, was carried out only in words. They made a request to A.A. Zhdanov to get things off the ground, because neither the newsreel studio, nor the Film Committee, nor other authorities they applied to, responded to their proposals.

Zhdanov wrote on a letter from Kogan and Yeshurin: "This is an old question about a military brigade of cameramen. Ask Bolshakov and Zaporozhets why the matter with the organization dragged on. It was decided to instruct the representatives of the Propaganda Department D.A. Poli Karpov and T.S. Zueva (head of the department of cultural and educational institutions), head of the GUPPKA A.I. Zaporozhets, as well as the chairman of the Cinematography Committee under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR I.G. Bolshakov to consider the substance raised in the

letter by S.Ya. Kogan and V.S. Yeshurin problem. [611] On May 14, 1941, a meeting of the Main Military Council was held, at which, among other things, the most important question of restructuring military propaganda was considered. The GVS meeting on May 14 was attended by: Secretaries of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks A.A. Zhdanov and G.M. Malenkov, People's Commissar of Defense S.K. Timoshenko, Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army G.K. Zhukov, representatives of the military department S.M. Budyonny, K.A. Meretskov, G.I. Kulik, B.M. Shaposhnikov, V.D. Sokolovsky. The first item on the agenda was worded as follows: "Results of the inspection of political studies in the units of the Red Army." A report on this issue was made by the head of the Main Directorate of Political Propaganda of the Red Army A.I. Zaporozhets. He summed up the results of the inspection of party political work with the personnel of the Red Army.

Representatives of GUPPKA F.F. were invited to the meeting. Kuznetsov and M.G. Gurevich. [612] Speaker in the debate on the report of G.M. Malenkov urged in all political propaganda work to take into account the "instructions of Comrade Stalin" at the graduation of military academies. "We are talking about a serious restructuring of propaganda in the Red Army," Malenkov emphasized. He was echoed by A.A. Zhdanov: "It is necessary to restructure military propaganda, educational work in the Red Army." [613] In general, as a result of the discussion of the report of A.I. Zaporozhets, he was instructed, taking into account the exchange of views, "to develop and submit to the next meeting of the Main Military Council proposals and a draft directive", in which to place the main

In May 1941, on the basis of Stalin's instructions, "voiced" in a speech to graduates of the military academies of the Red Army, several directive and instructional materials were prepared. May 26 A.I. Zaporozhets appealed to the secretaries of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b)

A.A. Zhdanov and A.S. Shcherbakov, as well as to the head of the UPA G.F. Alexandrov. Zaporozhets reported that the GUPPKA had drawn up "a draft section on the tasks of political propaganda in the Red Army, arising from the speech of Comrade STALIN on May 5 of this year, for a general directive prepared by the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks." On a copy sent to A.A. Zhdanov, there is a handwritten signature of the Secretary of the Central Committee, made in pencil. It can be concluded that he personally familiarized himself with the presented version of the text of the directive. [615] This project, entitled "The Tasks of Political Propaganda in the Red Army", consisted of three parts. The first part - the preamble - formulated the main tasks of the political agencies and party organizations of the Red Army, as well as directly the GUPPKA in the context of Stalin's instructions of May 5, 1941. The second part of the draft directive was entitled: composition of the Red Army. Finally, the third part contained the topics of classes with Red Army men and junior commanders for the summer period of 1941. The draft directive was accompanied by a list of feature films that were recommended for demonstration in the Red Army and were intended only for military personnel. [616] In an accompanying note addressed to A.A. Zhdanov and A.S. Shcherbakov, A.I. Zaporozhets additionally reported that the GUPPKA, on the basis of Stalin's instructions, "has prepared new directives: a) the immediate tasks of party political work in the Red Army; b) about political studies with the Red Army men and junior commanders for the summer period of 1941; c) on the Marxist-Leninist education of the commanding staff of the Red Army. [617]

On May 27, Zaporozhets sent Zhdanov a draft of the third of these directives. The head of the GUPPKA again reminded that the document was drawn up "on the basis of the instructions of Comrade STALIN, given by him at the graduation of students of the Red Army academies on May 5 of this year." He also requested permission to issue this directive "for leadership in the Red Army." [618] Request by A.I. Zaporozhets seems very remarkable. After all, on March 3, the directive of the GUPPKA approved by him "On the Marxist-Leninist studies of the commanding staff of the Red Army in 1941" was signed for publication, and then published as a separate brochure. [619] A legitimate question may arise: why was it necessary to reprint a policy document that has just come out of print? A similar question concerns the approved by A.I. Zaporozhets of directive No. 12 of January 20, 1941. [620] The answer to both questions is obvious: after May 5, 1941, the content of both directive materials, although they had already gone to the troops, did not meet the Stalinist task of restructuring military propaganda in an offensive spirit. Therefore, Zaporozhets (as he repeatedly emphasized, on the instructions of Stalin) drew up new directives, although their names remained the same.

them.

In addition, on May 26, 1941, the head of the Main Directorate of Political Propaganda of the Red Army sent A.A. Zhdanov, A.S. Shcherbakov and G.F. Aleksandrov the text of the report "Modern International Situation and Foreign Policy of the USSR". The text was prepared by the GUPPKA lecture group. A.I. Zaporozhets asked to be allowed to organize "lectures and reports for the personnel of the Red Army in closed classrooms" on the basis of this material. [621]

As early as April 25, 1941, the Organizing Bureau of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks decided to create a commission for the revision of instructions for army and navy party organizations. [622] The task of implementing this resolution was entrusted mainly to the GUPPKA. [623] May 28, 1941 A.I. Zaporozhets sent A.S. Shcherbakov's note "On the changes made to the draft new instruction to the Organizations of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks in the Red Army in comparison with the instruction approved by the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks in March 1934." First of all, the document emphasized that the old instruction was drawn up on the basis of the Party Rules adopted at the 17th Congress, and took into account the peculiarities of party work in peacetime and, conversely, did not at all affect the specifics of wartime. Further Zaporozhets

announced that a new draft "Instructions to the organizations of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks in the Red Army" would be submitted for approval by the Orgburo. It raises questions of organizational-party work, proceeding from the Party Charter adopted at the 18th Congress. In addition, the new instructions regulated the specifics of this work both in peacetime and in wartime. It took into account the changes that had taken place "in the life of the Red Army" since 1934: a) the implementation of unity of command; b) the experience of the Soviet-Finnish war. By this time, the Military Publishing House of the People's Commissariat of Defense had already submitted the second layout of the brochure with the text of the revised "Instructions for the organizations of the All-Union

Communist Party of Bolsheviks in the Red Army." [624] The versions of these documents were preliminarily revised by the commission of the Orgburo. In the text of the second layout of the "Instructions to the organizations of the CPSU (b) in the Red Army", which had the imprint of the Military Publishing House of the People's Commissariat of Defense and the date - 1941, in particular, it was emphasized: "Party organizations of the Red Army educate all personnel ... in the spirit boundless devotion to the Motherland, in the spirit of irreconcilable hatred for the enemies of the Soviet Union, in the spirit of constant readiness to wage an offensive war with the aim of completely destroying the enemy and achieving complete victory. A similar wording was also found in the draft "Instructions for organizations of the CPSU (b) in the Navy", which went out of print on May 22, 1941.

On June 3, 1941, the Orgburo, having considered the presented versions of both instructions, decided to instruct the commission set up to draw them up to introduce the amendments made at the meeting and again submit them for discussion. [625]

The structural subdivisions of the GUPPKA did not remain idle either. In the first half of May 1941, the head of the 7th department, M.I. Burtsev was summoned to the people's commissar of defense, where the reports of the department's employees on neighboring countries and armies were heard. Burtsev was especially worried about the information of senior instructors on Germany and its allies in Europe, since they did not have sufficient detailed data on the moral and political state of the Wehrmacht. A.I. Zaporozhets, referring to the decision of the extended meeting of the Main Military Council of May 14, 1941, explained M.I. Burtsev that the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks demanded to intensify work on educating personnel in the spirit of high combat readiness. In this regard, the head of the GUPPKA formulated a specific task for the leadership of the 7th department - "to prepare a report on Germany and the Wehrmacht as soon as possible." A.I. Zaporozhets hurried M.I. Burtsev, who subsequently admitted that there was no time left to obtain reliable data on the topic of the report or to refute the controversial provisions. [626]

All information about the political and moral state of the Wehrmacht was prepared by N.N. Bernikov, in the past - a graduate student of the Leningrad State University. He did not have the opportunity for deep generalizations, since he relied on a report received back in 1940 from the Intelligence Directorate of the Baltic Special Military District. This report, in turn, was based on surveys of Lithuanian refugees from the city of Memel (Klaipeda) occupied by the Germans in 1939. By the end of May 1941, an overview of the political and moral state of the German army was presented to the head of the 7th department of the GUPPKA. The text of the report was 140 handwritten pages). [627] In most of the materials listed above, with varying degrees of frankness,

Stalin's call for the need to restructure propaganda in an offensive spirit was formulated. Thus, in the draft section of the general directive of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, prepared under the leadership of A.I. relying on its increased political, economic and military power, conducts an offensive foreign policy. Therefore, it was necessary to educate the Red Army soldiers and commanders "in a militant and offensive spirit, in the spirit of the inevitability of a clash between the Soviet Union and the capitalist

talistic world ... ". [628] Similarly, the text of the report of the lecture group of the GUPPKA "Modern International Situation and Foreign Policy of the USSR" stated: "Particular attention should be paid to cultivating an offensive spirit among the fighters." [629] The draft directives of the GUPPKA "On political studies with the

Red Army men and junior commanders for the summer period of 1941" and "On the Marxist-Leninist education of the commanding staff of the Red Army" (second half of May 1941) provided explanations about the fact what connection exists between the concepts of "just" and "offensive" war. In the first of the above-mentioned drafts, overly ponderous formulations were chosen: "The following interpretation is sometimes given about just and unjust wars: if a country is the first to attack another and wage an offensive war, then this war is considered unjust, and vice versa, if a country has been attacked and only defends itself. , then such a war should supposedly be considered just. From this it is concluded that the Red Army will supposedly wage only a defensive war, forgetting the truth that any war waged by the Soviet Union will be a just war. [630] Criticized "the view held by some commanders of any offensive war as an unjust war", which, as emphasized in the document, led to the denial of the very "possibility of initiating military operations by the Red Army in the state interests of the Soviet Union".

From the beginning of June 1941, active work began to bring the level of the texts of the main directive documents, which reflected the essence of the propaganda support of the "slogan of offensive war". In the draft

directive of the GUPPKA "On the Tasks of Political Propaganda in the Near Future", the idea of the need for a comprehensive education of the personnel of the Red Army in the spirit of preparation for an "all-destroying offensive war" and the restructuring of all propaganda work for this purpose was formulated quite unambiguously. As noted in the document, in the international situation, in the life of the Soviet Union and the Red Army "recently" there have been significant changes that must be taken into account in all propaganda work.

In the field of foreign policy, these changes were expressed, according to the drafters of the document, in the following: the expansion of hostilities into the Balkan countries, the Middle East and Africa, the change by Germany of the slogans of "liberation from the chains of Versailles" to aggressive, economic difficulties of the belligerent powers and a sharp decline in living standards " working people of the entire capitalist world.

In the life of the Soviet Union, such positive phenomena were noted as "the steady growth of political, economic and military power", "brilliant successes in foreign policy", which made it possible, in particular, to annex Western Ukraine and Western Belarus, as a result of which "the capitalist world had to make room and retreat." In

the life of the Red Army, the compilers of the GUPPKA directive noted, proceeding, naturally, from Stalin's instructions of May 5, 1941, the completion of perestroika and methods of training and education of troops based on the experience of modern wars, rearmament based on the latest military equipment, an increase in the role and power tank and motorized divisions, the growth of political consciousness, discipline, ideological cohesion
ness.

The aforementioned directive concluded that the new conditions in which the USSR lives, the "fraught with surprises" international situation, and finally, the tasks set by the Bolshevik Party and the Soviet government for the Red Army require "a decisive turn in propaganda work, the Bolshevik education of personnel in the spirit of fiery Soviet patriotism, revolutionary determination and constant readiness to go on a crushing offensive against the enemy.

However, as emphasized in the draft directive, all these changes in the international arena, within the country and in the Red Army were not properly reflected in propaganda and agitation. For the umpteenth time, it was pointed out that there were "pacifist sentiments" and that the propaganda was of a "peaceful nature." Proceeding, probably, from the decision of the GVS of May 14, 1941, the authors of the draft directive of the GUPPKA pointed out that the propagandists "stopped criticizing the hostile fascist ideology" and denounced "the reactionary policy of German imperialism aimed at subjugating and enslaving other peoples." Moreover, they did not expose "the existing misconceptions about the German army as allegedly invincible."

The listed shortcomings in propaganda work, as emphasized in the document, are capable of "weakening the political and moral strength, lowering the combat activity, the militant, offensive spirit of the Red Army." In this regard, the draft directive of the State Unitary Enterprise PKA "On the tasks of political propaganda in the Red Army in the near future" proposed to raise propaganda work to the level of the "tasks of all peace and historical significance" facing the Red Army. All forms of propaganda, agitation and education needed to be "directed towards a single goal - the political, moral and combat training of personnel for the conduct of a just, offensive and all-destroying war."

It was further explained that the increased political, economic and military power of the USSR allows it to carry out an "offensive foreign policy, resolutely eliminating the hotbeds of war near its borders, expanding its territories." This offensive policy was expressed, as emphasized in the directive, in the annexation of Western Ukraine, Western Belarus, in the war with Finland.

From all of the above, a logical conclusion was drawn: since the strength of the USSR is constantly growing, the Red Army and the Soviet people, while defending it, "are obliged to act in an offensive manner, to move from defense, when circumstances so require, to a military policy of offensive operations." Further, in the draft

directive, the main provisions of Stalin's speech of May 5, 1941, concerning the reasons for the success of Germany and the defeat of France in the Second World War, were recounted. The same propositions formed the basis for explanations of how the "myth of the invincibility of the German army" should be debunked. In addition to Stalin's conclusions about "complacency", "arrogance", "dizziness from success" that the Wehrmacht allegedly suffered, much attention was paid to proving the presence of "serious economic difficulties" in the Third Reich in connection with the protracted war. It was pointed out that the German army is a great force, which is difficult to deny. But, as the drafters of the GUPPKA directive emphasized, as the fighting drags on, "Germany's military power is weakening." [631]

These and other similar characteristics of the Wehrmacht set them up for underestimating the strength of a potential enemy. Lectures and reports that were read to the personnel of the Red Army were sometimes carried out "on high" optimistic notes. One of the most common anecdotes used by speakers was the following. Molotov asked Ribbentrop why the Germans deployed an army of 2 million people near the border, to which the latter replied: "We brought our troops here to rest." In response to a similar question from the German Foreign Minister, his Soviet "colleague" tirade followed: the Red Army concentrated 2.5 million people near the western borders in order to "ensure rest" for the German troops. However, few people openly spoke at lectures and reports in May - June 1941, what a powerful military force Germany had and what first-class military equipment it was equipped with. Hence - ignorance of the whole truth about a potential adversary, a poor idea of the extent of the danger. The "traditional" point of view prevailed: "we will quickly deal with the aggressors and wage war on their territory." [632]

To explain the foundations of the domestic and foreign policy of the USSR, the problems of the Second World War, it was planned to use political studies with Red Army soldiers and juniors.

mi commanders, the Marxist-Leninist study of the commanding staff, the study of neighboring countries, reports, lectures, mass work and the Red Army press. The army newspapers should have been "made militant". The task of the army press included, as emphasized in the draft directive of the GUPPKA "On the tasks of political propaganda in the Red Army in the near future", not only training in military technology, but also the political education of Red Army soldiers and commanders. All political workers, commanders, party organizations, it was concluded in this important document, were to "lead the turn in propaganda and ensure the implementation" of this directive "not in words, but in deeds." [633]

As the available factual materials show, by the beginning of the war with Germany, real steps were taken to implement these directives of the GUPPKA. May 27, 1941 at the request of A.I. Zaporozhets The Secretariat of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks decided to increase the circulation of newspapers in seven military districts by 72,000 copies. In addition, four newly formed armies received their army newspapers, the total circulation of which reached 40,000 copies. Calculations show that, thanks to this decision, in the western military districts (Pribaltic, Kiev, Western Special, Odessa and Leningrad) the total circulation of Red Army newspapers increased from June 1, 1941, from 265,000 to 350,000 copies. [634] At the end of May 1941, in the Oryol Military District, probably based on the instructions of the draft directive of the GUPPKA "On the tasks of political propaganda in the Red Army in the near future", at the end of May 1941, "modern offensive combat in conditions as close as possible to the actual combat situation. The commander of the district troops, Lieutenant General F.N. Remezov gave army journalists the task of describing the actions of the participants in the exercises in such a way that they could emphasize all the innovations made to the combat training of the troops. They, in turn, studied in detail and directly the actions of the fighters in order to "use the knowledge gained in practical

newspaper work." June 2, 1941 V.V. Vishnevsky noted in his diary that, along with the concentration of Red Army troops, preparations were underway for "corresponding" (anti-fascist) literature. Anti-fascist films appeared in the units of the Red Army, the list of which, as already indicated, was approved by the GUPPKA ("Professor Mamlock", "The Oppenheim Family", etc.). [635] The political agencies of the Red Army paid constant attention to the cinema as an important means of propaganda. The plan for the demonstration of films in formations and units was approved by the head of the political propaganda department of the district (army) or his deputy. Inside the formation, he was endorsed by the head of the propaganda department or his deputy. [636] If at the beginning of June 1941, as V.V. Vishnevsky, in the presence of such careful control on the part of the command, previously banned anti-fascist films began to be shown in the troops, then most likely this followed from the instructions "from above". Consequently, the draft propaganda directives of the GUPPKA, which were still being worked on, began to be put into practice.

The following facts can also serve as a clear example of confirmation of their implementation. Two weeks before the start of the war, the head of the 7th department of the GUPPKA M.I. Burtsev arrived in Lutsk, where the headquarters of one of the strongest covering armies of the Kyiv Special Military District, the 5th Army, under the command of Major General of the Tank Forces M.I. Potapov. It is noteworthy that Potapov, who had at his disposal not only two mechanized, two rifle corps and two aviation divisions, relied on fortified areas (URs): Kovel'sky, Vladimir-Volyn'sky and Strumilov'sky. But the commander of the 5th Army on the eve of the war considered the URs not as a means that could be used for stubborn defense, but as a kind of springboard for a swift attack on the enemy. [637]

M.I. Burtsev arrived in Lutsk to assist the army political propaganda department in developing an "emergency plan." [638] The document drawn up in accordance with his instructions was called

"Plan for the political support of military operations during the offensive." It was signed by the head of the political propaganda department of the 5th army. Undoubtedly, based on the instructions of the emissary from Moscow (most likely, on the basis of leading directive materials, in particular, reports on the moral and political state in Germany and the German army), the "Plan for the political support of military operations during the offensive" spoke of the presence of "the first signs of a decline in morale" of the Wehrmacht, which will intensify and deepen after a strong, lightning strike is applied to it. The document proposed to conduct military operations on the territory of the enemy "in a situation favorable for the Red Army", when the support of the local (Polish) population was expected, as well as "the resistance of the German soldiers to the war and Hitler's policy". [639]

It was pointed out above that the draft directive of the GUPPKA "On the Tasks of Political Propaganda in the Red Army for the Near Future" planned to decisively put an end to the underestimation of criticism of the "hostile fascist ideology", "the reactionary policy of German imperialism". It was these moments that drew the attention of A.I. Zaporozhets, when he called for a conversation with a group of leading political workers. Among them was a member of the military council of the 16th Army A.A. Lobachev, who arrived in Moscow on June 10. According to Lobachev's memoirs, the head of the GUPPKA declared that they would have to work in the troops in a new situation, and orally acquainted the invitees with the directive on strengthening political propaganda and, in particular, "on the need to expose the reactionary

essence of fascism." [640] Similar instructions were received by A.A. Azarov. In the first half of June in Moscow, they received an order from the head of the Main Directorate of the Navy, Army Commissar 2nd Rank I.V. Rogov "to strengthen in oral propaganda the exposure of the aggressive actions of German fascism, to orient the personnel to increase vigilance and combat readiness." [641]

Thus, even in the process of being finalized, the draft directive of the GUPPKA "On the tasks of political propaganda in the Red Army in the near future" was brought orally to the responsible political workers at the army level.

Anti-fascist formulations and the idea of an offensive war were set forth in the propaganda documents of the GUPPKA at times so frankly that they even provoked comments from the leadership of the UPA of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks. G.F. Alexandrov, who read the text of the above-mentioned report "The Current International Situation and Foreign Policy of the USSR," found in it formulations from which it followed that the Wehrmacht was the most likely enemy of the Red Army. Noting that Germany had not yet met a worthy opponent, the drafters of the report argued: "Meanwhile, such a clash is not far off." G.F. Alexandrov remarked on this occasion in the margins of the document: "Such a wording must by no means be allowed. That would mean showing the cards to the enemy." The experience of military operations, later in the said document, showed that a defensive strategy against superior motorized units did not give any success. From this the conclusion followed: against Germany it was necessary to apply "an offensive strategy backed up by powerful technology." In the margins by the hand of G.F. Alexandrov in this place was made a meaningful note: "War with Germany." [642]

Thus, in May - June 1941 there was an active development of propaganda directive and instructive materials, which were aimed at implementing Stalin's instructions given in a speech to graduates of military academies.

German agents could not fail to notice how far this activity had gone. According to her, propaganda work in the units of the Red Army on the eve of June 22, 1941 was reduced to proving the following provisions: after hostilities were transferred to the territory of the enemy, an offensive would be launched in the West in order to liberate the countries of Europe from the German yoke, which in turn should stimulate the revolution -

revolutionary process and lead to the deliverance of the European peoples from the oppression of their own bourgeoisie. [643]

On May 22, 1941, a report was received from the headquarters of the 17th German Army that political workers assigned to the Red Army spoke of the inevitability of war between the USSR and Germany. After the conclusion of the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact, anti-fascist propaganda was officially banned, but it existed "in disguise", and from May 1941 it again began to be conducted openly among the troops. [644] On June 13, 1941, the intelligence report of the General Staff of the Wehrmacht High Command stated that during political studies and lectures, the personnel of the Red Army were "preparing for the possibility of war" against the Third Reich. [645] On May 21, 1941, an article by regimental commissar I. Bakanov was published in

the Komsomolskaya Pravda newspaper under the heading "Consultation". [646] It encouraged the all-round development of the qualities necessary in extreme military conditions. Bakanov was not a novice in covering topics related to the "Leninist-Stalinist doctrine of war." His publications appeared, for example, on the pages of the magazine Propagandist and Agitator of the Red Army. [647] The mentioned article by I. Bakanov began with the traditional statement: according to the Leninist-Stalinist doctrine, it is not the side that wages

an unjust war that attacked first, but the one that "is the representative of reaction, counter-revolution, imperialism." "Every revolutionary war is a just war," concluded the regimental commissar. Further, referring to V.M. Molotov, the author of the publication emphasized the need to "strengthen even more persistently the power of the defense of our state and the combative *offensive character* (italics mine. - *V.N.*) of the Soviet people." The first and most important preliminary result of the "imperialist war" for the USSR was, in the words of I. Bakanov, that "militarily" one should not yield to one's opponents. "The Red Army," he stressed, "should be the strongest army in the world. The current international situation obliges us to seriously, day by day, prepare for war. Further, I. Bakanov referred to that part of Stalin's speech to the graduates of military academies on May 5, 1941, which spoke of the completion of the process of perestroika and rearmament of the Red Army. The regimental commissar spoke out against the "pacifist sentiments" which were supposedly imposed on the people by "certain agitators".

The very next day after the publication of I. Bakanov's publication "Lenin-Stalin's Teachings on War", on May 23, 1941, information was received from London via TASS under the heading "Reuters about the article in Komsomolskaya Pravda". The Moscow correspondent of Reuters reported that the active training of pre-conscripts, who "are already good pilots or good shooters," and other facts testify to the preparation of the USSR for war. It also cited extensive passages from I. Bakanov's article about the need to prepare for it on a daily basis, eradicating manifestations of pacifism, fighting everything that hinders the strengthening of the defense capability of the USSR. The next "shuffle", received from the English capital, had the heading "Morning Post" about Bakanov's article. This report contained excerpts from the publication of the Daily Telegraph and Morning Post, which also presented the content of the material published in Komsomolskaya Pravda on May 21. The Moscow correspondent of the British newspaper emphasized that in the article by I. Bakanov England and its allies were no longer called "warmongers", and regarded this "as a significant change in Soviet policy" and in party propaganda, contributing to the "strengthening of the Soviet national feeling" in a period when the USSR is out of the war, but must "look the danger in the face." Obviously, the strong resonance that I. Bakanov's article, which was distinguished by unusually frank passages about the preparation of the USSR for war, had in England, seriously alarmed A.A. Zhdanov and A.S. Shcherbakov. On May 23, 1941, a

meeting of the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks took place. There was only one question on the agenda: "About Komsomolskaya Pravda, which testifies to the seriousness of the situation. Editorial Board of Komsomolskaya Pravda

by that time, she had already been accused by the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks. In August and November 1940, the Central Committee noted "disorders in the selection of personnel" for this newspaper. The result was not long in coming. By the decision of the Organizing Bureau of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks of November 21, 1940, four members of the editorial board of the newspaper received a reprimand "for not taking measures to cleanse the apparatus of the editorial board from unfit workers." [648]

This time, the guilt of the employees of Komsomolskaya Pravda turned out to be more serious. The secretariat approved the draft resolution of the Central Committee on the issue of I. Bakanov's article, which consisted of 5 points. It was acknowledged that the editors of Komsomolskaya Pravda violated the established procedure for publishing articles on foreign policy topics, thereby showing "carelessness and political frivolity." For this, a member of the editorial board of the newspaper N.N. Danilov, and her employees Ts.A. Stepanyan and Ya.M. Kader, according to the decree, were subject to removal from work in Komsomolskaya Pravda. The UPA of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks was pointed out to shortcomings in control over newspapers, and to the secretariat of the Central Committee of the All-Union Leninist Young Communist League - to the unsatisfactory leadership of Komsomolskaya Pravda. The UPA of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks was entrusted with the duty "to ensure strict control over the publication of articles affecting foreign policy issues, excluding any possibility of repeating such mistakes in the newspapers."

This draft resolution was submitted to the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, which approved it on May 24, 1941. [649] The case with the publication of I. Bakanov is a clear example of how the scope of propaganda preparations for war was essentially disavowed. It is significant that even after the consideration of the "Komsomolskaya Pravda case" at the Secretariat and the Politburo, only the newspaper's employees were punished, and the author of the sensational article, I. Bakanov, who, of course, received instructions "from above" on political attack the equality of the material he was preparing, remained aloof. Undoubtedly,

the well-established rhythm of work on the implementation of directive and instructive materials in the spirit of the "slogan of offensive war" was disrupted by the publication of the "TASS Report" dated June 13, 1941. [650] It, in particular, "exposed" rumors about "closeness of the war between the USSR and Germany. According to these rumors, on the one hand, Germany allegedly made "claims of a territorial and economic nature" to the Soviet Union, and negotiations are underway to conclude a new, "closer agreement between them." On the other hand, the USSR allegedly rejected these claims, in connection with which Germany began to concentrate its troops near its borders for an attack. Finally, the Soviet Union itself carried out intensified preparations for a war against it.

The TASS Report of June 13, 1941 stated that all these rumors were completely groundless. Both sides, it said, both the USSR and Germany, steadfastly observed the terms of the non-aggression pact between them. The transfer of German troops, "freed from operations in the Balkans", to the eastern and northeastern regions of Germany is connected, it was emphasized in "Refutation ...", "presumably with other motives" that have nothing to do with its relations with the Soviet Union. Union. Rumors that he was preparing for war with her were called "false and provocative." The traditional summer muster of reserve troops and the upcoming maneuvers, which take place every year, "depicted as hostile to Germany is at least ridiculous," the report noted. There are numerous facts testifying to the negative consequences of this Stalinist action, designed, as is commonly believed, only to clarify the intentions of the German side. Thus, in the units of the 11th army of the Baltic

Special Military District, the anti-fascist propaganda that had already begun was "restrained" ... by the employees of the GUPPKA who arrived there: after the TASS report, the speakers changed the tone of their materials "in the direction of calming down." [651] Anti-fascist films such as "Professor Mamlock" have ceased to be shown in the clubs of the border guards in the western military districts. [652]

But for the majority of political workers, even after June 13, 1941, the directives in the anti-German spirit received from the command remained in force. So, I.I. Aza-

the moat, which carried out political work on the ships of the Black Sea Fleet, which participated in large-scale landing exercises, was at first completely confused. Together with the commanders, he constantly explained to the personnel of the division participating in the landing operation that the war would be carried out only on foreign territory, spoke about the aggressiveness of Germany. The TASS report put him "in a ridiculous position." In addition, no additional instructions from Moscow, in addition to those that he received earlier from I.V. Rogov, did not follow. I.I. Azarov, convinced that the old attitudes remain in force, in his speech to the sailors emphasized that the TASS message of June 13 should not disarm spiritually and that fascism remains the worst enemy. [653]

Naturally, the effectiveness of any political and ideological campaign is determined by the degree of dissemination in the public consciousness of the ideas that were put forward in its course, by the understanding by representatives of all social groups of the population of the specific tasks assigned to them by the ruling elite. "The indecisiveness of the Kremlin leaders," wrote G.V. Kostyrchenko, - led to the fact that the psychological preparation of the population for the howl did not begin in any tangible form and on a large scale. [654]

On this occasion, first of all, it should be noted that due to the short duration of the specific campaign in question (it lasted about a month and a half and was interrupted for an objective reason, namely, due to the German attack on the USSR), it is rather difficult to determine the degree of its effectiveness.

However, there is factual material on the basis of which it can be concluded that the idea of an offensive war, which was the main core of the political and ideological campaign of May-June 1941, despite the incompleteness of the campaign itself, began to penetrate the consciousness of the Soviet **people** .

On the one hand, both among civilians and in military units, literally on the eve and in the first days after the start of German aggression against the USSR, it was widely believed that it was the Soviet Union that first started or provoked this war. Statements of this kind were recorded by the NKVD in June 1941. In this sense, the opinion of Paleev, an employee of the Main Quartermaster Directorate of the Red Army, is quite indicative, who stated literally the following: "... the acceleration of the war with Germany was caused by our provocative actions, that is, the concentration of troops on the Western border, and most importantly, the speech of Comrade. Stalin at the graduation of Academicians (May 5, 1941 - **V.N.**), where he stated that the entry of the USSR into the war is a matter of choosing the moment. In addition, all reports on the international question, especially closed ones, also said that war with Germany was inevitable, so it would be strange for Germany to expect our concentration. It must be admitted that the Germans' attack on us, from their point of view, was the only correct solution to the current situation. [655] On the other hand, despite the fact that Hitler

attacked in the first days of the war, the offensive spirit introduced by propaganda was strong both in the minds of civilians and among the command and political staff of the Red Army. Thus, the responsible inspectors of the city party committee, who visited the largest enterprises in Moscow on June 23-24, 1941 (the Sharikopodshipnik, Krasny Proletarian factories, the Bolshevikka factory), recorded the spread of "rumors" and "talks" among the workers and engineers "that supposedly the Red Army has taken Warsaw, Danzig (Gdansk) and Koenigsberg and is already conducting a successful offensive against Romania." [656] N.K. Popel, head of the political department of a

mechanized corps stationed in Western Ukraine, on June 22, 1941, observed how Soviet tankers wrote the slogan "Give Berlin!" With chalk on the sides of their combat vehicles. From the explanations of the commander of the tank battalion, Popel understood that he "composed" such slogans for the political officer, who hoped to "finish off Hitler" soon and pass along the main Berlin highway - Unter den Linden. Yes, and N.K. Popel had no doubt: "battles from the border

sy will soon be transferred to the territory of neighboring states, and then to Germany. [657] The fact

that responsible political workers in the active military units, contrary to the logic of the development of events, continued to adhere to the previous offensive guidelines, sometimes led to tragic results. At a meeting of the military council of the Southwestern Front on June 23, 1941, after receiving instructions from Moscow to start the offensive, the chief of staff of the front, Lieutenant General M.A. Purkaev expressed a well-founded opinion: the assigned combat mission in conditions when the enemy is rapidly moving forward is impossible. In response, a member of the military council of the front, corps commissar N.N. Vashugin retorted indignantly: "Have you thought what moral damage will be caused by the fact that we, who raised the Red Army in a high offensive spirit, will move on to passive defense from the first days of the war?" [658] After the failure of attempts to counteroffensive front N.N. Vashugin June 28, 1941 committed suicide. [659]

All of the above, in our opinion, gives grounds, firstly, to recognize the very fact of the beginning of the deployment of a political and ideological campaign under the slogan of an offensive war, the starting point of which was Stalin's speeches in the Kremlin to graduates of the military academies of the Red Army. However, we naturally cannot say that this campaign was completed, that it achieved its goal, since it was interrupted by the German aggression against the USSR that had begun.

It is difficult to deny the fact that in May-June 1941 a political and ideological campaign began to unfold in the USSR under the slogan of an offensive war. In contrast to the campaigns of 1939-1940, which were mentioned above, when Stalin's "comrades-in-arms" (Molotov, Zhdanov, Mekhlis) acted as initiators, and the leader himself remained, as it were, "in the shadows", in May 1941 Stalin publicly "voiced" the new tasks facing the party and army propaganda organs. The secretaries of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, who led the work on the direct practical implementation of the Stalinist slogan of a blunt war, as well as the leadership of the GUPPKA, sought to instill in the minds of the leaders of the propaganda structures of the Red Army that this was a new, radical turn in Soviet propaganda.

At the same time, there are no grounds to say that the political and ideological campaign that unfolded in May-June 1941 assumed large proportions, much less achieved its goal. The Kremlin gave the green light to its deployment. However, in the most difficult international situation, strict conspiracy had to be observed (primarily in publications in the open press). Therefore, there were no opportunities to deploy this campaign to the full power of the political propaganda apparatus. Ultimately, it was interrupted by the German aggression against the Soviet Union that began on June 22, 1941. The drafts of directive materials prepared by the GUPPKA, which were based on the slogan of "offensive war", turned out to be unclaimed and were archived.

CONCLUSION

Late 1930s - early 1940s - an important milestone in the development of the Stalinist system as a whole and its propaganda mechanism in particular. During this period, the Bolshevik leadership set itself important domestic and foreign political tasks, in the solution of which propaganda was used as a kind of "transmission belt" between the ruling elite and society.

The structure of propaganda organs was complex and branched out. This organism was very cumbersome, but strictly centralized and controlled personally by Stalin. Direct leadership of the propaganda sphere lay with Stalin's closest "comrades-in-arms". The people most devoted to him (A.A. Zhdanov, L.Z. Mekhlis, A.S. Shcherbakov and others) made up the "top echelon". "Middle" and "grassroots" links of prop-

Gandhi organs were filled with Stalinist "nominees" who occupied vacancies that had become vacant as a result of repressions.

In the second half of the 1930s. In connection with the growing threat of a direct armed clash with the "capitalist encirclement", which came mainly from Nazi Germany and Japan, the process of "militaryization" of propaganda was developed in the USSR, which undoubtedly affected the public consciousness. The expectation of war and the need to ideologically prepare for it dominated.

However, after the conclusion of the non-aggression pact with Germany, the price of which was the course towards rapprochement and "friendship" of the USSR with the Nazi regime, the propaganda structures sharply "rebuilt" and developed an active activity to substantiate this course. This testified to the fact that the political situation of the moment was more important for the Soviet leadership than the one chosen in the mid-1930s. the main course of confrontation with the Nazi regime, including in the ideological sphere.

Propagandists and agitators who carried out this "installation" constantly faced rejection by the majority of the population and the manifestation of anti-fascist sentiments. At the same time, Germany, previously presented as a potential military adversary, was no longer portrayed as such in open propaganda. Any hints even of a hypothetical armed clash with it, seen in works of literature and art, in periodicals and lectures, do not

were slowly cut short.

In parallel with the ideological support of the course towards rapprochement and "friendship" between the USSR and Nazi Germany, the propaganda mechanism, starting from September 1939, began to be adjusted by the Bolshevik leadership to solve another task, no less important from its point of view. Propaganda was everywhere connected to the justification of the territorial increments of the Soviet Union, carried out thanks to secret agreements with the Third Reich.

At the same time, to some extent, the experience gained by the political bodies of the Red Army during the fighting against Japanese troops in the Far East near Lake Khasan and on the Khalkhin Gol River in 1938-1939 was used.

By the end of the 1930s. the Bolshevik leadership finally realized the illusory nature of the strategic calculations on the "world revolution" as the main means for the destruction of the "capitalist encirclement". In Soviet propaganda, apologetic characteristics of the Red Army became prevalent, and armed actions against the border states of 1939-1940. (Poland, Finland) were interpreted as "liberation". These actions were accompanied by extensive political propaganda campaigns, which were designed to influence not only the public consciousness of the Red Army personnel, but also the civilian population.

The anti-Polish campaign in September 1939 became not only an expression of Stalin's external political ambitions, but also a kind of new "testing ground" for Bolshevik propaganda. The armed action against Poland, whose army and people were already fighting against the German invasion, was presented in Soviet propaganda materials as a "just offensive war" to liberate equal brothers - Belarusians and Ukrainians.

After the Polish campaign, the Red Army, which received the honorary epithet "liberator", initiated military operations against Finland. But the Bolshevik leadership soon had to face strong resistance from virtually the entire Finnish people, who did not want the establishment of the Kuusinen regime, which Moscow did not tie. The idea with the "People's Government of Finland" ended in failure, which turned out to be largely a propaganda action, in the preparation and implementation of which V.M. Molotov and A.A. Zhdanov. It was these Stalinist comrades-in-arms who prepared in advance, and after the Red Army crossed the border with Finland, they used falsified documents by them, in which they formulated the

dacha for the "liberation" of the Finnish people. However, failures in the "Winter" Soviet-Finnish war of 1939-1940. forced to abandon the liberation propaganda slogans for a while. After its completion, a number of meetings and sessions were held with the involvement of the senior command staff and the leadership of PURKKA to summarize and study the experience of hostilities, in which at the initial stage, Stalin.

Despite the existence of a nonaggression pact with Germany, it was clear that the ideological intransigence of the Soviet and Nazi regimes alone predetermined the inevitability of an armed clash between them. The unexpectedly quick victory of Germany over France, which posed a real threat to the USSR, forced the Soviet leadership to think more and more about the strength of the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact.

The curtailment of anti-fascist propaganda led to the fact that the Third Reich and the German war machine ceased to act as an enemy. However, from the autumn of 1940, when tension began to brew in Soviet-German relations, anti-Nazi and anti-German motives began to be seen in the closed propaganda materials. This process was held back by the continued official commitment to "friendship" with Germany. Military propaganda had not yet been reorganized, and the Wehrmacht was not considered in it as an enemy.

After the Soviet-German secret agreements had exhausted themselves, and there was no new agreement on the division of the "sphere of state interests" between the USSR and Germany, Stalin set a course for preparations for an armed and ideological confrontation with her. Since the end of 1940, active work was observed in the propaganda structures to strengthen "mobilization readiness", and in fact - to transfer the entire propaganda on a war footing. On

May 5, 1941, he delivered a big speech at the official graduation ceremony for students of the military academies of the Red Army and at a banquet on the occasion of this event. By this time, the Politburo had adopted a resolution that Stalin took over the leadership of the country: he replaced Molotov as Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR. The leader, in his speech to the graduates of the military academies of the Red Army, which became essentially "inaugural", made it clear that from now on Germany is regarded as a potential military adversary and that one should move from a peaceful policy "to a military policy of offensive operations", and propaganda should be reorganized in an offensive spirit. Stalin's speech was full of positive epithets about the Red Army, which allegedly completed the process of organizational restructuring, re-equipment and technical re-equipment with the latest means of struggle. At the same time, Stalin sought to show the Wehrmacht's lagging behind the demands of the time, which, in his opinion, consisted in the manifestation of "arrogance, boasting, complacency."

Stalin's instructions were immediately taken as the basis for the political and ideological campaign that began under the "slogan of offensive war." Under the leadership of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, the Main Directorate of Political Propaganda of the Red Army began to prepare projects of propaganda directives and instructive materials intended for the personnel of the Red Army. They carried the idea of the need to make comprehensive preparations for war, to act offensively in any situation, and, if necessary, to take the initiative to attack the enemy, i.e., Germany, on oneself. However, this does not at all indicate that the USSR wanted to act as an aggressor, as some historians and pseudo-historians (for example, V. Suvorov) are trying to prove.

The tasks set out in the draft directive and instructive documents of the GUPPKA were brought to the attention of interested parties, and even before their official approval, they were embodied in propaganda activities. This trend is especially clearly seen when one familiarizes himself not only with archival materials, but also when reading the open periodical press of May-June 1941.

The complex of identified sources allows us to conclude that during this period propaganda preparations for a "just, all-destroying offensive war" were in full swing. This conclusion is of great relevance: after all, some researchers talk about Stalin's negative reaction to the proposal put forward in mid-May 1941 by the People's Commissariat of Defense and the General Staff of the Red Army to deliver a preemptive strike against German troops concentrating to attack the USSR. At the same time, there is not a single piece of evidence that the Soviet leader imposed a ban on the deployment of propaganda in an anti-German, offensive spirit. A clear gap between the "defensive" (according to the studies of most historians) attitudes of the military leadership and the "offensive" attitude propagated by propaganda is obvious.

However, the new political and ideological campaign that began in May 1941 turned out to be incomplete, since it was interrupted by the German attack on the USSR. Propaganda offensive slogans, under which it unfolded, at the end of June 1941, in the conditions of German aggression, were replaced by purely defensive ones.

Notes 1 For

a detailed list of the author's publications up to 2004, see: *Vladimir Alexandrovich Nevezhin*.
Bibliographic index / Compiled by: S.G. Davidyan, S.P. Shcherbina. M., 2004. 2 Ibid. pp. 7-9, 39-47.

3 Kovalchenko I.D.

Essence and features of socio-historical development (Notes on the need for updated approaches) // Historical Notes. Theoretical and methodological problems of historical research. Issue. 1(119). M., 1995. S. 27.

4 Kolomiitsev V.F. Laws of history or sociological patterns? // Domestic naya history. 1997. N 6. S. 97.

5 Lokshina S.M. Brief dictionary of foreign words. Ed. 8th, stereotype. M., 1985. S. 94; Oracheva O.I., Podvintseva O.B. Political thought in terms and faces. Perm, 1995, p. 47; Big encyclopedic dictionary. Ed. 2nd, revised. and additional M., 1997. S. 434.

6

Ozhegov S.I. Dictionary of the Russian language. 16th ed., rev. M., 1984. S. 534; Lokshina S.M. Decree. op. S. 198; Skulenko M.I. History of political propaganda. Kyiv, 1990. S. 3; Big encyclopedic dictionary. S. 967 and others.

7 Jowett G.S., O'Donnell W. Propaganda and suggestion. M., 1988. S. 4.

8 Ibid. P. 3. 9

Skulenko M.I. Decree. op. P. 35.

10 Skulenko M.I. Decree. op. pp. 122-123.

11 Grechukhin P.B. Power and the formation of the historical consciousness of Soviet society in 1934-1941. Dis... Ph.D. Saratov, 1997, pp. 172-173; Ushakova S.N. Ideological and propaganda campaigns as a way of social mobilization of the Soviet society in the late 1920s - early 1940s. (on the materials of Western Siberia). Abstract of the thesis ... Ph.D. Novosibirsk, 2001, pp. 13-14. See also: Nevezhin V.A. Unfinished political-ideology-

military campaign in the USSR on the eve of the war with Germany (May-June 1941) // Stories of military history of Ukraine. Collection of scientific articles. Vip. 6. Kiev, 2002. S. 12-16; he is. Anti-Polish political and ideological campaign of 1939 // Russia - Poland: philological and historical-cultural discourse. Sat. articles of the participants of the international scientific conference (Magnitogorsk, November 18-19, 2005). Magnitogorsk, 2005, pp. 30-37; he is. Political and ideological campaigns of the Kremlin in 1939-1941. // International crisis of 1939-1941: from the Soviet-German treaties of 1939 to the German attack on the USSR. M-ly international. conferences, org. Institute of World History of the Russian Academy of Sciences, University of Latvia, Institute of Modern History (Munich), Moscow branch of the Foundation. K. Adenauer. Moscow, February 3-4, 2005. M., 2006. S. 307-326.

12

Gareev M.A. Facts refuting unscrupulous allegations// Independent military review. 1998. N 22. S. 5.

13

Kostyrchenko G.V. Stalin's Secret Politics: Power and Anti-Semitism. M., 2001. 14

IN AND. Lenin. unknown documents. 1891-1922 M., 1999. S. 201. 15 V.I. Lenin.

unknown documents. 1891-1922 pp. 375, 387, 389. 16 Lenin V.I. PSS. T. 42. S.

173. 17 Cited. Quoted from: The

Comintern and the Idea of the World Revolution. Documentation. M., 1998. Doc. N 60. 18 For

more details see: Dorokhov N.I. Soviet military-theoretical thought (1921-1941). Forecasts of a future war // Russia and the world - yesterday, today, tomorrow. Scientific works of MGI im. E.R. Dashkova. Issue. III. M., 1998. S. 75-92.

19 Emelyanova E.N. Ideas of war and peace in the theory and practice of the Comintern (1919-1923). Abstract ... Ph.D. M., 1998. S. 21.

20

For more details see: Kulish V.M. Soviet historiography of the Great Patriotic War // Soviet historiography. M., 1996. S. 274-315; Meltyukhov M.I. Modern domestic historiography of the prehistory of the Great Patriotic War (1985-1995). Abstract ... Ph.D. M., 1995. S. 3.

21

Documents of Soviet patriotism (in the days of the fighting near Lake Khasan). M., 1939; Party political work in a combat situation: Sat. documents published in a combat situation at Khalkhin Gol. M., 1940. 22 Party and political work in

a

combat situation. Sat. documents published during the free campaign in Western Ukraine and Western Belarus. M., 1940.

23

Newspaper at the front. M., 1940; Propaganda, agitation and press in a combat situation. M., 1940; Bazilevsky P.A. Bureau of the Komsomol in a combat situation. From the experience of fighting the White Finns. M., 1941; Karaev G. The defeat of the White Finnish bridgehead. L., 1941; Soviet-Finnish war 1939-1940 Brief operational essay. M., 1941; Fighting in Finland. T. 1-2. M., 1941. 24 Zaporozhets A.I. On the

restructuring of the work of political agencies and party organizations of the Red Army (From a speech at the first party conference of the Baltic Special Military District on December 13, 1940). M., 1941.

25

On the Marxist-Leninist studies of the commanding staff of the Red Army in 1941 (Directive of A. I. Zaporozhets). M., 1941; About political studies with the Red Army men and junior commanders of the Red Army in the 1941 academic year. (Guidelines and curricula). M., 1941.

26

Hayrapetyan M.E. Stages of the foreign policy of the USSR. 1917-1940 M., 1941. 27 Popel

N.K. At a difficult time. M., 1959; Lobachev A.A. Difficult roads. M., 1960; Azarov I.I. Besieged Odessa. M., 1962; Palgunov N.G. Thirty Years (Memoirs of a Journalist and Diplomat). M., 1964.

28

Kulish V.M. Decree. op. S. 286. 29

The Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union 1941-1945. In 6 volumes. T. 1. M., 1960. S. 424-435. 30 Great Patriotic War

of

the Soviet Union 1941-1945. T. 1. S. 433. 31 The Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union

1941-1945. T. 1. S. 424-435. 32 Ibid. P. 434. 33 Ibid. P. 435. 34 Ibid. P. 434. 35 Ibid. P. 435. 36

Konyukhovsky V.I.

The struggle of the

Communist Party

to

strengthen the Red

Army (1921-1941). M., 1958; Kuzmin N.F. On guard of peaceful labor (1929-1940). M., 1959; Ideological and political work of the CPSU at the front (1941-1941). M., 1960, etc.

37

Nikitin E.F. Activities of the Communist Party to strengthen the Soviet Armed Forces in the prewar years (1939 - June 1941). Dis... d.h.s. M., 1965. T. II. pp. 452-457.

38

Petrov Yu.P. Party building in the Soviet Army and Navy. Activities of the CPSU in the creation and strengthening of political agencies, party and Komsomol organizations in the armed forces (1918-1961). M., 1964. S. 335-336.

39

Komkov G.D. Ideological and political work in the CPSU in 1941-1945. M., 1965. S. 54, 61, 62. 40 Kulish V.M.

Decree. op. pp. 295-296. 41 Rytov A.G.

Knights of the Fifth Ocean. Ed. 2nd, rev. M., 1970; Kraminov D.F. In the Orbit of War: Notes of a Soviet Correspondent Abroad. 1939-1945 years. M., 1980; Burtsev M.I. Epiphany. M., 1981; Mazurov K.T. Unforgettable. Minsk, 1984; Sapozhnikov B.G. The readiness of Soviet orientalists to defend the Motherland // Weapons of the word. Articles and memoirs of Soviet orientalists. 1941-1945. M., 1985. S. 11-38 and others.

42

Party and political work in the Red Army: Documents. July 1929 - May 1941 M., 1985. 43

History of the Second World War, 1939-1945: In 12 vols. T. 3. M., 1974. S. 395-407; Party political work in the Armed Forces of the USSR (1918-1973): 1st. feature article. M., 1974; Bokarev V.P. The historical experience of the CPSU in the training of political workers in the army and navy (1921-1941). M., 1983; Ideological work in the Armed Forces of the USSR: Historical and theoretical essay. M., 1983; Klochkov V.F. The Red Army - the school of communist education of Soviet soldiers, 1918-1941. M., 1984, etc.

44

Klochkov V.F. Decree. op. S. 212. 45

There. S. 43.

46

History of Soviet political censorship. Documents and comments. M., 1997. S. 208-209. 47 Kulish V.M.

Decree. op. P. 304. 48 Vashik K.

Presentation of historical knowledge and new multimedia technologies. M., 1999. S. 5-6.

49

On the work of the political administration of the Red Army // News of the Central Committee of the

CPSU. 1990. N 3. 50 Artamoshin Yu. Management miscalculations // Arguments and Facts. 1989. N 23. June 10-16; Eve and the beginning of the war: Documents and materials. M., 1991. S. 308.

51 Komkov G.D. Political propaganda and agitation in the years of severe trials // Spiritual potential of the Victory of the Soviet people in the Great Patriotic War, 1941-1945. M., 1990. S. 36. 52 Mulyukov R.S. Historical experience of the

Communist Party in the construction of political organs and party organizations in the Red Army (1921 - June 1941). M. 1989; Yukhtanov M.V. Activities of the Communist Party in the international education of soldiers of the army and navy during the years of the pre-war five-year plans (1928-1941). Dis... Ph.D. M., 1990; Gontarenko A.A. Party leadership of the institute of deputy political officers in the political education of the personnel of the Red Army (1938-1940). Dis... Ph.D. M., 1991.

53 Souvenirs O.F. The Red Army on the eve ... Essays on the history of the political education of personal composition of the Red Army 1929 - June 1941 M., 1993.

54

Poznyakov V.V. The foreign policy of the three great powers and the image of the allies in Soviet propaganda during the Second World War. 1939-1945 // Yalta. 1945 Problems of war and peace. M., 1992. C. 165-179.

55

Suvorov V. Cleansing: Why did Stalin behead his army? M., 1998. P. 35. 56 Suvorov V.

Icebreaker... Day "M"... 57 Danilov V.D.

Was Stalin preparing an attack on Germany? // Search. 1994. No. 24(266). June 17-23. 58

"Explain to the Romanian soldiers the hopelessness of the war against the USSR" // Source. 1995. N 3. S. 61-68; "False attitudes in education and propaganda". Report of the Head of the Main Political Directorate of the Red Army L.Z. Mehlis on military ideology. 1940 // Historical archive. 1997. N 5-6. pp. 82-99; Two directives of 1941 on propaganda preparation of the USSR for war // Archeographic Yearbook for 1995. M., 1997. S. 191-207; On political activities with the Red Army men and junior commanders of the Red Army for the summer period of 1941 // Military Historical Archive. 2005. No. 8(68). pp. 188-189. 59 For more on this discussion see: Was Stalin preparing an offensive war against Hitler?

Unplanned discussion. Collection of materials / Comp., comments, author. articles by V.A. Nevezhin. M., 1995; Meltyukhov M.I. The eve of the Great Patriotic War: the discussion continues. M., 1999; he is. Stalin's missed chance. The Soviet Union and the Struggle for Europe: 1939-1941 (Documents, facts, judgments). 2nd ed., corrected. and additional M., 2002; Nevezhin V.A. Stalin's strategic plans on the eve of June 22, 1941 (based on the results of the "unplanned discussion" of Russian historians) // Domestic History.

1999. No. 5. C. 108-120; he is. USSR on the eve of the war with Germany (May-June 1941): the latest discussions on the problem in Russian historiography // Stories of military history of Ukraine: Zb. Sciences. Articles K., 2003. Vip. 7. S. 99-105; he is. I.V. Stalin on the eve of the "big war" (May-June 1941): based on the materials of the "unplanned discussion" of Russian historians // Belarus during the Great Patriotic War: the lessons of history and the present: Proceedings of the international scientific conference (Minsk, June 29-30, 2004) .). Mn., 2004. S. 31-35; Bobylev P.N. It's too early to put an end to the discussion. On the issue of planning a possible war with Germany in the General Staff of the Red Army in 1940-1941 // Patriotic history. 2000. N 1. S. 41-64; Korolenkov A.V. On the eve: continuation of discussions about the events of the pre-war period // Patriotic history. 2004. N 3. S. 169-176. 60 Was Stalin preparing an offensive war against Hitler?... 61 For a list of reviews in Russian, see: Vladimir Alexandrovich Nevezhin.

Bibliographic index. S. 7.

62

See: Rev. V.V. Farsobina: Questions of history. 1995. N 10. S. 167.

63

Pavlova I.V. The mechanism of power and the construction of Stalinist socialism. Novosibirsk, 2001, p. 367.

64

See op. A.V. Golubeva: Domestic history. 1996. N 5. P. 203. 65 The first

publications on this complex problem began to appear at the turn of the 20th and 21st centuries. See, for example: Sokolov A.K. Soviet society on the eve of the war // Power and society in Russia. XX century. M. - Tambov, 1999. S. 136-154.

66

Nevezhin V.A. Stalin's speech on May 5, 1941 and an apology for the offensive war // Domestic History. 1995. N 2. S. 54-69; Meltyukhov M.I. Ideological documents of May June 1941 on the events of World War II // Ibid. pp. 70-85.

67

Zhukov Yu.N. Secrets of the Kremlin. Stalin, Molotov, Beria, Malenkov. M., 2000; Kostyrchenko G.V. Decree. op.

68

Friendship O.V. The Great Patriotic War in the Consciousness of the Soviet and Post-Soviet Society: Dynamics of Ideas about the Historical Past. Rostov-on-Don, 2000, pp. 7-19; she is. The Great Patriotic War in the historical consciousness of the Soviet and post-Soviet society. Dis... d.h.s. Rostov-on-Don, 2000; Nevezhin V.A. The writer's reflections on the coming war // Army and Society. 1900-1941 Articles, documents. M., 1999. S. 270-293. 69 Nevezhin V.A. Offensive War Syndrome...; he is. Soviet

propaganda and ideological preparation for war...; Osmachko S.G. Decree. op.; Meltyukhov M.I. Stalin's missed chance... 70 Osmachko S.G. Decree. op. pp. 130-131.

71

Gareev M. Facts refuting unscrupulous allegations; Vishlev O.V. Naka nune on June 22, 1941. Documentary essays. M., 2001; Mertsalov A.N., Mertsalova. L.A. A.-A. Jomini. Founder of scientific military theory. M., 1999. S. 264-266 and others.

72 Pavlova I.V. Decree. op. pp. 373-376.

M., 2002; Su
thieves V. Icebreaker-2. Mn., 2003; Isaev A. Antisuvorov. M., 2005.

74 24 hours. Press Digest (St. Petersburg). 1994. No. 20 (258).

May 19. 75 Literary newspaper. 1998. 23 Sept. No.

38(5714). P. 11. 76 Top secret.

1998. N 7. 77 Poznyakov V.V. Decree. op. S. 166; Babichenko D.L. Writers and censors. Soviet literature of the 1940s under the political control of the Central Committee. M., 1994. S. 10-21; Nevezhin V.A. Offensive War Syndrome... S. 27-51; Russia and the West. Formation of foreign policy stereotypes... P. 71-79; The Great Patriotic War. 1941-1945. Military-historical essays. Book. 1. S. 59-62; Zhukov Yu.N. Decree. op. pp. 99-101; 123-124; Kostyrchenko G.V. Decree. op. pp. 152-162 and others.

78

Seleznev I.A. Secrets of Russian history of the XX century. Krasnodar, 1997. S. 60-61.

79

Grechukhin P.B. Decree. op. P.

171. 80 Kruglov N., Plotnikov N. Bloodless, but powerful weapon // Independent military review. Weekly Supplement to Nezavisimaya Gazeta. 1997. N 18. S. 5; Plotnikov N. Calculations and miscalculations ... Goebbels // Army. 1993. N 22. S. 52-55.

81 Winter War 1939-1940. Book. 1 Political history. M., 1998; Soviet-Finnish war 1939-1940. In 2 vols. T. 2. St. Petersburg, 2003. S. 495-515.

82 Ksenofontova N.F. The Soviet-Finnish war in the coverage of Soviet propaganda (1939-1940) // The Great Patriotic War in the assessment of the young: Sat. articles of students, graduate students, young scientists. M., 1997. S. 45.

83 Meltyukhov M.I. Stalin's missed chance...; Osmachko S.G. Decree. op. etc. 84

Nevezhin V.A. Soviet propaganda during the "winter war" // 105 days of the "winter war". To the sixtieth anniversary of the Soviet-Finnish war of 1939-1940. // St. Petersburg, 2000. S. 86-97; he is. Finland in Soviet propaganda during the "winter war" (1939-1940) // Russia and the world through each other's eyes: From the history of mutual perception. Issue. 1. M., 2000. S. 284-305; he is. Political and ideological campaigns of the Kremlin (1939-1941)...

85 Nevezhin V.A. Stalin's speech on May 5, 1941 and a turn in propaganda. Analysis of directive materials // Did Stalin prepare an offensive war against Hitler? C. 147-168; he is. Stalin's speech on May 5, 1941 and an apology for an offensive war...; he is. Offensive War Syndrome... Chapter Four; he is. Moscow, Kremlin, May 5, 1941 // Military History Journal. 2001. N 5. S. 62-69; he is. So what did Stalin say on May 5, 1941? Historiography of the issue // Teaching history at school. 2001. N 5. S. 17-23; he is. Stalin's assessment of Germany as a potential adversary on the eve of June 22, 1941 // Russia and the world through each other's eyes: From the history of mutual perception. Issue. 2. M., 2002. S. 101-111; Nevezhin V.A. Stalin's Speech of 5 May 1941 and the Apologia for Offensive War // Russian Studies in History. Vol. 36. 1997. N 2. P. 48-72; Nevezhin V.A. Stalin's 5 May 1941 Addresses: The Experiences of Interpretation // The Journal of Slavic Military Studies. Vol.

11. 1998. N 1 (March). P. 116-146; Niewieżyński W. Wehrmacht w ocenie Stalina w przededniu wojny niemiecko - sowieckiej // Arcana (Kraków). 2000. No. 2. S. 155-166.

86 Bassists Yu.V. Stalin - Hitler. From pact to war. SPb., 2001. S. 145-150. 87

Bezymensky L.A. Hitler and Stalin before the fight. M., 2000. S. 421-442. 88 Vishlev

O.V. On the eve of June 22, 1941 ... S. 79-102. 89 Gareev

M.A. Facts that refute unfair claims. 90 Emelyanov Yu.V. Decree. op. pp.

199-200. 91 Shubin A.V. The world is on

the edge of the abyss. From global crisis to world war: 1929-1941 years. M., 2004. S. 487-488.

92

Bonwetsch B. Nochmals zu Stalins Rede am 5. Mai 1941. Quellenkritisch-historiographische Bemerkungen // Osteuropa: Zeitschrift für Gegenwartsfragen des Ostens. 1992. No. 6. S.536-542.

93

Hoffmann J. Stalin's War of Extermination 1941-1945. Planning, Realization and Documentation. Capshaw, 2001. P. 39-51.

94

Gorodetsky G. Fatal self-deception: Stalin and the German attack on the Soviet Union. M., 1999. Reviewed by V.A. Nevezhin. Did the USSR intend to attack Germany? // Book review "Ex libris NG". 1999. 18 Nov. S. 13.

95 Stalin I.V. About the article by Engels "Foreign policy of Russian tsarism" // Bolshevik. 1941. N 9 (May). pp. 1-5.

96

Nevezhin V.A. Offensive war syndrome ... S. 20-21. 97 Bordyugov

G.A. Hitler Comes to Power: New Dominants of Foreign Policy Decisions of the Stalinist Leadership. 1933-1934 // Patriotic history. 1999. N 2. S. 38-41; Bordyugov G.A. Extraordinary age of Russian history: four fragments. SPb., 2004. S. 139-169; Bordyugov G., Bukharaev V. National histories in revolutions and conflicts

Soviet era. M., 1999. S. 17-19, 29; Pavlova I.V. Decree. op. pp. 417-418; I.V. Stalin - "On Engels's article "The Foreign Policy of Russian Tsarism" - and ideological preparation for a world war (Introductory article by M.V. Zelenov) // Questions of history. 2007. N 7. S. 3-40; Martirosyan A.B. 22nd of June. Truth of the Generalissimo. M., 2005. S. 223-230.

98 Was Stalin preparing an offensive war against Hitler?... S. 122-168; Nevezhin V.A. Offensive war syndrome ... S. 215-235; Meltyukhov M.I. Lost chance Steel on ... S. 415-453. 99 Totalitarianism. From the history of

ideologies, movements, regimes and their overcoming. M., 1996; Grechukhin P.B. Decree. op. S. 172; Molodyakov V.E. Beginning of World War II: geopolitical aspects // Patriotic history. 1997. N 5. S. 128-137; he is. Rec. on the book: V.A. Nevezhin. Offensive war syndrome... // Patriotic history. 1998. N 3. S. 183-185; Sokolov B. Propaganda as a mirror of real politics // Independent military review. 1998. No. 5(79). February 6-12, etc.

100

Wehner M. Der letzte Sowjetmythos. Ein russischer historikerstreit: Die Debatte über Stalins Angriffpläne 1941 // Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung. 1996. Page N 6 / Mittwoch, 10. April. No. 84; Raak R.Ch. A source from the highest circles of the Comintern about Stalin's plans related to the Second World War // Patriotic History. 1996. N 3. S. 45, note 9; Bonvech B. Us stupid strategy - attack - attack. A historian from Germany about the discussion around the events of 1941 // Domestic History. 1998. N 3. S. 24; Derbski S. Syndrom wo jny zaczepnej w sowieckiej propagandzie 1939-1941 // Arcana. 1998. No. 5. S. 110.

101 Vishlev O.V. On the eve of June 22, 1941 ... S. 80; Kostyrchenko S.V. Decree. op. P. 221. 102

RGASPI. F. 558. Op. 11.

103

Ibid. F. 82. 104

Ibid. F. 78. 105

Ibid. F. 88.

106

Secrets and lessons of the winter war, 1939-1940. SPb., 2002. S. 504-516; Winter War 1939-1940. Book. 2. I.V. Stalin and the Finnish campaign. (Transcript of the meeting at the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist

Party of Bolsheviks. M., 1998. S. 272-282. 107 Military

History Journal. 2001. N 3. S. 95-96. 108 "False Directions in

Education and Propaganda" ... 109 M.I. Meltyukhov, referring to the publication of D. Brandenberger, wrote that the conference on military ideology took place on May 13-14, 1940, and L.Z. Stalin's Missed Chance... P. 344) See also: Rubtsov Yu.V. Decree Op.... P. 95.

110

"False attitudes in the matter of education and propaganda ...". P. 82.

111 "Winter War": work on the mistakes (April-May 1940). Materials of the commissions of the Main Military Council of the Red Army on the generalization of the experience of the Finnish campaign. M.: SPb., 2004.

112

Ibid. pp. 328, 329.

113

Ibid. pp. 329-389. Unfortunately, when publishing the transcript of the plenary meeting of the GVS on the issue of military ideology, a typo crept into the title. It should be read not April 13-14, 1940, but May 13-14, 1940 (Ibid., p. 344). The transcript materials were partially put into circulation by M.I. Meltyukhov. See: Meltyukhov M.I. Stalin's missed chance ... S. 345. 114

Poznyakov V.V. Decree. op. S. 169; Did Stalin cook?... S. 123; Nevezhin V.A. Offensive war syndrome ... S. 149.

115

IN AND. Lenin. Unknown Documents... 116

1941 Documentation. Book. 2. M., 1998. Doc. No. 437; Winter war 1939-1940. Book. 2; Neva Zhin V.A. Stalin's table speeches. Documents and materials. M.; SPb., 2003.

117

Party political work in a combat situation. Sat. documents published during the liberation campaign in Western and Western Ukraine. Belarus; Party political work in the Red Army...

118

"Literary Front". History of political censorship 1932-1946 Sat. documents. M., 1994; Power and artistic intelligentsia. Documents of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) - VKP (b), VChK - OGPU - NKVD on cultural policy. 1917-1953. M., 1999; Great censorship: Writers and journalists in the Land of the Soviets. 1917-1956. M., 2005; Kremlin cinema, 1928-1953: Documents. M., 2005. 119
International situation

through the eyes of Leningraders, 1941-1945: (From the Archive of the Office of the Federal Security Service for St. Petersburg and the Leningrad Region). SPb., 1996; Nikulin V.V. The Soviet-German Pact of 1939 and the Population (Socio-Political Aspect) // Proceedings of the Fifteenth All-Russian Correspondence Conference. SPb., 1999. S. 5-7. 120

Meltyukhov M.I. Materials of special departments of the NKVD on the mood of the soldiers of the Red Army in 1939-1941. // Military-historical anthropology. Yearbook, 2002. Subject, tasks, development prospects. M., 2002. S. 306-318; he is. Stalin's missed chance...; he is. Soviet-Polish wars. 2nd ed., corrected. and additional M., 2004; Osmachko S.G. Decree.
op.

121 Simonov K.M. Through the Eyes of a Man of My Generation: Reflections on I.V. Stalin. M., 1988.

122

Ehrenburg I.G. People, years, life. Memoirs: In 3 volumes. Ed. corrected and additional T.2: Book. 4, 5. M.,

1990. 123 Gnedin E.A. In the People's Commissariat. 1922-1939 // Historical collection. Paris, 1982, pp.

357-393. 124 Palgunov N.G.

Decree. op. 125 Kraminov
D.F. Decree. op. 126

Sheinis Z.S. Before the invasion: From the notebook of 1939-1941 // New and modern history. 1990. N 1. S. 98-118.

127

Chernyavsky G.I. Diaries of G.M. Dimitrova // Modern and recent history. 2001. N 5. P. 48. 128

Prishvin M.M. Diaries. M., 1990. 129

RGALI. F. 1038. Op. 1. D. 2076, 2077, 2079. A detailed description of the content of this source is presented in the following publications: Vishnevsky Vs. "... We ourselves will go on the attack." From the diaries of 1939-1941 // Moscow. 1995. N 5. S. 103-110; Nevezhin V.A. Offensive War Syndrome...; he is. The writer's reflections on the coming war... S. 271-273.

130

Vernadsky V.I. Diary of 1938 // Friendship of Peoples (hereinafter - DN). 1991. N 2. C.219-248; he is. Diary of 1939 // DN. 1992. N 11-12. WITH.; he is. Diary of 1940 // DN. 1993. N 9. C.173-194.

131 Chernyavsky G.I. Decree. op.
P.

48. 132 Dimitrov G. Diary (March 9, 1936 - February 6, 1949). Sofia, 1997.
133

Chernyavsky G.I. Decree. op.
134

Baranov Yu. Blue spill: Diaries, letters, poems, 1936-1942. I grew up
Lovel, 1988; Mankov A. From the diary of 1938-1941. // Star. 1995. N 11. S. 167-199.
135

Kostyrchenko G.V. Decree. op. pp. 155-156.
136

Ibid. P. 159. 137

Ibid. P. 99. 138

XVIII Congress of the CPSU (b). Verbatim report. M., 1939. S. 31.
139

The issues of the structure and activities of the UPA of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks in the pre-war period are reflected in detail in a number of documentary publications (see, for example: "Literary Front" ...) and scientific research (Babichenko D.L. Decree. Op.).

140

Zhukov Yu.N. Decree. op. P. 110.

141 The Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union, 1941-1945.: In 6 vols. T. 1. M., 1960. S. 427.
142

RGASPI. F. 71. Op. 10. D. 130. L. 135.
143

Babichenko D.L. Writers and censors... S. 17.
144

History of Soviet political censorship... S. 60-61. 145 History
of

Soviet political censorship... S. 65-67. 146

There. pp. 68-69. 147

Ibid.

P. 70. 148

Garyaeva T.M. Soviet political censorship (History, activities, structure) // Eliminate all mentions ...: Essays on the history of Soviet censorship. Minsk, 1995. S. 20, 27, 30, 35. 149 GARF. F. 9425. Op. 1. D. 11. L. 3. 150 Ibid. L. 4. 151

The history of Soviet political censorship ... S. 39-40. 152

There. pp. 283-284.

153

Blum A.V. Soviet censorship in the era of total terror. 1929-1953. SPb., 2000. S. 29. 154 The history of Soviet

political censorship ... S. 63-64. 155 Gnedin E.V. Decree. op. P. 382.

156

The Communist Party of the Soviet

Union in resolutions and decisions of congresses, conferences and plenums of the Central Committee (1898-1986).

Ed. 9th. T. 7. M., 1985. S. 181.

157

Great Patriotic War 1941-1945 Military-historical essays. Book. 1. S. 60. 158 RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 125. D. 73. L. 18.

159 Poznyakov V.V. Decree. op. C. 166, 169.

160

Stalin I.V. Organizational report of the Central

Committee to the XIII Congress of the RCP(b). 24

May 1924 // Stalin I.V. Op. T.6. S. 217.

161

Maryamov G. Kremlin censor. Stalin is watching a movie. M., 1992. S. 48-49. 162

For more on this, see, for example: The Kremlin Cinema... 163 Soviet

Culture in the Reconstructive Period, 1928-1941. M., 1988. S. 212. 164 All-Union population census in

1939. Main results. M., 1992. Tab. N 35. 165 For more details, see, for example: Big censorship...

166

M.N. Tukhachevsky and the "military-fascist conspiracy" II. //

Military archives of Russia. Issue.

1. M., 1997. P. 170. 167

Osmachko S.G. Decree. op. P. 136. 168

Petrov Yu.P. Decree. op. pp. 330, 331. 169

RGASPI. F. Ibid. D. 13. L. 138.

170

Klochkov V.F. Decree. op. P. 44. 171

News of the Central Committee of the CPSU,

1990. N 3. P. 198. 172 Kostyrchenko G.V.

Decree. op. P. 159. 173 Nezavisimaya Gazeta.

1999. 9 Sept. P. 16. 174 For more details, see: Nevezhin V.A. Stalin's

table speeches... 175 Dimitrov G.

Decree. op. S. 129. 176

Novikov N.V. Memoirs of a Diplomat: Notes, 1938-1947. M., 1989. S. 37. 177

Kraminov D.F. Decree. op. P. 29. 178

Rubtsov Yu.V. Decree. op. P. 7.

179

Kostyrchenko G.V. Decree. op. P. 158. 180

Zhukov Yu.N. Decree. op. pp. 99-101. 181

Maryamov G.B. Decree. op. P. 11. 182

Kostyrchenko G.V. Decree. op. P. 159. 183

Cited. by: Aroseva O.A., Maksimova V.A. Without makeup. M., 1998. S. 62. 184

Varga E.S. "Open in 25 years" // Political studies (hereinafter - POLIS).

1991. N 2. S. 157.

185

Cited. Quoted from: Censorship in the USSR. Documents 1917-1991 / Comp. A.V. Bloom. Bochum, 2000, p. 325, 186

"The Happiness of Literature". State and writers. 1925-1938 Documentation. M., 1997. Doc. N 86. 187 RGASPI.

F. 17. Op.

163.

D. 1151. L. 70. 188 Zhukov Yu.N. Decree. op. P.

103.

189 Ortenberg D.I. Stalin, Shcherbakov,

Mekhlis and others. M., 1995. S. 37, 38, 66, 67, 96, 98; Ehrenburg I.G. Decree. op. S. 236.

190

Biographical data and information about the activities of L.Z. Mekhlis gleaned from the public

Katsy Yu.V. Rubtsov. 191

Aroseva O.A., Maksimova V.A. Decree. op. P. 48. 192 Ibid.

pp.

5-7, 27-64, 83. 193 Aroseva

O.A., Maksimova V.A. Decree. op. S. 64.

194

Shtemenko M.S. General Staff during the war. Book. 1. M., 1985. S. 17. 195

The history of Soviet political censorship ... S. 68-69. 196

History of Soviet political censorship... S. 72-73. 197 History
of

Soviet political censorship... S. 72. 198 History of Soviet

political censorship... S. 82. 199 GARF. F. 9425. Op. 1.
D.

11. L. 50. 200

History of Soviet political censorship ... S. 69. 201

Censorship in the USSR. Documents 1917-1991. Doc. N

237. 202 Kremlin cinema ... S. 44.
203

Kostyrchenko G.V. Decree. op. P. 161.
204

Gnedin E.A. Decree. op. 380.
205

Party and political work in the Red Army ... Doc. N 7, 112, 114, 130. 206 Op.

Quoted from: Kuznetsov N.G. The day before. Course to victory. M., 1974. S.

242-243. 207 Party and political work in the Red Army ... S. 500, approx. 64.
208

Party and political work in the Red Army ... Doc. N 24. 209 Osmachko

S.G. Decree. op. pp. 137-138. 210

Russian archive: Great Patriotic. T. 13(2-1). Orders of the People's Commissar
rony. M., 1994. Doc. N 18, 19.
211

Frolov D.D. From the history of the Winter War 1939-1940. Soviet prisoners of war, Finnish
propaganda at the front and the mood of the citizens of the USSR during the Winter War. Sat. doc
tov. Petrozavodsk, 1999. S. 41, 42.
212

Skulenko M.I. Decree. op. P. 147.
213

Frolov D.D. Decree. op. pp. 41, 42.
214

Stalin I.V. On the foundations of Leninism // Stalin I.V. Op. T. 6. M., 1947. S. 96.
215

Ibid. P. 153. 216

Ibid. P. 73. 217

XVII Congress of the CPSU (b). January 26 - February 10, 1934 M., 1934.
S. 8, 10. 218

There. P. 12. 219

XVII

Congress of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks. January 26 - February 10,

1934. M., 1934.

S.

14. 220 Ibid. P. 6. 221 RGASPI. F. 558. op. 11.

D. 118. L. 2. 222

News of the Central Committee of the CPSU.

1990. N 1. P. 168. 223 News of the Central Committee of the CPSU. 1990. N 1. S. 168-169; Russia and the West. Formation of foreign policy stereotypes... P. 190.

224

Suvorov V. Cleansing. P. 327. 225

News of the Central Committee of the CPSU. 1990. N

1.

S. 170-172. 226 Nevezhin V.A. Big Kremlin receptions of Stalin (1930s - early 1940s) // Ote honest history. 2005. N 3. S. 65.

227

Lushnikov A.M. Soviet military school in 1921-1941: socio-political aces development milestones. Yaroslavl, 1997. S. 49.

228

Nevezhin V.A. Stalin's table speeches ... S. 44-45. 229 Commander of

the Winged Army. Documentary story about Yakov Alksnis. M., 2002. S. 186-187. 230 Nevezhin V.A. Stalin's table speeches ...

S.

53-55. 231 RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 163. D. 1061. L. 120. 232 Ibid. L. 66.

233

There. Op.3. D. 963. L. 12. 234

Is it true. 1935. May 4.

235

True. 1939. May 8. 236

True. May 4, 1935; News. 1935. May 4. At a banquet for participants of May Day the 1934 parade was attended even more - about 2000 people. (True. 1934. May 4).

237

RGASPI. F. 17. Op.163. D. 1061. L. 1076; D. 1105. L. 101. 238 News.

1935. May 4. 239 True.

1935. May 4. 240

Nevezhin V.A. Stalin's table speeches ... S. 83. 241

In a letter addressed to I.V. Stalin dated April 19, 1935 K.E. Voroshilov reported that 1,076 people were scheduled to graduate from military academies in May, of which 145 people. - from the academies located in Leningrad (RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 163. D. 1061. L. 120).

242

RGASPI. F. 74. Op. 1. D. 160. L. 42. 243

Kalinin M.I. On communist education and military duty. M., 1962. S. 324. 244

Nevezhin V.A. Stalin's drinking speeches ... S. 78. 245

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 163. D. 709. L. 138, 147. 246

There. F. 558. Op. 11. D. 1165. L. 1; F. 71. Op. 10. D. 256. L. 35. 247

There. D. 1166. L. 55. 248

RGASPI. D. 1166. L. 55. 249

Truth. Feb. 14, 1938 250

History of the CPSU(b). Short course. M., 1939. S. 288, 289. 251

Ibid.

P. 317. 252 Ibid.

P.

318. 253 History

of

the CPSU(b). Short course. M., 1939. S. 320. 254 RGASPI.

F.

558. Op. 11. D. 1118. L. 1. 255 History of the

All-

Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks. Short

course. P. 320. 256 Truth.

1938. 9 Sept. 257

The ideological weapon of Bolshevism // Propagandist and agitator of the Red Army. 1938. N 19. S. 1. 258

Documents on the history of the Munich agreement 1937-1939. M., 1979. S. 346-347. 259 I.V.

Stalin about the "Short course of the history of the CPSU (b)". Meeting transcript
research institutes of propagandists of Moscow and Leningrad // Historical archive. 1994. No. 5. S. 4. 260

I.V. Stalin about the "Short course of the history of the CPSU (b)". Meeting transcript
research institutes of propagandists of Moscow and Leningrad // Historical archive. 1994. N 5. S. 13. 261

Ibid. P. 22. 262

XVIII Congress of the All-Union Communist Party (b). March 10-21, 1939 Stenogra
physical report. M., 1939. S. 11-13, 15. 263

Political studies of a Red Army soldier. 1939. N 8. April. P. 25. 264
M.N.

Tukhachevsky and the "military-fascist conspiracy" ... S. 25.

265

RGVA. F. 9. Op. 29. D. 380. L. 217. 266

History of the All-Union Communist Party of

Bolsheviks. Short course. pp. 261-262. 267 The description of the main events at Lake Khasan is given in the book: "At the border clouds are gloomy..." (to the 65th anniversary of the events at Lake Khasan): Analytical materials.

Zhukovsky; M., 2005. 268 Osmachko
S.G.

Decree. op. P. 16. 269 Cited. by: "On
the border ...". S. 176. 270

Osmachko S.G. Decree. op. App. 1. P. 174. 271

Sapozhnikov B.G. Decree. op.
272

"At the border, the clouds go gloomy ...". P. 188.
273

Osmachko S.G. Decree. op. P. 128.
274

Clouds go gloomy on the border ... S. 194-196. 275
Op.

Quoted from: Meltyukhov M.I. Soviet-Polish wars ... S. 279. 276 Truth. Jan
22,

1939 277 RGASPI. F. 88.
Op.

1. D. 782. L. 32. 278 The description of the

armed conflict on the Khalkhin-Gol River is given according to: Afanasyev V.A. Khal Khin-Gol in the
retrospective of the Great War // Patriotic History. 1999. N 5. S. 181-185; Osmachko S.G. Decree. op. 279

Zolotarev V., Iskaykin S. Victory in the Mongolian steppes // Independent military review
nie. 1999. N 34. S. 5.

280

There.

281

Osmachko S.G. Decree. op. P. 129.

282

Party and political work in the Red Army ... Doc. N 153. S. 376-377. 283 Osmachko S.G.

Decree. op. S. 107; App. 10. S. 213. 284 "Winter War": work
on

the mistakes ... S. 335. 285 Osmachko S.G. Decree. op.
P.

126. 286 Osmachko S.G. Decree. op.

pp.

126-127. 287 Osmachko S.G. Decree. op.

S.

115. 288

- Osmachko S.G. Decree. op. pp. 121, 128.
289
- Osmachko S.G. Decree. op. Doc. N 158. S. 381-382.
290
- Ibid. pp. 126, 218. 291
- Sapozhnikov B.G. Decree. op. P. 22.
292
- Osmachko S.G. Decree. op. App. 10. S. 213.
293
- "Winter War": work on the mistakes ... S. 36. 294
- Essays on the history of Russian Soviet journalism. 1933-1945. M., 1968. S. 214, 280, 351, 361, 432.
295
- Marxist historian. 1938. N 1. 296
- Grechukhin P.B. Decree. op. P. 160.
297
- Pavlenko P.A. Rus' // Banner. 1937. N 12. 298
- Zhukov Yu.N. Decree. op. P. 91.
299
- Kostyrchenko G.V. Decree. op. pp. 182-183.
300
- Ibid. P. 180. 301
- History of Soviet political censorship... S. 70-72. 302 Kuznetsov
- N.G. Sharp turns: From the notes of the admiral. M., 1995. P. 46. 303 Lebedev-
- Kumach V. Book of Songs. M., 1938. S. 57-58. 304
- Lebedev-Kumach V. Book of Songs. pp. 51-52.
305
- There. S. 56.
306
- Meltyukhov M.I. Soviet-Polish wars ... S. 279. 307 Truth.
1939. 24 Aug. 308
- News. 1939. 1 Sept. 309
- Propagandist and agitator of the Red Army. 1940. N 3.S.
- 42-43. 310 RGVA. F. 9. Op. 39. D.
70.
- L. 179. 311 Volkogonov D.A. Triumph and Tragedy: A Political Portrait of I.V. Stalin. In 2 books.
Book. 2. Part 1. M., 1989. S. 131-132; Plotnikov N. Decree. op. pp. 54-55.
312
- Vert A. Russia in the war 1941-1945. Issue. 1. M., 1965. S. 67. 313

Vernadsky V.I. Diary 1940. P. 174. 314 Tucker R.

Stalin in power. 1928-1941. History and personality. M., 1997. S. 542-543. 315 OR State. bibl.

them. Saltykov-Shchedrin. F. 1086. Unit. ridge 5. L. 68, 70. 316 The

international situation through the eyes of Leningraders ... Doc. N 1. 317

Nikulin V.V. Decree. op. pp. 5, 6.
318

RGASPI. F. 77. Op. 1. D. 883. L. 56. 319

Kraminov D.F. Decree. op. S. 55.
320

RGALI. F. 1038. Op. 1. D. 2076. L. 43, 48. 321

Simonov K.M. Decree. op. pp. 83-84.
322

OR State. bibl. them. Saltykov-Shchedrin. F. 1086. Unit. ridge 5. L. 68, 70, 71. 323

Literary newspaper. 1990. May 9. 324

Rybkin E.I. Worldview and military history // Military History Journal 1989.
N 3. S. 50.

325

The international situation through the eyes of Leningraders ... S. 4, 8-11.
326

Vernadsky V.I. Diary 1939. P. 38. 327 Censorship
in

the USSR 1917-1991. S. 286, approx. 1. 328

Zelenov M.V. Glavlit in the 20s - 30s // Questions of History. 1997. N 3. S. 33. 329

GARF. F. 9425. Op. 1. D. 11. L. 53, 59. 330

Censorship in the USSR 1917-1991. Doc. N 238. S.

285. 331 Ibid. Doc. No. 242. S.
291. 332

There.

333

Censorship in the USSR 1917-1991. P.

286. 334 Ibid. S. 286.,

approx. 1. 335 Ibid. Doc. N

245. P. 297. 336 Lebedev-Kumach V.I.

Song book. 337 Lebedev-Kumach V.I. Fighting songs and poems. M., 1940. The book was published by the Main Military Publishing House of the People's Commissariat of Defense of the USSR. Put into production on November 28, 1939; Signed for publication January 9, 1940

338

Nevezhin V.A. Offensive war syndrome... S. 61. 339 Prishvin

M.M. Decree. op. pp. 277-278. 340

Simonov K.M. Decree. op. S. 82; Rybkin E.I. Decree. op. S. 50; Leonhard W. The shock of the pact between Hitler and Stalin: Memoirs of contemporaries from the USSR, Western Europe and the USA. L., 1989. C. 60, 62; Orlova R.D. Memories of the past tense M., 1993. S. 233. 341 International situation

through the eyes of Leningraders ... Doc. N 1. 342

Subject to disclosure: USSR - Germany, 1939-1941: Documents and materials. M., 1991. S. 166-167.

343

Ehrenburg I.G. Decree. op. P. 222.

344

Truth. 1940. 2 Aug.

345

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 117. D. 279. L. 121-122. 346

Bordadyn A. Organization of the military economy in Germany // World economy and world politics. 1940. N 8. S. 38-49.

347

To the study of neighboring countries in political studies (Journal articles) // Political studies of the Red Army. 1941. N 7. April. S. 2 (cover).

348

RGALI. F. 1038. Op. 1. D. 2077. L. 69-69v. 349

Sharapov Yu.P. By the start of World War II. (November 10, 1992). L. 3 (Archive of the author). 350

Senyavskaya E.S. Man at War S. 49.

351

Ehrenburg I.G. Decree. op. pp. 223-224.

352

RGALI. F. 618. Op. 2. D. 1101. L. 206, 209. 353

1941. Documentation. T. 2. Doc. N 14P. P. 577.

354

Meltyukhov M.I. Materials of special departments of the NKVD ... S.

307-308. 355 Meltyukhov M.I. Materials of special departments of the

NKVD ... S. 307. 356 1941. Book.

2.

M., 1998. S. 584. 357 Osipov N. Just and unjust wars // Political studies of a Red Army soldier. 1939. N 17. S. 19-27.

358

Osipov N. Decree. op. P. 27.

359

Cited. by: Lenin V.I. Op. Ed. 3rd. T. XXVI. pp. 49-50.

360

Osipov N. Decree. op. P. 27. 361

On

the internal causes of Poland's military defeat // Pravda. 1939. 14 Sept. 362 Documents of foreign

policy. 1939. - T. XXII. In 2 books. - Prince. 2: September - December. - M., 1992. P. 97. 363 Osmachko S.G. Decree. op. pp.

115-116. 364 Golubev A.V. Interwar Europe

through the eyes of Soviet caricature // Europe. 2003.

No. 3(8). S. 168.

365

There. S. 139.

366

Tokarev V. The Polish theme (1939) outside Pravda. Soviet satirical graphics in metropolitan and provincial publications // Polacy i rosjanie - przewycieřanie uprzed zeř. Poles and Russians - overcoming prejudice. Łodzi, 2006. S. 290.

367

Crocodile. 1939. N 25 (September). S. 3. 368

Crocodile. 1939. N 26 (September). 369

Meltyukhov M.I. Soviet-Polish wars ... S. 456-457. According to other sources, the Belorussian and Ukrainian fronts had more than 6,500 guns, about 4,000 tanks and more than 2,000 aircraft (Osmachko S.G. Decree. Op. App. 1. S. 176-177).

370

Osmachko S.G. Decree. op. App. 1. P. 177. 371

Repko S.I. Organization of propaganda activities of the Red Army during the fighting in the autumn of 1939 // Journalism. History and Modernity: Sat. scientific tr. M., 1993. S. 48. 372

Osmachko S.G. Decree. op. S. 47.

373

Meltyukhov M.I. Soviet-Polish wars ... S. 448.

374

Is it true. 1939. Sept. 18; News. 1939. 18 Sept. 375 Documents of

foreign policy. 1939. Book. 2. S. 96. 376 Tucker R. Decree. op. pp.

543-544. 377 Meltyukhov M.I. Soviet-

Polish wars ... S. 449-450. 378 Ibid. P. 115. 379 Meltyukhov M.I. Materials of
of
special departments
of

the NKVD ... S. 308-309. 380 Meltyukhov M.I. Materials of special departments of the

NKVD ... S. 308-309. 381 Osmachko S.G. Decree. op. S. 108.

382

Crocodile. 1939. N 27.

383

Ibid. P. 14. 384

Crocodile. 1939, p. 15.

385

Ibid. P. 6. 386

Crocodile. 1939. S. 5.

387

Ibid. No. 28 (October).

388

There. S. 5.

389

Tokarev V. Decree. op. pp. 294-295.

390

Ibid. 1939. N.27. P. 12. 391

Tokarev V. Decree. op. pp. 290-300.

392

True. 1939. Nov. 1 393

True. 1939. Nov. 19 394

Crocodile. 1939. N 30. P. 13.

395

Meltyukhov M.I. Soviet-Polish wars ... S. 451-453. 396

Meltyukhov M.I. Materials of the special departments of the NKVD ...
S.

309. 397 Censorship in the USSR ... Doc.

N 238. S. 286. 398

Subject to disclosure... Doc. N 78, 79. 399

Is it true. 1939. 3 Nov.

400

Pravda.1939. Nov 3

401

Winter war 1939-1940. Book. 1. S. 126.

402

Winter War 1939-1940. Book. 1. S. 127.

403

Reader on national history (1914-1945). M., 1996. S. 485. 404 Tanner V.

Diplomatic confrontation between the Soviet Union and Finland, 1939-
1940. M., 2003. P. 42.

405

Local wars of the 20th century: the role of the USSR // Patriotic history. 1992. N 4. S. 14.

406

St. George the Victorious. 1994. Sept. (N 17). 407

Baryshnikov V.N. From Cool Peace to Winter War: Finns' Eastern Politics
diy in the 1930s. SPb., 1997. S. 271.

408

Documents of foreign policy. 1939. Book. 2. Doc. N 772. 409

Motherland. 1995. N 12. P. 55.

410

Kilin Yu. Optimism: What did the Finns hope for in 1939? // Motherland. 1995. N 12.S. 51.411

Propagandist and agitator of the Red Army. 1939. N 22. S. 36-37.

412

Rautbard M. Marxist-Leninist principle of peaceful coexistence of the Soviet state and capitalist countries //
Propagandist and agitator of the Red Army. 1939. No. 22. S.

35.

413

Is it true. 1939. 26 Nov.

414

True. 1939. Nov. 27; News. 1939. 27 Nov. 415 Interpretation
of

the events related to the Mainila incident is given on the basis of the following publications: Aleksandrov K.M.
New about the incident in Mainil (Little-known pages of the history of the Soviet-Finnish war of 1939-1940) //
New sentry. 1994.

N 1. S. 24-29; Pharmacist P. "There were no shots" // Motherland. 1995. N 12. S. 53-55; he is. Soviet-Finnish
Wars. M., 2004. S. 59-65; Manninen O. "There were shots" // Motherland.
1995. N 12. S. 56-57.

416

Winter war 1939-1940. Book. 1. S. 135. 417

Manninen O. Decree. op. P. 57. 418

Truth. 1939. 28 Nov. 419

True. 1939. 29 Nov. 420

Is it true. 1939. 30 Nov.

421

Sinitsyn E. The resident testifies. M., 1996. S. 36-37. 422 Voronov N.N.
In

the service of the military. M., 1961. S. 135. 423 According to

other sources, the units of the Red Army, concentrated near the borders with Finland, numbered about 400
thousand people. and were armed with 1915 guns, 1500 tanks and up to 1400 aircraft (including combat aviation
of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet). See: Winter War 1939-1940. Book. 1. S. 151.

424

Osmachko S.G. Decree. op. App. 1. S. 177-178. 425

Soviet-Finnish war 1939-1940. T. 1. St. Petersburg, 2003. P. 499. 426 Ibid. S.
499.

427

On both sides of the Karelian front, 1941-1944: Documents and materials. Petroza Vodsk, 1995.
428 Foreign

Policy of the USSR. Collection of documents. T. IV. M., 1946. Doc. N 381. 429 The

struggle of the Finnish people for their liberation: Collection of materials. 2nd ed. M. - L., 1939. S.
8-20. 430

Stepakov V.N. On the history of one TASS message // Questions of History. 1999. N 4. S. 172-173.
431

Dongarov A.G. The war that might not have happened: On the political and diplomatic history of
the Soviet-Finnish armed conflict of 1939-1940. // Questions of history.
1990. N 5. S. 38; Winter war 1939-1940. Book. 1. S. 177-178.

432

Winter war 1939-1940. Book. 1. S. 177.

433

RGASPI. F. 77. Op. 1. D. 888. L. 1-9.

434

Sinitsyn E. Decree. op. P. 41.

435

Winter war 1939-1940. Book. 1. S. 178.

436

The struggle of the Finnish people ... S. 9, 10,
13,

17. 437 Baryshnikov V.N. Decree. op. S. 270; Dongarov A.G. Decree. op.
P.

39. 438 The struggle of the Finnish

people ... S. 18. 439 Winter war 1939-1940. Book. 1. S. 177; Soviet-Finnish war 1939-1940. Book.
1. S.

306-307. 440 The struggle of the
Finnish people ... S. 18. 441

Winter war 1939-1940. Book. 1. S. 177.

442

Mankov A. Decree. op. P. 181.

443

The struggle of the Finnish people ... S. 12,
18,

21. 444 Vihavainen T. The miracle of the "winter war": a divided nation gains unity // Rodi
on the. 1995. N 12. P.

76.

445 Osmachko S.G. Decree. op. P.

115. 446 Osmachko S.G. Decree. op.
pp.

128, 129. 447 Khorkov A.G. Stormy June: Tragedy and feat of the troops of the border military
districts in the initial period of the Great Patriotic War. M., 1991. S. 82.

448

Voronov N.N. Decree. op. pp. 146-147; Winter war 1939-1940. Book. 1. S. 172. 449

Meltyukhov M.I. Materials of special departments of the NKVD ... S. 311-312.
450

News. 1939. 14 Dec. 451

Meltyukhov M.I. Materials of special departments of the NKVD ... S. 311-312.
452

Tucker R. Decree. op. P. 552.
453

Vernadsky V.I. Diary 1940. P. 174. 454 RGASPI. F.
17.

Op. 117. D. 293. L. 88. 455

Danilov V.D. Bitter victory in the Finnish snowdrifts // Today. 1994. 30 Nov.
456

Winter War 1939-1940 ... Book. 1. S. 134.
457

RGALI. F. 1038. Op. 1. D. 1401. L. 4.40. 458

RGASPI. F. 71. Op. 10. D. 219. L. 14. 459

Nevezhin V.A. Stalin's table speeches ... S. 228-230. 460

Osmachko S.G. Decree. op. P. 108.
461

Meltyukhov M.I. Materials of special departments of the NKVD ... S. 313.
462

Cit. by: Hayrapetyan M.E. Decree. op. 86. 463

Was Stalin preparing an offensive war against Hitler? S. 138. 464 At a combat

post. 1941. June 30. 465 Osmachko

S.G. Decree. op. S. 134.
466

News of the Central Committee of the CPSU. 1990. N 3.S.
194.467

Shilov P. Then there was no fashion to reward // Motherland. 1995. N 12. S. 65. 468

RGALI. F. 1038. Op. 1. D. 2077. L. 46. 469

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 125. D. 71. L. 110. 470

Baranov Yu. Decree. op. P. 116.
471

Cited. Quoted from: "Winter War": work on the mistakes ... S. 5.
472

Lists of participants in the meeting at the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks
on April 14-17,

1940 were published: Ibid. pp. 25-31. 473 Nevezhin V.A. Stalin's table

speeches... S. 171, 172, 178. 474 Rubtsov Yu.V. Decree. op. S. 96.

475

Winter war 1939-1940. Book. 2. S. 275-278; "Winter War": work on the bugs ... S. 31-41. 476 "Winter War":

work on the mistakes ... S. 42-44. 477 "Winter War": work on

the mistakes ... S. 129-132. 478 Ibid. P. 45. 479 "Winter

War": work on

the

mistakes ... S. 36, 37. 480

There. S. 154.

481

There. P. 328. For the text of the report by L. Z. Mekhlis, see: Ibid. pp. 329-343.

482

Rubtsov Yu.V. Decree. op. P. 95.

483

Rubtsov Yu.V. Decree. op. P. 95.

484

Lushnikov A.M. Decree. op. P. 69.

485

Rubtsov Yu.V. Decree. op. P. 96.

486

Rubtsov Yu.V. Decree. op. P. 96.

487

Ibid. P. 97. 488

"Winter War": work on the mistakes ... S. 344-389. 489 Ibid.

13.

490 RGALI.

F.

1038. Op. 1. D. 1401. L. 1-56. 491

Party and political work in the Red Army ... Doc. N 179.

492

Klochkov V.F. Decree. op. P. 43, 57.

493

Burtsev M.I. Decree. op. pp. 24-25.

494

RGASPI. F. 71. Op. 25. D. 4989. L. 1-12. 495

Burtsev M.I. Decree. op. P. 26.

496

RGASPI. F. 77. Op. 1. D. 913. L. 44, 48, 65-66. 497

Zaporozhets A.I. Decree. op. pp. 7-8.

498

Russian Archive: Great Patriotic War. T. 12(1). M., 1993. S. 63. 499 Ibid. S.

132.

500

Azarov I.I. Decree. op. P. 5.

501 Russian Archive: Great Patriotic War. T. 12 (1). pp. 102, 369.

502

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 116. D. 67. L. 61

503

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 117. D. 283. L. 34-89.

504

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 125. D. 57. L. 33, 36.

505

RGASPI. F. 17. L. 11, 12.

506

There. L. 15, 16, 17, 19, 22.

507

There. L. 14, 29.

508

News of the Central Committee of the CPSU.

1990. N 5. S. 191-196. 509 Historical

archive. 1996. N 2. S. 40. 510 RGASPI. F.

17.

Op. 125. D. 28. L.

13-16. 511 Ibid. D. 71. L. 103. 512 RGALI. F. 1038.

Op.

1. D. 2183. L. 91-91 ob., 93. 513 RGASPI.

F.

17. Op. 125. D. 71. L. 103. 514 RGALI. F. 2456. Op. 1. D.

709. L. 10, 95, 146, 169, 203. 515

Zhukov Yu.N. Decree. op. pp. 160-161. 516 Ibid. S. 131.

517

Kostyrchenko G.V. Decree. op. S. 218.

518

Rubtsov Yu.V. Decree. op. P.

98.

519 Ibid. P. 212.

520

Sharapov Yu.P. Lyceum in Sokolniki: Essay on the history of IFLI - Moscow Institute of History, Philosophy and Literature. N.G. Chernyshevsky (1931-1941). M., 1995. S. 122-124. 521 Op. Quoted from:

Censorship in the USSR 1917-1991... 522

Djilas M. The face of totalitarianism. M., 1992. S. 27.

523

Stalin's Politburo in the 30s. Collection of documents. M., 1995. Doc. N 27. 524 RGASPI.

F.

17. Op. 116. D. 43. L. 39; D. 97. L. 12. 525

Sheinis Z.S. Decree. op. S. 107; Ehrenburg I.G. Decree. op. pp. 224-225. 526

Palgunov N.G. Decree. op. P. 231.
527

Ehrenburg I.G. Decree. op. pp. 224-225.
528

Sheinis Z.S. Decree. op. P. 107.
529

The USSR and the German Question. 1941-1949. T. 1. M., 1996. S. 24; Berezhkov V.M. How did I become
Stalin's translator. M., 1993. S. 169.
530

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 116. D. 24. L. 112. 531

Historical archive. 1995. N 5-6. pp. 50, 54. 532

Sheinis Z.S. Decree. op. pp. 106-107; Borev Yu. Staliniada. Riga, 1991. P. 175. 533

Palgunov N.G. Decree. op. P. 228.
534

Kraminov D.F. Decree. op. P. 5.
535

Bolshevik press. 1941. N 11. S. 2. 536 The

Communist Party of the Soviet Union in resolutions ... S. 209. 537 Bolshevik

press. 1941. N 11. S. 2. 538 RGASPI. F. 17.
Op.

117. D. 275. L. 27-28v. 539 Petrov Yu.P. Decree.
op.

P. 310. 540 Lushnikov A.M. Decree.
op.

S. 47. 541

1941 - lessons and conclusions. M., 1992. S. 48.
542

1941 Book. 2. Doc. N 436. 543

Khlevnyuk O.V. Politburo. Mechanisms of political power in the 30s. M., 1996. P. 256. 544 Ivanov R.F.

Stalin

and the Allies: 1941-1945 Smolensk, 2000. P. 123. 545 Bezymensky L. Ten days
in

May // New time. 2001. N 19. P. 35. 546 Zhukov Yu.N. Decree. op. pp.

187-188. 547 Pavlova I.V. Decree. op.
P.

207. 548 Kostyrchenko G.V. Decree.
op.

P. 220. 549 Petrov I. I carried out the

task of Stalin // Motherland. 1992. N 5. S. 32-33. 550

Yakovlev A.S. Purpose of life: memoirs of an aircraft designer. Ed. 6th, add. M., 2000. S. 188. 551 Historical

archive. 1996. N 2. S. 21. 552

Hoffman J. Preparation of the Soviet Union for an offensive war. 1941 // Ote honest history. 1993. N 4.S. 29. 553

Zelenov V.M. Decree. op. P. 33. 554

Kumanev G.A. They say the Stalinist people's commissars. Smolensk, 2005. S. 473. 555

Dimitrov G. Decree. op. pp. 202-203. 556

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 121. D. 94. L. 4. 557

International Literature. 1940. No. 3-4. pp. 289, 345; N 5-6, S. 344-345; N 7-8. pp. 321-322; N 9-10. pp. 274-275; N 11-12. S. 343; 1941. N 1. S. 203; N 2. S. 192-196; N 3. S. 188; N 6. S. 199. 558

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 125. D. 32. L. 89, 107, 112; D. 38. L. 6. 559

RGALI. F. 1038. Op. 1. D. 2076. L. 75. 560

Military History Journal. 1994. N 6. S. 51. 561 RGASPI. F.

17. Op. 3. D. 1025. L. 3. 562 Filippov I.F.

Notes on the "Third Reich". M., 1966. S. 156-157. 563 Filippov I.F. Notes on the

"Third Reich". M., 1966. S. 159. 564 Ibid. pp. 102-103; Documents of

foreign policy. 1940 - June 22, 1941. T. XXIII. In 2 books. Book. 2(2). M., 1998. Doc. N 712.

565

Is it true. 1940. 16 Oct.

566

Filippov I.F. Decree. op. pp. 119-122. 567

Sheinis Z.S. Decree. op. N 1. S. 106. 568

Truth. 1941. March 4. 569

Cit. by: Agapov A.B. Diaries of Joseph Goebbels. Prelude of Barbarossa. M., 2002. P. 160. 570 Documents of

foreign policy. 1940 - June 22, 1941. Book. 2(2). Doc. N 712. 571 Ibid. Doc. 716. 572

Kassil L. Personnel and

roles // Pravda. 1941. March 16. 573

Bagramyan I.Kh. Thus the war began. M., 1971. S. 55. 574

Kraminov D. F. Decree. op. P. 169.
575

Dimitrov G. Decree. op. P. 223.
576

Novikov N.V. Decree. op. S. 79; 1941 Documentation. Book. 2. Doc. N 370. 577
The
foreign policy of the USSR... Vol. IV. Doc. N 503.
578

Levitsky O. Historical examples of the heroism of the Russian infantry // Political studies of Krasnoar
meitz. 1941. No. 7. S. 10-16.
579

Nevezhin V.A. Stalin's drinking speeches ... S. 260. 580

RGALI. F. 1038. Op. 1. D. 2079. L. 31. 581

Truth. 1941. May 1.
582

Ehrenburg I.G. Decree. op. P. 228.
583

RGALI. F. 1038. Op. 1. D. 2079. L. 29. 584

Baranov Yu. Decree. op. pp. 86-87.
585

Ribbentrop I. von. Between London and Moscow: Memoirs and Last Recordings: From His Legacy,
ed. An. von Ribbentrop. M., 1996. S. 180-181, 183.
586

Wert A. Decree. op. P. 75.
587

Subject to disclosure... Doc. N 168. 588

Truth. 1941. May 3.
589

Is it true. 1941. May 6.
590

The content of Stalin's speeches on May 5, 1941 is given according to: 1941. Documentation.
Book. 2. Doc. N

437. 591 Military history magazine. 1995. N 3. S. 40-41.
592

RGASPI. F. 77. Op. 1. D. 913. L. 118. 593

Truth. 1941. May 9; News. 1940. May 9. 594

1941. Documentation. Book. 2. S. 179.
595

RGASPI. F. 558. Op. 1. D. 206. L. 166-166v. 596

Agapov A.B. Decree. op. S. 273.
597

Vishlev O.V. Why did I.V. Stalin in 1941? // New and recent history. 1992.
N 1. S. 96; Gareev M.A. Was the Soviet Union preparing a preemptive attack on Germany in 1941? // War and politics. 1939-1941. M., 1999. S. 277.
598

Zakharov M.V. General Staff in the prewar years. M., 1989. P. 171. 599 Witman
B.

A spy who was betrayed by his homeland. Kazan, 1993. P. 100. 600

Meltyukhov M.I. Stalin's missed chance ... S. 364; he is. Materials of special departments of the NKVD ... S. 314-315. 601

RGASPI F. 77. Op. 1. D. 906. L. 43. 602

Bordyugov G., Bukharaev V. Decree. op. P. 29.
603

RGALI. F. 1038. Op. 1. D. 2183. L. 95v. 604

RGALI. F. 1038. Op. 1. D. 2183. L. 95v. - 96. 605

RGALI. F. 1038. Op. 1. D. 1459. L. 1-4 606
Ibid.

D. 2183. L. 95v. - 96. 607 Ibid. D.

1459. L. 4. 608 1941.

Documentation. Book. 2. S. 216. 609

RGALI. F. 1038. Op. 1. D. 1459. L. 1. 610

Soviet culture in the reconstructive period ... S. 198. 611 RGASPI.
F.

77. Op. 1. D. 895. L. 110-111. 612

The main military council of the Red Army. March 13, 1938 - June 20, 1941: Documents and mothers
aly. M., 2004. S. 309.
613

The main military council of the Red Army. March 13, 1938 - June 20, 1941: Documents and mothers
aly. M., 2004. S. 489.
614
Ibid. S. 309. 615

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 125. D. 27. L. 53. 616
Ibid.

L. 54-69. 617 Ibid.

L.

53. 618 Ibid. L.

26.

619 About

Marxist-Leninist education... 620

About political studies with the Red Army soldiers and junior commanders of the Red Army in 1941 ... The brochure with the text of this directive was signed for publication on January 29, 1941 621

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 125. D. 27. L. 84 622

Ibid. Op. 117. D. 281. L. 17. 623

Petrov Yu.P. Decree. op. P. 327.
624

RTSKHIDNI. F. 17. Op. 117. D. 281. L. 20, 54, 55, 56. 625

RGASPI. 17. Op. 117. D. 281. L. 17, 21, 43. 626

Burtsev M.I. Decree. op. pp. 27-28.
627

Repko S.I. The price of illusions.: Propaganda against the troops and population of the enemy in the first months of the war // Military History Journal. 1992. No. 11. S. 9.
628

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 125. D. 27. L. 54. 629

Ibid. L. 121. 630

Was Stalin preparing an offensive war against Hitler? P. 88. 631 Two

directives of 1941 ... S. 203-206. 632

Third Army: History. People. Exploits. M., 1995. S. 40. 633 Two

Directives... S. 207. 634

Was Stalin preparing an offensive war against Hitler? S. 151. 635

Was Stalin preparing an offensive war against Hitler? S. 164. 636

Party and political work in the Red Army ... S. 433.
637

Vladimirsky A.V. On the Kiev direction: According to the experience of warfare, howl
scams of the 5th Army of the Southwestern Front in June-September 1941. M., 1989. S. 19-20. 203.
638

Burtsev M.I. Decree. op. S. 31.
639

Hoffman J. Decree. op. P. 27.
640

Lobachev A.A. Decree. op. P. 126.
641

Azarov I.I. Decree. op. P. 9.
642

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 125. D. 27. L. 99, 100. 643

Vishlev O.V. Why did Stalin hesitate in 1941? From the German archives // New and newer
shay history. 1992. N 2. S. 89.

644

Hoffman J. Decree. op. P. 28. 645
The

front-line soldiers answered like this! // Military history magazine. 1989. N 5. P. 32. 646

Bakanov I. Lenin-Stalin's teaching about war // Komsomolskaya Pravda. 1941. May 21. 647

Bakanov I. Military issues in the "Short course of the history of the CPSU (b)" // Propagandist and agitator of the Red Army. 1939. N 24. S. 4-9; he is. Marxist-Leninist theory and military affairs // Propagandist and agitator of the Red Army. 1940. N 3. S. 6-12.

648

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 116. D. 61. L. 62 649

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 116. D. 90. L. 1; Op. 117. D. 278. L. 2; Op. 121. D. 117. L. 6-10. 650

News. 1941. June 14. 651

On

the front line. Documents of the Central Archive of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation. 1941-1945 // Historical archive. 1995. N 2. S. 44.

652

Novoplyansky D. 24 hours before the war // Pravda. 1994. June 21. 653

Azarov I.I. Decree. op. P. 11. 654

Kostyrchenko G.V. Decree. op. P. 221.
655

Meltyukhov M.I. Materials of special departments of the NKVD ... S. 316; he is. missed chance Stalin ... S. 365. 656

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 125. D. 44. L. 70, 72, 73. 657

Popel N.K. Decree. op. pp. 21, 22. 658

Bagramyan I.Kh. Decree. op. P. 116.
659

Russian Archive: Great Patriotic War. T. 12(1). S. 60.